between confederated states, much less between states united under the same national government, a clause merely affirmative of an established rule of law, and not denied to the humblest, or most distant foreign nation. It was hardly supposable, that the states would deal less favourably with each other on such a subject, where they could not but have a common interest, than with foreigners. A motive of a higher kind must naturally have directed them to the provision. It inust have been, "to form a more perfect Union," and to give to each state a higher security and confidence in the others, by attributing a superior sanctity and conclusiveness to the public acts and judicial proceedings of all. There could be no reasonable objection to such a course. On the other hand, there were many reasons in its favour. The states were united in an indissoluble bond with each other. The commercial and other intercourse with each other would be constant, and infinitely diversified. Credit would be every where given and received; and rights and property would belong to citizens of every state in many other states than that, in which they resided. Under such circumstances it could scarcely consist with the peace of society, or with the interest and security of individuals, with the public or with private good, that questions and titles, once deliberately tried and decided in one state, should be open to litigation again and again, as often as either of the parties, or their privies, should choose to remove from one jurisdiction to another. It would occasion infinite injustice, after such trial and decision, again to open and re-examine all the merits of the case. It might be done at a distance from the original place of the transaction; after the removal or death of witnesses, or the loss of other testimony; after a long lapse of time, and under cir

cumstances wholly unfavourable to a just understanding of the case.

§ 1304. If it should be said, that the judgment might be unjust upon the merits, or erroneous in point in law, the proper answer is, that if true, that would furnish no ground for interference; for the evils of a new trial would be greater, than it would cure. Every such judgment ought to be presumed to be correct, and founded in justice. And what security is there, that the new judgment, upon the re-examination, would be more just, or more conformable to law, than the first? What state has a right to proclaim, that the judgments of its own courts are better founded in law or in justice, than those of any other state? The evils of introducing a general system of re-examination of the judicial proceedings of other states, whose connexions are so intimate, and whose rights are so interwoven with our own, would far outweigh any supposable benefits from an imagined superior justice in a few cases.1 Motives of this sort, founded upon an enlarged confidence, and reciprocal duties, might well be presumed to have entered into the minds of the framers of the confederation, and the constitution. They intended to give, not only faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each of the states, such as belonged to those of all foreign nations and tribunals; but to give to them full faith and credit; that is, to attribute to them positive and absolute verity, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied, any more than in the state, where they originated.2

1 Green v. Sarmiento,1 Peters's Cir. R. 74, 78 to 80; Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Caine's R. 462.

2 Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Peters's Cir. R. 74, 80, 81; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. R. 462, 467; Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. R. 515, 544,

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§1305. The next section of the clause is, "And "the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner, in which such acts, records, and proceedings "shall be proved, and the effect thereof." It is obvious, that this clause, so far as it authorizes congress to prescribe the mode of authentication, is wholly beside the purpose of the preceding. Whatever may be the faith and credit due to the public acts, records, and proceedings of other states, whether prima facie evidence only, or conclusive evidence; still the mode of establishing them in proof is of very great importance, and upon which a diversity of rules exists in different countries. The object of the present provision is to introduce uniformity in the rules of proof, (which could alone be done by congress.) It is certainly a great improvement upon the parallel article of the confederation. That left it wholly to the states themselves to require any proof of public acts, records, and proceedings, which they might from time to time deem advisable; and where no rule was prescribed, the subject was open to the decision of the judicial tribunals, according to their own views of the local usage and jurisprudence. Many embarrassments must necessarily have grown out of such a state of things. The provision, therefore, comes recommended by every consideration of wisdom and convenience, of public peace, and private security.

§ 1306. But the clause does not stop here. The words added are, "and the effect thereof." Upon the proper interpretation of these words some diversity of opinion has been judicially expressed. Some learned judges have thought, that the word "thereof" had reference to the proof, or authentication; so as to read, "and to prescribe the effect of such proof, or authentication." Others have thought, that it referred to the

1

antecedent words, "acts, records, and proceedings;" so as to read, "and to prescribe the effect of such acts, records, and proceedings." Those, who were of opinion, that the preceding section of the clause made judgments in one state conclusive in all others, naturally adopted the former opinion; for otherwise the power to declare the effect would be wholly senseless; or congress could possess the power to repeal, or vary the full faith and credit given by that section. Those, who were of opinion, that such judgments were not conclusive, but only prima facie evidence, as naturally embraced the other opinion; and supposed, that until congress should, by law, declare what the effect of such judgment should be, they remained only prima facie evidence.

1307. The former seems now to be considered the sounder interpretation. But it is not, practically speaking, of much importance, which interpretation prevails; since each admits the competency of congress to declare the effect of judgments, when duly authenticated; so always, that full faith and credit are given to them; and congress by their legislation have already carried into operation the objects of the clause. The act of 26th of May, 1790, (ch. 11,) after providing for the mode of authenticating the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the states, has declared, "and the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state,

1 See Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. R. 462, 467; Hitchcock v. Aicken, 1 Caine's R. 460; Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Peters's Circt. R. 74; Field v. Gibbs, Id. 155; Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. R. 515, 544, 545.

from whence the said records are or shall be taken." 1 It has been settled upon solemn argument, that this enactment does declare the effect of the records, as evidence, when duly authenticated. It gives them the same faith and credit, as they have in the state court, from which they are taken. If in such court they have the faith and credit of the highest nature, that is to say, of record evidence, they must have the same faith and credit in every other court. So, that congress have declared the effect of the records, by declaring, what degree of faith and credit shall be given to them. If a judgment is conclusive in the state, where it is pronounced, it is equally conclusive every where. If reexaminable there, it is open to the same inquiries in every other state. It is, therefore, put upon the same footing, as a domestic judgment. But this does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, in which the original judgment was given, to pronounce it; or the right of the state itself to exercise authority over the persons, or the subject matter. The constitution did not mean to confer a new power or jurisdiction; but simply to regulate the effect of the acknowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within the territory.3

1 By the act of 27th March, 1804, ch. 56, the provisions of the act of 1790 are enlarged, so as to cover some omissions, such as state officebooks, the records of territorial courts, &c.

2 Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch. R. 481; Hampden v. M'Connell, 3 Wheat. R. 234; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 12, p. 243, 244; Sergeant on Const. ch. 31, [ch. 33.]

3 Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. R. 462, 467; Shumway v. Stillman, 4 Cowen's R. 292; Borden v. Fitch, 13 Johns. R. 121.