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section 333, saved an exception, or an objection and ex-ception, as the case may be, to the order or ruling he complains of. A party will be conclusively presumed on appeal to have consented to such rulings and orders as he did not except or object to, and therefore will not be heard to complain of them for the first time in this court.

The reason for this rule of practice is obvious and has often been referred to in the opinions of this court. If a party in the circuit court could, by failing to make objections or save exceptions, thus lull his adversary into security, and also deprive the trial court of an opportunity to correct errors to which its attention was called, and avail himself of the objection for the first time in this court, he would be permitted to place his adversary at a great disadvantage as well as materially obstruct the speedy disposal of cases.

For this, as well as other reasons that we might suggest, the uniform practice is not to allow a party to make for the first time in this court an objection that Ishould have been made in the trial court. As illustrative cases on this subject we refer to Branson v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky., 330; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Graves, 78 Ky., 74; Loving v. Warren County, 14 Bush, 316; Buckles v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky., 795. But in the cases before us we think the court properly refused to set aside the orders of dismissal because the reasons for asking that it be done, which appear in a resolution adopted by the directors of the White City Co., and an amended pleading tendered with the motion to set aside the order, did not make any substantial change in the issues as presented in the 143 Ky., case.

For the purpose of showing this, we will now consider more in detail the things that it is said distinguish these cases from the 143 Ky. case. It is first insisted that a resolution adopted by the board of directors of the White City Co., on the faith of which the three notes were executed to the bank, was not relied on or made a part of the record in the 143 Ky. case, and the argument is made that this resolution estops the appellees from making the defense that they were only endorsers of the paper and not sureties. The resolution reads: "Be it resolved by the board of directors of the White City Co. that the president of the White City Co. be authorized to borrow $15,000, and that the board of directors of the White City Co. sign the note for security of

the money and pledge the first receipts of the White City Co. to liquidate this deal."

The pertinent part of each of the notes executed to the bank, reads as follows: "We promise to pay to the order of First National Bank, Louisville, Ky., $.

value received, negotiable and payable at the office of First National Bank of Louisville, Ky., and hereby pledge as security therefor, and as security for any other debt or liability we may now or hereafter owe or be under to said bank the receipts of the White City Co., as per resolution herewith attached."

In the 143 Ky. case the bank charged in its petition that the appellees signed the notes as sureties and not as endorsers, and therefore were not entitled to notice of the dishonor of the paper; and it was further contended that the fact that they did sign as sureties might be shown by parol evidence. But in rejecting this view, we said that under the Negotiable Instrument Act "A person who places his signature upon an instrument other than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an endorser, unless he clearly indicate by proper words in the endorsement his intention to be bound in some other capacity." Section 63 is to be read in connection with section 31, which is as follows:

"The endorsement must be written on the instrument or upon a paper attached thereto. The signature of the endorser, without additional words, is a sufficient endorsement.

"The purpose of the statute is to exclude parol evidence and to make the written instrument control the rights of the parties. The statute fixing the legal effect of the instrument, parol evidence may not be received to give it a different effect."

In short, the ruling of the court in that case was that a person who places his name upon paper other than as maker, drawer or acceptor, is deemed to be an endorser unless he indicates by proper words in the endorsement his intention to be bound in some other capacity, or his intention to be bound in some other capacity than as endorser appears on the paper in connection with and as a part of the endorsement.

It is true the resolution adopted by the board of directors was made a part of the paper executed to the bank, or rather, as appears from the paper, was attached thereto. But neither the resolution nor the note contain any words indicating an intention on the part of the

signers of the papers to be bound in any other capacity than as endorses. If the resolution should be considered in connection with and as a part of the endorsement, it does not show a purpose on the part of the persons who signed the paper to become bound in any other capacity than as endorsers. The resolution simply recites that the board of directors of the White City Co. will "sign the note for security of the money," without in any manner indicating whether they would sign the note as makers, drawers, acceptors, sureties or endorsers, and that the directors will pledge the receipts of the White City Co. to liquidate the notes, and the notes recite that the signers have pledged the receipts of the White City Co. as security for their payment. Reading both of these papers together, they merely provide that the directors will sign the notes as security for the money advanced and pledge for their payment the receipts of the White City Co., and these conditions do not have the effect of showing that when the directors signed the notes as endorsers they intended to become liable as sureties. There are no words either in the resolution or in the notes indicating a purpose on the part of the signers of the notes to become bound otherwise than as endorsers, and so the opinion in 143 Ky. is controlling on the question that the signers of this paper should be treated as endorsers.

