the vendor's creditors cannot set up the vendor's right of exemption from attachment in defense of an action by the creditors for the recovery of the property. Tilton v. Sanborn. Opinion by Allen, J.

IOWA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. DECEMBER 14, 1883.

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW-EPISCOPAL CHURCH-SALARY OF RECTOR CANNOT BE REDUCED BY VESTRY OR

CHURCH.-By the canons of the Episcopal Church in the United States of America, a rector canonically elected and in charge, or an instituted minister, may not be removed from his parish by the parish or vestry against his will except by the bishop, etc. Held, that where plaintiff was elected rector by the vestry of defendant, an Episcopal Church incorporated and connected with the Episcopal Church of the United States, his salary agreed upon could not be reduced by the vestry or the church. It was not competent for the vestry of the parish, in violation of the canons of the church, to dissolve the pastoral relation, against the plaintiff's will. These canons became just as much a part of the contract of employment of plaintiff, as if they had been specifically referred to or written out in full therein. The salary upon which the plaintiff was employed constitutes an essential part of the contract. If the defendant could be permitted to reduce the plaintiff's salary without his consent, it could force him to agree to a dissolution of the pastoral relation, and thus accomplish, indirectly, what they could not do directly. The right to the salary stipulated at the time the plaintiff accepted the position of rector, is a valuable property right secured to the plaintiff by contract. One party to the contract cannot ignore its provisions or violate them with impunity. The civil courts will not revise the decisions of churches or religious associations upon ecclesiastical matters, but they will interfere with such associations when rights of property or civil rights are involved. Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509; O'Hara v. Stack, 90 Penn. St. 477; Avery v. Inhab. of Tyringham, 3 Mass. 159; Sheldon v. Congregational Parish, 24 Pick. 281; Lynd v. Menzies, 33 N. J. Law, 162; Batterson v. Thompson, 8 Phila. 251. Bird v. St. Mark's Church of Waterloo. Opinion by Day, C. J.

HOMESTEAD-WHEN APPROPRIATED FOR RAILROAD MONEY FOR, EXEMPT.-Where a railroad company appropriated a homestead for its right of way, held, that the damages paid for such homestead was exempt from execution, and that this was so, although a portion of the homestead was not taken. A clear distinction exists between the proceeds of exempt property, exempt from attachment when such property has been sold by the debtor, and when it has been sold by proceedings against his will and changed into money. Where such property is converted into a mere right of action by a proceeding wholly in invitum, such right of action and the money collected are also exempt from attachment, the same as the property itself. Stebbins v. Pealer, 29 Vt. 289; Keyes v. Rines, 37 id. 263; Mitchell v. Milhoan, 11 Kans. 617; Houghton v. Lee, 50 Cal. 101; Cooney v. Cooney, 65 Barb. 524. Substantially the same rule is held in Tillotson v. Wolcott, 48 N. Y. 188. Kaiser v. Seaton. Opinion by Adams, J. MORTGAGE-SUFFICIENCY OF IDENTIFICATION NOTE IN. Where a note secured by a mortgage was therein referred to by its date, the name of the maker, the day of its maturity, and the rate of interest provided for, and the time it becomes payable, held, that such reference was sufficient to identify the note and authorize it to be read in order to determine the terms of the mortgage. The record of the mortgage

OF

imparted notice that the amount of the note was to be determined by that instrument itself, to which reference was made. Kellogg v. Frazier, 40 Iowa, 502; Clark v. Hyman, 55 id. 14; Bourne v. Littlefield, 29 Me. 302; Ricketson v. Richardson, 19 Cal. 330; Gill v. Pinney's Admr., 12 Ohio St. 38; Tousley v. Tousley, 5 id. 78; Hurd v. Robinson, 11 id. 232; Babcock v. Lisk, 57 Ill. 327; Booth v. Barnum, 9 Conn. 286; Stoughton v. Pasco, 5 id. 442; S. C., 13 Am. Dec. 72. See also Michigan Ins. Co. v. Brown, 11 Mich. 266; Webb v. Stone, 24 N. H. 282. Fetes v. O'Loughlin. Opinion by Beck, J.

