a decree for sale entered and the bill to impeach the decree be dismissed. Accordingly, the pleadings, proof, and stipulation were sent to the judge who heard the partition suit, and at the October term, 1915, the court entered a decree. The decree orders that the two cases be consolidated and heard together. It recites the hearing of the partition suit and that the court found in that case the members of the club were the owners, as tenants in common, of all of said Island 45 lying southeast of the north and south half-section line of section 26, which included all of that part of said island lying in the northeast quarter of section 26 and all the island lying in section 25; that their title was obtained by a quitclaim deed March 27, 1895, from M. A. Kamp and wife. This, as we understand it, gave to the members of the club all of the island except about 15 acres in the north or northwest end, and that is what the club members claimed to own. The decrée contains no recitals as to the wrongful or fraudulent entry of the partition decree contrary to the findings and directions of the court, but again finds the ownership of Island 45 to be the same as it is alleged the court found in the partition suit, and decrees a sale of the property by the master in chancery. The decree recites that by consent of the parties the suit to set aside the Clarksville Hunting and Fishing Club owned, then the report of the commissioners appointall of Island 45 except that part west and ed to make partition should be approved and north of the line pointed out to the club members by George Keightley; that they derived their title through the said Keightley and were put in possession thereof by him; that the line separating the club's property from other property was pointed out by said Keightley. The bill alleges the decision of the judge was announced in open court, and the then solicitors of complainants in the partition suit were directed by the court to prepare a decree in accordance with the findings announced by the court, submit the same to the solicitors for the defendants, and afterwards present it to the court for his signature. The bill further alleged that one of the then solicitors for complainants in the partition suit, in disregard of the findings and instructions of the court and with intent to cheat and defraud defendants to said partition suit, prepared and submitted to the court a pretended decree and secured the signature of the judge thereto, which pretended decree was contrary to the proofs heard on the hearing and to the findings of the court and a fraud on the rights and interests of complainants, who were defendants in the partition suit, and a fraud on the court. The bill further alleged the solicitor for complainants in the partition suit did not submit the draft of the decree to the solicitors for defendants in that suit; that neither said defendants nor their solic-partition decree for fraud is dismissed. itors were permitted to see or know what the terms of said pretended decree were, and none of them had any knowledge of what said decree was until after it had been signed by the judge and filed in said court; that said pretended decree recites that the court found that the conveyance by Kamp and wife to the members of the Clarksville Hunting and Fishing Club was intended to convey the south part of Island 45, in section 25, containing 26.34 acres, and the deed was reformed to so read. [1] It is first contended by plaintiffs in error that there was no reference to the master to take the proofs, and that the proofs taken by him and reported to the court should not be considered. Before the amendment to the bill was filed, an order of reference to the master was made to take and report the proofs. When leave was granted to amend the bill, the order of reference was vacated, leave to amend given, and leave to defendants to answer the bill as amended in 10 days, "and cause referred to the master Defendants to the bill to impeach the parti- to take and report the evidence and cause tion decree answered, denying the fraud continued." This order was made October 12, charged in procuring the decree and denying 1910. Two days later the amendment to the complainants were entitled to the relief bill was filed, and in July, 1911, the answer prayed. Thereafter the parties entered into was filed and replication filed to the answer. a stipulation that the only question involved Afterwards the testimony of the witnesses was whether the evidence heard in the par- was heard by the master and reported to the tition suit was competent and sufficient to court. It is the contention of the plaintiffs support the decree in said suit on the ques- in error that the cause was not ready to be tion as to who owns Island 45 and what part referred until issues were joined, and that of said island belonged to complainants and after the amendment to the answer was what part to defendants. It was therefore filed and issue joined by the answer and repagreed that the clerk should send to the lication no order of reference was made, judge, who heard the partition suit, all the that the master had no authority to take the pleadings, exhibits, and evidence heard per-proof, and the court was not authorized to taining to Island 45, taken in the partition consider the evidence taken and reported by suit, and that said judge might at the next him. No such objection appears to have been term render a decision whether the decree made in the court below, but the plaintiffs filed in the partition suit should stand as in error appeared at the taking of the testientered