It is further argued for the bank that as the appellee Bickel was a director in and president of the White City Co., and vice-president of the bank, and had actual knowledge the day before the notes matured that they would mature on the next day, and that the White City Co. had no funds with which to pay them, it was his duty as an officer of the bank to see to it that notice of the dishonor of the paper was given to the parties entitled to notice, and that his failure to do this estops him from denying his liability on the paper.

We do not know of any authority, and have not been referred to any by counsel fc appellant, holding that the vice-president of a bank is, by virtue of his office alone, charged with the duty of seeing that notice of the dishonor of paper is given to the person entitled thereto or liable in any manner if he fails to do so. Of course the vice-president of a bank or the president or any director, or indeed any other officer or employe might be charged by resolution of the bank or by its habit and custom of dealing with the duty of protesting paper

or giving notice of its dishonor, but there is no showing in these cases that Bickel had ever been. authorized by the bank to do these things or that there was any custom of the bank under which he did or should do them; and the vice-president of a bank, simply because he is vice-president, is under no duty to attend to these matters and is not to be held liable for his failure to do so. A state of case also might arise in which the vice-president or other officer of the bank might be held liable for the failure to give notice, as when it was shown that the officer sought to be charged with liability was guilty of fraud or it was shown that he in some manner actively prevented the giving of notice, but we have no such state of case here. It is usual and customary for the cashier of the bank to look after matters of this kind, and in the absence of any showing that it was not the custom of the cashier of the first National Bank to attend to the protesting of paper and the giving of notice of dishonor, we must presume that it was the duty of the cashier to have discharged this duty in respect to these notes.

Nor do we think that the fact that Bickel was an officer of the bank relieved the bank from the necessity of giving him notice. Bickel signed the paper not as an officer of the bank but as an officer of another corporation borrowing money from the bank, and his rights and liability on the paper are precisely the same as those of the other parties who signed it. The statute, requiring that notice of dishonor shall be given, is peremptory, and all persons entitled to the notice are released from liability unless it is given, although they may be connected with the bank, whose duty it is to give notice, as officers or in some other capacity, with the exception that the bank officer whose duty it was to give notice would be of course estopped to plead want of notice as a defense to a suit by the bank against him.

We think the judgment in each case should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

1.

Connecticut Fire Insurance Company v. Moore.

(Decided May 22, 1913.)

Appeal from Hickman Circuit Court.

Pleading-Defect-When Cured by Verdict.-The omission of a fact essential to a cause of action will not be cured by the ver

dict, when there is no admission or proof of the fact, nor submission of the question to the jury.

2. Judgment-Non obstante veredicto-Not Allowed After Motion for a Peremptory Which Should Have Been Sustained.—A party is not entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto where at the conclusion of the evidence he moves for a peremptory instruction and his motion should have been sustained.

3.

4.

5.

Insurance, Fire-Forfeiture for Additional Insurance-WaiverEvidence.-Evidence that an agent at the time of the taking out of a policy consented to additional insurance is admissible on the question of waiver.

Insurance, Fire-Agent-Evidence-Admission.-Proof of knowledge of an insurance agent authorized to solicit insurance and issue policies of additional insurance may be shown by proof of his admission of knowledge made during the continuance of the agency.

Evidence-Letter-Proof of Contents-Practice-Where a letter is in the possession of the adverse party it is the proper practice to give him reasonable notice to produce it, before receiving other proof of its contents.

OLIVER & OLIVER for appellant.

E. M. BRUMMEL, JOSEPH BENNETT and ROBBINS & THOMAS for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WILLIAM ROGERS CLAY, COMMISSIONER-Reversing.

Plaintiff, Mona M. Moore, was engaged in the millinery business in the town of Clinton, Kentucky. On March 28,1911, the Connecticut Fire Insurance Company issued to her a policy insuring her stock against fire in the sum of $500. During the life of the policy her stock of goods was destroyed by fire. She brought this action to recover the amount of the policy. A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in her favor in the sum of $500. The insurance company appeals.

The first error relied on is the failure of the trial court to sustain the company's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The petition sets forth the issuance of the policy, the payment of the premiums, and the fact that the stock of goods was destroyed by fire. It further alleges that the defendant had broken the conditions of its contract in that it had refused and failed to pay plaintiff the full amount of the insurance or any part thereof, although the same had been due since the day of.... ., 1911. The petition utterly fails to show the value of the goods destroyed

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