PARTNERSHIP-INDIVIDUAL DEBT OF PARTNER AND DEBT DUE FIRM.-A partner has no right to release a debt due his firm in consideration of the release of his individual indebtedness to the firm debtor. A partner has authority to bind the firm in all matters pertaining to the partnership business. But it is not properly partnership business to release indebtedness due to it in consideration of the release of indebtedness due to its debtor from one of its members. The precise question arose in McNair v. Platt, 46 Ill. 211. In that case the court said: "The rule is firmly established, and not to be controverted, that where a member of a copartnership is indebted to a person owing the firm, he cannot apply the indebtedness due to the firm for the purpose of cancelling his indebtedness, nor can he apply the funds or property of the firm for such purpose without the consent of his copartner, or at least his subsequent ratificatiou;" citing Brewster v. Mott, 4 Scam. 378, and Hilliard v. Walker, 11 Ill. 644. See also Weed v. Richardson, 2 Dev. & B. Law, 535; Pierce v. Pass, 1 Port. (Ala.) 232; Caldwell v. Scott, 54 N. H. 413; Todd v. Lorah, 75 Penn. St. 155; Everingham v. Ensworth, 7 Wend. 329; Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns. 34; Viles v. Bangs, 36 Wis. 135. Thomas v. Stetson. Opinion by Adams, J.

PRACTICE-RETURN MUST BE ANNEXED TO ATTACHMENT.-Where there is no return indorsed on or annexed to a writ of attachment by the officer, the attachment must be discharged. The writ and return constitute essentially one record and must go together. Dickson v. Peppers, 7 Ired. Law, 429; McCrory v. Chaffin, 1 Swan, 307; Union Bank v. Barnes, 10 Humph. 244. Filing the writ with no indorsement of the proceedings is no return, but a return may be made by leave of court upon payment of costs. Hall v. Ayer, 19 How. Pr. 91; Nelson v. Brown, 23 Mo. 13. If the officer fail to make a return the court may doubtless direct him to do so. If he refuse, or make

a false return, he becomes liable to the party injured. Under the statute and adjudications, without a return an essential record is wanting, and the court has before it no proper evidence upon which it can base any proceedings against specific property or credits. Rock v. Singmaster. Opinion by Adams, J.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

ATTACHMENT LIABILITY OF OFFICER SEIZING PROPERTY OF THIRD PERSON-FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE- - SURETY -BOND NOT SIGNED BY PRINCIPAL(1) It is well established that where an officer, in order to justify a seizure of goods under an attachment, attacks the plaintiff's title on the ground that it is acquired by a conveyance from the defendant in the writ, which was fraudulent and void as to creditors, he must show not only the indebtedness in favor of the plaintiff in the writ, and the writ itself, but the preliminary proceedings which authorized the issuing of it. Nobles v. Holmes, 5 Hill, 194; Van Etten v. Hurst, 6 id. 311: Matthews v. Densmore, 43 Mich. 461; Thornburgh v. Hand, 7 Cal. 554; 2 Phil. Ev. Cow. &

Hill's Notes (5th Am. ed.) 366; Braley v. Byrnes, 20 Minu. 435. (2) In an action to recover the value of personal property wrongfully taken from the plaintiff, the defendant may, when, at least, he has acted in good faith, show in mitigation of damages that the property had been, by legal process, in favor of a third person, and against the plaintiff, lawfully taken from the defendant and sold, and thus legally applied to discharge an obligation of the plaintiff. Higgins v. Whitney, 24 Wend. 379; Sherry v. Schuyler, 2 Hill. 204: Ball v. Liney, 38 N. Y. 6; Irish v. Cloyes, 8 Vt. 30; Curtis v. Ward, 20 Conn. 204; Kaley v. Shed, 10 Metc. 317; Howard v. Cooper, 45 N. H. 339; Hopple v. Higbee, 23 N. J. Law, 342; Colton v. Read, 2 Wis. 458; Bates v. Courtwright, 36 Ill. 518. Or the officer may show in mitigation that the property belonged to another than the plaintiff, and that it had been lawfully taken from him (the defendant) and disposed of, upon legal process against the owner, in favor of one who had a right, as against both the owner and the plaintiff, to have the property so appropriated. (Squire v. Hollenback, 9 Pick. 551; Perry v. Chandler, 2 Cush. 237; Hanson v. Herrick, 100 Mass. 323; Stewart v. Martin, 16 Vt. 397. (3) A statute requiring a bond with sureties, is complied with if there are sureties though there was not a principal obligor. Keene v. Deardon, 8 East. 298; Dixon v. Dixon, 2 Bos. & Pul. 443; Taylor v. Ricards, 9 Ark.378; Barnett v. Warren, Circ. Ct. Hardin, 180; Thorn v. Savage, 1 Blackf. 51; People v. Judges Com. Pl., 5 Cow. 34; Chandler v. Smith, 14 Mass. 313. Howard v. Manderfield. Opinion by Dickinson, J.