or be modified or set aside; that, if mony by the master, and the decree prepared partition should be entered and the bill to impeach the original decree dismissed; but the parties and the court appear to have so referred to the master to take the proofs and report the same, and that his report was confirmed and approved by the court. All the parties appear to have understood and treat- understood and interpreted the stipulation, ed the cause as having been referred to the master, and his report was heard and considered without objection. Such objection cannot now be interposed. for the decree recites that the bill to impeach the original partition decree is dismissed by consent. To all intents and purposes it appears to have been contemplated by the stipulation that, to avoid the controversy of a trial upon disagreeable charges in the bill to impeach the decree, the parties agreed that controversy might be settled by the court again considering the evidence taken and reported by the master, and, if the original decree was not prepared in accordance with the findings of the court from the proofs, and its directions for the preparation of the decree, that the court might enter another decree in accordance with the proofs and its findings and directions upon the original hearing, instead of rendering a decree in the suit to impeach the partition suit decree. It [2] We are further of opinion the parties were warranted in treating and considering the case as referred to the master, for the reason that the meaning and purpose of the order of October 12th were that upon the filing of the amendment to the bill, and the answer to the bill as amended, the cause was to stand referred to the master to take and report the evidence. That appears to have been the understanding of the court and all the parties and in our opinion was a correct interpretation of the order. The stipulation entered into in the suit to impeach the partition decree recognizes that the testimony in the partition suit was taken and reported seems entirely evident from the decree enby the master and approved by the court. It is true, the stipulation recites that the only question is whether the testimony so taken and reported by the master was competent and sufficient to sustain the decree; but it is further agreed that it shall be taken and reviewed by the court for the purpose of determining whether the decree in the partition suit should stand as entered or be modified or set aside. No objection was ever made to its competency for consideration by the court on the ground that the cause had not been referred to the master, and the objection now made cannot be entertained. 1. JUDGMENT Freese v. Glos, 248 Ill. 280, 93 N. E. 745; 16 Cyc. 438. tered that the court so understood the stipu- THORPE v. HELMER et al. STATUTES. (275 Ill. 86) (No. 10845.) Oct. 24, 1916.) EXTENT 785(2) LIEN The lien of a judgment attaches, not only to actually have in real estate, but to whatever inthe interest which the judgment debtor may terest the records disclose in him, free from the claims of all other persons of which the judgment debtor had no actual or constructive notice. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1359; Dec. Dig. 785 (2).] 847-LIEN-RIGHTS OF AS We have examined the evidence, and in our opinion it clearly supports the finding of the decree brought up for review by this writ of as to the ownership of Island 45. Whether the entry of a decree for partition and the dismissal of the bill filed to impeach the original partition decree were erroneous, 2. JUDGMENT and two or three other minor questions SIGNEE. raised, in the view we take of the case are the equitable right of the judgment creditor, The assignee of a judgment acquires only not proper subjects for discussion in this and is bound by equities existing between the opinion. Evidently, we take it, for the pur- judgment creditor and the judgment debtor, but pose of determining whether the decree for is not affected by any equities which would partition filed by the solicitors for the com- not affect his assignor. plainants in that suit was the decree directed by the court to be prepared and filed, without going into the charges of fraud in preparing and filing said decree, the parties entered into the stipulation which we have referred to and set out in substance. It was agreed in the stipulation that the court who heard the evidence in the partition suit might review that evidence and render a decision confirming, modifying or setting aside the decree. It is not expressly stated that, if the decree was found by the court not to be in accordance with its findings and the directions given for its preparation, another decree for [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. 88 1548-1555; Dec. Dig. 847.] 3. MORTGAGES 173 - PURCHASE-MONEY MORTGAGE PRIORITY PRIOR JUDGMENT LIEN. A mortgage to secure the purchase money over a prior judgment lien against the vendee. of land, though not recorded, takes precedence but this rule does not apply to subsequent judg ments. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 412, 419 424; Dec. Dig. 173.] 4. MORTGAGES 174 BONA FIDE PUR - CHASERS-NOTICE-RECORDS. affecting it as to prior creditors or purchasers, Failure to record a mortgage, though not makes it void as to subsequent purchasers For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes without notice, by reason of section 30 of the Conveyance Act. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 413-416; Dec. Dig. 174.] 