(41 Sup.Ct.) $500 (209 S. W. 432), and defendant brings certiorari. Reversed. Mr. T. J. Beall, of El Paso, Tex., for pe titioner. Mr. Rufus B. Daniel, of El Paso, Tex., for respondents. was lost lay wholly within the state of Texas. Compare Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. V. Sabine Tramway Co., 227 U. S. 111, 33 Sup. Ct. 229, 57 L. Ed. 442. And the Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), under which carriers may limit liability by published tariff, applies to the bag Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opin- gage of a passenger carried in interstate ion of the Court. commerce (Boston & Maine Railroad Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526, 58 L. Ed. 368, L. R. A. 1915B, 450, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593), although it does not deal with liability for personal injuries suffered by the passenger (Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, 39 Sup. Ct. 108, 63 L. Ed. 294). The subsequent legislation, the Cummins Amendment (Act March 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196), as amended by the Act of August 9, 1916, c. 301, 39 Stat. 441 (Comp. St. §§ 8592, 8604a), has not altered the rule regarding liability for baggage. On March 14, 1917, Mrs. Woodbury took the Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio *358 Railway at San Antonio, *Tex., for El Paso, Tex., and checked her trunk, which she took with her. It was lost and she sued the company in a state district court for the value of trunk and contents, which the jury found to be $500. Mrs. Woodbury was traveling on a coupon ticket purchased at Timmins, Ontario, from a Canadian railroad, entitling her to travel over it and connecting lines, from Timmins to El Paso and return, apparently with stop-over privileges. When the trunk [2] But counsel for Mrs. Woodbury inwas lost she was on her journey out. She sists that solely because her journey originatwas not told, when she purchased her ticketed in Canada the provisions of the Act to or when she checked her trunk, that there Regulate Commerce do not apply. The conwas any limitation upon the amount of the tention is that section 1 of the act of 1887 carrier's liability. It did not appear wheth- does not apply to the transportation of paser the ticket purchased contained notice of sengers from a foreign country to a point any such limitation, nor did it appear what in the United States. To this there are two was the law of Canada in this respect. The answers. The first is that the transportation company insisted that Mrs. Woodbury was here in question is not that of a passenger, on an interstate journey, and that under the but of property. Boston & Maine RailAct to Regulate Commerce (Act Feb. 4, 1887, road Co. v. Hooker, supra. The second is c. 104, 24 Stat. 379, as amended [Comp. St. that the act does apply to the transportation § 8563 et seq.]), it was not liable for more than $100, since it had duly filed with the of both passengers and property from an Interstate Commerce Commission and pub- adjacent foreign country, such as Canada. lished a tariff limiting liability to that Section 1 declares that the act applies to * engaged in amount unless the passenger declared a high- "any common carrier er value and paid excess charges, which Mrs. the transportation of passengers or property Woodbury had not done. She insisted that from any place in the United States her transportation was not subject to the to an adjacent foreign country." A carrier Act to Regulate Commerce, because it be- engaged in transportation by rail to an adgan in a foreign country, and that the lia- jacent foreign country is, at least ordinarily, bility was governed by the law of Canada, engaged in transportation also from that which should, in the absence of evidence, country to the United States. The test of the be assumed to be like the law of Texas, the application of the act is not the direction of forum, and that by the law of Texas the limitation of liability was invalid. The trial court held that she was entitled to recover only $100, and entered judgment for that amount. This judgment was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, which entered judgment for Mrs. Woodbury in the sum of $500. 209 S. W. 432. The case came here on writ of certiorari. 250 U. S. 637, 39 Sup. Ct. 493, 63 L. Ed. 1183. The only question before us is the amount of damages recoverable. [1] If Mrs. Woodbury's journey had started *359 in New York, *instead of across the border in Canada, the provision in the published tariff would clearly have limited the liability of the carrier to $100; for her journey would have been interstate, although the particular stage of it on which the trunk * *360 * the movement, but *the nature of the transpor- placed upon the act by the Interstate Com- On Certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. bankruptcy Involuntary proceeding in against the Northern Fire & Marine Insurance Company, in which John Vallely was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. Adjudication was vacated on application by the company, and the trustee filed petition to revise the order in matter of law in the Cir Jeals specifically with the transportation of property to or from foreign countries; but cases arising under that clause are not applicable here. That clause applies where the foreign country is not adjacent to the United States. The cases which hold that the act does not govern shipments from a foreign country in bond through the United States to another place in a foreign country, whether adjacent or not, are also not in point. Compare United States v. Philadel-cuit Court of Appeals, which certified quesphia & Reading Ry. Co. (D. C.) 188 Fed. 484; In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 52 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 671, 726-729; M. Canales v. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co., 37 Interst. Com. Com'n R. 573. tions to the Supreme Court. Questions answered, to sustain the order vacating the adjudication. *349 *Mr. Rome G. Brown, of Minneapolis, Minn., for Vallely. *351 *Mr. N. C. Young, of Fargo, N. D., for In Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court. Since the transportation here in question was subject to the Act to Regulate Com-surance Co. merce, both carrier and passenger were bound by the provisions of the published tariffs. As these limited the recovery for baggage carried to $100, in the absence of a declaration of higher value and the payment of an excess charge, and as no such declaration was made and excess charge paid, that sum only was recoverable. Reversed. (254 U. S. 348) The Insurance Company was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt May 3, 1917, upon petition of its creditors. The petition averred the corporate capacity of the company under the laws of North Dakota, and that it had been "engaged in the business of insuring property against loss by fire, hail," etc. Pro VALLELY v. NORTHERN FIRE & MARINE cess was duly issued and served, and the INS. CO. company making default, an order of adjudication was entered against it. No ap (Submitted Nov. 17, 1920. Decided Dec. 13, peal was taken from the order. The admin 1920.) No. 96. istration of the estate proceeded in due course, claims presented, assets collected and reduced to money, payments made to pro 40-Acts beyond delegated au- tect equities, and suits brought by the trustee 1. Courts thority are void. in his official capacity. In the matters of the Though an erroneous judgment by a court estate the trustee frequently conferred with is not void, but so long as it stands is binding the president and secretary of the bankrupt on every one, an act by a court beyond the and received from them co-operation, assistpower delegated to it is a nullity, even priorance and information without question of the to reversal. 2. Bankruptcy ~72(1)-Involuntary adjudication of insurance company is void. Under Bankruptcy Act, § 4b, as amended by Act June 25, 1910, §§ 3, 4 (Comp. St. § 9588), providing that any moneyed business, or commercial corporation, except certain specified corporations, including insurance companies, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt, there is no power in the District Court to adjudge an insurance corporation a bankrupt, so that such adjudication is void and may be set aside on application by the insurance company, which defaulted before the adjudication, even though its motion was made after the expiration of the time to appeal from the adjudication. 3. Bankruptcy 440-Petition to revise proper remedy for review of order vacating adju dication. validity of the adjudication. Considerable moneys were paid out and expenses incurred by the trustee. After the above course of administration, and on December 18, 1917, the company by its attorneys filed a motion in the District Court to vacate the adjudication as null and void, and to dismiss the proceedings, upon the ground that it appeared that the company *352 was an insurance corporation and that the court was, therefore, without jurisdiction. The motion was sustained and an order entered vacating the adjudication and dismissing the petition of the creditors on authority of section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act as amended by the Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 839 [Comp. St. § 9588]), which provides that A petition to revise a matter of law under Bankruptcy Act, § 24b (Comp. St. § 9608), is the proper remedy to review an order of an "Any moneyed, business, or commercial corinferior court of bankruptcy, vacating an ad- poration, except a municipal, railroad, insurjudication and dismissing the bankruptcy pro-ance, or banking corporation may be ceeding for want of jurisdiction. adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (41 Sup.Ct.) The trustee filed a petition to revise the order of the District Court in a matter of law in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the latter court certifies that it is indispensable to the determination of the case, and to the end that the court may properly discharge its duty, desires instruction upon the following questions: or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to "reached a wrong conclusion, the judgment the provisions and entitled to the benefits of is not void, it is merely error to be correctthis act." ed on appeal or by motion to vacate, timely made, but as long as it stands it is binding on every one." There is plausibility in the propositions taken in their generality, but there are opposing ones. Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are *not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 7 L. Ed. 164; Old Wayne Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236, 51 "1. Is a petition to revise in matter of law under section 24b of the Bankruptcy Act the proper remedy to review an order of an inferior court of bankruptcy vacating an adjudication and dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding for want of jurisdiction upon the motion of the bankrupt after the expiration of the time | L. Ed. 345. for appeal, he having neither contested the involuntary petition against him nor appealing from the adjudication? "2. Where it appears from the averments of a petition in involuntary bankruptcy that the person proceeded against is an insurance corporation and therefore within the exceptions of section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 839), is there such an absence of jurisdiction in the court of bankruptcy that its adjudication, rendered upon due service of process and default, and not appealed from, should be vacated and the proceeding be dismissed upon the motion of the bankrupt after the time for appeal has expired? *353 "3. Where an insurance corporation adjudged bankrupt in an involuntary proceeding after the passage of the amendatory Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 839), upon due service of process and default, does not appeal from the adjudication, but acquiesces therein and aids the trustee in the performance of his duties in administering the estate, may it be estopped from thereafter questioning the validity of the adjudication and the power of the court and the trustee to proceed?" [1] Of the construction of the statute there can be no controversy; what answer shall be made to the questions turns on other considerations, turns on the effect of the conduct of the company as an estoppel. That it has such effect is contended by the trustee, and there is an express concession that if objection had been made the company would have been entitled to a dismissal of the petition. It is, however, insisted that it is settled "that an erroneous adjudication against an exempt corporation, whether made by default or upon a contest or trial before the bank *354 Which of the propositions shall prevail in a given case cannot be dogmatically asserted, and cases of their consideration and application can be cited against each other. There is such citation in the pending case. Plaintiff in error cites, among others, McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 6 L. Ed. 300; Des Moines Navigation Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 8 Sup. Ct. 217, 31 L. Ed. 202; First National Bank v. Klug, 186 U. S. 202, 22 Sup. Ct. 899, 46 L. Ed. 1127. McCormick v. Sullivant involved the effect of diversity of citizenship, and it was decided that an absence of its allegation did not impeach the judgment rendered in the case and preclude its being conclusive upon the parties. And it was said (as it has often been said) that the courts of the United States are "of limited jurisdiction, but not inferior courts, in the technical sense of those words, whose judgments taken alone, are to be disregarded. If the jurisdiction be not alleged in the proceedings, their judgments and decrees are erroneous, and may, upon writ of error, or appeal, be reversed for that cause. But they are not absolute nullities." In Des Moines Navigation Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 8 Sup. Ct. 217, 31 L. Ed. 202, there came up to be considered also the effect of a prior adjudication as dependent upon an allegation of diversity of citizenship, and the ruling in McCormack v. Sullivant was affirmed. The immediate comment on these cases is that the courts had jurisdiction of their subject-matter and necessarily power to pass ruptcy court, can be attacked only by appeal, upon the fact (diversity of citizenship) upon writ of error, or prompt motion to vacate," which that jurisdiction depended in the givand that section 4 does not relate to the juen case. The subject-matter of the suit was risdiction of the court over the subject-mat-not withheld from them by explicit provision ter. "It does not, therefore," is the further of the law which was their sole warrant of contention, "create or limit jurisdiction of the court with respect to its power to consider and pass upon the merits of the petition," and that "the valid exercise of jurisdiction does not depend upon the correctness of the decision." And again, if the court in the exercise of its jurisdictional power, power. First National Bank v. Klug is nearer to *355 the question in the case at bar. It was a case in bankruptcy. The Act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat. 544), provided that "any natural person, except a wage-earner or a person engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage | court to extend the act to corporations of eiof the soil" might "be adjudged an invol- ther kind is to enact a law, not to execute untary bankrupt