[Decided Dec. 29, 1883.]

COVENANT -AGAINST

INCUMBRANCE

AND QUIET ENJOYMENT- BREACH OF EVICTION DAMAGES.An outstanding contract between the vendor and a third person giving the latter the right to cultivate the land sold for a share in the crops during the coming season, is an incumbrance constituting a breach of a covenant against incumbrances, and the inability of the vendee to obtain possession during the season because of the contract constitutes a breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment. An incumbrance, within the meaning of the covenant against incumbrances, includes any right or interest in the land which may subsist in third persons to the diminution of the value of the land, but consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance. Rawle, Cov. 94, 95; 2 Greenl. Ev. 242; Bouv. Law. Dict. tit. "Incumbrance; " Prescott v. Trueman, 4 Mass. 630. Hence an outstanding lease is an incumbrance. Grice v. Scarborough, 2 Spear, 649; Batchelder v. Sturgis, 3 Cush. 201; Porter v. Bradley, 7 R. I. 538. It is generally stated that "an eviction is necessary to a breach of the covenants for quiet enjoyment or of warranty." And no doubt the original and technical meaning attached to the word " eviction" was an expulsion by the assertion of a paramount title and by process of law. But the idea that the ouster must be process of law has been long since abandoned. The rule now is that these covenants are broken whenever there has been an involuntary loss of possession by reason of the hostile assertion of an irresistible title. Moreover, the eviction may be constructive. Constructive eviction is deemed to be caused by the inability of the purchaser to obtain possession by reason of the paramount title. When at the time of the conveyance he finds the premises in possession of one claiming under paramount title, the covenants for quiet possession or of warranty will be held broken without any other act on the part of either the grantee or the claimant, for the latter can do no more toward the assertion of his title, and as to the former the law will compel no one to commit a trespass in order to establish a lawful right in another action. Rawle, Cov. 154; Murphy v. Price,

48 Mo. 250; Clark v. Estate of Conree, 38 Vt. 475; Russ v. Steele, 40 id. 315. Where the incumbrance is an unexpired term or lease, the general rule, at least in the absence of any special circumstances, is that the measure of damages will be the fair rental value of the land to the expiration of the term. The underlying principle is that the damages should be estimated according to the real injury arising from the existence of the incumbrance, which, in the case supposed, is presumably and ordinarily the value of the use of the premises for the time during which the vendee has been deprived of such use. Rawle, Cov. 291, 292; Rickert v. Snyder, 9 Wend. 423; Batchelder v. Sturgis, 3 Cush. 205; Porter v. Bradley, 7 R. I. 542. Fritz v. Pusey. Opinion by Mitchell, J. [Decided Jan. 10, 1881.]

SLANDER-EVIDENCE-POPULAR MEANING OF WORD IN FOREIGN LANGUAGE. In an action for slander, held, that the popular meaning in which a German word was used could be shown, as could also the meaning of a gesture. When the slanderous words contain a word or phrase in a foreign language, which has, in common parlance among the people who speak that language, a meaning somewhat different from the definition by lexicographers, aud commonly understood by them in common speech, it is competent to prove that fact. Townsh. Sland., § 334; Wachter v. Quenzer, 29 N. Y. 547. This is but an application of the general rule that words are to be construed in the sense in which the hearers would naturally understand them. The general rule, doubtless, is that the jury and not the witness are to determine the meaning and application of the words. But where, as is often the case, the slanderous charge is not made in direct terms, but by equivocal expressions, insinuations, gestures, or even tones of the voice, which often have a potent meaning incapable of description, it is competent for witnesses who heard and saw them to state what they understood by them, and to whom they understood them to be applied. Leonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Smith v. Miles, 15 Vt. 245; Barton v. Holmes, 16 Iowa, 252; Townsh. Sland., § 384. Blakeman v. Blakeman. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

[Decided Jan. 14, 1884.]