5. MORTGAGES 171(4) - PRIORITIES-CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE-RECITAL THAT TRUST DEED SECURES PURCHASE MONEY. The question whether the record of a trust deed, which did not identify the land intended, was constructive notice as to that land was not affected by recital in the trust deed that the notes secured were given for the purchase money. DUNN, J. This is an appeal by Jacob Glos from a decree of partition rendered by the circuit court of Cook county in the case of Frederick A. Thorpe against Joseph W. Helmer and Jacob Glos, finding title in fee in Frederick A. Thorpe and Joseph W. Helmer, awarding partition between them, and finding that Jacob Glos had no interest in the premises except the right to repayment of certain taxes. Glos claims sole ownership in fee of the premises. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, There is one question going to the merits Cent. Dig. 88 397, 402-404; Dec. Dig. which is decisive of the case, and will be 171(4).] the only question considered. The appellant's 6. MORTGAGES 171(4)-RECORD-CONSTRUC- title is derived through a judgment against TIVE NOTICE-SUBSEQUENT NOTICE. Where a recorded trust deed failed to identify the land intended, the fact that the inventory of the estate of the deceased maker thereof, filed more than two years after recovery of a judgment against him, recited that the land was subject to the trust deed was not constructive notice to the judgment creditor. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 397, 402-404; Dec. Dig. §§ 171(4).] 7. VENDOR AND PURCHASER -RECORDS-DEEDS. William G. Waddell and the appellees' through a mortgage from the same person, and the question in the case is, Which has the superior title? The property in controversy is described as lots 4 and 5, in block 16, in the subdivision by John G. Shortall, trustee, of the north half of the northeast quarter of section 26, township 38, north, range 14, east of the third 231(4)-NOTICE principal meridian, situated in the city of Chicago, in the county of Cook, in the state of Illinois. Lyman E. Crandall conveyed these lots by warranty deed dated July 5, 1890, filed for record August 11, 1890, to William G. Waddell. By a trust deed bearing the same date, Waddell conveyed to Henry T. The record of a deed is constructive notice only to parties holding in the same chain of title, and a purchaser is not required to examine every record that might, by some possibility, affect real estate before he can safely take the title. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. § 516; Dec. Dig. Miller property of the same description as 231(4).] 8. VENDOR AND PURCHASER TICE-RECORDS-DEEDS. 231(14)-No When a description in a conveyance in a chain of title is erroneous and the error is apparent on the face of the instrument and of such a character as would lead a purchaser of ordinary prudence to make inquiry as to the land intended to be described, and inquiry would have led him to knowledge of the true condition of the title, he will be held to such knowledge. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. §§ 538, 539; Dec. Dig. 231 (14).] that mentioned in the deed from Crandall to Waddell, except that the lots were stated to be in section 16 instead of 26. This trust deed was given to secure the payment of two notes of the same date, one for $825, the other for $800, payable in one and two years after date, respectively, to the order of William G. Waddell, and contained the statement, "Above notes are given for part purchase money." Waddell died in 1897, leaving a will which disposed of his real estate, but contained no specific description of it. His widow, who was the executrix of the will, included in her inventory of real estate, which was filed on April 21, 1899, the lots by the correct description, reciting that the title was acquired by warranty deed from Lyman E. Crandall dated July 5, 1890, and that they were incumbered by a trust deed to Henry T. Miller, trustee, dated July 5, 1890, for $1,625. On January 4, 1901, a bill was [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Mortgages, filed in the circuit court of Cook county by Cent. Dig. §§ 397, 402-404; Dec. Dig. James B. White and Henry T. Miller, trus171(4).] 9. MORTGAGES 171(4)-CONSTRUCTIVE No TICE-RECORD OF DEFECTIVE INSTRUMENT. The record of a trust deed to lots in a subdivision by one S. in section 16 was not constructive notice that it was intended to convey lots in section 26, although the only subdivision by said S. in the county was in section 26, where there was nothing in the description itself to indicate that there was not a subdivision by S. in section 16, and nothing to indicate that the land intended to be conveyed was in section 26. Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Samuel C. Stough, Judge. Partition by Frederick A. Thorpe against Joseph W. Helmer and others. From a decree, Jacob Glos appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions. John R. O'Connor and Alben F. Bates, both of Chicago, for appellant. Buell & Abbey, of Chicago, for appellee. tee, to foreclose the trust deed, describing deed. A decree of foreclosure was rendere l, the lots as they were described in the trust and later a master's deed was made to Elsie the premises were sold to James B. White, and later a master's deed was made to Elsie White and Mary S. White, who had succeeded to James B. White's interest, he having died. In this deed, as in all the foreclosure proceedings, the description corresponded with the erroneous description in the trust deed. On November 18, 1913, Elsie White entitled. He was not affected by any equities which would