elusive effect of a judgment is confined by law as expressed in the maxim. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, and also as to the manner in which the former judgment in that class of cases should be taken advantage of by the party. Broom, Max. (4th ed.), 321; Sparry's Case, 5 Rep. 61. But it is believed that the case at bar may be decided without encountering any of those conflicting opinions, as they occur chiefly where the party claiming the benefit of the former judgment failed to plead it at the first opportunity, or where no such opportunity was presented, and it was introduced under the general issue. Decisions made in such cases were cited at the argument, but they afford very little aid in the solution of any question arising in this record. Remark should also be made, that the 101*] several replications *set up the former judgments, not merely as settling some collateral fact involved in the case, but as having determined the entire merits of the controversy involved in the pleadings. Stafford v. Clark, 2 Bing. 377. Such a case falls directly within the rule that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, or one in the same court directly on the point, is, as a plea, a bar, and conclusive between the same parties upon the same matter directly in question in a subsequent action. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 St. Tr. 538. When not pleaded, but introduced as evidence under the general issue, the judgment, it was said in that case, was equally conclusive between the parties; but that point will not be considered in this case, as it is in no manner involved in the pleadings. Express determination of the court, also, in the case of Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 357, was, that the rule that a recovery in one action is a bar to another, is not confined to personal actions alone, but that it extends to all actions, real as well as personal. Repeated decisions established the rule, in the early history of the common law, that where a judgment was rendered on the merits it barred all other personal suits, except such as were of a higher nature, for the same cause of action. Hitchin v. Campbell, 2 W. Bl. 831. Judgment in a writ of entry is not a bar to a writ of right; but the meaning of the rule is, that each species of judgment is equally conclusive upon its own subject-matters by way of bar to future litigation for the thing thereby decided. Hence, the verdict of a jury, followed by a judgment or a decree in chancery, as held by this court, puts an end to all further controversy between the parties to such suit, and it has already appeared that a judgment for either party on demurrer to a pleading involving the merits, is the same as it would have been on an issue of fact, joined upon the same pleading, and found in favor of the same party. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 113; Lawrence v. Hunt, 10 Wend. 83; Wood v. Jackson, 8 Wend. 9; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch. 565. 102* *Determination of this court, in the case of Aspden v. Nixon, 4 How. 467, was, that a judgment or decree, in order that it may be set up as a bar, must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon the same subject-matter, between the same parties, and for the same purpose; and in the case of Packet 7 WALL U. S., Book 19. Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 341, 16 L. ed. 653, the decision was, that, "the essential conditions under which the exception of the res judicata becomes applicable are the identity of the thing demanded, the identity of the cause of the demand, and of the parties in the character in which they are litigants." Attempt was made in that case, as in this, to maintain that the judgment in the first suit could not be held to be an estoppel, unless it was shown by the record that the very point in controversy was distinctly presented by an issue, and that it was explicitly found by the jury; but the court held otherwise, and distinctly overruled that proposition, although the defense of estoppel failed for other reasons. Courts of justice, in stating the rule, do not always employ the same language; but where every objection urged in the second suit was open to the party within the legitimate scope of the pleadings in the first suit, and might have been presented in that trial, the matter must be considered as having passed in rem judicatam, and the former judgment in such a case is conclusive between the parties. Greathead v. Bromley, 7 T. R. 455; Broom, Max. (4th ed.), 324. Except in special cases, the plea of res judicata, says Taylor, applies not only to points upon which the court was actually required to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. 