Statement of the Case.

of his being so licensed or authorized, and take an oath that he will honestly demean himself in the practice of the law, and to the best of his ability execute his office of attorney-atlaw; and also, when he is licensed in this State, take the oath of fidelity to the Commonwealth."

It was for the Supreme Court of Appeals to construe the statute of Virginia in question, and to determine whether the word "person" as therein used is confined to males, and whether women are admitted to practise law in that Commonwealth.

THE HAYTIAN REPUBLIC.

Leave denied.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH

CIRCUIT.

No. 1136. Argued April 27, 1894. Decided May 26, 1894.

When a vessel, libelled for smuggling and for violations of the Chinese Exclusion Act, is discharged on giving the bond required by law, it may be again libelled in another district for similar offences, alleged to have been committed prior to the offences charged in the first libel; but, if both suits proceed to judgment, there can be but one forfeiture of the vessel.

ON June 7, 1893, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Washington, the United States libelled the steamship Haytian Republic for violations of the "Chinese Exclusion Act," and for smuggling opium. It was averred that the violations of the Exclusion Act occurred at the following dates: 1st, September 20, 1892; 2d, October 8, 1892; 3d, October 12, 1892; 4th, October 15 and 16, 1892; 5th, November 1, 1892; 6th, November 26, 1892; 7th, December 12, 1892; 8th, December 13, 1892; 9th, January 2, 1893; 10th, January 26, 1893; 11th, February 2, 1893; 12th, March 28, 1893; 13th, May 11, 1893.

The offences of opium smuggling, according to the libel, were committed as follows:

Statement of the Case.

November 21, 1892, at Portland, Oregon, 2000 pounds, of the value of $22,000; December 7, 1892, at St. Johns, on the Columbia River, 1000 pounds, of the value of $11,000.

The prayer was for the forfeiture of the vessel on account of the violations of the Exclusion Act, and for judgment for $32,000, the value of the opium, with recognition of a lien on the ship for that amount.

The Northwest Loan and Trust Company claimed the vessel, and, after due appraisement, she was bonded.

On the 6th day of July, 1893, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon, the United States again libelled the same steamship for violations of the Chinese Exclusion Act and for smuggling opium. In this libel it was alleged that the violations of the act were committed at the following dates: 1st, October 29, 1892; 2d, June 14, 1893; and 3d, June 28, 1893, all at the port of Portland, Oregon. And the opium smuggling was charged as follows:

1st, October 29, 1892, at Portland, Oregon, 1640 cans, containing 820 pounds, of the value of $9840; 2d, December 27, 1892, at St. Johns, Oregon, 1000 pounds, valued at $12,000.

The prayer of this second libel was for forfeiture of the vessel for the violations of the Exclusion Act and for judg ment for $28,840, the value of the opium, with recognition of a lien on the vessel for that amount.

On the 14th of July, 1893, an amended libel was filed, charging the smuggling of opium, 1st, on July 28, 1892, Willamette River, 300 pounds of opium, of the value of $3300; 2d, on August 30, 1892, on the Columbia River, near the mouth of the Willamette River, of 800 pounds, of the value of $8800; 3d, on the 2d of September, 1892, near Swan Island, 1400 pounds, worth $15,400; 4th, on the 27th of January, 1893, at Portland, Oregon, 1200 pounds, worth $11,220; and 5th, on the 22d of February, 1893, at Portland, Oregon, 900 pounds, value $9900.

The prayer of the amended libel was also for the forfeiture of the vessel, and for a decree for the penalty to the value of the opium, which was $48,620, with lien upon the vessel.

The original and amended libel claimed, therefore, the for

Argument for Appellees.

feiture of the vessel for three violations of the Chinese Exclusion Act, the first occurring in October, 1892, and the two last after June 7, 1893; and also sought to enforce against the vessel an aggregate penalty of $77,460 for seven acts of opium smuggling, which, they charged, had taken place at various dates between the 28th of July, 1892, and the 22d of February, 1893.

Thus, all the offences against the Chinese Exclusion Act, charged by these libels, except the two last, occurred prior to June 7, 1893, the date of the filing of the libel in the District Court of Washington, and all the offences of opium smuggling therein charged occurred prior to the filing of the suit in Washington.

The Northwest Loan and Trust Company appeared as claimant in the new suit. It excepted to all the averments as to violations of the Exclusion Act and smuggling which, according to the allegations, were committed before the filing of the suit in the District of Washington. Its exception, therefore, covered all the charges of smuggling opium and one of the charges of violation of the Chinese Exclusion Act. To the two averments of violation of the act, which were not excepted to, an answer was filed.

The court sustained the exception and dismissed the libels, except as to the two charges of violation of the Exclusion Act subsequent to the filing of the suit in the Washington District. As to these, it held that the averments of the libel stated no violation of the laws of the United States.

The case was taken by appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. This action of the Circuit Court of Appeals was brought up for review under a writ of certiorari.

Mr. Solicitor General for the United States.

Mr. John H. Mitchell for the steamship Haytian Republic and for The Northwest Loan and Trust Company.

The well-settled rule, which requires the boundaries of the jurisdictions of courts of equal jurisdiction in different States or

Argument for Appellees.

districts, both as to persons and subject-matter, to be clearly defined and recognized, to the end that proceedings in one shall not in any respect, or in the slightest degree, be obstructed or delayed by proceedings in the other, will not permit a second seizure and libel in rem against a vessel, pending seizure and proceedings thereunder in another jurisdiction, or even in the same jurisdiction, and for alleged cause or causes of forfeiture existing at the date of the first seizure. If there can, under such circumstances, be a second seizure, then there may be a third, and a fourth, or even more, in as many other districts, or even in the same district..

The right of the claimant to give bond and have the vessel released is a statutory right, one which attaches as often as a seizure occurs, but he must give bond conditioned for the payment of the full appraised value of the vessel in the event of condemnation. If there can be two or more seizures of the same vessel in as many different districts and as many different bonds given for the value of the vessel, and a decision in each case be entered in favor of the government, may not the claimant, nay, will he not, be compelled to respond on these several bonds to an amount double or treble, as the case may be, of the value of the vessel ?

The Solicitor General suggests in his brief that "If various libels filed by the government be pending in different jurisdictions, each involving a forfeiture, and a bond has been given, in a proper case a stay may be obtained, pending a speedy determination in one suit, and if a judgment of forfeiture is rendered in that suit, it would seem proper to allow it to be pleaded in bar of the other suits."

It is respectfully submitted that any rule which makes the progress of the proceedings in one district court depend on the progress or delay of similar proceedings in another district court, ought not to be regarded with favor by this court.

This being a proceeding in rem not in personam, it is clear the case does not come within the category of cases permitting separate suits as upon separate and distinct demands; on the contrary, this proceeding in rem comes clearly within the doctrine laid down by this court, speaking through

Argument for Appellees.

Mr. Justice Field, in Stark v. Starr, 94 U. S. 477, 485, where it is said: "It is undoubtedly a settled principle that a party seeking to enforce a claim legal or equitable must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, all the grounds upon which he expects a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demand and prosecute it by piecemeal, or present only a portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought, and leave the rest to be presented in a second suit, if the first fail. There would be no end to litigation if such a practice were permissible."

What was the special relief sought by the government in the proceeding in the Washington court? Simply the confiscation of the vessel. This being so, the government was "not at liberty to split up its demand and prosecute it by piecemeal."

What would be the result of a final decision either way by the Washington court as a bar to future seizures and suits for antecedent causes of forfeiture, whether such causes were or were not included in the libel in that case? The answer to this query is a proper test as to whether the Oregon court could acquire jurisdiction pending the suit in the Washington court, or if jurisdiction could attach, whether it could stand against a plea of lis pendens in the Washington court.

It is respectfully insisted such final decree in the Washington court, either condemning the vessel on the one hand, or exonerating the owner against all charges preferred on the other, would be an absolute bar to any future suit against the same vessel, either on account of the causes of forfeiture alleged in the bill or any similar antecedent causes, not included in the bill. If this be true, then a plea in abatement or bar, or exceptions filed, which amount to the same thing in effect, to the bill in the Oregon court, must abate the proceedings in that suit.

Chief Justice Marshall, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, held that, to ascertain what is embraced in a cause it is necessary to consider what will be concluded by the judgment, and a judgment is confessedly conclusive of every point which might have been raised in pleading, whether