not affect his assignor. His rights are the same as if the Chicago Title & Trust Company had purchased the property of William G. Waddell on the date the judgment was rendered and had then conveyed it to appellant. The question is not affected by the fact that the mortgage was given for purchase money. A mortgage to secure the purchase money of land, even though not recorded, takes precedence over a prior judgment lien against the vendee. Roane v. Baker, 120 Ill. 308, 11 N. E. 246. But this rule has no application to a subsequent judgment. The recording law applies only to subsequent and not to prior purchasers, and the failure to record a mortgage, though not affecting it as to prior creditors or purchasers (Elder v. Derby, 98 Ill. 228), by reason of section 30 of the Conveyance Act, made it void as to subsequent purchasers without notice. and Mary S. White by quitclaim deed convey- as the Chicago Title & Trust Company was ed the lots by the correct description to Joseph W. Helmer. On May 4, 1914, he quitclaimed an undivided one-fourth interest in the lots to Frederick A. Thorpe, who filed the bill for partition on July 31, 1914. On October 30, 1896, the Chicago Title & Trust Company, as assignee of George L. Magill, insolvent, recovered a judgment against William G. Waddell in the circuit court of Cook county on two notes indorsed to George L. Magill, for $5,635.78 and costs, on which an execution was issued November 11, 1896, which was returned "no property found." On January 28, 1903, an alias execution was issued on the judgment, which bore an indorsement that the judgment had been assigned to Jacob Glos by the Title Guarantee & Trust Company, assignee of George L. Magill. This writ was returned the next day, and, notice having been given to Elsie Waddell, executrix of the will of William G. Waddell, of the rendition of the judgment, the issuance and return of execution thereon, the assignment of [5-9] The only question remaining is wheththe judgment to Jacob Glos, that the same er the record of the trust deed was conwas a lien upon his real estate and at the ex-structive notice that it was intended to conpiration of three months alias execution vey the lots in section 26. This question is would be issued, a pluries execution was issued July 28, 1903, which was levied on the lots in question. They were sold by the sheriff, and after the expiration of the time of redemption a sheriff's deed was executed to Jacob Glos on December 5, 1904. [1-4] Under our statutes the lien of a judgment attaches, in the absence of actual notice, not only to the interest which the judgment debtor may actually have in real estate, but to whatever interest the records disclose in him, and a purchaser and a judgment creditor having a lien stand upon the same equity. Martin v. Dryden, 1 Gilman, 187; Massey v. Westcott, 40 Ill. 160; Smith v. Willard, 174 Ill. 538, 51 N. E. 835, 66 Am. St. Rep. 313. The judgment of the Chicago Title & Trust Company became a lien on all property appearing of record in William G. Waddell, free from the claims of all other persons of which it had no notice, either actual or constructive. There is no claim that it had actual notice of the trust deed to Henry T. Miller. Its title was therefore not affected by that trust deed unless the record of it was constructive notice that it was intended to convey lots in section 26 instead of section 16. The judgment was not assignable so as to convey the legal title. The assignee of a judgment acquires only the equitable right of the judgment creditor. He is bound by any equities that may exist between the judgment creditor and the judgment debtor. Yarnell v. Brown, 170 Ill. 362, 48 N. E. 909, 62 Am. St. Rep. 380. In this case, however, there were no equities between the Chicago Title & Trust Company and Waddell. Glos, by the assignment of the judgment, became entitled to enforce the lien of it on Waddell's real estate by execution to the same extent not affected by the recital that the notes secured were given for purchase money. If the description of the premises did not identify the property, the fact that the notes were given for purchase money was immaterial, and did not tend to identify the property any more clearly. The recital in the inventory of Waddell's estate did not tend to show constructive notice, for that inventory was not filed until more than two years after the recovery of the judgment by the Chicago Title & Trust Company. The record of a deed is constructive notice only to parties holding in the same chain of title, and a purchaser is not required to examine every record that might, by some possibility, affect real estate before he can safely take the title. Rohde v. Rohn, 232 Ill. 180, 83 N. E. 465; Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Wright, 153 Ill. 307, 38 N. E. 1062. When a description in a conveyance in a chain of title is erroneous and the error is apparent on the face of the instrument and of such a character as would lead a purchaser of ordinary prudence to make inquiry as to the land intended to be described, and inquiry would have led him to knowledge of the true condition of the title, he will be held to such knowledge. Morrison v. Miles, 270 Ill. 41, 110 N. E. 410; Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Dayton, 116 Ill. 257, 4 N. E. 492; Bent v. Coleman, 89 Ill. 364. In this case, however, there was no error apparent on the face of the trust deed-nothing to lead to inquiry. The property was described as in the subdivision by John G. Shortall, trustee, of the north half of the northeast quarter of section 16. The