other reasons above stated, to send about an equal number of troops from hence to replace these volunteers, who were to be passed over to England to join the regiments for which they had entered. This operation in the Irish militia continued from the 27th of January to the 10th of March; and it is necessary not only to make some allowance after this period for the time requisite for the vo lunteers to join their regiments, but at least the same allowance after their junc. tion, as to the volunteers of the English militia for their acquiring the requisite qualifications for active service. tactics, and to acquire that knowledge | fore necessary for this, in addition to the and confidence in each other which would enable them to act together with regularity or advantage in the field. The whole attention of the illustrious personage at the head of the army, and of his majesty's ministers, was immediately turned to these objects: the greatest exertions were made to supply new clothing and other requisites; and, for the first time during the war, the indulgence usually granted to a considerable proportion of the regimental officers, to be absent from the winter quarters on their private affairs until the middle of March, was suspended; even the general officers were ordered to remain with their respective brigades, and were furnished with the most pointed instructions to exert their utmost diligence in bringing them forward and rendering them fit for service. All these precautions were in a great degree frustrated by the extreme rigour of the winter, which set in by the 20th of December, before several of the regiments had even reached the quarters in which this system was to be pursued; and with every disposition in all parties little progress beyond that of supplying their wants, was made from that time till the end of Frebruary 1800. The next observation extremely material to be attended to is, that nearly the whole of the old regiments which were employed in Holland, had been drawn from Ireland, and that on their return it became necessary to send them back to that country. This necessity arose from various causes. 1. That it is impossible for our navy to watch and protect that country from the designs of the enemy during the winter months, with equal certainty as during the fine season. 2. That the reverses experienced on the continent at the end of the campaign of 1799, and the suspension of military operations both in Switzerland and Italy, had in some degree revived the hopes of the disaffected in Ireland, whose views were likely to receive a further aid from the severity of the winter, which, in proportion as it increased the distress of the lower orders, afforded an additional facility to the treasonable practices of those who were employed to delude them into rebellion. Thirdly and principally-Because a measure was then proposed and adopted in the parliament of Ireland, for adding 10,000 men to the regular forces, by allowing that number to volunteer from the Irish militia. It was there Having premised these unquestionable facts, I have now to state, that, for a considerable time after the arrival of the army from Holland, his majesty's ministers were induced to hope that, with the great addition which the military force of this country had received, sufficient means might be assembled to enable us, by an extensive enterprise, to strike a vital blow at the naval power of France; and with that view, investigations were for some time carried on under the direction of naval and military characters of the first authority in this country, who were to have conducted the enterprise; but his majesty's servants were induced by the same authority to lay aside the project. So early as the 22nd of February 1800, they thought it their duty to recommend to his majesty that a force of not less than 20,000 men should be collected at as early a period as possible in the Mediterranean, in order to co-operate with the Austrians on the side of Italy and the south of France; on the following day (the 23rd) his majesty having approved of the plan, a communication to this effect was made to the duke of York, and the most pressing orders given in every department to prepare for this service. The command was offered to sir C. Stewart, and accepted. In answer to this communication, his Royal Highness, on the 28th, laid before his majesty's ministers a detailed account of the state of the army, of the exertions that had been made during the winter to bring forward the regiments in pur suance of the regulations I have already stated to the House, of the unavoidable difficulties and obstacles that had occurred, and of the condition and strength of each corps as it then stood. In this report, which is very minute and particular on all these points, his Royal Higliness, after stating them, expresses himself in the following words: "It will therefore be evident, that, although the number of men required may be embarked, yet I must feel it a duty to give it as my decided opinion, that there are not any of the corps mentioned in a state for actual service, and that unless they are allowed uninterruptedly to employ the ensuing two months in equipment, formation, and instruction, little advantage is to be expected from their services against the enemy, however ably conducted. I shall therefore conclude my remarks on these corps, by expressing an earnest hope that it may suit the arrangements in agitation, not to call upon them until the expiration of the period above-mentioned, when, confiding in the zeal and ability of the generals and other officers in command of them, I think I may safely pronounce that they will be in a state to act as his majesty may be pleased to direct." His majesty's ministers, however, at the same time that they concurred with his Royal Highness in acknowledging the zeal and exertions of the general officers and the respective regiments enumerated in his report, and in doing full justice to the anxious attention with which his