(41 Sup. Ct.) *566 their several cases, denied that the funds | held for, by, on account of, or on behalf of, or were held for the benefit of an enemy, and for the benefit of an enemy or ally of enemy not holding a license granted by the President hereunder, which the President after investigation shall determine is so owing or so belongs or is so held, shall be conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian." set up the trust under which they held *them as required by the laws of Massachusetts or Connecticut for the security of American policyholders and creditors, with reasons for their right to retain the funds alleged in detail. The libellant moved for decrees for possession upon the pleadings which were granted by the District Court. The decrees were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, 265 Fed. 477; Garvan v. $6,000 Bonds, 481. As the decision of the latter Court is not made final by the statute the cases have been brought on writ of error to this Court. We are to take it therefore that the President has "so required," and that a case is made out under section 17 unless we are to consider the defences interposed. gation" additionally points to the intent to make his act decisive upon the point, as it is in other cases mentioned in section 7 (a). But it is said that the subject of the section is enemy property only and therefore that the determination cannot be final in its effect. Day v. Micou, 18 Wall. 156, 21 L. Ed. 860. And it is true that it is not final against the claimant's rights. Upon surrender the claimant may at once file a claim under section 9 (section 31151⁄2e), if he satisfies the repre [3] If we look no further than section 7 (c), it is plain that obedience to the statute requires an immediate transfer in any case within its terms without awaiting a resort to the Courts. The occasion of the duty is a de[1] As is obvious from the statement of mand after a determination by the President the pleadings the libels are brought upon the and it is hard to give much meaning to the theory that these are purely possessory ac- words "which the President after investigations and that for the purposes of immediate tion shall determine is so • held" unpossession the determination of the Enemy less the determination and demand call the Property Custodian is conclusive, whether | duty into being. The condition "after investiright or wrong. The claimants on the other hand set up substantive rights and seek to have it decided in these suits whether the funds are enemy property in fact and whether they have not the right to detain them. Strictly possessory actions still survive in the laws of some States and have been upheld, leaving the party claiming title to a subsequent suit. Grant Timber & Manufac- | turing Co. v. Gray, 236 U. S. 133, 35 Sup. Ct. 279, 59 L. Ed. 501. There can be no doubt that Congress has power to provide for an immediate seizure in war times of property supposed to belong to the enemy, as it could provide for an attachment or distraint, if adequate provision is made for a return in case of mistake. As it can authorize a seizure in pais it can authorize one through the help of a Court. The only questions are whether it has done so as supposed by the libellant and if so whether the conditions imposed by the Act have been performed. [2] If the Custodian was entitled to demand the delivery of the property in question it does not seem to need argument to show that the demand could be enforced by the District Courts under section 17 of the Act, giving to those Courts jurisdiction to *567 make all such orders and decrees as may be necessary and proper to enforce the provisions of the Act. The first question then is whether the Custodian had the right to make the demand. By section 5 (section 31152c) the President may exercise any power or authority conferred by the Act through such officers as he may direct. It is admitted that he has exercised the powers material to these cases through the Enemy Property Custodian and by the Act of November 4, 1918, 201, 40 Stat. 1020, the Custodian is given the right to seize. By section 7 (c) section 31151⁄2d-as originally enacted: "If the President shall so require, any money or other property owing or belonging to or *568 sentative of the President may obtain a return, and, if he does not obtain it in sixty days after filing his application, or forthwith if he has given the required notice but filed no application to the President, may bring a Court, in which case the property is to be suit to establish his rights in the District retained by the Custodian until final decree. These provisions explain the initial words of section 7 (c) as saving the ultimate rights of the claimant while the determination of the President still may be given effect to carry out an immediate seizure for the security of the Government until the final decision upon the right. The reservation implies that mistakes may be made and assumes that the transfer will take place whether right or wrong. The argument on the original words of the Act in view of the manifest purpose seems to us to be strong, but it appears to us to be much strengthened by the amendments of later date. By the Act of November 4, 1918, c. 201, 40 Stat. 1020, section 7 (c), was amended among other things by adding after the requirements of