Strength should be lord of imbecility,

And the rude son should strike his father dead.
Force should be right; or rather right and wrong,
Between whose endless jar justice resides,

Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will; will into appetite;

And appetite, an universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce an universal prey,
And, last, eat up himself.'

In the middle ages nobility assumed an essentially religious and somewhat of a symbolic character, which invested it with an air of venerable majesty, of which we can now only form an idea from consulting those heroic and holy annals which exhibit the lives of saints. According to the harmonious and divine philosophy of the Catholic Church, every man had his post and his honourable employment. The pride of inferiors was calmed, and the world beheld the burden, as well as the ornaments, of greatness.

The advice which St. Bernard addressed to the inferior clergy dwelling in monastic retirement, was applicable also to the laity in regard to their superiors. "Brethren," said the saint, "let us reverence the bishops, but let us fear their labours; if we think upon their labours, we shall not be desirous of their honours, nor shall we be disposed to watch, but rather to honour them. It would be inhuman to censure the works of men, of whose burden you do not feel the weight. He who is occupied in public affairs may sometimes be discerned acting and speaking less circumspectly; but let no man who remains in security at home venture to condemn him." Moreover, while the spirit of the inferior classes of men was thus tempered, princes and nobles were taught to consider themselves as

1 Troilus and Cressida, act I. sc III.

elevated for the purpose of ministering to the wants of their inferiors. "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister"; and it was an affecting appeal of St. Chrysostom, which was never lost upon the great in Catholic times, when he said, "Would it not be shameful that, in a religion which induces us to recognize Jesus Christ for our master and our sovereign master, there should be any men who wish to possess a more absolute empire than he exercised?" The great, therefore, might be humble even as the lowest servant of their hall. For it was not pride to remain in the station to which men were born, and in which the providence of God had placed them, provided they made use of it in the manner for which God designed it. Noble rank was in that event perfectly compatible with preserving the sentiments of a humble heart, with the knowledge of one's faults and misery, and with the habitual conviction, that it was something foreign to men's selves with which the order of God had invested them.1 In fact, the Church instructed all her children, that to be proud of birth, or rank, or fortune, was to be guilty of a mortal sin; and how far the spirit of nobility conformed to this principle, it shall be my endeavour to demonstrate, by facts of history, in the next book.

It is not a valid objection which some have advanced against nobility, considering it as involving men in the condition of those who seek the praise and honour of the world. "It is partly right," says St. Augustin, "that men should wish to be praised; since it is right that they should desire truth, which, although it may not be the object of praise, is yet alone worthy of praise. The good

'Bourdalone, Serm. sur l'Ambition; and Nicole, Essais de Morale, vol. II.

Master hath taught us by his Apostle, not to act well in order that we may be praised by men, having their praise for our end; and yet, for the sake of other men, to seek their praise; for when good men are praised, it is not those who are praised, but it is those who praise that are benefited; for to the one it is sufficient that they are good; but they who ought to imitate the good are to be congratulated whenever good men are praised by them, since in this manner they prove that they are pleased with goodness for thus said the Apostle, Placete omnibus per omnia, sicut et ego omnibus per omnia placeo'; adding the motive, Non quærens quod mihi utile est, sed quod multis, ut salvi fiant.''

XXI. "Of government the properties to unfold would seem in me to affect speech and discourse." I undertake not to instruct rulers, nor to follow the adventurous path of Occleve, who wrote De Regimine Principum, or of Lydgate, who composed the Governaunce of Princes. Yet nobility has conducted us to the throne of power, and we cannot retrace our steps until we have considered the principles of its foundation, as far as they are connected with the spirit and institutions of chivalry.

"The governing and being governed," says Aristotle, "is not merely to be classed with things unavoidable, but with those also which are beneficial. Immediately from their birth, some things are set apart for being governed, and some to have the power of governing; and there are many forms of being governed and of governing; for in all things throughout universal nature there are that which governs and that which is governed; not merely in all things that have life, but even in those which are without life there is a certain ruling power as a harmony."

1 S. Augustin. ad Darium Epist. CCXXXI.
Polit. lib. I, c. 2.

Socrates thus examines Lysis: "Tell me, O Lysis, do your father and mother greatly love you?' 'Yes, that they do, truly,' replied the youth. Therefore they wish you to become as happy as possible?' 'How could it be otherwise?' Does

a serving-man, who can do nothing that he wishes, seem to you to be happy?' 'No, truly.' 'Therefore, if your father and mother wish you to bo happy, it is clear they must also have such desires respecting you as will enable you to be happy.' "Certainly." 'Do they then suffer you to do whatever you like, and do they hinder you from nothing?' 'No, indeed, far otherwise, O Socrates, for they hinder me from many things.' What do you say? Wishing you to be happy, do they hinder you from doing what you wish? Answer me to this: if you should wish to mount into one of your father's chariots and take the reins, when he goes to contend, would he not permit you?' 'No, truly, he would not permit me.' How then? My father has a hired servant to be charioteer.' 'What! do they rather permit a hired servant than you to do what he pleases with the horses, and, in addition, do they give him money for his pains? At least, I suppose they allow you to take charge of the mulechariots and to manage the reins, and to take the whip and flog them?' 'A likely thing, indeed, that they should allow me to do so!' 'What, may no one whip them?' 'Yes, to be sure, the muleteer may.' 'Is he a servant or a free man?' 'A servant.' 'So then they seem to think more of a servant than of you their son, and they permit him to do many things which they will not allow you to touch, and he may do what he likes, and you cannot do what you like; and again answer me to this: do they allow you to be your own master or not?' 'Not they, indeed.' 'What, does any one command you?' Yes, this pedagogue here. Is he also a

servant? That he is, our own.' 'O awful calamity a free man to be ruled by a slave! But what does this pedagogue do?' 'He takes me to school.' What, are there masters to rule over you?' There are, assuredly.' So your father gives you abundance of tyrants. But say, when you return home to your mother, does she permit you to do what you like, that you may be happy? to meddle with the wool and the spindle whilst she is weaving? Does she permit you to handle the comb, the shuttle, or any other of the instruments?' Here the lad began to laugh. By Jove, O Socrates, she would not only prevent me, but she would beat me soundly, if I were to lay a finger on them.' 'O Hercules! have you ever injured your father or mother?' 'Not I, truly.' But then, for what crime or cause do they so horridly hinder you from being happy and doing what you like; and why do they bring you up in such a way, day after day, that you are always obeying some one, and, in short, that you can never do what you like? You are not master of any thing, O Lysis; you have not power to do any thing which you desire !'"'!

This dialogue is intended to expose the absurdity of the political sophists, who inflame the minds of men with a vague idea of a state of liberty, for which they are disqualified by the very constitution of their nature, insomuch that every attempt to acquire it is sure to occasion the loss, in some degree, of the real freedom which is essential to their happiness. Their ordinances are to maintain liberty, order, right, and justice, "quæ cum magnifice primo dici videntur, considerata minus probantur." The sense of each man, and the nature of things, and truth itself, discovered by experience,

1 Plato, Lysis.