NARRATIVE, &c.

A REQUISITION having been made by the general government for a body of New York militia, it was the pleasure of Gov. Tompkins to appoint Gen. Stephen Van Rensselaer to take command of the forces which should be raised for the defence of the northern and western frontiers of this State, in answer to that requisition. That officer entered upon his command on the 13th of July, 1812, having done me the honour to request my services as his aid. I was anxious to serve my country in the contest in which she was engaged, and I did not hesitate, therefore, to take the situation thus offered me.

On reaching the Niagara frontier towards the middle of August, the General found his troops scattered along the whole line of the river, and exposed to be cut up in detail. Having inspected his ground, his resolution was promptly taken to concentrate his forces at Lewiston. Orders to that effect were immediately given. His camp was formed, and the duties of discipline and instruction were entered upon without delay. From the moment of his assuming the command, his position was one of the utmost exposure and danger. He lay within sight of a powerful enemy, separated from him only by a narrow river, for the crossing of which, that enemy possessed every facility. He had a line of thirty-six iniles to guard, and his whole force was considerably less than one thou

sand men, many of them without shoes, and all of them clamorous for pay: Of ammunition, there were not ten rounds per man, and no lead: There was not one piece of heavy ordnance in the whole line, and there were no artillerists to man the few light pieces which we possessed. Add to this, that the troops could not take or keep the field, for want of tents and covering; that the medi cal department, if one could be said to exist at all, was utterly destitute of every thing necessary for the comfort of the sick or the disabled; and that there was among the men that entire want of subordination, to say nothing of discipline, which always characterizes raw militia; and some idea may be formed of the condition of our army.

The condition of the forces on the opposite bank of the river, was in contrast with ours in every particular. There was a well appointed, and well found army, under the most exact discipline, and commanded by skilful and experienced officers. Every important post, from Fort Erie to Fort George, was in a defensible state, and the enemy had possessed himself of a very commanding position on the heights of Queenstown, which he was rendering every day more secure and formidable. He had, moreover, the mastery of the Lakes, and was at that moment industriously employed in using that advantage to increase his numbers, and add to his supplies at Niagara.

In this state of things, the armistice which had been concluded between Gen. Dearborn and the Governor General of Canada, was announced to Gen. Van Rensselaer, and it became necessary to settle with the commander of the British forces opposite to us, terms of an arrangement for the government of the armies on the

* On the first of September, he had only 691 men fit for duty,

Niagara, during the continuance of the armistice. The performance of this duty was assigned to me, and a suggestion having been made by me to that effect, I had the authority of General Van Rensselaer to attempt such an arrangement, as, besides securing the objects contemplated by Gen. Dearborn, might enable us, pending the armistice, to use the waters of the Ontario, as a common and undisturbed highway for the purposes of transpor

tation. My interview with Gen. Sheaffe, on this mission, was one full of interest. As was anticipated, the terms proposed by me were met not only with objec tions, but at first by an unequivocal refusal to accede to them. The following clause, proposed and insisted on, on the part of the British General, will serve to show how wide of each other were our respective views and interests. "It is moreover to be distinctly understood, that there is not any thing in the foregoing articles, to be construed into granting facilities for the forwarding of troops, stores, &c., which did not exist before the declaration of the armistice, farther than they are to pass unmolested as therein provided, in the mode and by the routes assigned to them prior to the cessation of hostilities." The result of a protracted discussion, however, was an agreement which confined the restrictions to the movements of troops, stores, &c., to the country above Fort Erie, and left such movements elsewhere, entirely unshackled and free.

The importance of this arrangement has never been sufficiently appreciated. The immediate and pressing necessity for it on our part, was, that without it, the ordnance and supplies intended for our army, having been collected at Oswego, were not likely ever to reach us; the roads were impassable, especially for heavy cannon, and the highway of the Lake was beset by a triumphant ene

my. As soon as the negotiation was successfully completed, an express was despatched to Col. Fenwick at Oswego, to move on with his supplies with all possible expedition. But General Van Rensselaer was enabled to use this advantage for another purpose, of great importance to the service. No sooner was the way open, than an express was sent to Ogdensburgh with an order for the removal of nine vessels from that place to Sackett's Harbour. To this movement was Commodore Chauncey indebted for the ascendancy which he for a time was enabled to maintain on the lake, and without which the subsequent descent at Little York could not have been attempted.

Col. Fenwick had not arrived, when orders were received from Gen. Dearborn, to put an end to the armistice. He was, however, as it turned out, then approaching his place of destination, at which he shortly afterwards arrived. He was directed, out of abundant caution, to land at the Four Mile Creek, instead of attempting to reach Fort Niagara. As soon as this was effected, and in the same morning, having been charged with the delivery of the notice terminating the armistice, to the British Commandant, I crossed over from the Fort to discharge the duties of this mission, which I did in a personal interview with Gen. Sheaffe.

It will be seen by a reference to the documents collected in the appendix to this Narrative, that from the first, Gen. Van Rensselaer acted on the certain knowledge, that it was e pected of him to make a descent upon Canada at the earliest possible period. He knew that neither the government nor the country was prepared to be satisfied with defensive measures only. Nothwithstanding this, the first glance he had of his position, after he reached the frontier showed him at once, that

nothing could be attempted, at least for a considerable period. Indeed his own condition was critical in the extreme, and even his ability to defend himself in case of attack, was more than doubtful. Gen. Dearborn, the commander of this entire district, had been ordered by the Secretary of War, in his instructions of the 1st of August, to make a diversion in favour of Gen. Hull, at Niagara. There was no preparation to do any thing effectual under this order. Before Gen. Van Rensselaer reached the frontier, Gen. Brock was on his way, with a competent force withdrawn from his posts on the Niagara, to meet Gen. Hull, leaving behind him however, a force abundantly sufficient, with the reinforcements they were then receiving, for the protection of the posts he had left, against any attempt which could have been made on them on our part; sufficient even to have made it quite possible to carry the war to the American side of the river, with every prospect of advantage and success.

The first relief which Gen. Van Rensselaer experienced, was in the arrival of Col. Fenwick, with ordnance and stores, on the 4th day of September, as already related. Before this, however, and while as yet not a man had appeared to reinforce his numbers, the disgraceful fall of Detroit and surrender of Gen. Hull, had been announced, and Gen. Brock had been actually seen returning to this frontier, and conducting along the heights of Queenstown, an American army as prisoners of war. It was not much to be wondered at, that this event "spread great alarm among the inhabitants, and produced strong symptoms of distrust among the troops."

During the month which succeeded the announcement of this event, the condition and prospects of the army were, on the whole, but little improved. There was, in nearly all this time, every reason to expect an attack.