transfer "or the same may be seized by the Alien Property Custodian; and all property thus acquired shall be held, administered and disposed of as elsewhere provided in this Act." This shows clearly enough the peremptory character of this first step. It cannot be supposed that a resort to the Courts is to be less immediately effective than a taking with the strong hand. Clinkenbeard v. United | Act of March 28, 1918, c. 28, 40 Stat. 459, States, 21 Wall. 65, 22 L. Ed. 477, has no 460 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 3115%1⁄2ff), application. That was debt on a bond for enlarging section 12, the Custodian "shall be a tax and turned on the right of the Govern-vested with all of the powers of a common-law ment to the tax, not on possession. By a trustee in respect of all property, other than later paragraph "the sole relief and remedy money, which has been or shall be, or which of any person having any claim to any has been or shall be required to be, conveyed," * property" transferred to the Custo- etc., to him, and is given the power to sell dian "or required so to be, or seized by him and manage the same as though he were shall be that provided by the terms of this absolute owner. All this may be conceded if Act." The natural interpretation of this no claim is filed. But this act did not reclause is that it refers to the remedies ex- peal section 9, which is amended by the lapressly provided, in this case by section 9; ter Acts of July 11, 1919, c. 6, 41 Stat. 35, that property required to be transferred and and of June 5, 1920, c. 241, 41 Stat. 977, and property seized stand on the same footing, as we have said, provides for immediate claim and suit and requires the property in cases of suit to be retained in the custody of the Alien Property Custodian or in the Treasury of the United States to abide the result. The present proceeding gives nothing but the preliminary custody such as would have been gained by seizure. It attaches the property to make sure that it is forthcoming if finally condemned and does no more. Decrees affirmed. *569 not that the resort by the Custodian *to the Courts instead of to force opens to the person who has declined to obey the order of the statute or who has prevented a seizure a right by implication to delay what the statute evidently means to accomplish at once. [4] To the conclusion that we reach it is objected that the Custodian gets a good deal more than bare possession-that the property is to be conveyed to him, and that by the The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of these causes. MEMORANDUM DECISIONS DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1920 (254 U. S. 617) No. 301. NEW ORLEANS DRY DOCK & SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. John A. S. GRAY. Jan. 3, 1921. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. For opinion below, see Gray v. New Orleans Dry-Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 146 La. 826, 84 South. 109. Mr. John Flannery, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156) as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). (254 U. S. 654) No. 625. Emma F. RUMSEY, petitioner, v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. Jan. 3, 1921. For opinion below, see 267 Fed. 554. Mr. T. J. O'Donnell, of Denver, Colo., for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. (254 U. S. 654) No. 628. BOSTON, CAPE COD & NEW YORK CANAL COMPANY, petitioner, v. C. W. CHADWICK & COMPANY. Jan. 3, 1921. For opinion below, see 266 Fed. 775. Messrs. Samuel H. Pillsbury and Thomas H. Mahony, both of Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Messrs. Edward E. Blodgett and Foye M. Murphy, both of Boston, Mass., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied. (254 U. S. 653) No. 623. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. Lee VANDIVER. Jan. 3, 1921. For opinion below, see 104 S. E. 24. Mr. Hollins N. Randolph, of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner. Mr. Virgil E. Adams, of Atlanta, Ga., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia denied. (254 U. S. 654) No. 630. Benjamin F. DORRANCE et al., petitioners, v. Charles Francis DORRANCE. Jan. 3, 1921. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 53. Mr. Wm. A. Glasgow, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa. (Mr. Wm. J. Hughes, of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioners. Messrs. J. A. Collett, K. McC. De Weese, of Kansas City, Mo., and Charles A. Houts, of St. Louis, Mo., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certio (41 Sup.Ct.) rari to the United States Circuit Court of Ap- | Appeals of the District of Columbia. For opinpeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. ion below, see United States v. Lane, 49 App. D. C. 48, 258 Fed. 520. Mr. Francis W. Clements, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in er ror. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon authority of subdivision 5 of section 250 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1159 [Comp. St. § 12271); United States ex rel. Champion Lumber Co. v. Fisher, Secretary of the Interior, 227 U. S. 445, 33 Sup. Ct. 329, 57 L. Ed. 591. (254 U. S. 618) (254 U. S. 619) No. 137. FITCH, CORNELL & COMPANY, No. original. Ex parte In the matter of plaintiff in error, v. The ATCHISON, TOPEthe CITY OF DALLAS, petitioner. Jan. 11, KA & SANTA FÉ RAILWAY COMPANY. 