Royal Highness had forwarded, in concert with them, the equipment and improvement of the troops, felt it a duty imposed upon them, by their experience of all the difficulties and delays incident to the unwieldy movements of an armament of 20,000 men, to urge his Royal Highness (as the only resource that remained) to select in the first instance as many of the troops, not amounting to less than 5,000 in the whole, as were least deficient, and to send them off as the first division to Minorca, there to wait the arrival of the remainder, and with the most pointed instructions to the general, under whom they sailed, to use every exertion in pro. moting their improvement in that island. This was all that could be done to save time, and in consequence near 6,000 mer. were embarked during the month of March. After some detention in the Downs by contrary winds, they sailed from thence on the 8th of April, were obliged to take shelter in Torbay on the 13th, re-sailed on the 24th, and finally reached Minorca on the 12th of May. Before I can proceed farther in this part of my statement, it is necessary to observe, that, owing to the severity of the winter, all communication between this court and that of Vienna was suspended from the end of December until the middle of March, and, in consequence, that when his majesty's ministers determined, on the 22nd of February, to send 20,000 men to assist Austria in the Mediterranean, the resolution was taken upon the general presumption that such an employment of our forces would be most conducive to the general success of the war, and would be most acceptable at Vienna; but without any previous knowledge or certainty, on our part, of their sentiments, wishes, or views upon this subject. It must also be recollected, that although we were then acting with Austria against a common enemy, no alliance or binding plan of concert or co-operation actually existed between the two courts. It would not be consistent with my duty or my situation to state the particulars of what passed between the two courts, either with respect to general concert, or on the subject of our proposed co-operation in Italy, when the communication was at length opened; but gentlemen will observe that the season for action was then fast approaching, and if they will consider the distance between London and Vienna, and the possibility that all the details and arrangements of an extensive plan of mutual co-operation and assistance might require some references, or be liable to some difficulties on either side, not foreseen by the other, they will be aware that our military preparations kept pace at least with the possibility of establishing any concert for giving them effect.-To elucidate this part of the subject, I must here observe, that, according to the lowest calculation made by sir Charles Stuart, 3,000 draught horses would have been requisite to enable a British force of 20,000 infantry to move and co-operate with the Austrians; that a proportionate number of baggage and forage waggons, &c. would have been necessary; that in order to procure these upon the spot (for it is evident they could not be sent by sea), as well as pioneers and every other appendage of an army in the field, and for the formation of our magazines, it was indispensable to obtain the previous concurrence of the court of Vienna. I might farther observe, that a large body of British infantry could be of no material service, nor could it even provide for its own security, without a proportionate number of cavalry, estimated by sir Charles Stuart at not less than 5,000; and that upon this Malta, and endeavour to expedite the reduction of that island. On the 22nd of April, sir C. Stuart, having perused the instructions which had been prepared for him to the above effect, was induced to resign the command; and as so many false rumours and surmises, injurious to government, and particularly to myself, have been circulated respecting the motives which induced that gallant officer to take this step, I shall here take the liberty of reading a few words from the letter, in which he states the true reason of his retirement. point also it was necessary to know the sentiments of the court of Vienna.-If gentlemen will add to these considerations the dislike all the great military powers of the continent (but Austria perhaps more than any other) feel at their armies serving with the troops of other powers, having different rates of pay, different allowances of provisions, and different modes of discipline; and if they will make some allowance for the political jealousy which the cabinet of Vienna may have entertained of the interference of any other power in her operations and military views in Italy, they will feel and admit that the It would certainly have been to me, as adjusting a plan of co-operation for the it must have been to every member of this British forces in the Mediterranean might House, a great satisfaction had that exrequire much time, and present many cellent officer been enabled by his attenddifficulties before it could be finally con- ance in his place to have prevented by his cluded. Be the reasons, however, what personal testimony the necessity of apthey may, the fact certainly is, that it was pealing to his letter on this occasion; not arranged, and that the brilliant suc- but most unfortunately for his afflicted cesses which attended the opening of the family, for his country, for his friends, campaign by the Austrians on the side of and for the army, he is now languishing Italy, and the great pressure they had on a bed of sickness; perhaps at this moreason to expect, and afterwards expe- ment the stroke of death is impending rienced on the Rhine, induced them, on over him, and the heroic example of the one hand, to be still less anxious for steady valour, and of the most noble enour co-operation in Italy, and on the other, thusiasm, joined to the soundest judg much more so for our employing the force ment, which have marked his military intended