Opinion of the Court, per MARTIN, J. [Vol. 152. It requires either that the owner shall expressly consent to the particular alteration made, or that, with a knowledge of the particular object for which they are employed, he acquiesces in the means adopted for that purpose. In this case we find no evidence whatever to indicate the appellant's willingness to have these particular improvements made by Riker, or of any acquiescence upon her part in the means adopted for that purpose, unless to the extent of raising the ceiling in her store. We are, therefore, of the opinion that it cannot be properly held that there was any knowledge or conduct upon the part of the appellant from which it could be implied that she consented to the performance of the labor or the furnishing of materials for which the plaintiff sought to establish his lien. The learned referee held that knowledge upon her part was immaterial, as she might have, in some way, ascertained the fact; how we are not informed. Moreover, we are aware of no principle upon which it can be properly held that the appellant had any such opportunity to acquire knowledge of the intended alterations as to make it the equivalent of actual knowledge, so that consent on her part might be implied. That she had no such knowledge is proved and not denied. Under these circumstances, the only ground, if any, upon which the plaintiff was entitled to establish a lien upon the appellant's property, was by virtue of the written consent which was actually given. The effect of that consent has already been considered, and can at most be regarded as extending to such labor and materials are were employed in raising the ceiling in her building. But it is said, and was held by the learned General Term, that oral testimony as to the conversations which preceded the execution of the appellant's written consent was incompetent. In the first place the plaintiff is not in a position to insist upon that claim, inasmuch as the evidence was introduced by him. In the next place the general rule which excludes evidence of parol negotiations and undertakings, when offered to contradict or substantially vary the legal import of a written agreement, applies only in controversies between the parties N. Y. Rep.] Opinion of the Court, per MARTIN, J. to the instrument. (Juilliard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 529, 534; New Berlin v. Norwich, 10 Johns. 229; McMaster v. Ins. Co. of N. A., 55 N. Y. 234; Coleman v. First Nat. Bank, 53 N. Y. 388.) It is obvious that the doctrine announced by the learned General Term cannot be sustained. Indeed, the respondent's counsel contends that this evidence was admissible, and cites the foregoing cases as sustaining that doctrine. Moreover, if the contrary doctrine were upheld, it would then follow that the appellant gave no consent whatever which would render her property liable to a lien for any of the improvements made by Riker, as we have already determined that her written consent, of which the plaintiff had no knowledge, was insufficient to justify the court in holding her property liable to a lien for the labor and materials furnished by the plaintiff. Nor do we think the conclusion of the court below, that the plaintiff's lien can be sustained in equity upon the ground that the appellant was, at the expiration of the tenant's term, to have the benefit of all the alterations made, if she should so elect, can be upheld. The answer to that position is that before any consent of the appellant was obtained she was entitled, under the original lease, to all the benefit of any alterations which should be made upon the premises. So that she acquired nothing by reason of the subsequent provision to the same effect. Again, when we consider the facts in this case, any benefit she might derive from the alterations made is far from apparent. At least sixty-five feet of her party wall, both in the basement and on the first floor, have been removed, and the front taken out and changed, so that before she can enjoy her property separately she will be required to construct sixty-five feet of party wall, two stories in height, and change the entire front of her building, unless the assignee of Riker shall make such changes for her. The plaintiff knew that Riker was not the owner of the premises. He was, therefore, put upon inquiry to ascertain Riker's rights as lessee. (Spruck v. MeRoberts, supra.) Besides, there is no evidence that he was ever influenced by Opinion of the Court, per MARTIN, J. [Vol. 152. her consent, or that he knew of its existence. As we have already seen, the referee found that the appellant was in a position, before signing such consent, to ascertain the full particulars in regard to the improvements and alterations Riker proposed to make. There is no evidence to show that she was able to ascertain those facts, except so far as his statement in regard to the arch and raising the ceiling was concerned, as those were the only alterations that he mentioned to her. That she knew he intended to make others was not proved. The proof also shows that she could not have ascertained the fact from the acts of the plaintiff or Riker while making the alterations, as she was not in the city at that time. On the trial, the appellant, upon the cross-examination of the plaintiff, asked him if Riker told him whether the appellant had given him permission to alter the store. This was objected to by the plaintiff and the evidence was excluded. Under such circumstances, it is manifest that the doctrine of estoppel has no application in this case. Without further discussion of the various questions involved, we are of the opinion that the learned referee erred in finding that the appellant gave any such consent for the alteration of her building as is contemplated by the statute, or that there was any consent, express or implied, which would make her property liable to a lien therefor, unless to the extent of raising the ceiling in her store. While she consented that an arch between the two stores might be constructed, inasmuch as none was made, she cannot be held liable for its supposed cost. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event. All concur, except O'BRIEN, not voting. 33:50 Fed 823 CHARLES CURRAN, Respondent, v. LOUIS GALEN, as President 1. WORKINGMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS LEGITIMATE PURPOSES. The organization or co-operation of workingmen is not of itself against any public policy, and must be regarded as having the sanction of law, when it is for such legitimate purposes as that of obtaining an advance in the rate of wages or compensation, or of maintaining such rate. 2. RESTRICTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF LABOR - UNLAWFUL PURPOSE - PUBLIC POLICY. If the purpose of an organization or combination of workingmen is to hamper or restrict the freedom of the citizen in pursuing his lawful trade or calling, and, through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other workingmen to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions, under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, such purpose is against public policy and unlawful. 4 3. CONTRACT WITH EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATION. The fact that a contract between a workingmen's organization and an employers' association was entered into on the part of the employers with the object of avoiding disputes and conflicts with the workingmen's organization, does not legalize a plan of compelling workingmen, not in affiliation with the organization, to join it, at the peril of being deprived of their employment. Curran v. Galen, 77 Hun, 610, affirmed. (Argued January 29, 1897; decided March 2, 1897.) APPEAL from a judgment of the General Term of the The plaintiff demands damages against the defendants for large income, and had constant employment at remunerative wages. He sets forth the existence of an unincorporated association in the city of Rochester, where he was a resident, called the Brewery Workingmen's Local Assembly, 1796, Knights of Labor; which was composed of workingmen employed in the brewing business in that city and was a branch of a national organization known as the Knights of Labor. He alleges that it assumed to control by its rules and regulations the acts of its members in relation to that trade and employment, and demands and obtains from its members implicit obedience in relation thereto. Plaintiff then alleges in his complaint that the defendants Grossberger and Watts wrongfully and maliciously conspired and combined together, and with the said local assembly, for the purpose of injuring him and taking away his means of earning a livelihood, in the following manner, to wit: That in the month of November, 1890, Grossberger and Watts threatened the plaintiff that, unless he would join said local assembly, pay the initiation fee and subject himself to its rules and regulations, they and that association would obtain plaintiff's discharge from the employment in which he then was and would make it impossible for him to obtain any employment in the city of Rochester, or elsewhere, unless he became a member of said association. In pursuance of that conspiracy, upon plaintiff's refusing to become a member of said association, Grossberger and Watts and the association made complaint to the plaintiff's employers and forced them to discharge him from their employ, and, by false and malicious reports in regard to him, sought to bring him into ill-repute with members of his trade and employers and to prevent him from prosecuting his trade and earning a livelihood. The answer, in the first place, admitted all that was alleged in respect to the organization of the local assembly, as to how it was composed and as to its being a branch of the national organization of the Knights of Labor, and as to its assuming to control the acts of its members and to demand from them implicit obedience. It then denies, generally and specifically, |