upon default or an impar- one. tial trial" and should "be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits" of the act. [3] The first question concerns procedureonly, and should be answered in the affirmative. First National Bank v. Klug, supra; Matter of Loving, 224 U. S. 183, 32 Sup. Ct. 446, 56 L. Ed. 725. The second and third questions concern themerits and are respectively answered in theaffirmative and negative. So ordered. A petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed against Klug and a trial was had upon the issue, whether he was "engaged chiefly in farming" within the meaning of the act, and the jury having found accordingly, the District Court entered a judgment dismissing the petition. The question of the jurisdiction was certified to this court and it was held that the "District Court had and exercised jurisdiction." This further was said: "The conclusion was, it is true, that Klug (Argued Oct. 13, 1920. Decided Dec. 13, 1920.) could not be adjudged a bankrupt, but the court had jurisdiction to so determine, and its jurisdiction over the subject-matter was not and could not be questioned"-citing Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 15, 25, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. Ed. 405; Smith v. McKay, 161 U. S. 355, 16 Sup. Ct. 490, 40 L. Ed. 731. (254 U. S. 300)WALLS, Atty. Gen. of Wyoming, et al. v. MIDLAND CARBON CO. et al. No. 219. I. Constitutional law 212-Conservation by state of natural resources within prescribed limits not discrimination. It is within the police power of the state to regulate the use of natural resources, so as not to conflict with the rights of others, so that the fact that such regulation applies only to specified limits does not establish discrimi nation between users. 2. Mines and minerals 86-States may regu late use of gas from natural wells. [2] It will be observed, therefore, that the act of 1898, made jurisdiction depend upon an inquiry of fact and necessarily jurisdiction was conferred to make the inquiry, and pronounce judgment according to its result. The case, therefore, is not pertinent to, or authority upon, the case at bar. The Act Natural gas, which has the property of cirof June 25, 1910, which covers the present culating of its own accord underneath the surproceeding is peremptory in its prohibition. face, is not to be treated in law the same asIt excludes, by section 4, insurance corpo- other minerals fixed in place, to which the ownrations from the benefits of voluntary bank-er of the land has full right, but the state can ruptcy, and by subdivision "b" prohibits them from being adjudged involuntary bankrupts. The effect of these provisions is that there is no statute of bankruptcy as to the excepted corporations, and necessarily there is no power in the District Court to include them. In regulate the use of gas drawn from such wells under its police power, to preserve the natural resources. 3. Mines and minerals 86-Prevention of use of natural gas for carbon is within state's police power. The enactment of Laws Wyo. 1919, c. 125, other words, the policy of the law is to leave prohibiting the use of natural gas for the manthe relation and remedies of "municipal, rail-ufacture of carbon or other products, without *356 using the heat generated thereby for other industrial or domestic purposes, which use was shown to require large volumes of gas for a small quantity of carbon, is within the police power of the state, to prevent waste of natural resources. 4. Mines and minerals 86 Comparative value of uses of natural gas is question for state. road, insurance, or banking" corporations to their creditors and their creditors to them, to other provisions of law. It is easy to see in what disorder a different policy would result. We may use for illustration a municipal corporation. Its creditors may be enterprising, its officers acquiescent or indifferent. Can, therefore, the allegations of the former and the default of the latter confer jurisdiction on the District Court to entertain a petition in bankruptcy against the corporation and render a decree therein, and, if not, why not? If consent can confirm jurisdiction, why not initially confer jurisdic-gas for manufacturing carbon, even though it tion? It is not necessary to point out the disorder that would hence result and the difficulties that the officers of a bankrupt court would encounter in such situation. The legislative power thought care against the possibility of it was necessary, and in that care associated insurance corporations. For a The question of the relative value of the use of natural gas for the production of carbon and for industrial and domestic purposes is its police power, to conserve its natural reone for the state to decide, in the exercise of sources, and it can prohibit the use of such appears that the value of the carbon exceeds the value of the gas for fuel. 5. Constitutional law 225(1)-Preventing waste of natural gas within 10 miles of town not discrimination. The provision of Laws Wyo. 1919, c. 125, restricting the use of natural gas for carbon For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (41 Sup.Ct.) burning only in case of gas produced within 10 of natural gas." The first section is as folmiles of an incorporated town or industrial lows: plant, does not make that statute invalid as a discrimination between carbon manufacturers within its terms and those situated farther from towns. 