for that quarter in some serious life, is, I have too much reason to apprediversions on the western coast of France. hend, never again to animate the exerHis majesty's ministers, whose only wish tions of British soldiers, by whom, howwas to regulate their exertions in such a ever, as long as these virtues remain a mode as promised to be most advantageous just object of pride and admiration in our to the common cause, felt it their duty, as army, his name and services will ever be well in compliance with the wish of their recollected with gratitude, affection, and ally, as from their own conviction, to adopt respect. The sentence of this letter, which this modification, and the plan of employ- I think it necessary to read, is as follows: ing the remainder of the troops in an at-"Although I have freely submitted these tack upon Belleisle, and in harassing the western coasts of France, was accordingly resolved upon. This resolution was taken about the middle of April; and it was then determined to employ the first division of the 20,000 men above-mentioned, which had already sailed for the Mediterranean, together with such disposeable force as might be withdrawn from the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar (making in the whole about 9,000 men) in co-operating with the Austrians, either by diversions on the coasts of France within the Mediterranean, or by giving them a more direct assistance, should any reverse (certainly then very little expected on their part) make them wish that our troops should be employed in either of the above modes; and if not, that sir C. Stuart should proceed with them to professional remarks to you, on the difficulty of reducing La Valletta by siege, I trust you will do me the justice to believe, that neither the circumstances I have have stated, the reduction of the force first proposed, or the inferiority of the objects now in contemplation, comparatively with those originally designed, make me for one instant wish to relinquish the danger or honour of the undertaking; but the same point of honour, the good of this country, and, I may add, the humanity which gives rise to these feelings, render it impossible for me to obey the particular instruction concerning the introduction of a Russian force into Malta." The subsequent part of the letter states the general's reasons for declining to contribute to the reduction of Malta, in case that reduction were to lead to a Russian garrison, or any troops of that country, being admitted. These reasons may be good or bad, but they have nothing to do with the fact, and are therefore unnecessary to be produced on this occasion. Such, in his own words, is the ground on which he resigned the command; and I cannot on this occasion avoid remarking, that whilst we are accused of acting with insincerity towards Russia, the circumstance which led to this resignation is a strong proof how anxious his majesty felt to offer to that power (though bound to it by no positive engagement whatever) a participation in the advantages of that conquest, in case Russia had remained faithful to her alliance, and to the bonds of amity then subsisting between her and this country. smaller vessels, making a general total of 483 ships of war, besides 743 French privateers, 15 Dutch, and 76 Spanish, in all 834, which, added to the 483 ships of war, makes a grand total of 1,317 vessels equipped for the purposes of war; while, on the other hand, Great Britain has lost by capture only 3 ships of the line, and one ship of 50 guns, of which one of the line and that of 50 guns have been retaken; and of the frigates taken from Great Britain, only one, of 32 guns (the Ambuscade) is now in possession of the enemy, or perhaps two, as it appears that another has lately been captured in the Mediterranean. Most of the smaller vessels have also been retaken. It is a constant attempt of those gentlemen, who find it convenient to depreciate the successes, and to cast a shade over the laurels of their country, to separate our naval and military operations; but to that manœuvre I cannot submit ; for, when gentlemen talk of a disgraceful and disastrous war, they must recollect that the same councils have guided the one, which have conducted the other. No person who knows the respect I entertain for the meritorious services of the board of Admiralty, or who knows the unbounded love and esteem I bear to the illustrious character who presided over that board during the late administration, will believe me capable of detracting any thing from the glory that belongs to him. But I believe that noble lord would not receive it as a compliment from any person, to be told that he conducted the naval operations of the war, except in concert with others of his majesty's confidential servants; neither, on the other hand, will they suppose that I exclusively arrogate to myself any of those successes which I have detailed. If there have been any defects or delays in the preparations for executing the plans resolved upon, that demerit belongs in a peculiar degree to me; but what I contend for is, that no separation can be made in the councils, by which any of the operations, naval or military, have been conducted.—And there is another ground, which renders it impossible to separate from our naval successes the operations of his majesty's forces in the various quarters of the globe. Our naval successes are not solely owing to the unparalleled skill and valour of our commanders, and the decided superiority of our fleets; but they are likewise in a great degree to be attributed to the mea In consequence of this resignation, sir R. Abercrombie was sent for, and offered the command; and on the 5th of May he received his instructions. He sailed from Spithead on the 13th in a single frigate, but meeting with a very long passage, for which, as for other disappointments of a similar nature, ministers are surely not responsible, he did not reach Minorca until the 22nd of June. On his arrival there, he found a requisition from general Melas for a body of troops, and in compliance with his instructions in this respect, so little time was lost in paying attention to the wishes of our ally, that he sailed on the following day for Genoa; but on the 14th of that month the battle of Marengo had been fought, and the false security of the Austrians, whilst it rendered them in the outset of the campaign too indifferent perhaps to our assistance, and afterwards too inattentive to the movements of the French on the side of the Alps, had enabled Buonaparte to strike that fatal blow, which ruined at once the hopes of the campaign and of the war.