Feb. 4, 1830. "It is four or five years since I warned brother B. against the spirit of speculation that was growing up in Connecticut. Two years ago, I began to feel alarmed as to his own theories. More recently I have had several free conversations with him, and my fears have been allayed by assurances from him that he should hereafter preach the parts of Calvinism, against which the unsanctified heart revolts, and which on mature deliberation he did not think it his duty to preach earlier in Boston. I objected to him, that Calvinism has two legs, the agency of God and the agency of man; he had made it walk on one, and thus had given it the halting gait of Theristes instead of the majestic march of Achilles. The grand danger of brother B. is too much reliance on means. He and are both virtually in the old 'moral suasion' system. He plumply denies, that the more the unregenerate man sees of God, the more he hates his character and objects,-that it must, if that were true, be the worst thing we could do to preach the Gospel to them."* Is this Calvinism? Is it truth?

We regret that it did not accord with the views of Mr. Matthews to introduce into his memoir the letter of Dr. Porter to Dr. Beecher, which has been recently published in some of our religious periodicals. That letter is the property of the church. It constitutes an important article in her history, which ought to be preserved and recorded. Besides, the delineation of Dr. Porter's character is deficient without it. And furthermore, the position which Dr. Beecher occupies before the public, as a leader in the defection from Calvinism, and of the seceding faction in the Presbyterian church, demands its publicity. It should be known that christian friendship remonstrated with him years ago when he began his divergent course, and warned him of the results.

Tht following extract is from the same letter.

"Dr. Taylor's closing number on means, was a designed modification of the former ones, partly on the suggestion of Dr. Beecher. The latter told him that he had employed terms badly in speaking of the suspension of selfishness." All that Taylor means, said he to me, is that the carnal mind is held in check, or does not act, not that it is extinct.

* Memoir, pp. 220, 221

"While this carnal mind is thus checked, has it moral qualities?" said I. "Doubtless." "Is it sinful or holy or neither?" (Pause.) "The man is doubtless a sinner." "Can one who pugnaciously and ostentatiously maintains that all sin consists in action, maintain, too, that a carnal mind is sinful while all its action has ceased ?"*

Our readers will not be surprised, that to this last fatal interrogatory was given "no reply."

A cardinal principle in Dr. Taylor's theory of regeneration, is, that self-love, or a regard to one's own happiness, is the primary cause and ultimate end of all moral action." "Thus," he says, "self-love is the primary cause of all moral action." "Of all specific voluntary action, the happiness of the agent in some form, is the ultimate end."

We design no invidious comparison of characters. Far from it. But the philosophical affinity of certain sentiments, is worthy of regard. Lord Bolinbroke, in his attempts to subvert revealed religion, resolved all morality into this same self-love, as its primary and final cause. "We love ourselves," said he, "we love our families, we love the particular societies to which we belong; and our benevolence extends, at last, to the whole race of mankind. Like so many different vortex, the centre of all is self-love." "It" i. e. virtue which he is defining, "it is only the love of ourselves." Hume develops the same theory in his " Principles of Morals," and Volney, in his "Law of Nature." True, the mere paternity of a doctrine, involves neither its truth or falsity. But it is certainly an observable phenomenon, that sceptical philosophers should have adopted and maintained, in their attempts at the subversion of Christianity, the identical principle which is fundamental in the system of a philosophical divine. If these divines. intend only to assert a fact, predicable of all men, till regenerative grace subordinates the love of self, to the supreme love of God, for his own moral excellence-a fact, involving huge criminality; we should have nothing to object. Such is the awful fact. But this is not their meaning. They speak of self-love as the primary cause and ultimate end of all moral action, as right, and with this meaning, they affirm it alike of God and angels, of men and devils. And thus, by a most dexterous exploit of philosophy, all sin is

Memoir, p. 221.

+ Posthumous Works, as quoted by Fuller.

fairly and forever ejected from the universe, though we have been gravely assured, by the same philosophy, that God himself could not prevent its ingress. Soberly, according to this principle, the existence of sin at all, is an utter impossibility. Grace and redemption become unmeaning terms. The incarnation and crucifixion of the Son of God, were the awfully magnificent scenes of an undemandedempty tragedy.

On this point Dr. Porter thus writes:

"Dr. Taylor's views of self-love cannot stand inquiry. Fuller, in his Gospel its own Witness,' shows this to be an infidel sentiment; and Smalley, volume 1st of his sermons, shows that Satan is innocent, if ultimate 'regard to self is no sin." "This one principle, sweeps the whole away. There remains no radical distinction of character between the saint and the sinner. The most depraved individual on earth, or even among apostate spirits, is doubtless the centre of his own affections. And though he may have perverted views of what is his real interest, he means, notwithstanding, to act, and does act, from a 'primary' regard to himself. And if this is the highest principle of action to a holy being, then an angel and a devil stand on the same ground, as to moral character; in other words, there is no distinction between holiness and sin."*

The practical operation of this principle, if but legitimated and carried out in the moral government of God, is thus represented :

"Besides, this theory would split the moral system into as many jarring parts, with as many centres of 'primary' affection, as it contains individuals. It would set every moral agent at variance with every other moral agent, and with God himself. Whereas, the simple precept, Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart,' sets up another standard in every bosom. It establishes a common centre of moral affection to the universe of moral agents, and binds the hearts of all to each other, and to the throne of Jehovah."t

"Virtue-I need not tell, when proved and full
Matured-inclines us up to God."

The volume before us contains a large variety of rich

Memoir, pp.

223-236.

+ Memoir, pp. 236–237.

and instructive matter, which our limits forbid us at present to notice. We heartily wish it an extensive circulation. With the blessing of God, it cannot fail to exert a happy influence on the cause of sound doctrine and practical piety. The distinguished subject of it, has finished his course. God has taken him from this distracted world, to the peace, and purity, and bliss of heaven. May he call and raise up others like him, to occupy the high places in Zion, and adorn and defend the pure Gospel of Jesus.

ART. V.-ON THE NATURE OF SIN.

By Rev. NATHANIEL HEWITT, D. D.

O. My dear sir, the great questions now agitated between us, respect our opposite conceptions of the Nature of Sin. Will you state precisely your belief on this fundamental doctrine.

P. My views of the nature of sin are derived from Romans v. 13.-"Sin is not imputed when there is no law," and its parallel texts. "This assertion [of the Apostle] leads us irresistably to the conclusion, that nothing in any being is accounted sin, but conduct that is a violation of law." "In regard to the nature of sin itself,-what that is, in the subjects of his moral government, for which God blames and punishes-the Apostle warrants me in asserting the unlimited proposition: that sin in every form and instance is reducible to the act of a moral agent in which he violates a known rule of duty."t

O. You affirm, if I understand your meaning, that in order to constitute an act of man sinful, it is essential that a "rule of duty" known to him at the time when the act is performed, be violated by the act which is done.

P. I do: because "it is absurd to class any of his [moral agent's] choices under the head of sin, but those in which he violates known obligation. For a known obligation must either be violated or complied with; and compliance with obligation is holiness if any thing is-so that sin must consist in the violation, rather than the contrary. And the obligation which is violated must be known; for if there be + Idem, p. 4.

See Professor Fitch's Discourses on the Nature of Sin, p. 3.

no knowledge of an obligation, there can be no act of will whatever in reference to it: and there is just as much reason, if the determination of the agent be compared with such an unknown obligation, to say that he complies with it, as that he violates it, in any case; because, without the knowledge of an obligation, he has never really made the choice for a compliance or a violation."* "The testimony of Paul admits [not] of evasion: 'Sin is not imputed'—it is not charged to a moral agent as having any existence, and as forming any ground of blame--' when there is no law' when there is none applied to the agent which he violates." Disc. p. 11.

O. Saul of Tarsus was guilty of sin, when he did many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth; yet he committed these acts of sin, "ignorantly and in unbelief." Your proposition, therefore, that sin in "every form and instance," is an act in violation of known duty is unscriptural; for it is a contradiction to say that a man violates known obligation ignorantly. This instance of sin is "necessarily at variance with the essential characteristics. of sin, embraced in the general proposition," and consequently your proposition falls to the ground.

P. "I meant not to be understood to confine the rules of duty to what the phrase might designate in the popular acceptation, to the published laws of God or man merely, but would extend them to all moral obligations, however made known, by the conscience, by the works of God, or by published statutes. Moral obligations wherever and however made known to a given moral agent, are to him a law; and it is a violation of such as are known to him, or knowable."t

O. Hold, sir. You have essentially varied your proposition. Known and knowable are as far apart as knowledge and ignorance. Your proposition is, "sin in every form and instance is a violation of known duty." Unless then you can make it appear that a duty which is unknown but knowable, is as well known by being knowable though unknown, as when it is in fact known, then it is plain that you have not only varied your proposition, but, what is more important, have renounced it.

P. Suffer me to complete the statement I was making