Opinion of the Court. minerals. Indeed, this has often happened. We, therefore, use the term known to be valuable at the time of sale, to prevent any doubt being cast upon titles to lands afterwards found to be different in their mineral character from what was supposed when the entry of them was made and the patent issued. In the present case there is no dispute as to the mineral character of the land claimed by the plaintiff. It is upon the alleged prior occupation of it for trade and business, the same being within the settlement or town site of Deadwood, that the defendant relies as giving him a better right to the property. But the title to the land being in the United States, its occupation for trade or business did not and could not initiate any right to it, the same being mineral land, nor delay proceedings for the acquisition of the title under the laws providing for the sale of lands of that character. And those proceedings had gone so far as to vest in the plaintiff a right to the title, before any steps were taken by the probate judge of the county to enter the town site at the local land office. The complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that on the 20th of November, 1877, the plaintiff applied to the United States land office at Deadwood to enter the land as a placer mining claim, and that on the 31st of January, 1878, he did enter it as such by paying the government price therefor. No adverse claim was ever filed with the register and receiver of the local land office, and the entry was never cancelled nor disapproved by the officers of the Land Department at Washington. right of the government, therefore, passed to him; and though its deed, that is, its patent, was not issued to him until January 31, 1882, the certificate of purchase, which was given to him. upon the entry, was, so far as the acquisition of title by any other party was concerned, equivalent to a patent. It was not until the 28th of July following that the probate judge entered the town site. The land had then ceased to be the subject of sale by the government. It was no longer its property; it held the legal title only in trust for the holder of the certifi cate. Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210, 218. When the patent was subsequently issued, it related back to the inception of the right of the patentee. The Opinion of the Court. The position that the patent to the plaintiff should have contained a reservation excluding from its operation all buildings and improvements not belonging to him, and all rights necessary or proper to the possession and enjoyment of the same, has no support in any legislation of Congress. The land officers, who are merely agents of the law, had no authority to insert in the patent any other terms than those of conveyance, with recitals showing a compliance with the law and the conditions which it prescribed. The patent of a placer mining claim carries with it the title to the surface included within the lines of the mining location, as well as to the land beneath the surface. The act of Congress of May 10, 1872, contemplates the purchase of the land on which valuable mineral deposits are found; and its provisions in this respect are retained in the Revised Statutes, § 2319. Whilst we hold that a title to known valuable mineral land cannot be acquired under the town-site laws, and, therefore, could not be acquired to the land in controversy under the entry of the town site of Deadwood by the probate judge of the county in which that town is situated, we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion against the validity of the entry, so far as it affected property other than mineral lands, if there were any such at the time of the entry. The acts of Congress relating to town sites recognize the possession of mining claims within their limits; and in Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U. S. 447, 449, we said that "land embraced within a town site on the public domain, when unoccupied, is not exempt from location and sale for mining purposes; its exemption is only from settlement and sale under the pre-emption laws of the United States. Some of the most valuable mines in the country are within the limits of incorporated cities, which have grown up on what was, at its first settlement, part of the public domain; and many of such mines were located and patented after a regular municipal government had been established. Such is the case with some of the famous mines of Virginia City, in Nevada. Indeed, the discovery of a rich mine in any quarter is usually followed by a large settlement in its immediate neighborhood, and the consequent organization Opinion of the Court. of some form of local government for the protection of its members." It would seem, therefore, that the entry of a town site, even though within its limits mineral lands are found, would be as important to the occupants of other lands as if no mineral lands existed. Nor do we see any injury resulting therefrom, nor any departure from the policy of the government, the entry and the patent being inoperative as to all lands known at the time to be valuable for their minerals, or discovered to be such before their occupation or improvement for residences or business under the town-site title. The The claim of the defendant, under the second special plea, to allowance for improvements made upon the property, is as untenable as his claim to the title. It is asserted under a statute of the Territory, which provides that "in an action for the recovery of real property, upon which permanent improvements have