-In consequence the armament went to Leghorn, from whence a part of it was dispatched to Malta, and the remainder returned to MiThe effect that battle, and the disasters in Germany, followed by the armistice, had upon our other plans, and the been already fully explained. subsequent part of the campaign, have Dorca. verted. I avoid dwelling on the naval successes of this war, because they are uncontroThe most signal victories have been obtained-the most gallant exploits have been achieved, and in the course of the war, we have taken or destroyed 78 ships of the line, 181 frigates, and 224 sures which have been taken to annihilate the naval resources of our enemy: and, the subject ;-for to this statement should what are those measures, other than the be added the exports to our conquests in capture of their colonies, and the conse- every other quarter of the world. I shall quent annihilation of their navigation and not enter into a minute examination of commerce? them. Indeed the exports to Ceylon and the other conquests in the East Indies cannot be accurately ascertained, these exports being necessarily blended with those to the East Indies in general; but I do know that the exports to the East Indies, which in 1791 were under a million, last year amounted to above 1,600,000!.; of British produce, exclusive of the increase on private trade, which, although I cannot accurately state it, there can be no doubt has increased in a similar proportion; and it will farther be observed that all these statements are without any reference to the commercial advantages which we have secured to ourselves by our decided superiority in the Mediter ranean during this war. To enlarge upon that subject, or to calculate the advantages which, in a commercial view, the possession of Malta may open, would lead me into a more extensive field than is necessary for the object in view. The state. ments I have made are more than sufficient to demonstrate the proposition for which they are adduced. Before I leave this head, allow me a moment to apply what I alluded to at a former period of my speech, respecting the benefits to be derived from an early possession of the colonies of our enemies, in so far as it opens a beneficial substitute for those markets which must be interrupted more or less by every war, in proportion as that war is more or less com. plicated and extended. It will be satisfactory to the House to be informed to what extent this object has been attained. I have seen the accounts of exports for the year 1799. To our West India conquest and the Cape of Good Hope alone they amounted to 1,775,000l.; and to this ought fairly to be added the increase of export to our old West India possessions, occasioned chiefly by the capture of the enemies' colonies, and the security thence derived to our own. In 1792, the exports to our own colonies amounted to 2,550,000l.; and in 1799, the exports to the same colonies amounted to 3,983,000l. When this excess, being 1,433,0007., is added to the. exports to the conquered colonies, in the same year, they amount to 3,206,000l. During the same year, the exports to Denmark, Russia, Sweden, Poland, Prussia and Germany, amounted to 2,883,000l., being 313,000l. less than the extended exports to the West Indies. -And the result of the statement is, that, by our successful exertions in the course of the war, we have provided markets for the export of the produce and manufactures of Great Britain, more than a substitute for all the markets of Europe. But, in stating my proposition in this shape, I do great injustice to my own argument in considering these markets merely as a substitute: for there cannot be a doubt, that by much the greatest part of these exports to the continent would continue to be sent, even if we should be at war with the whole North of Europe. The true way therefore of view. ing the exports to those conquered colonies is, to consider them as an acquisition of additional markets, and not merely as a substitute for old ones. It will be remarked, that the observations I have just made are confined solely to our West India possessions and the Cape of Good Hope. But this is too limited a view of I further stated at the commencement of my speech, that in my judgment nothing ought to limit the exertions of this country in early offensive operations against the colonial possessions of the enemy, when we are forced to recur to arms, except the precautions prescribed by a just attention to the defence and internal security of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It will therefore be expected, that I should state to the House how we are circumstanced in that respect. The return of lord Malmesbury from Lisle, at the end of the year 1796, was the period when it became necessary to pay a minute attention to the force requisite for the secure defence of Great Britain and Ireland; and at that period the charge of that business devolved upon the department over which his majesty had commanded me to preside. The force at that time stood, in Great Britain, regular cavalry 7,687, fencible ditto 6,646 total cavalry 14,383; regular infantry 10,974; fencible ditto 6,678, Militia 36,049, total infantry 53,701. In Ireland, regular cavalry 3,982, fencible ditto 781; total cavalry 4,713. Regular infantry 1,078, fencible ditto 10,521, militia 20,030 total infantry 31,629. There is at present |