2 Taylor, Ev. sec. 1513; Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare, 115. Substantially the same rule was laid down in the case of Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 346, in which the court said that "a recovery in one suit upon issue joined on a matter of title, is equally conclusive upon the subject-mat- [*103 ter of such title" in any subsequent action, as an estoppel. Better opinion is, that the estoppel, where the judgment was rendered upon the merits, whether on demurrer, agreed statement or verdict, extends to every material allegation or statement which, having been made on one side and denied on the other, was at issue in the cause, and was determined in the course of the proceedings. 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 6th ed. 787. The allegation in the case of Ricardo v. Garcias, 12 Cl. & Fin. 400, was, that the matters in issue on the second suit were the same, and not in any respect different from the matters in issue in the former suit, and the House of Lords held that the plea was sufficient evidently deciding that nothing was open in the second suit which was within the scope of the issue in the former trial. Stevens v. Hughes, 7 Casey, 381. Properly construed, the opinion of this court on this point in the case of The Packet Co. v. Sickles, 5 Wall. 592, 18 L. ed. 553, is to the same effect, as plainly appears in that part of it in which the court say that if the record of the former trial shows that the verdict could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter in question, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties. Applying that rule to the case at bar, it is clear that a judgment rendered on demurrer settles every matter 4.9 82-107 which was well alleged in the pleadings of the opposite party. 9. Separate examination of the authorities cited by the defendants, in view of their number, is impracticable, but it will appear, if they are carefully read and rightly applied, that they do not support the proposition under consideration. On the contrary, the decision of the court in the case of Gilbert v. Thompson, 9 Cush. 348, is, that a judgment in a former action is conclusive where the same cause of action was adjudicated between the same parties, or the same point was put in issue on the record and directly found by the verdict of a jury; and the case of Merriam v. Whittemore, 5 Gray, 104*] 316, is precisely to the same effect. Unguarded expressions are found in the opinions in the case of Carter v. James, 13 Mees. & Wels. 137, but the decision turned upon the point that the cause of action was not the same in the pending suit as that litigated in the former action. For these reasons our conclusion is that the decision of the circuit court in sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiffs to the rejoinder of the defendants was correct, and that the plaintiffs were thereupon entitled to judgment. 10. In such cases, where the sum for which judgment should be rendered is uncertain, the rule in the Federal Courts is that the damages shall, if either of the parties request it be assessed by a jury. 1 Stat. at L. 87, § 26; Renner v. Marshall, 1 Wheat. 218; Mayhew v. Thatcher, 6 Wheat. 129. But if the sum for which judgment should be rendered is certain, as where the suit is upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, the computation may be made by the court, or what is more usual, by the clerk; and the same course may be pursued even when the sum for which judgment should be rendered is uncertain if neither party request the court to call a jury for that purpose. Common law rules were substantially the same, except that "the court themselves might, in a large class of cases, if they pleased, assess the damages and thereupon give final judgment." 2 Saund. Pl. and Ev. 218; 2 Arch. Pr. 709. Evidently a jury in this case was not necessary, but it was not error to hear proofs under the submission, as both parties assented to the course pursued. Exceptions were taken to the ruling of the court in allowing interest upon the coupons, and the bill of exceptions states that the exception of the defendants was allowed, but it does not state what amount of interest was included in the judgment, nor give the basis on which it was computed. Judging from the amount of the sum found due, it is, perhaps, a necessary inference that interest was allowed on each coupon from the time it fell due to the date of the judgment, and if so, the finding was correct. 105*1 'Bonds and coupons like these, by universal usage and consent, have all the qualities of commercial paper. Mercer Co. v. Hackett, 1 Wall. 83, 17 L. ed. 548; Meyer v. Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384, 17 L. ed. 564. Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money, on a given day, and being drawn and executed in a form and mode for the very purpose that they may be separated from the bonds, it is held that they are negotiable, and that a suit may be maintained on them with- Necessity for remark upon the other exceptions is superseded by what has already been said in respect to the plaintiff's demurrer. Judgment affirmed, with costs. Mr. Justice Miller, dissenting: The doctrine of estoppel by a former judg ment between the same parties, is one of the most beneficial principles of our jurisprudence, and has been less affected by legislation *than almost any other. But its effect [*106 is to prevent any further inquiry into the merits of the controversy. Hence, with all the salutary influence which it exerts in giving permanence to established rights, in putting an end to angry contests, and preserving tranquillity in society, it can only be justified on the ground that the precise point, either of law or of fact, which is presented in the suit where the estoppel is pleaded, had been previously decided between the same parties or their privies, by a court of competent jurisdiction. The principle is equally available and potent whether it is set up by a defendant as an answer to a cause of action, or by a plaintiff to prevent the same defense being used in the second suit that was decided against in the first. In the former case, it must appear that the cause of action in the second suit was the same that it was in the first suit, or depended In the latter on precisely the same facts. case it must appear that the defense set up in the second suit was the same defense, or in other words, consisted of the same facts or points of law as that which was passed upon in the first suit. It is true that some of the earlier cases speak as if everything which might have been decided in the first suit must be considered concluded by that suit. But this is not the doctrine of the courts of the present day, and no court has given more emphatic expression to the modern 74 U. S. rule than this. That rule is, that when a for mer judgment is relied on, it must appear from the record that the point in controversy was necessarily decided in the former suit, or be made to appear by extrinsic proof that it was in fact decided. This is expressly ruled no less than three times within the last eight years by this court, to wit: in Steam Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333, 16 L. ed. 650, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L. ed. 550; Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35, 17 L. ed. 755. The principle asserted in these decisions is supported by an array of authority which I will not stop to insert here, but which may be found well digested and arranged in the notes of Hare and Wallace to the Duchess of Kingston's Case, 2 Sm. Lead. Cas. 791, et seq. The opinion just read asserts a different rule, 107*] and insists that whatever might have been fairly within the scope of the pleadings in the former suit, must be held as concluded by the judgment. In the case before us, the second plea clearly and distinctly avers that the bonds, which are the foundation of plaintiff's action, were issued without any good or valuable consideration, and that this fact was known to the plaintiffs when they received them. I have examined in vain all the pleas filed by defendants in the former suit to discover any plea which set up this defense, or which raised such an issue that the want of consideration must have been passed upon in deciding the case. Nor can I discover any plea under which it might have been decided. Here, then, is a distinct, substantial defense to the bonds sued on, sufficient to defeat the action, which was never presented to the court in the former action and, therefore, never decided; and I am of opinion that the former suit did not conclude defendants' right to have this matter inquired into in this action. EDWARD W. BURBANK, Plff. in Err., V. EDMOND B. BIGELOW. (154 U. S. 558, Appx.) Objection to want of parties, when too late objection must first be made in court below, or it will not be available here. It is too late, on the day set for trial, to move that the suit be dismissed, because a partner of plaintiff, in the transaction which is the foundation of the suit, was not made a plaintiff in the case. Defendant cannot go to trial before a jury on the facts of a case involving fraud, and let it proceed to judgment on the verdict, and then raise the question for the first time in this court, that the action is one of equitable cognizance. [No. 36.] Argued Mar. 26, 1868. Decided Jan. 11, 1869. 'N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United Bigelow, the plaintiff below, one of the partners of the firm of Bigelow & Burbank (T. S. Burbank), filed his petition in the Circuit Court of the United States for the State of Louisiana, against Edward W. Burbank, the brother of his partner; and also against his partner, T. S. Burbank charging fraud between the two Burbanks to defeat his rights, and claiming that Edward W. Burbank owed the firm of Bigelow & Burbank a certain sum of money, one half of which he asks that the court compel Edward W. Burbank to pay to him. T. S. Burbank, before answering, filed a per emptory exception, and the suit was dismissed as to him. Edward W. Burbank, after a general answer of denial, also filed a peremptory exception. The court overruled this peremptory exception on the ground that it "came too late." The case went to the jury, and a verdict was rendered for $13,864.34 in favor of the plaintiff, Bigelow; whereupon the defendant sued out his writ of error. Messrs. C. Cushing and W. W. Boyce, for appellant: The action in this case is brought by one partner against a debtor of the partnership, the other partner not being joined in the action. It is submitted that no such action can be maintained. This is so clearly the case in courts of common law, that it is not deemed necessary to cite authorities. Nor can such action be maintained by the Louisiana practice. Cutler v. Cochran, 13 La. 482; Hyde v. Brashear, 19 La. 402; Babcock v. Same, 19 La. 404; Crozier v. Hodge, 3 La. 358; Dick v. Dunlap, 1 Rob. La. 54; Shipman v. Hickman, 9 Rob. La. 149; Halliman v. Clark, 4 La. Ann. 180; Robb v. Bailey, 13 La. Ann. 457; Rugely v. Gill, 15 La. Ann. 509. The omission to join the proper partners as defendants is not a matter of form, but law; and the partner sued may have the case dismissed. Dougart v. Desangle, 19 Rob. 430. If it appear on the pleading that another should have been joined, who had been omitted, the defendant may demur, arrest the judgment or bring a writ of error. Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 418; Wilson v. Lenox, 1 Cranch, 194; U. S. Bank v. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171; Suydam v. Williamson, 20 How. 433, 15 L. ed. 980; Farni v. Tesson, 1 Black, 309, 17 L. ed. 67; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 661, 18 L. ed. 82; Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669; Slacum v. Pomeroy, 6 Cranch, 221; Garland v. Davis, 4 How. 131; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 410. It is submitted, therefore, that the judgment in this case should be arrested, without reference to the peremptory exception filed by the defendant below. But it is clear that exception was in time, and should have been admitted by the judge on the trial. See Tutrix v. Porte, 18 La. Ann. 456, "An exception in which case the court says: that plaintiff is absolutely without right to stand in judgment may be impleaded at any stage of the proceedings." See article 346, Code of Practice of Louisiana, which declares that "Peremptory exceptions founded in law may be pleaded in every stage of the action previous to the definitive judgment, but they was pleaded specially, and sufficient time allowed to adverse party to bring his evidence." The peremptory exception in this case founded in law, and sufficient time allowed the adverse party to bring his evidence, because the facts set forth in the peremptory exception were set forth in plaintiff's petition. Mr. Thomas J. Durant, for defendant in error: The exception of the plaintiff in error, defendant below, E. W. Burbank, was nothing of this sort; it came, therefore, too late, and the judge properly overruled it. The case of Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 418, disposes of the only question raised by the record in the present case. Where the record shows that no question under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act was passed upon by the state court, no ground appears of jurisdiction in this court over the judgment, and the writ of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. [Nos. 329, 330, 331.] Argued Jan. 8, 1869. Decided Jan. 11, 1869. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota. IN That was an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, brought by Nicolet & Siggs as partners; in which, after issue taken on pleas in bar of These actions were brought in one of the the action, the defendants, on the day set for district courts of the State of Minnesota, by trial, filed a plea averring that Musson and oth-the defendants in error, to recover damages reers were also partners with plaintiffs, and citizens of Louisiana. The plea was stricken out by order of the court, on the ground that it came too late. This court held that such action was within the discretion of the circuit court, and would not be revised. In the case before us, the defendant below, plaintiff in error, filed his peremptory exception after the case was at issue, and on the day that it was set for trial before a jury, prayed that the suit should be dismissed, because T. S. Burbank, a partner with plaintiff in the transaction which is the foundation of this suit, was not made a plaintiff in the case. The court overruled this exception on the ground that it came too late. We were at first inclined to distinguish the two cases under the idea that the plea in the first case rested on the citizenship of the partners not joined in the suit, who, if joined, would have defeated the jurisdiction of the court. But it is expressly said in the opinion, that "the plea is to be considered as if the averment, that Musson and others were citizens of Louisiana, had not been contained in it." The point ruled in that case is identical with the one presented here, and that decision must govern this. The objection, that the matter of plaintiff's demand is one of equitable cognizance in the Federal Courts, cannot prevail. No such objection was raised in the court below, at any stage of the proceedings; and it cannot be permitted to a defendant to go to trial before a jury on the facts of a case involving fraud, and let it proceed to judgment on the verdict, without any attempt to assert the equitable character of the suit, and then raise that question for the first time in this court. As the record raises no other question for our consideration, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. WILLIAM F. DAVIDSON, Plff. in Err., V. JACOB L. STARCHER; (154 U. S. 566, Appx.) Jurisdiction over state judgment-case dismissed. NOTE. What the record must show respecting the presentation and decision of a Federal question in order to confer jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court of a writ of error to a state court-see note, 63 L.R.A. 471. sulting from the explosion of a steamboat boiler on the Mississippi River near St. Paul, and judgments were obtained by the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, on appeal, affirmed the judgments; whereupon the defendants sued out this writ of error. On motion to dismiss. Messrs. Smith and Gilman and R. P. Spalding, for defendants in error: This court can take jurisdiction over the causes, only by virtue of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. at L. 85, and it has been repeatedly decided, that to give this court jurisdiction under said section 25, it must appear on the record itself to be one of the cases enumerated in that section. Mills V. Brown, 16 Pet. 525; Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738. It is true that the Supreme Court of the State decides that the fact of the explosion of the boiler is prima facie evidence that it was caused by negligence and refers to 5 Stat. at L. page 396, sec. 13, which they treat as but an affirmance of the common law. The court also decides that it was negligence to permit the water in the boiler to fall below three inches above the flue; also that carriers of passengers by steamboat are required to employ licensed engineers; and refers to 10 Stat. at L. 69, sec. 12, and p. 67, sec. 8, sub. 10. But there is nothing in this which brings the cases within the provisions of said section 25 of the Judiciary Act. In the first place, the opinion of the court is no part of the record. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Polleys, 13 Pet. 157; Mobile v. Eslava, 16 Pet. 234. Furthermore, the decision of the state court must be against the claim set up under the law, etc., of the United States, to confer appellate jurisdiction to the court. McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat. 538; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet. 149; Walker v. Taylor, 5 How. 64; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420 (65 U. S. XVI. 740); Gordon v. Caldeleugh, 3 Cranch, 268. Mr. L. Allis, for plaintiff in error. [No brief is on file.] Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivered the opinion of the court: In these cases it appears, on looking into the record, that no question under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act was passed upon by the court. No ground appears, therefore, of jurisdiction in this court over the judgments of the state court, and the several writs of error must be dismissed for want of jurisdictiou *MADELINE HENRIETTE GIRARD, be, and another trustee appointed. That was Marguerite P. Lardy, Anne Stephanie de done in the case of The City of Coventry, who Lentilhac, and Alfred de Lentilhac, her Hus- were trustees of a charity. band, Fabricius Devars Dumaine, a minor, and Marguerite Palmire, a minor, by their next friend, John Devars Dumaine, all aliens and subjects of the French, Appts., V. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, (See S. C. 7 Wall. 1-16.) Chancellor, or Legislature, may substitute one trustee for another-Girard estate vested in Philadelphia-change of its limits or charter does not affect its title. See The Mayor of Coventry v. The Atty-Gen. 7 Bro. P. C. 235, a case cited and approved by this court in the Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. 676, 7; Dummer v. Corp. of Chippenham, 14 Ves. 245. The defendant, avoiding Soohan's Case, makes its claim, not for the present City, but for the territory and population of the late City. It could plausibly claim in no other way. Beardsworth v. Torkington, 1 Q. B. (N. S.), 782; Atty-Gen. v. Vivian, 1 Russ. 226; AttyWhen a trustee is unable longer to administer, Jackson, 15 Pa. 44; Soohan v. Philadelphia, 33 Gen. v. Grant, 1 P. Wms. 669; Plymouth v. the charities or trusts do not fail, but the Chancellor will substitute another trustee. The sovereign, by legislation (if needed) may have the charities properly administered. The residue of the estate of Stephen Girard, at the time of his death, was, by his will, vested in the Corporation of Philadelphia on trusts, which it was fully competent to execute. valid legal By the supplement to the Act incorporating the City, commonly called the "Consolidation Act," the identity of the Corporation is not destroyed. The change in its name, the enlargement of its area, or increase in the number of its corporators, cannot affect its title to property held at the time of such change. Pa. 9. It is a principle of law that the Legislature, in altering the franchises, cannot affect individual rights in the case of public more than private corporations. Terret v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52; Stormfeltz v. Manor, etc. 13 Pa. 560; St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 503; Bailey v. Mayor of N. Y. 3 Hill, 531; 2 Kent, Com. 275; Story, Const. § 1387. county municipalities is to render impossible The effect of consolidating the City with the The Corporation, under its amended charter, has the performance of the municipal uses devised. every capacity to hold, and every power and authority necessary to execute, the trusts of the will.dation, to perform these municipal uses for the Grant arithmetical possibility, since consoli[No. 24.] Argued Jan. 7, 1869. benefit of the territory and population of the late City; the devise was to a municipal disPPEAL from the Circuit Court of the Unit-ferred to the municipal discretion of the councretion of the late City, and cannot be transAed States for the Eastern District of ty. It comes within the rule in cases of Pennsylvania. Decided Jan. 18, 1869. The case is stated by the court. Mr. Girard's devise of the remainder of the residue of his estate was not an absolute, but a strictly limited, devise. To the questions before the court, it matters not whether the devise is properly or improperly called by the testator in his will, a trust. His meaning is clear enough. The estate was limited, not absolute. The devisees took in trust for certain limited specified objects, and for none other. It was an office to be performed by the devisee. 2 Jarm. Wills, 198; Lewin, Trusts, 171, Vol. 24, Law. Lib. Any expression in a will showing the testator's intention, limits the devised estate accordingly. The word "trust" in a will means only what is required to effect the intentions of the testator. 1 Jarm. 796; 2 Jarm. 198, 273; 1 Pow. Dev. 223; Doe v. Norton, 11 Mees. & W. 923; Inglis ▼. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 119; 2 Co. Litt. 7, 8; 3 Com. Dig. 90, Condition, a, 4; 4 Ibid. 173, 4; Estate by Devise, n. 9. A corporation, being trustee of a charity, is looked upon in equity as an individual. Grant, Corp. 118. The college trustees and beneficiaries were different parties. The trustee was the City, but the beneficiaries were not the City. They were certain orphans to be educated by the City, at the expense of the trust. Should the City abuse the college trust, they might be removed by the courts, as an individual might NOTE.-Municipal corporation as trustee of a charity-see note, 14 L.R.A. 69. 7 WALL. grants or devises to personal discretion. Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 386, 15 L. ed. P. & E. R. Co. 27 Pa. 402; Ommanney v. 87; Hibbard v. Lamb, Ambl. 309; Mercer Co. v. Butcher, 1 Turn. & R. 260; Lee v. Young, 2 Bradford v. Belfield, 2 Sim. 264; Hill, Trust, You. & Col. 532; Cole v. Wade, 16 Ves. 46; 485; Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. 335. strongly against the pretension to hold for terThere is a class of English cases which bears ritory and population and not for the City. Gen. v. Davies, 9 Ves. 535; Chapman v. Brown, Atty-Gen. v. Whitchurch, 3 Ves. 141; Atty239; Clark v. Taylor, 21 Eng. L. & E. 308; 6 Ves. 404; Blandford v. Thackerell, 2 Ves. Jr. Grieves v. Case, I Ves. Jr. 548. The defendants say the consolidated charter that they cannot be held to conditions which was imposed on them by a legislative Act, and have been made impossible by act of law. Let it be admitted that estates on condition, originally, become absolute if afterwards the fulfillment of the condition be made impossible by the grantor, or by the act of God or of the law. This is not such a case. Though the devisee took an estate limited or conditioned to certain uses, the condition was not in abatement of the gift; it was the gift itself. But is it true in fact or law that the charter dence taken in the court below shows the petiwas "imposed" on the defendants? The evition for consolidation of the corporators to the Legislature was accompanied by a draft of the Consolidation Act as afterwards passed; it shows the approval of this proceeding of the corporators by the authorities of the Corporation; it shows the unanimous vote of the Phila |