WARRANTY -ON SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.To constitute a warranty in law, neither the word "warranty," nor any equivalent word, is indispensable. A clear and positive affirmation or representation of the quality of a thing sold, when made by a seller as a part of a contract of sale, and relied upon by the purchaser, is a warranty. Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198; Zimmerman v. Marrow, 28 Minn. 367; Forkelson v. Jurgenson, 28 id. 383; Benj. Sales, $929. Warder v. Bowen. Opinion by Berry, J. [Decided Dec. 28, 1883.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

CARRIER LIABILITY FOR LOSS BY ISSUE OF TWO ADVICE NOTES FOR SAME CONSIGNMENT-HOLDERS FOR

VALUE. The Great Eastern Railway Company sent to B. and Co., who were consignees for certain wheat, an advice note stating that the wheat had arrived, and was held to B. and Co.'s order. The note contained no entry of weight or charges for carriage, but across the spaces for these was written "account to follow." At the foot of the note was a delivery form to be signed by consiguees, "Please deliver to

or

bearer." B. and Co. indorsed this document, and handed it to S. and Co., and the railway company agreed to hold the wheat to the order of S. and Co. Afterward B. and Co. obtained an advance from the plaintiffs upon the security of a delivery order for the wheat signed by S. and Co. The plaintiffs lodged this

order with the railway company, who accepted it. Subsequently to this the railway company sent another advice note to B. and Co., which differed from the first in some particulars, and across the top of which was written "charges only," but which was upon the same printed form as the first. The two advice notes in reality related to the same consignment of wheat. B. and Co. obtained a second advance from the plaintiffs upon the security of the second advice note by fraudulently representing that it related to another consignment of wheat. B. and Co. thereupon signed the delivery form on the second note, and filled in the plaintiffs' names, and handed it to them, and they lodged it with the railway company, who accepted this order also. In an action by the plaintiffs against the railway company for the amount lost by them on the second advance to B. and Co., held, by the Court of Appeals (affirming the judgment of Pollock, B.), that the railway company having been guilty of culpable negligence, and such negligence having been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' loss, the defendants were estopped from alleging that the two advice notes related to the same consignment of wheat; and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to recover. Held, also, that although the advice notes were not negotiable instruments, yet from the form in which they were drawn, and the mode in which the defendants dealt with them, they could not be taken to be in the nature of mere invoices of the goods. Court of Appeals, June 18, 1883. Coventry v. Great Eastern R. Co. Opinions by Brett, M. R., and Lindley and Fry, L. JJ. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 641.)

My attention has been called to the communication in your last issue of Judge Goepp of this city. There must be some mistake in the matter if the Institute library be the one referred to in the letter. A copy of Chandler's American Criminal Trials has been the property of the Law Institute for nearly forty years. The reference in Burrill to Chambers' Trials, is to the expression of a threat against the deceased by one of the parties indicted.

The Carawan case is a pamphlet copy of the evidence in a murder trial, which took place over thirty years ago in an inferior court of North Carolina. As the court exercises appellate jurisdiction only over the decisions of its own clerks and justices of the peace, it is not surprising that as yet no reports of its decisions are in print.

Chandler's Criminal Trials was prepared for popular reading. It is an abridged narrative of trials divested of the technicalities of legal proceedings. Its use in court would be as novel as that of a copy of Spicer's Judicial Dramas, Cowley's Famous Divorces, or Burke's Romance of the Forum. The Carawan pamphlet may be found very likely in the library of every

lawyer who makes a specialty of collecting criminal trials. Every reference in Burrill clearly indicates that the pamphlet is simply a narrative of the facts or report of the evidence in this murder trial.

It is therefore at par with ephemeral publications which in their time were hawked or sold in the street as reports of the trials of Walworth, McFarland, Stokes, Monroe Edwards and Rozenweig.

A pamphleteer of the day, would entitle it "Sinful Desires; an Account of the wicked Career of a Clergyman." If the law of the land is only to be ascertained from such sources, perhaps it would be as well that the law be permitted to remain unrevealed.

The question of evidence in the Carawan case was no doubt the same as in the Spooner case cited by Burrill from Chandler's Trials. Both references are made by Burrill in the same connection, and this is therefore a reasonable presumption. Even were these records of evidence valuable for court purposes, they would still be superfluous, as the books are full of authorities regarding the admissibility in like cases of the defendant's declaration of intent and threats. Witness, Wharton, Bishop, Greenleaf, Archbold. Bennett and Heard, Horrigan and Thompson, Starkie, Hawley, Taylor, Russell, Hume, Roscoe, Robinson, etc.