proof shows that there is only one subdivision in Cook county by John G. Shortall, trustee, and that it is in section 26, but there is neither allegation nor proof that the Chicago Title & I Trust Company knew that fact. In any event, it was not required to look for the record of title to a lot of land in section 16. The record of an instrument affecting the title to land is constructive notice only so far as the land is correctly described, unless it is apparent from the record itself that there is a misdescription. Slocum v. O'Day, 174 Ill. 215, 51 N. E. 243; Harms v. Coryell, 177 Ill. 496, 53 N. E. 87. There is nothing in the description to indicate that there was not a subdivision by John G. Shortall, trustee, in section 16, and nothing to indicate that the land intended to be conveyed was in section 26. The decree will be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (275 Ill. 70) COOKE, J. The county collector made application in the county court of Edgar county for judgment and order of sale against the property of Walter L. Ross, receiver of the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Company, defendant in error, for delinquent taxes of 1914. It was admitted that the collector had made a prima facie case, and the cause was submitted to the court upon stipulation as to the facts. The taxes objected to were the hard road taxes for the town of Ross. On July 24, 1913, a petition signed by freeholders and addressed to the supervisor of the town of Ross was presented to the highway commissioners of that town for "a special election for the purpose of voting for or against levying a special tax at the rate of one dollar on each $100 of the assessed valuation of all the taxable property, including railroads, in said town, for each year for a period of five years, beginning in 1914, to be used in PEOPLE ex rel. VANCE, County Collector, V. the construction and maintenance of gravel, ROSS. (No. 10791.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Oct. 24, 1916.) 1. HIGHWAYS 121-LEVY OF TAX-AU THORITY. The power and authority to levy a hard road tax is not inherent in the voters of a town-held ship, but is granted by act of the Legislature, and must be strictly construed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 379; Dec. Dig. 121.] 2. HIGHWAYS 127(1) - LEVY OF TAXES STATUTE-CONSTRUCTION. Under Road and Bridge Act of 1913 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 121) § 108, providing for a petition for a vote to be taken at the next annual town meeting for or against an annual tax for hard roads, and further providing for a special election, and section 110, requiring the road commissioners to levy an annual tax in accordance with the vote if in favor thereof, there is no authority to impose a special tax to begin in the future; and, the evident purpose of a special election being to provide an opportunity to vote when the petition has been presented too late for the annual election; a special election in August 1913, to submit the proposition of levying a special tax beginning with the year 1914, was unnecessary, and, the proposition submitted to the voters not being such as was authorized by the statute, the tax levied thereunder is invalid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 384; Dec. Dig. 127(1).] rock, macadam and other hard roads" described in the petition. The commissioners considered the petition, and determined to call a special election. After various steps had been taken, notices of an election to be held on August 23, 1913, "for or against levying a tax at the rate of one dollar * * * for each year for a period of five (5) years, beginning in 1914, to be used in the construction and maintenance of gravel, rock, macadam, or other hard roads" therein described, were posted. Numerous objections were filed to the tax. The proceedings were had immediately after the present road and bridge act became effective, and the steps taken in the matter of presenting the petition, acting upon it and the holding of an election were evidently designed to comply both with the new act and the one which it had superseded. Among the objections to the tax were three to the effect that the tax was invalid because the proposition voted upon at the special election was for the levying of a tax for the year 1914 and for four succeeding years, and not for the levying of a tax for the current year and four succeeding years, it being contended that the statute does not warrant or authorError to Edgar County Court; Dan V. ize the taking of a vote upon the proposition Dayton, Judge. Application by the People, on the relation of Archie N. Vance, County Collector, for a judgment and order of sale against the property of Walter L. Ross, Receiver of the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. W. H. Hickman, State's Atty., and F. C. Van Sellar, both of Paris, for plaintiff in error. C. E. Pope and H. F. Driemeyer, both of East St. Louis (Charles A. Schmettan, of Toledo, Ohio, of counsel), for defendant in error. of levying a hard road tax to commence in any year except the year in which the election is held. [1-2] The right to levy a hard road tax is not inherent in the voters of a township. The power and authority to levy such a tax is granted by act of the Legislature, and this power must be strictly construed. The only power conferred upon the voters of a town to impose a tax for hard roads is found in the Road and Bridge Act of 1913. By section 108 of that act it is provided that on petition of a certain per cent. of the landowners who are legal voters of the town, ad |