and made it obligatory upon the company to maintain an office and sell
tickets in Kentucky at those rates. The company refusing to comply
with the requirements of this act, an indictment was found against it.
This was demurred to, and such proceedings were had thereafter
that the defendant was adjudged guilty and fined $1000, and the
judgment was sustained as constitutional by the Court of Appeals of
the State. The case being brought here by writ of error, it is by the
whole court Held, that the Kentucky act of March 3, 1890, in its effect
upon the Bridge Company, violated the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States.
3. The judges concurring in the opinion of the court, (BROWN, HARLAN,
BREWER, SHIRAS and JACKSON, JJ.,) after reviewing in detail the
course of the decisions, announce the following as their grounds for
concurring in this result and in the judgment: (1) That the traffic
across the river was interstate commerce; (2) that the bridge was
an instrument of such commerce; (3) that the statute was an
attempted regulation of such commerce, which the State had no con-
stitutional power to make; (4) that Congress alone possesses the
requisite power to enact a uniform scale of charges in such a case, the
authority of the State being limited to fixing tolls on such channels
of commerce as are exclusively within its territory.
4. The minority of the court (consisting of FULLER, C. J., and FIELD,
GRAY and WHITE, JJ.) gave the reasons for their concurrence in the
result and the judgment as follows: (1) The several States have the
power to establish and regulate ferries and bridges, and the rates of
toll thereon, whether within one State, or between two adjoining
States, subject to the paramount authority of Congress over interstate
commerce. (2) By the concurrent acts of the legislature of Ken-
tucky in 1846, and of the legislature of Ohio in 1849, this bridge
company was made a corporation of each State, and authorized to fix
rates of toll. (3) Congress, by the act of February 17, 1865, c. 39,
declared this bridge "to be, when completed in accordance with the
laws of the States of Ohio and Kentucky, a lawful structure; but
made no provision as to tolls; and thereby manifested the intention
of Congress that the rates of toll should be as established by the two
States. (4) The original acts of incorporation constituted a contract
between the corporation and both States, which could not be altered
by the one State without the consent of the other. Covington & Cin-
cinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 204.
5. Without passing upon the validity of the 5th and 14th sections of the
act of the legislature of Texas of April 3, 1891, establishing a rail-
road commission with power to classify and regulate rates, the re-
mainder of the act is a valid and constitutional exercise of the
state sovereignty, and the commission created thereby is an adminis-
trative board, created for carrying into effect the will of the State, as
expressed by its legislation. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 362.
6. A citizen of another State who feels himself aggrieved and injured by
the rates prescribed by that commission may seek his remedy in
equity against the commissioners in the Circuit Court of the United
States in Texas, and the Circuit Court has jurisdiction over such a
suit under the statutes regulating its general jurisdiction, with the
assent of Texas, expressed in the act creating the commission. Such
a suit is not a suit against the State of Texas. Ib.
7. It is within the power of a court of equity in such case to decree that
the rates so established by the commission are unreasonable and un-
just, and to restrain their enforcement; but it is not within its power
to establish rates itself, or to restrain the commission from again
establishing rates. Ib.
8. The act of the legislature of Indiana of March 6, 1891, concerning
taxation is not obnoxious to the constitutional objections made to it,
since the Supreme Court of that State has decided: (1) That the
constitution of that State authorizes such a method of assessing rail-
road property, which decision is binding on this court; and (2) that
the act gives the railroad companies the right to be heard before
final determination of the question, which construction is conclusive
on this court; and, further, since (3) a tax law which grants to the
taxpayer a right to be heard on the assessment of his property before
final judgment provides a due process of law for determining the
valuation, although it makes no provision for a rehearing. Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Backus, 421.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1, 4, 7, 8, 9;
TAX AND TAXATION, 1, 2;
TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION, 1, 2.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 10.
The acceptance by a supernumerary officer in the Continental line of an
appointment in the regiment of guards authorized by the State of
Virginia took him out of the line and put him into the new organiza-
tion. Williams v. United States, 648.
1. A stipulation between a telegraph company and the sender of a mes-
sage, that the company shall not be liable for mistakes in the trans-
mission or delivery of a message, beyond the sum received for sending
it, unless the sender orders it to be repeated by being telegraphed
back to the originating office for comparison, and pays half that sum
in addition, is reasonable and valid. Primrose v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 1.
2. The appellant has failed to prove the renewal of his contract with the
appellee, which alleged renewal is the foundation of the remedy
sought for by his bill. Smith v. Washington Gas Light Co., 559.
3. When a charter party provides that the hirer of the vessel need not
make good any loss arising from ordinary wear and tear, a finding by
the court that repairs sued for resulted from ordinary wear and tear
is a bar to recovery.
White v. United States, 661.
4. Money paid to a person on a vessel chartered to the government by the
owner of the vessel cannot be recovered from the United States unless
authorized by them. Ib.
5. A contract with the United States for the delivery of postage stamps to
it construed. Continental Bank Note Co. v. United States, 671.
See ADMIRALTY, 8;
COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
1. An indictment for murder which charges that the offence was com-
mitted on board of an American vessel on the high seas, within the
jurisdiction of the court and within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States, sufficiently avers the locality of the
offence. St. Clair v. United States, 134.
2. An indictment which charges that A, B and C, acting jointly, killed
and murdered D, is sufficient to authorize the conviction of one,
though the others may be acquitted. Ib.
3. A charge in an indictment that the accused did then and there, pirati-
cally, wilfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought, strike and
beat the said D, then and there giving to said D several grievous,
damaging and mortal wounds, and did then and there, to wit, at the
time and place last above mentioned, him, the said D, cast and throw
from and out of the said vessel into the sea, and plunge, sink and
drown him, the said D, in the sea aforesaid, sufficiently charges that
the throwing into the sea was done wilfully, feloniously and with
malice aforethought. Ib.
4. An indictment being found after the trial jury had been properly dis-
charged, the court may order a venire to issue for persons to serve as
jurors, and may further direct the marshal to summon talesmen. Ib.
5. Rule 63 of the court below is not inconsistent with any settled principle
of criminal law, and does not interfere with the selection of impartial
juries. Ib.
6. Circumstances attending a particular transaction under investigation
by a jury, if so interwoven with each other and with the principal
facts that they cannot well be separated without depriving the jury of
proof that is essential in order to reach a just conclusion, are admissi-
ble in evidence. Ib.
7. On the trial under an indictment charging that A, B and C, acting
jointly, killed and murdered D, without charging that they were co-
conspirators, evidence of the acts of B and C are admissible against
A, if part of the res gesta. Ib.
8. A party may show that the testimony of one of his witnesses has taken
him by surprise, and that it is contrary to the examination of him pre-
paratory to the trial, or to what the party had reason to believe that the
witness would testify; or that the witness had been recently brought
under the influence of the other party and had deceived the party
calling him. Ib.
9. The certificate of the vessel's registry and proof that she carried the
flag of the United States were properly admitted on the trial of this
case, and established a prima facie case of proper registry under the
laws of the United States, and of the nationality of the vessel and its
owners. 1b.
10. When no exception is taken on the trial of a person accused of crime
to the action of the court below on a particular matter, that action is
not subject to review here, although the statutes and practice of the
State in which the trial takes place provide otherwise. Ib.
11. In criminal proceedings all parts of the record must be interpreted
together, so as to give effect to every part, if possible, and a deficiency
in one part may be supplied by what appears elsewhere in the record.
12. The indictment in this case is sufficient. United States v. Cook, 555.
1. In an action by the sender of a cipher message against a telegraph
company, which is not informed, by the message or otherwise, of the
nature, importance or extent of the transaction to which it relates, or
of the position which the plaintiff would probably occupy if the mes-
sage were correctly transmitted, the measure of damages for mistakes
in its transmission or delivery is the sum paid for sending it. Prim-
rose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 1.
2. In an action by the representatives of a railroad employé against the
company, to recover damages for the death of the employé, caused by
an accident while in its employ, which is tried in a different State
from that in which the contract of employment was made and in
which the accident took place, the right to recover and the limit of
the amount of the judgment are governed by the lex loci, and not by
the lex fori. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 190.
When a deed contains a specific description of the land conveyed, by metes
and bounds, and a general description referring to the land as the
same land set off to B, and by B afterwards disposed of to A. the
second description is intended to describe generally what had been
before described by metes and bounds; and if, in an action of eject-
ment brought by a grantee of A, as plaintiff, the description by metes
and bounds does not include the land sued for, it cannot be claimed
under the general description. Prentice v. Northern Pacific Railroad
Co., 163.
1. When two parties acquire title to the same tract of land from the same
grantor, if the later grantee takes his deed with knowledge that the
first grantee is in possession of the land, and has enclosed it, and is
cultivating it, he is chargeable with knowledge of all the equitable
rights of the first grantee with which an inquiry would have put him
in possession. Horbach v. Porter, 549.
2. To justify a decree for the specific performance of a parol contract for
the sale of real estate, the contract sought to be enforced, and its per-
formance on the part of the vendee must be clearly proved; and in
this case it is not so proved in several particulars. Rogers Locomotive
Works v. Helm, 610.
3. In a suit in equity to set aside a sale of personal property as induced
by false representations, a decree in favor of the plaintiff will be sus-
tained if the representations proved are of the same general character
as those averred in the bill, though not in its precise language. Tur-
ner v. Ward, 618.
4. The court, being satisfied that the various matters detailed in the opin-
ion were part and parcel of a scheme devised to hinder and delay
creditors in the collection of their debts, affirms the decree of the
court below in this case. Woodfolk v. Seddon, 658.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 8, 9;
LOCAL LAW, 2;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 7.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
A court of probate, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the probate of
wills and the administration of the estates of deceased persons, has
no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator of the estate of a living
person; and its orders, made after public notice, appointing an admin-
istrator of the estate of a person who is in fact alive, although he has
been absent and not heard from for seven years, and licensing the
administrator to sell his land for payment of his debts, are void, and
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