chiefly to the genius of his tutor, the pundit Jalla, the priest of the Jummoo family, who was considered a man of such extraordinary ability that if he could have controlled the troops he might have established a dynasty of Peshwas at Lahore, but before his position was consolidated he endeavoured to reduce the power of Golab Sing, who succeeded Dhyan Sing as the ruler of Jummoo; he also sequestered the estates of some of the chiefs, and, more particularly, offended the ranee Jhindun and her brother by his supercilious deportment. She appealed to the army, A.D. and Heera Sing and the pundit were obliged to fly, but 1844 were overtaken and killed, and their heads brought in triumph to Lahore. On the dissolution of the Government of Heera Sing the management of affairs fell into the hands of Jowaher Sing, the brother of the ranee, and of her favourite paramour, Lall Sing, a brahmin, who had nothing to recommend him but his comely person. The soldiers received a fresh augmentation of pay, and became so insubordinate that it appeared necessary to find some employment for them to prevent the total overthrow of the Government. They were therefore instigated to march to Jummoo and fleece raja Golab Sing, whom they brought down to Lahore and from whom they wrung more than a crore of rupees. To keep them from mischief at the capital they were then recommended to attack Moolraj, who had been allowed to succeed his father in the government of Mooltan, and from him they extorted eighteen lacs. Soon after, Peshora Sing, another of the sons of Runjeet, raised the standard of revolt, but was defeated and basely murdered by Jowaher Sing. He had always been popular with the people and the army, and the contempt which was felt for the wretched debauchee who occupied the post of minister was turned into indignation by this atrocity, and he was led out into the plain of Meean Meer and executed. After the loss of her brother, the ranee sat daily in durbar, and in the beginning of November appointed Lall Sing minister, and Tej Sing commander-in-chief. But the army, which had within the year humbled the two great feudatories of Jummoo and Mooltan, was now the sole power in the state.

Preparations

The anarchy which reigned in the Punjab constrained 1845 the Government of India to make energetic preparations for the defence of the frontier. The cantonment at Ferozepore on the Sutlej which was inade- on the fronquately garrisoned had been reinforced by Lord tier. Ellenborough, but Sir Henry Hardinge found that the

force assembled there, though amounting to 17,000 men, was not sufficient for its defence, still less for extensive operations if they should be forced upon us. He therefore gradually massed 40,000 men on the frontier, and in the stations below it, so imperceptibly as to attract no attention in our own provinces; and he likewise brought up from Sinde to Ferozepore the fifty-six large boats which Lord Ellenborough had wisely constructed to serve as a pontoon. It has been surmised that it was the assemblage of this large force on and near the frontier which roused the suspicions of the Khalsa army, and led them to anticipate our designs by the invasion of our territories. But since our discomfiture in Afghanistan had lowered our prestige, that army had twice marched down to the banks of the Sutlej and threatened to cross it. Considering, moreover, the distracted state of the Punjab Government, with the most efficient army ever collected under the banner of any native State, flushed with its past successes and panting for new triumphs, and utterly beyond control, the GovernorGeneral would have been without excuse if he had not made the most ample preparations to meet a crisis which might turn up any day. The invasion was the work of the raneo-justly termed by Sir Henry Hardinge the Messalina of the north-and of Lall Sing and Tej Sing. They felt that the only chance of maintaining their authority in the Punjab was to involve the army in a conflict with the British Government; and it was they who launched the Sikh battalions on our provinces for their own security, and endeavoured to avert the plunder of Lahore by sending them across the Sutlej to plunder Delhi and Benares.

A.D. The Sikh 1845 army cross the Sutlej.

On the 17th November, the order was issued to cross the Sutlej. Major Broadfoot, the political agent on the frontier, urged the most prompt and energetic measures of defence, but Sir Henry Hardinge, still clinging to the hope of peace, directed him to send another remonstrance to the durbar, the only reply to which, however, was an order to commence the march without any further delay. Animated by a feeling of national and religious enthusiasm, 60,000 Khalsa soldiers, with 40,000 well-armed camp followers, and 150 guns of large calibre, crossed the Sutlej in four days, and by the 16th December, were encamped within a short distance of the fort of Ferozepore, which was held by Sir John Littler, one of the oldest and best officers in the service, with about 10,000 men and 21 guns. On the 11th December, preparations

had been made for a grand ball in the state tents of the A.D. Commander-in-Chief at Umballa, when information was 1844 received that the whole Sikh army had marched down to the Sutlej and was on the eve of crossing it. The ball was abandoned, and the night passed in preparing to march to the relief of Sir John Littler, who was enveloped by a force six times the number of his own. Hours were now invaluable, and the troops, heavily accoutred, performed a march never before attempted in India, of 150 miles in six days, through heavy sands, the most formidable of all roads, with little time to cook their food, and scarcely an hour for repose. On the 13th the Governor-General issued a declaration of war, and confiscated the districts belonging to the Sikh crown south of the Sutlej. The day after the Sikh army had crossed the river, a large portion of it pushed on to Ferozeshuhur and began to construct entrenchments of the most substantial character, leaving Tej Sing to watch the movements of Sir John Littler.

Tall Sing's scouts brought him information that the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were advancing with only a slender force, and he pushed Battle of on with 20,000 men and 22 guns to Moodkec, Moodkee. where he awaited their arrival under cover of the jungle. On the 18th December, the army had performed a fatiguing 1845 march of twenty-one miles over an arid plain; the troops were suffering severely from thirst; they had not broken their fast since the preceding night, and were preparing for a meal, when a cloud of dust rose up in front, and the roar of cannon announced the approach of Lall Sing's army. Sir Hugh Gough was taken by surprise, as at Maharajpore; and then came the first conflict between the sepoy of Hindostan and the Khalsa battalions of the Punjab, and the superiority of the Sikh, whom a high political authority had declared to be "a rabble demoralised by the absence of "every principle of subordination, and by its wretched "violence," became at once indisputable. Ŏne of our regiments turned round and sought the rear, and it was with difficulty the Commander-in-Chief and his staff could drag it to the front. Even a European corps was for a time staggered by the precision and rapidity of the enemy's fire, and in the confusion of the hour, one regiment fired into another; but victory declared on our side, though not without the loss of 900 in killed and wounded. For sixty years it had been the practice of the home authorities to unite the office of Commander-in-Chief with that of Governor-Gene

A.D.

ral, when he happened to be a military man, as in the case of Lord Cornwallis, Lord Hastings, and Lord William Bentinck. It was unfortunately omitted in the case of Sir Henry Hardinge, but after the miserable tactics exhibited at Moodkee, he placed his services at the disposal of Sir Hugh Gough, and magnanimously took the post of second in command, and thus restored in some degree the confidence of the troops.

Battle of

shuhur.

The army halted two days at Moodkee to take repose and 1845 bury the dead, and was reinforced by the arrival of two European and two native regiments, brought up Feroze- by forced marches, through the indefatigable exertions of Sir Henry Hardinge. It started for the entrenched camp of the Sikhs at Ferozeshuhur on the morning of the 21st December, without provisions or tents. Sir John Littler was directed to join it at the computed hour of its arrival, and he moved out early in the morning, and evaded the notice of Tej Sing by leaving his camp pitched, his bazaar flags flying, and his cavalry pickets standing, and reached the main body with 5,500 men and 22 guns a few moments before noon. The Sikh entrenchment was in the form of a parallelogram, a mile in length and half a mile in breadth, with the village of Ferozeshuhur in the centre. The number of troops within it, commanded by Lall Sing, was estimated at 35,000, with 100 guns and 250 camel swivels. The batteries were mounted, not with ordinary field artillery, but with heavy siege guns, placed in position; the day was the shortest in the year, and with such an enemy to deal with as the Sikhs had proved themselves to be at Moodkee, every moment was of inestimable value; but three hours were strangely frittered away after Sir John Littler's arrival, and it was nearly four in the afternoon before the first shot was fired. Sir Charles Napier in his comments on the strategy of the day remarks that the attack should have been made on the two sides which were not protected by the tremendous guns immoveably fixed, but Sir Hugh Gough resolved to follow his usual practice of charging at once right up to the muzzle of the guns and carrying the batteries by "cold steel." He took the command of the right, Sir Henry Hardinge of the centre, and Sir John Littler of the left. It fell to Sir John to assault the strongest section of the enemy's position, where they had gathered the strength of their heaviest guns. His own field pieces were found to be of little, if any use, and his troops advanced gallantly up to the bat

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teries, but were at once arrested by the overwhelming fire A.D. of the enemy. The 62nd Foot, mowed down by grape and 1845 round shot, was checked, and retired beaten, but not, in the 21 Dec eye of candour, dishonoured. The other divisions encountered an equally terrific resistance. To borrow the language of the historian of the Sikhs, guns were dis"mounted, and the ammunition blown into the air; squadrons were checked in mid career; battalion after "battalion was hurled back with shattered ranks; and it "was not till after sunset that portions of the enemy's "position were finally carried. Darkness and the obstinacy "of the conflict threw the English into confusion; men of "all regiments and all ranks were mixed together. "Generals were doubtful of the fact, or the extent of their own success, and colonels knew not what had become of "the regiments they commanded, or of the army of which "they formed a part." The Governor-General had five aides-de-camp killed and four wounded. He himself passed the night in moving from regiment to regiment, endeavouring to sustain the spirits and to revive the ardour of the men, and, instead of retiring to Ferozepore as he was advised to do, determined to renew the engagement the next morning, although there was only one weak division for the work which had baffled the whole army. At daydawn he and the Commander-in-Chief collected the scattered soldiers of General Gilbert's division, attacked the batteries in reverse, and captured them after a feeble resistance. In the Sikh encampment during the night there had been stormy counsels and bitter recriminations; the military chest had likewise been plundered, and, through the cowardice or the treachery of the commander, the legions who had defended this Roman encampment with Roman courage were in full flight to the Sutlej. The British line halted as soon as it had cleared the works, and the two commanders were received with acclamation as they rode along the ranks. The cheers had scarcely died out when a cloud of dust announced the approach of a new enemy. This was Tej Sing, who, finding that Sir John Littler had eluded his vigilance, marched down to Ferozeshuhur on the morning of the 22nd, with 20,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and seventy guns. He found that the entrenchment was lost, and the Sikh army in full retreat to the river, and after a brief cannonade, which at once dismounted our feeble artillery, withdrew to the Sutlej. He did not know that the British army, or what remained