been made by a defendant, or those under whom he claims, holding under color of title, adversely to the claim of the plaintiff, in good faith, the value of such improvements must be allowed as a counterclaim by such defendant." case presented by the defendant is not covered by the provisions of this law. There can be no color of title in an occupant who does not hold under any instrument, proceeding, or law, purporting to transfer to him the title or to give to him the right of possession. And there can be no such thing as good faith in an adverse holding, where the party knows that he has no title, and that, under the law, which he is presumed to know, he can acquire none by his occupation. Here the defendant knew that the title was in the United States, that the lands were mineral, and were claimed as such by the plaintiff, and that title to them could be acquired only under the laws providing for the sale of lands of that character; and there is no pretence that he ever sought, or contemplated seeking the title to them as such lands, or claimed possession of them under any local customs or rules of miners in the district. Judgment affirmed. Statement of Facts. SPARKS & Another v. PIERCE & Others. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA. Submitted October 14, 1885.-Decided November 16, 1885. Mere occupancy of the public lands and making improvements thereon give no vested right therein as against the United States or any purchaser from them. To entitle a party to relief in equity against a patent of the government he must show a better right to the land than the patentee, such as, in law should have been respected by the officers of the Land Department, and being respected would have given him the patent. It is not sufficient to show that the patentee ought not to have received the patent. A person who makes improvements upon public land, knowing that he has no title, and that the land is open to exploration and sale for its minerals, and makes no effort to secure the title to it as such, under the laws of Congress, or a right of possession under the local customs and rules of miners, has no claim to compensation for his improvements as an adverse holder in good faith, when such sale is made to another and the title is passed to him by a patent of the United States. This was an action to recover a parcel of mining ground, situated in Lawrence County, in the Territory of Dakota, and claimed by the plaintiffs under a patent of the United States, bearing date March 22, 1880, and issued to them upon an entry made November 30, 1877. The complaint alleged that, on the 11th of December, 1878, the plaintiffs were the owners in fee and possessed of the demanded premises, deriving their title under the said patent of the United States, founded upon the entry mentioned; that afterwards, on the 12th of said December, while they were thus seized and possessed of the premises, the defendants, without right or title, entered upon them, ousted the plaintiffs therefrom, and had ever since unlawfully withheld them to the damage of the plaintiffs of five hundred dollars. It also alleged that the value of the rents and profits of the premises from the entry of the defendants had been ten dollars a month; and it prayed judgment for the possession of the premises, for the damages sustained, and for the rents and profits lost. The answer of the defendants denied generally the several Statement of Facts. allegations of the complaint, except as stated therein, and then set up specially, by way of counterclaim, various matters which they contended constitute in equity a good defence to the action and entitles them to a portion, at least, of the demanded premises, or to compensation for their improvements thereon. The matters set forth as grounds for equitable relief were alleged upon information and belief, and were substantially these: That on the 28th of February, 1877, the land in controversy, with other land adjacent thereto, was appropriated and occupied as a town site and for town-site purposes, and as such was laid out into lots, blocks, streets and alleys, and designated as Central City, having at that time about one hundred inhabitants; that this number increased until, on March 22, 1880, the date of the plaintiffs' patent, the place became an important one, containing about two thousand inhabitants; That on the said 28th of February, 1877, the grantor of the defendants was in the peaceful occupation and possession of the land in controversy as a lot in said Central City, and that on the 12th of December, 1878, he sold them the lot with the improvements thereon for a valuable consideration; That after the said 28th of February, 1877, the plaintiffs, without legal right, caused certain ground within the town site, including that in controversy, to be surveyed for a placer mining claim, and an application for a patent based upon that survey to be filed in the United States land office at Deadwood, in the county of Lawrence; That, within the time required by law, the inhabitants of the town, including the grantor of the defendants, filed a protest in the land office against the issuing of the patent, basing the protest upon the ground, among other things, that the land was subject to the prior rights of the town-site occupants, and was not mineral; but that,. notwithstanding the protest, the local land officers, on the 30th of November, 1877, received from the plaintiffs the price of the land as a placer claim, and the fees prescribed by law, and allowed their entry of the same; that, subsequently, on the 22d of April, 1877, the Commis |