rebellion.167 Nor was Henry's insistence upon direct relations with the barons of Wales' a mere matter of form or dignity. It was an obvious act of policy to break up the growing unity of Welsh national resistance by reminding the representatives of ancient but decayed dynasties that legally as well as historically they stood on the same footing as the upstart lords of Snowdon. Welsh magnates with traditions such as those of the petty native chieftains who divided with the Marchers the ancient principality of Powys, or the still more degenerate descendants of the house that had once ruled all Deheubarth from Dinevor, were only too ready to make common cause with the English against a more immediate and more dangerous rival. It was equally important, in the likely case of a partition of the principality of Gwynedd between brothers, that each joint holder of the divided state should be a tenant-in-chief of his English overlord. By such devices the feudalisation of Welsh Wales was perceptibly brought nearer, and once brought within the meshes of the feudal doctrine of fealty, time was sure to increase the subjection of the Welsh barons to the Crown. Henry and Edward knew how in Southern France the reservation of the rights of the 'privileged' barons of the Limousin, Quercy, and Périgord had practically made of no effect the boasted concession by St. Louis of all his rights in these districts in the Treaty of Paris of 1259.168 It was their obvious policy to create among the jealous Welsh chieftains a privileged class of direct royal vassals like the privileged lords so fully established on the Dordogne and the Lot. It was equally Llywelyn's obvious policy to keep a tight hold over his influential brother chieftains. He had won back their homages when he was fighting for his own hand in the earlier years of the barons' wars. In his treaty of 1265 with Montfort he made the recognition of his dominion over the magnates of Wales as primary a condition of alliance as the acknowledgment of his claim to the

167 Praedictis malitiis non contentus, immo barones nostros Walliae et ligios homines nostros omnes quos potuit ad nequitiam suam allicere a fide et servitio necnon et homagio nostro fecit imprudenter recedere et secum non minus seditiose guerrare.'-Foedera, i. 258.

168 M. Gavrilovitch, Étude sur le Traité de Paris de 1259 (1899), pp. 75–82.

K

Principality.169 It was a more precious gain to have the homages of the Welsh barons than even the national title of Prince of Wales. The feudal idea of lordship was now so far influencing Llywelyn's mind that he did not regard himself as a true prince unless he was surrounded by a ring of vassal barons. So much was this recognised that, after his humiliation ten years later, Edward I. still allowed him to retain the homage of some five of the barons of Snowdon,' 'inasmuch as he could not be called a prince if he had no barons under him.' 170

Both as regards the Principality and the homage of the Welsh barons, the treaty of 1267 exactly confirmed to Llywelyn what he had obtained from Montfort in the hour of his greatest need. Here, as so often elsewhere, Edward was incorporating the results of Montfort's work into the traditional and legal obligations of the lawful and restored monarchy. If we turn to the territorial from the legal concessions, we shall find that the position of the Welsh prince was equally favourable. Substantially he was secured the numerous Marcher territories upon which he had laid violent hands during the days of trouble. Moreover, his aggressions at the expense of the rival Welsh chieftains were legitimated with almost the same completeness as his aggressions at the expense of the Marchers. A short comparison of Llywelyn's territorial position as settled at Shrewsbury with his position according to the Treaty of Woodstock of 1247, with the help of the maps on pp. 76 and 135, will bring out clearly the enormous strides which he had made.

At Woodstock Llywelyn and his brothers were confined to Anglesey, Snowdon, and Merioneth. Then his power was shared with his brothers. Now he was lord paramount. Save for the conditional restoration of Davydd on terms which it was anticipated he would not like, Llywelyn was sole master of the ancient territories of his house. Then the sons of Gruffydd were local lords of a limited district with few rights outside it. Now Llywelyn was the suzerain of every Welsh baron, wherever he lived. He was the lord of

189 Foedera, i. 457. Dominium etiam omnium magnatum Walliae cum principatu . . . concedimus.' 170 Ann. Osney, p. 273; cf. Foedera, i. 545.

Gruffydd of Powys. Only the representative of the ancient house of Dinevor was removed from his immediate sway. No longer had he to scramble for power as best he could with a swarm of rivals. And whatever rights he attained by the treaty were guaranteed to him and his heirs by hereditary succession.

In 1247 Llywelyn had expressly renounced the Four Cantreds, the river of Conway, and Mold. In 1267 he was restored unconditionally to the lordship of the Four Cantreds. There was no longer any use in reserving the castles, since Llywelyn had probably long levelled them to the ground. Mold indeed he had never conquered, and it had remained with its English lord. But there was something very humiliating to Robert of Mold and his overlord Edward of Chester when the restoration of Hawarden was made conditional on Robert pledging himself not to erect a castle there for thirty years.

We are left to guess the exact limits of the lands actually held by Llywelyn in Mid-Wales at the time of the treaty. But, as they were to be restored to their former owners, the matter is of the less importance. The exceptions made to this rule of restoration, however, show how deeply Llywelyn was allowed to cut into the heart of the Marcher power. Roger Mortimer was a special sufferer, though of all the Marchers he was the most friendly and closely allied to Edward. Mortimer lost Gwrthrennion and his share of Brecon. If he were restored to Maelenydd, it was subject to vexatious claims of Llywelyn which seriously disturbed his tenure. After Evesham, Mortimer had received a grant of Kerry and Kedewein. He was now forced to give up these lands definitely to his rival, and it was but small consolation that he might prosecute any claims for any part of them by the same means of law which had been allowed to Llywelyn in the case of Maelenydd. Further south still Llywelyn's possession of Abergavenny drove the wedge of Welsh dominion deep into the lower Vale of Usk. Humphrey de Bohun the younger, who lost Brecon, and the youthful George of Cantilupe, who lost Abergavenny, thus atoned dearly for their personal or family devotion to the

lost cause of Earl Simon. It was only in the extreme south that Llywelyn was allowed no footing. There the interests of the Clares in Morganwg and Gwent, of Valence in Pembrokeshire, and of Maredudd ap Rhys in the Vale of Towy all combined to exclude him. Moreover, there was nothing in the treaty to prevent the Lord Edward resuming possession of the districts of Cardigan and Carmarthen which he had received in 1254. Llywelyn was thus limited to the North of the Dyvi. It was the one exception to his triumphant vindication of the rights of his famous grandfather. What in 1265 he had extorted from the extreme need of Simon de Montfort, he now obtained with the formal permission of the triumphant King and his son.

M. Gavrilo

The financial clauses of the treaty are similarly a substantial re-enactment of the compact of 1265. The only differences were, that the 30,000 marks fine was now only 25,000 marks and that the date and method of the repayment of the instalments were somewhat different. We should not pass too lightly over this aspect of the treaty. vitch has shown that the one substantial thing which Henry III. obtained from Louis IX. in the Treaty of Paris of 1259 was the money payments.171 Henry's financial distress was almost as great in 1267 as in 1259, and the considerable sums offered by the Welsh prince were a very acceptable addition to his impoverished exchequer.

Such were the advantages reaped by Llywelyn from the treaty. Alone of Montfort's friends he came out of an unsuccessful struggle with terms such as are seldom obtained even by brilliant triumphs in the field. And it was the more remarkable since the chief sufferers by the treaty were Edward himself and his best friend, Roger Mortimer. Why did Edward allow the treaty to be made? Why did Mortimer utter no word of protest? Full answers to these questions cannot be given. We can only fall back upon the exhaustion of the country, the known difficulties of successful campaigning in Wales, the pressure of the papal legate, the general desire for peace, and the cry for the Crusade. But we shall be safe in regarding the two chief factors in the

17 Op. cit. pp. 54-56.

pacification as the alliance of Llywelyn with the house of Clare, and the moderation and self-restraint of Edward. Had Edward striven to crush Llywelyn, there can be but little doubt that he could have succeeded. Other interests, however, called him away. He may well have dreaded the revival of the Montfort party by a renewal of the Welsh war. He had no mind to give the Earl of Gloucester a chance of re-enacting the part of Leicester. He renounced, therefore, his early ambitions, and went on his way to Palestine, leaving Llywelyn triumphant, and Gloucester even more than Llywelyn the master of the situation.

How far was the treaty carried out? To answer this question fully would be to write the history of Wales and the Marchers for the next ten years. It is enough here to say that, though the English King and his son and the papal legate had every wish to observe the treaty, it never was fully executed even to the limited extent to which mediaval treaties were ever carried out. Though the main lines of settlement were indicated in it, many troublesome details still remained to be fixed. Within a year of the treaty Henry appointed a commission, on August 17, to sit at Montgomery to try individual claims of right according to the law and customs of the Marchers.' 172 With this investigation of detail troubles began. Moreover, Llywelyn himself soon became involved in quarrels with the Shropshire tenants of Gruffydd ap Gwenwynwyn, who raided the lands of Gruffydd, which Llywelyn seems to have still kept strictly under his own control.173 On May 21, 1269, Edward himself was directed to go to Montgomery in the hope of appeasing disputes.174 But the Welsh and Marchers acknowledged no law but force. The Hundred Rolls show that in the early years of Edward I.'s reign Llywelyn still encroached largely on English lands; and the other early records of the same reign reveal Marchers claiming or ruling territory that, according to the treaty of 1267, rightfully belonged to Llywelyn. The Welsh prince was so elated by his successes that he did not realise the limitations of his power, but embarked upon that career of ambition which within ten years 172 Foede a, i. 477. 173 Royal Letters, ii. 328-30. 174 Foedera, i. 479.