6. Constitutional law 42-Producer cannot object that state has not exercised full powers of conservation. A producer of natural gas cannot object to a statute restricting the use of natural gas, on the ground that the statute does not exercise the full powers of the state for the conservation of such resource. 7. Mines and minerals 86-Act held to require only practicable utilization of heat from natural gas. "The use, consumption or burning of natural gas taken or drawn from any natural gas well or wells, or borings from which natural gas is produced for the products where such natural gas is burned, consumed or otherwise wasted without the heat therein contained being fully and actually applied and utilized for other manufacturing purposes or domestic purposes is hereby declared to be a wasteful and extravagant use of natural gas and shall be unlawful when such gas well or source of supply is located within ten miles of any incorporated town or industrial plant." ⚫310 Section 2 prohibits the use, sale, or other Laws Wyo. 1919, c. 125, prohibiting con- distribution of natural gas, the product of sumption of natural gas for its products, without the heat therein contained being fully and any well owned, leased, or managed by any actually utilized for other manufacturing or do- person for the purpose of manufacturing or mestic purposes, requires only that the heat producing carbon or other resultant prodshall be utilized to its fullest practical and pos- ucts from the burning or consumption of sible uses as in other fuel by the existing in- such gas, without the heat therein being ful strumentalities, so that the statute is not in-ly and actually utilized for other manufacvalid as requiring a use of the heat which is turing purposes or domestic purposes. impossible, since no instrumentalities are capa- lations are made misdemeanors. ble of utilizing the full heat value of the gas. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the ed States for the District of Wyoming. Vio The grounds of contention against the act are set forth in very voluminous pleadings, supplemented by a number of affidavits. But Unit-only a brief summary of them is necessary to Suit by the Midland Carbon Company and another against William L. Walls, Attorney General of the State of Wyoming, and others, to restrain defendants from enforcing or attempting to enforce a statute of the state of Wyoming. From a decree granting an interlocutory injunction, defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded. ⚫301 present the question involved, which is, stated broadly, that the act transcends the police power of the state, its purpose and effect being not to regulate and conserve natural gas, but to prohibit its use, and make a discrimination between owners having equal rights, and thereby violates article 1, § 10, of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment thereof. Prior to the enactment of the statute, the Midland Company had erected a factory for *Mr. Henry E. Lutz, of Denver, Colo., for the manufacture of carbon black, which facappellants. tory is located about 11⁄2 miles from the town of Cowley, Big Horn county, at an expendi Messrs. John W. Lacey, of Cheyenne, Wyo., and Reid L. Carr, of New York City, for ap-ture of $375,000. It is equipped for the manpellees. *309 ufacture of such carbon black, and can be used for no other purpose, and there is pro *Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opin- duced from it approximately 13,000 pounds ion of the Court. The complainants are corporations of Delaware and have their places of business in that state. The defendants are officers of Wyoming, being respectively, its Attorney General, prosecuting officer of Big Horn county, and the Governor of the state. It is alleged that jurisdiction of the District Court depends upon diversity of citizenship and the Constitution of the United States; the Constitution being violated by an act of the Legislature of the state. Chapter 125 of the Session Laws of 1919. The object of the suit is to restrain defendants, and each of them, from enforcing or attempting to enforce the legislation. of that article daily, which is sufficient for the manufacture of 117,000 pounds of printing ink. From the gas consumed to make the carbon black, there is first extracted approximately 1,600 gallons per day of high-gravity gasoline. The uses of carbon black are enumerated, and it is alleged that no form of it possessing the same properties and the wide variety of uses can be commercially manufactured from any material or substance other than natural gas. The origin of the industry and the uses of its product are variously detailed, and it is *311 alleged that the company's *factory is so conducted as to permit no waste, that the best It is declared by the act, which is at- known processes and appliances are emtacked, that its purpose is "the conservation ployed, and that the operation of the gasoline For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |