facture a large quantity of distilled spirits, to wit: 100,000 gallons, and did neglect to make a true entry and report of the same, and did not from day to day make a true entry in a book kept for that purpose of the number of gallons by him distilled, and also of the number of gallons by him placed in warehouse, and of the number of gallons by him sold and removed for consumption and sale, and the proof thereof, and that he did not cause the same to be done.

(2) That the said Hodson did not conform to the provisions of said Act and Acts in this, to wit: that he did sell and remove from his distillery, for consumption and sale, a large quantity of distilled spirits manufactured by him to wit: 50,000 gallons, and did neglect to render to the assessor or assistant assessor of the said Second Collection District, etc. a true account in duplicate, taken from his books, of the number of gallons of spirits distilled by him, and also of the number of gallons sold and removed for consumption and 404*] sale. *(3) That the said Hodson did not conform to the laws aforesaid in this, to wit: that he did remove from his distillery a large quantity, to wit: 100,000 gallons of spirits, then and there by him manufactured, upon which duties were by law imposed, and which duties he neglected to pay.

(4) And that the said Hodson did not conform to the provisions of the laws aforesaid in this, to wit: that he did manufacture a large quantity of spirits, to wit: 100,000 gallons, and did remove the same from his distillery for consumption and sale, before the same were inspected, gauged and branded by an inspector appointed to perform such duties, and did neglect to cause the spirits so removed to be inspected, gauged and branded before the same were removed, as aforesaid. The defendants filed a rejoinder, specially traversing each of the breaches assigned, and concluded to the country. This put the cause at issue. Upon the trial the United States offered in evidence the bond and proof of the several breaches. The defendants objected to the evidence upon the ground that the conditions were not required by, and were not in conformity with, the statutes of the United States. The court sustained the objection and excluded all the evidence. A verdict and judgment were thereupon rendered for the defendants. The United States excepted, and have brought this ruling here for review.

The only inquiry presented for our consideration is the validity of the bond upon which the suit was founded.

It would have been more regular to raise the question by a demurrer after oyer or by a motion in arrest of judgment. But if the bond were void it was competent for the defendants to raise the objection at any stage of the trial. The court was not bound to proceed further, when it became clear that, whatever the verdict, the plaintiff could not recover. To proIceed with the trial under such circumstances would have been idly to waste the time of the court and trifle with the forms of justice.

The bond was taken under the 53d section 405] of the Act of June 30th, 1864, ch. 173 (13 Stat. at L. 242). That section required a bond to be given by every licensed distiller,

and prescribes its conditions. They are, substantially:

That if the distiller shall use any additional still he will report the fact to the assessor. That he will from day to day enter in book to be kept for that purpose, the number of gallons that may be distilled, and the quantity of grain he may use; and that the book shall be open at all times to the inspection of the assessor.

That he will render to the assessor on the 1st, 11th and 21st days of each month an account in writing of the number of gallons distilled, of the number placed in warehouse, and of the number sold or removed for consumption and sale, and also of the quantity of grain used for the fractional part of a month next preceding the report, and the proof there. of, which report is to be verified by affidavit.

That he will not sell, or permit to be removed for consumption and sale, any spirits distilled under his license until they have been inspected, gauged, proved and entered upon his books, as aforesaid.

And that he will at the time of rendering his account to the collector pay the duty imposed by law upon such spirits.

It is not denied that all the breaches are within the requirements of the statute touching the bond, except that part of the first one, which is, that the licensee did not, from day to day, "make true and exact entry thereof in a book to be kept for that purpose, of the number of gallons by him placed in warehouse, and the number of gallons by him sold and removed for consumption and sale, and the proof thereof." It is said the statute required him to do this, but did not require him to give a bond that he would do so. The statute required the bond to be conditional that he would, from day to day, enter in a book to be kept for that purpose, the [*406 number of gallons distilled; that the book should be open to the inspection of the assessor; that he would render, at the time specified, "an exact account in writing" of the number of gallons sold or removed for sale and consumption, and the proof thereof; and that he would not sell, or permit to be sold or removed, for consumption or sale, any spirits distilled by him until the quantity had been "duly entered upon his books, as aforesaid." Considering these provisions together, we think the implication clear, that they require such an account to be kept as the breach alleges was not kept, and that if the conditions, as prescribed, had been set out at length in the bond, such would have been their legal effect. The first part of the 57th section is silent as to the bond, but is explicit as to the account, and strongly supports the conclusion at which we have arrived. The question must be considered in the light of the entire context bearing upon the subject. What is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed. U. S. v. Babbitt, 1 Black, 55, 17 L. ed, 94.

Revenue statutes are not to be regarded as penal and, therefore, to be construed strictly. They are remedial in their character, and to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of their enactment. Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 145, 18 L. ed. 121.

We hold this, like all the other breaches, to be within the conditions which the statute enacts the bond shall contain.

In one view of the case, this fact is important; in another and perhaps more important one, it is no wise material. Both will be presently considered.

The record is silent as to any coercion or duress. The bond is, therefore, to be considered a voluntary one. U. S. v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 345. A bond in this form is not prohib. ited by the statute, nor is it contrary to pub lic policy. It was founded upon a sufficient consideration, and was intended to subserve a lawful purpose.

In U. S. v. Tingey, 5 Pet. 127, the suit was 407*] upon the bond of a purser in the Navy. The statute declared "that every purser, before entering on the duties of his office, shall give bond, with two or more sufficient sureties, in the penalty of $2,000, conditioned faithfully to perform all the duties of purser in the Navy of the United States." Act of Mar. 30, 1812, ch. 47, 2 Stat. at L. 699. The court said "It is obvious that the condition of the present bond is not in the terms prescribed by the Act and it is not limited to the duties or disbursements of Deblois as purser, but creates a liability for all moneys received by him, and for all public property committed to his care, whether officially as purser or otherwise." The bond was held to be valid. The decision was put upon the grounds that the Government had the capacity to make the contract, that the United States were a body politic, and that, as incident to its general right of sovereignty, it was competent to enter into any contract not prohibited by law, and found to be expedient in the just exercise of the powers confided to it by the Constitution. Dugan v. U. S. 3 Wheat. 172, was referred to as sustaining this proposition. It was remarked that a different principle would involve a denial to the General and State Governments of the ordinary rights of sovereignty. In conclusion, it was said, in relation to the bond there in question, "The United States have a political capacity to take it. We see no objection to its validity in a legal or moral view." Tingey, who was & surety, pleaded, among other things, in the court below, that the bond "was under color and pretense of said Act of Congress and, under color of office, required and extorted from the said Deblois, and from the defendant, as one of his sureties, against the form and effect of the said statutes, by the then Secretary of the Navy." The United States demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, and gave judgment for the defendant. The United States prosecuted a writ of error. This court neld the plea sufficient and affirmed the judgment.

In the case of U. S. v. Bradley, 10 Pet. 343, 408*] the views of the court expressed in U. S. v. Tingey [supra] were restated and, upon the fullest consideration, were reaffirmed.

U. S. v. Linn, 15 Pet. 290, was an action against a receiver of public moneys and his sureties. The statute in that case required that the receiver should "give bond, with approved security, in the sum of $10,000, for the faithful discharge of his trust." The instrument given was without seal and was,

therefore, not the security required by the statute. The counsel for the defendants insisted that the instrument was void for the reasons, among others, that it was not the form of security required by the statute; that the prescribing of one security was an implied prohibition of all others, and that if the instrument in question could be sustained, the statute might in all cases be disregarded and a mortgage of realty or personalty or any other imaginable security might be substituted for that which the statute required. The court responded: "If this is a contract, entered into by competent parties and for a lawful pur pose, not prohibited by law, and is founded upon a sufficient consideration, it is a valid contract at common law." "A mortgage, or any other approved security voluntarily given, would, no doubt, be valid."

These cases are conclusive of the question before us. Their authority has not been shaken by any later adjudication; we think they rest upon the soundest principles, and are in accordance with a wise and salutary policy. We feel no disposition to re-examine the propositions they affirm.

A narrower view of the instrument in question may be taken, which will also maintain its validity to the extent of the breaches assigned in the declaration. It is a settled principle of law that where a bond contains conditions, some of which are legal and others illegal, and they are severable and separable, the latter may be disregarded and the former enforced. Applying this principle to the case before us, all which this instrument contains with reference to statutes other than [*409 the Act of 1864, under which it was taken, may be rejected, and the generality of the reference to that Act may be so limited as to include only what is covered by the conditions prescribed by the statute, as if those conditions were incorporated and set out in the bond in hæc verba. An authority exactly in point for this eonstruction is found in the well considered case of Ohio v. Findley, 10 Ohio, 51. The principal in the bond in that case was a county treasurer. The bond was conditioned that he should perform his official duties according to law. The statute, as in the case before us, was specific in its requirements as to what the bond should contain, and the condition, it was admitted, largely exceeded them. The court said: "That part which is legal is marked out in the statute book itself, and is, therefore, as completely severable from the rest as if the two parts were separated in the condition of the bond."

But we prefer to place our judgment upon the broader ground marked out by the adjudications of this court, to which we have referred. Everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorance standing alone can never be the basis of a legal right. If a bond is liable to the objection taken in this case and the parties are dissatisfied, the objection should be made when the bond is presented for execution. If executed under constraint, the constraint will destroy it. But where it is voluntarily entered into and the principal enjoys the benefits which it is intended to secure and a breach occurs, it is then too late to raise the question of its validity. The parties are estopped from avail

THE OWNER AND CLAIMANT OF THE STEAMER KALORAMA.

(See S. C. "The Kalorama," 10 Wall. 204-218.) Lien on vessel, not dependent on registry or possession-lien for supplies-ports of other States proof of necessity of supplies-lien for supplies ordered by owner.

A lien on a vessel for repairs or supplies is a privilege in the thing and is not dependent upon possession or registry.

For repairs made on and supplies furnished to a foreign ship, the party has a lien on the ship itself for security, and he may maintain a suit in rem in the admiralty, to enforce his rights.

Ports of States, other than those where the vessel belongs, are for that purpose considered as foreign ports.

The repairer or furnisher must prove affirmatively that the ship needed such repairs and supplies.

The necessity for credit must be presumed where the repairs and supplies were ordered by the master, and they were necessary for the ship.

credit of the vessel.

The owner can order repairs and supplies on the [No. 70.]

Argued Nov. 30, 1870. Decided Dec. 12, 1870.

A

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland. The libel in this case was filed by the appellants, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, to recover for repairs and supplies.

That court entered a decree in favor of the libelants, which, upon appeal, was reversed by the circuit court, whereupon the libelants took an appeal to this court.

The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. S. Teackle Wallis and John H. Thomas, for appellants:

There was an express agreement for liens, as security for all the items of the accounts. 10 WALL. U. S., Book 19.

If there were no such express contracts, implied liens arose from making the advances under the circumstances proven.

The Grapeshot (ante, 651).

If there are items in the accounts which cannot be maintained as maritime liens, the credits more than extinguish them, leaving a balance due for claims of an unquestionably maritime character. The law, in that event, ought to appropriate the credits to the most precarious debts-to those which are unsecured-leaving still due the balances for which there are maritime liens.

2 Greenl. Ev. sec. 533; Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch, 8.

The attachments issued out of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, were proceedings in personam, and no bar to the right to maintain these libels in rem. Creditors making advances to ships in a foreign port, are entitled to three-fold remedies-against the ship, the master, and the owners. These are cumulative, not alternative, and may all be pursued simultaneously.

Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. 589; The Paul Boggs, 1 Sprague, 369; Harmer v. Bell, 22 Eng. L. & E. 70.

The fact that the owner was in Baltimore when some of the debts were contracted, and that he ordered some of the articles from which they arose, did not prevent the accrual of a lien therefor.

The James Guy, 1 Ben., 112; Young Fall v. The James Guy, 5 Int. R. R. 109; The Hilarity, 1 Blatchf. & H. 90.

In the case of the Sultana, the lien was refused on other grounds, which would not have been alleged if the fact of the articles having been ordered by, or in the presence of, the owner had been sufficient objection.

Pratt v. Reed, 19 How. 359, 15 L. ed. 660; The Grapeshot, ante, 651.

The reduction of the amount in dispute by recoveries from other sources since the appeal, does not affect the jurisdiction of this court.

Cooke v. U. S. 2 Wall. 218, 17 L. ed. 755. Mr. Wm. Shepherd Bryan, for appellee: The advances were made in pursuance of a contract entered into with the owners personally. By this contract the appellants assumed entire charge of the steamers for a series of voyages, and were to receive the specified compensation of ten per cent. commission on the gross freights. They became the agents of the owners; freighted the ships, collected the freights, and paid their expenses.

James Pendergast speaks of it as an "enterprise" in which Pendergast, Fenwick & Co. were engaged. He also speaks of the firm as the "agent" of the owners. This agent appointed captain, officers and crew, ordered supplies, and stood in the place of owners generally. As said by this court on a similar occasion: "There is nothing in the nature of a maritime contract in the case."

Minturn v. Maynard, 17 How. 477, 15 L. ed. 235; see, also, Ward v. Thompson, 22 How. 330,

16 L. ed. 249.