1921. Mr. Francis Marion Etheridge, of Dal-Jan. 17, 1921. In error to the Supreme Court las, Tex., for petitioner. Motion for leave to file petition for a writ of mandamus herein submitted by Mr. Francis Marion Etheridge for the petitioner. No. original. Ex parte In the matter of The CITY OF DALLAS, petitioner. Jan. 17, 1921. See, also, 254 U. S. 619, 41 Sup. Ct. 217, 65 L. Ed. -. Motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus herein denied. of the State of New York. For opinion below, see 226 N. Y. 597, 123 N. E. 864, which af firms judgment, 170 App. Div. 222, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1079. Mr. Henry M. Wise, of New York City, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Gardiner Lathrop and S. T. Bledsoe, both of Chicago, Ill., and A. S. H. Bristow, of New York City, for respondent. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, tember 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of SepSt. § 1214); Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. City of Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 255, 64 L. Ed. 421. (254 U. S. 618) No. 168. Louis H. DENEE, plaintiff in error, v. Peter MORRISON. Jan. 17, 1921. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. For opinion below, see 95 Wash. 76, 163 Pac. 382. Mr. Fred B. Morrill, of Spo(254 U. S. 619) kane, Wash., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Reese No. original. Ex parte In the matter of H. Voorhees, of Spokane, Wash., for defendant HUSSEIN LUTFI BEY, Master of the Turk-in ish Government Steamship GUL DJEMAL, petitioner. Jan. 17, 1921. Motion for leave to file a petition for writs of prohibition and/or mandamus herein denied. error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214); Jett Bros. Distilling Co. v. City of Carrollton, 252 U. S. 1, 40 Sup. Ct. 255, 64 L. Ed. 421. No. 374. PUEBLO OF LAGUNA, appellant, v. Jose CANDELARIA et al. Jan. 17, 1921. Mr. Francis C. Wilson, of Santa Fé, N. M., for the motion to dismiss or affirm denied. appellant. Motion for further consideration of (254 U. S. 666) No. 469. The PULLMAN COMPANY, petitioner, v. The STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. Jan. 17, 1921. On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, of the State of New York. For opinion below, see Bryant v. Pullman Co., 228 N. Y. 579, 127 N. E. 909, which affirmed order, 188 App. Div. 311, 177 N. Y. Supp. 488. See, also, 254 U. S. 624, 41 Sup. Ct. 9, 65 L. Ed. Mr. Maurice C. Spratt, of Buffalo, N. Y., for petitioner. Dismissed per stipulation. (254 U. S. 655) No. 631. John Barton PAYNE, as Agent, etc., petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al. Jan. 17, 1921. For opinion below, see Hines v. Industrial Accident Commission, 192 Pac. 859. Mr. Henle C. Booth, of San Francisco, Cal. (Mr. Wm. F. Herrin, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Warren H. Pillsbury, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondent Industrial Commission. Mr. Neal Power, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondents Brizzolara. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California denied. (254 U. S. 655) No. 647. John W. SEAMAN et al., appellants, v. Samuel W. ADLER. Jan. 17, 1921. For opinion below, see Adler v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 828. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. (254 U. S. 655) No. 658. LEE WING WAH et al., petitioners, v. Edward WHITE, as Commissioner of Immigration, etc. Jan. 17, 1921. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 961. Messrs. Jackson H. Ralston and George W. Hott, both of Washington, D. C. (Mr. Geo. A. McGowan, of San Francisco, Cal., of counsel), for petitioners. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied. No. 23, original. The STATE OF OKLAHOMA, complainant, v. The STATE OF TEXAS. Jan. 18, 1921. See, also, 254 U. S. 280, 41 Sup. Ct. 146, 65 L. Ed. Mr. S. P. Freeling, of Oklahoma City, Okl., for State of Oklahoma. Messrs. C. W. Taylor, of Austin, Tex., and Orville Bullington and A. H. Carrigan, both of Wichita Falls, Tex., for State of Texas. Fourth report of receiver filed, on motion of Mr. John S. Flannery, of Washington, D. C., of counsel for receiver. (254 U. S. 666) Jan. 18, No. 169. WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS. 1921. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. For opinion below, see 288 Ill. 159, 123 N. E. 259. Mr. E. Marvin Underwood, of Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edward J. Brundage of Chicago, Ill., for defendant in error. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff in error. (254 U. S. 667) No. 165. Joseph B. BEUTEL et al., plaintiffs in error, v. Oscar G. FOREMAN et al., Trustees, etc. Jan. 19, 1921. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. For opinion below, see 288 Ill. 106, 123 N. E. 270. Messrs. Albert Fink and David D. Stansbury, both of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. Samuel A. Ettelson and Chester E. Cleveland, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendants in error. Dismissed with costs, pursuant to the tenth rule. (255 U. S. 44) (41 Sup.Ct.) oil and fertilizer from other fish or the offal ALASKA FISH SALTING & BY-PRODUCTS of salmon, as the Legislature was warranted CO. v. SMITH. (Argued Jan. 20 and 21, 1921. Decided Jan. 31, 1921.) No. 166. manu 1. Licenses 7(3)-Greater tax on facturers of fertilizer, etc., from one kind of fish than from others, not unconstitutional. Assuming that Acts Alaska May 1, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 52), April 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 76), and May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 74), levying license taxes on manufacturers of fish oil, and fertilizer from herring, impose higher taxes than are imposed on manufacturfrom the offal of salmon, they do not, for that ers of fish oil or fertilizer from other fish or reason, contravene the Constitution. 7 2. Eminent domain 2(11)-Licenses (1)-That business is destroyed does not invalidate statute or require compensation. Though a license tax should destroy a business, it would not be made invalid or require compensation upon that ground alone, as those entering upon the business take that risk. 3. Statutes 279-Acts judged by contents, and not by allegations as to purpose. Statutes must be judged by their contents, and not by allegations as to their purpose in a complaint. 4. Statutes 55-Acts of Congress held not "fish laws" within act prohibiting repeal of such laws by territorial Legislature. Act Cong. June 6, 1900, § 29, and Act June 26, 1906 (Comp. St. §§ 3628-3643), imposing taxes on fish oil works and fertilizer works, are not "fish laws" within Act Aug. 24, 1912 (Comp. St. §§ 3528-3544), providing that the power of the Alaska Legislature to alter and repeal laws shall not extend to fish laws of the United States applicable to Alaska. 5. Statutes 55-Territorial statute licensing manufacturers of fertilizer, etc., held not contrary to acts of Congress. Act Cong. June 6, 1900, § 29, and Act June 26, 1906 (Comp. St. §§ 3628-3643), imposing taxes on fish oil works and fertilizer works, in Alaska, do not import a license to such works, and Acts Alaska, May 1, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 52), April 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 76), and May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 74), levying license taxes on manufacturers of fish oil and fertilizer, claimed to be prohibitory, are not in conflict therewith. 6. Licenses 7(3)-Not lacking in uniformity because greater tax imposed on one class of manufacturers than on others. in making such classification. 7. Licenses 8(1)—Statutory provision limiting amount of taxes held inapplicable. Act Cong. Aug. 24, 1912, § 9 (Comp. St. 3536) providing that no tax shall be levied in Alaska for territorial purposes in excess of one per centum upon the assessed valuation of property, does not apply to a license tax on manufacturers of fish oil, fertilizer, etc. 8. Licenses 7(8)-Double taxation by United States and territorial Legislature held permitted by statute. Under Act Cong. Aug. 24, 1912 (Comp. St. § 3528-3544), providing that the Alaska Legislature may not alter or repeal laws providing for taxes on business and trade, but that this shall not prevent the Legislature from imposing other and additional taxes or licenses, a taxpayer cannot object that license taxes are imposed both by the United States and by the territory. In Error to the District Court, Division No. 1, of the Territory of Alaska. Action by the Alaska Fish Salting & ByProducts Company against Walstein G. Smith. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. #45 *Messrs. R. E. Robertson, of Juneau, Alaska, and Harvey M. Friend, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error. *47 *Mr. J. C. Murphy, of Anchorage, Alaska, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action to recover the amount of taxes levied under statutes of Alaska which the plaintiff alleges to be contrary to the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, c. 387, 8 3, 37 Stat. 512 (Comp. St. § 3530), creating a legislative assembly in the Territory of Alaska, and to the Constitution of the United States. Judgment was given for the defendant upon demurrer to the complaint, the parties agreeing that the foregoing grounds of recovery were the only matters in dispute. The statutes attacked, viz.: May 1, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 52), April 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 76), and May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 74), levy license taxes of two dollars a barrel and two dollars a ton respectively, upon persons manufacturing fish oil, fertilizer and fish meal in whole or in part from herring. The Act of Congress after giving effect to the Constitution and laws of the United States in the Territory provides that the authority therein granted to the legislature "to alter, amend, modify, and repeal * of Acts Alaska May 1, 1913 (Laws 1913, c. 52), April 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, c. 76), and May 3, 1917 (Laws 1917, c. 74), levying license taxes on manufacturers of fish oil, fertilizer, etc., from herring, do not violate Act Cong. Aug. 24, 1912, § 3 (Comp. St. § 3530), requiring taxes to be uniform upon the same class of subjects, though the tax is greater laws in force in Alaska shall not extend to than that imposed on persons manufacturing the fish laws For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |