89; Cullers v. May, 81 Tex. 110, 16 S. W. 813; Wylie v. Grundysen, 51 Minn. 360, 53 N. W. 805, 19 L. R. A. 33, 38 Am. St. Rep. 509; Junker v. Hustes, 113 Ind. 524, 16 N. E. 197; Cleveland v. McCanna, 7 N. D. 455, 75 N. W. 908, 41 L. R. A. 852, 66 Am. St. Rep. 670; Beckman v. Manlove, 18 Cal, 389. In view of our statute, however, the question is not open for discussion in this state. If Snow, or his assignee, the appellant, was still entitled to claim the judgment exempt when the court allowed and entered the judgment of set-off, it may well be that the court erred in entering said judgment. For the purposes of this decision we shall assume, without deciding, that the assignment of the claim from Snow to the appellant conferred upon him all the usual and ordinary rights of an assignee. By section 3247, which is in harmony with the law generally, it is provided that non-residents, or those who are about to depart from the state with the intention of becoming residents elsewhere, are not entitled to the benefits of our exemption laws. Snow left this state and ceased to be a resident thereof in January, 1905; the assignment of his claim to appellant was not made effective as against respondent until September, 1907, and the set-off of the judgments was not made until the 23d day of July, 1909. Snow therefore had forfeited his 7, 8 right to hold either the claim or judgment exempt before the assignment to appellant was made, and appellant thus acquired and can claim no rights Snow could not claim when the assignment was made, in so far as exemptions are concerned. This is clearly the logic of the cases of Millington v. Laurer and Cullers v. May, supra. In both of those cases claims that were exempt were assigned, and in both it is clearly intimated that the exemptions were held available to the assignees only because the assignments were for value, and were made at a time when the assignor had a right to enforce his exemption rights. Such is not the case here. Neither when the assignment nor when the set-off was made by the court could either Snow or appellant have enforced the exemption as against respondent. Moreover, the authori ties we have cited are clearly to the effect that appellant always held the claim assigned to him a subordinate to respondent's judgments, and unless he can claim the judgment based on said claim as exempt, his rights are inferior to those of respondent. From what we have said it follows that he cannot sustain such a claim. This is the view the district court entertained, and in view of the facts and circumstances, and the law, applicable thereto, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court is right. What we have said also disposes of all the other questions raised by appellant. The judgment is therefore affirmed, with costs to respond ent. STRAUP, C. J., and MCCARTY, J., concur. ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING. FRICK, J. Appellant has filed a petition for rehearing upon the ground that we have failed to consider a material question. In determining the case we were of the opinion that the question now urged by counsel was not involved, but in view of his strenuous insistence and in deference to his contention we have concluded to make a few observations upon his application for rehearing. In support of the application counsel insists that the result reached by us in the opinion filed is contrary to the equitable doctrine that in a court of justice no one will be permitted to benefit by his own wrong. The contention is now seriously made that inasmuch as ap pellant's judgment was obtained by reason of respondent's wrongful and unlawful acts in causing appellant's exempt books to be sold upon execption, and that appellant's judg ment was for that reason also exempt, that therefore if respondent be permitted, as we have held, to set off the judgments he has obtained against appellant's judgment obtained as aforesaid, that respondent will be permitted to benefit by his own wrong. Numerous cases are cited in which it has been held that where A by stelth, fraud or misrepresentation has induced B to come or go into a jurisdiction other than that of B's residence, and A thus obtains service of legal process upon B in the foreign jurisdiction, or where A by the means aforesaid obtains a judgment or other legal advantage over B, that the courts will not permit A to profit by his wrong, but will quash such service upon the application of B, or arrest the enforcement of a judgment thus obtained. That this doctrine is sound, wholesome and just and should be enforced in all proper cases no one can doubt, and it is well illustrated and applied in the following among other cases to which we have been referred by counsel: Pomroy v. Parmlee, 9 Iowa, 144, 74 Am. Dec. 328; Chubbuck v. Cleveland, 37 Minn. 466, 35 N. W. 362, 5 Am. St. Rep. 864; Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky. 624; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Iowa, 260, 7 Am. Rep. 129; Hill v. Goodrich, 32 Conn. 588; Cavanagh v. Manhattan Tr. Co. (C. C.), 133 Fed. 818; Olson v. McConihe, 54 Misc. Rep. 48, 105 N. Y. Supp. 386. The counsel who makes the application frankly admits that he has found no case where the facts were as in the case at bar. Neither have we, and neither the doctrine invoked by counsel nor the cases cited by him, in our judgment, can have any application in this case. It is not questioned that respondent's judgments were based upon just claims, and that they were legally and properly obtained. True it is that appellant's judgment was based upon the wrongful and unlawful acts of respondent in causing exempt property to be levied on and sold. The judgment that respondent obtained represented the exempt property, and for that reason was likewise exempt. But the judg ment which in contemplation of law is property, lost its exempt character and ceased to be immune from legal attack by reason of the non-residence of appellant long before the district court allowed respondent's judgments to be set off against appellant's judgment. Suppose appellant had ceased to be a resident of this state and had left his books here, would any one question the right of any creditor to seize his books by legal process and sell them, and apply the proceeds thereof to the satisfaction of a judgment upon which such process had duly issued? After appellant had ceased to be a resident of this state his books ceased to be immune against levy and sale. They then lost their exempt character. No one would be bold enough to contend, we think, that because the books at one time were exempt, that for that reason they always continued to be so notwithstanding the fact that the conditions upon which their exempt character was based no longer existed. What is true of the books is true with respect to appellant's judgment. When the books ceased to be exempt they could be seized on execution and sold, and when the judgment ceased to be exempt it too could be made available by appellant's creditors, and they, could reach it by any process known to the law, and one way to reach such a judgment was by way of setting off the judgments appellant's creditors had against the judgment he had against them. As it would have been neither wrongful nor unlawful to have seized the books on execution after appellant had lost his right to claim them as exempt, it likewise could not be wrongful for respondent to ask that his judgments against appellant be offset against the judgment appellant had against respondent. It is manifest therefore that the doctrine contended for by counsel can have no application to the facts of this case. This being so, and no good reason appearing why a rehearing should be granted, it ought to be, and accordingly is, denied. STRAUP, C. J., and MCCARTY, J., concur. ROLAPP V. OGDEN & NORTHWESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY et al. No. 2116. Decided June 3, 1910. On Application for Rehearing, 1. CORPORATIONS-ISSUE OF STOCK-CONSIDERATION. Const., art. 12, sec. 5, provides that corporations shall not issue stock, except to bona fide subscribers therefor, or their assignee, or issue any obligation for payment of money, except for money or property received, or labor done, and that all fictitious increase of stock, or indebtedness, shall be void. Section 11 provides that no corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for money paid, labor done, or property actually received. Comp. Laws 1907, sec. 316, provides that property may be received in payment for stock, but if so, it must be described in the articles of incorporation, and its fair cash value stated, which statement, except for corporations created for mining and irrigation, must be supplemented by affidavit that the property is reasonably worth the amount in cash stated, for which it is received. Section 432, relating exclusively to railroads, provides that a certificate of incorporation shall not be issued to any railroad company until it appears by affidavit that one thousand dollars for each mile of the proposed railroad has been subscribed, and that ten per cent of the amount subscribed by each subscriber has been paid. Section 331 provides that the property of a corporation and the unpaid capital stock shall be liable for the debts of the corporation. Held, that the capital stock of corporations, except those created for mining and irrigation, must represent full actual value, either in money or property, and the subscribers for stock must pay one hundred cents on the dollar, or its equivalent, for their stock, and until so paid they are liable to creditors of the corporation for any balance remaining unpaid on their subscriptions. (Page 554.) 2. CORPORATIONS-ISSUE OF BONDS-"FICTITIOUS INCREASE OF INDEBTEDNESS." Const., art. 12, sec. 11, provides that no corporation shall issue stock or bonds, except for money paid or labor done, or property actually received, and that all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void. Held, that a corporation can. not issue bonds as a bonus to subscribers to the capital stock, and where subscribers to the stock of a corporation paid for the amount of stock issued to them, so that they were entitled to fully paid stock, bonds of the corporation issued to them in addition to the stock were void, as against creditors while in the hands of stockholders, not purchasers for value and without notice; they being a "fictitious increase of indebtedness" within the Constitution, even though they were issued and delivered as security for additional |