These authorities are equally complete in elucidation of the following and kindred topics, as to whether the expressions of mental and bodily feelings are hearsay- the admissibility of the declarations of a party whenever the condition of his mind is at issue and the declarations tend to throw light upon such conditionthe expediency of admitting evidence which goes to show the state of feelings of the parties toward each other at the time of the act committed-the relevancy of all facts which tend to prove a real motive of the defendant in killing the deceased, whether such evidence be offered by the prosecution or the defensethreats by the deceased when the evidence is favorable to the slayer-defendant's declarations and threats and of declarations generally and the circumstances under which they are admissible as evidence in trials for murder.

The hindrances to the free exercise of will and determination, constraint of personal action by force or fear, the various kinds of duress and as to what constitutes duress at law, the application of the rule of duress per minas, the legal limitations of fear in actions, civil and criminal may be found exhaustively, lucidly and most skillfully discussed by many of the most noted American and English law writers in the following references, which are taken from the annotated catalogue of the New York Law Institute Library of 1884, and which I trust you can spare the space to print, as they may be of interest and use to the profession:

What is and what is not duress-who may take advantage of duress-effect of duress. A. C. Freeman Note of Cases, 26 Am. Dec. (1881) 374-378.

What constitutes compulsory payment-compulsion must be illegal, unjust or oppressive-must exist when-must proceed from the party receiving payment-must consist of actual or threatened exercise of power over person or property-compulsion of legal process commencement of suit or threat thereof, not compulsion-duress of actual or threatened imprisonment-menaces-duress of goods-duress of realtyduress as to third person-necessity, sufficiency and utility of process-recovery of illegal taxes paid under compulsion-as to money paid for redemption of laud, etc.-license fees-illegal fees exacted colore officiiillegal distress money wrongfully demanded as rent-excessive freight exacted by carriers-other examples of involuntary payments. A. C. Freeman, Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 153-171.

Civil duress and undue influence. 1 Ky. Law Re

porter (1880), 137-146. Same article with additional matter. 1 Ind. Law Mag. (1883) 1-23.

Voluntary payments. I. H. Lionberger, 18 Central Law Journal (1884), 188-190.

Payment under protest; constructive duress. 72 Law Times, London (1881), 129.

Recovery of money paid under duress. Note of cases, vol. 2, Smith's Leading Cases, 7th Am. ed. (1873), 415-416; id., 8th Eng. ed. (1879) 429, 431.

What constitutes duress. Wm. L. Murfree, Jr., 12 Central Law Journal (1881), 121-122. John Profatt's Note of Cases, 4 Am. Dec. (1878) 172-173. M. D. Ewell's Notes of cases, 18 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) (1879( 747-751; 22 id. (1883) 190-191. N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 24 English Rep. (1880) 634-637.

Defense of duress. Vol. 6, Wait's Actions and Defenses (1879), 649-664. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 788, 794.

Need and duress; gifts, etc. Note of Cases, Vol. 2) Part 2, White and Tudor's Lead. Cas. 4th Am. ed. (1877, 1245-1250.

Fraud and duress; compromises. Note of Cases, vol. 2. Part 3, White and Tudor's Lead. Cas., 4th Am. ed. (1877) 1731-1834.

Duress on married woman avoids deed. J. H. Stewart's Note of Cases, 34 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1882) 13.

Marriage void for duress, ratification, etc. J. H. Stewart's Notes of Cases, 37 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1884) 196.

When payment to carrier of extortionate prices is duress. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 169; N. C. Moak's Notes of Cases, 13 English Rep. (1876) 52; 16 id. (1877) 215.

Duress per minas. W. H. Phillips, 14 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) (1875) 201-207; Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 771-773.

Duress by actual or threatened imprisonment. N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 12 English Rep. (1876) 741-743; John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 4 Am. Dec. (1878) 172-173; A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 158-159.

Duress of imprisonment by abuse of legal process. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876 766-767.

Threat of legal proceedings, civil or criminal. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 45 Am. Dec. (1883) 157-158; N. C. Moak's Note of Cases, 16 English Rep. (1877) 215. Duress by threat of imprisonment of third persons. 26 Albany Law Journal (1882), 424-426.

Extorting money by process. J. H. Stewart's Note of Cases, 32 N. J. Eq. Rep. (1880) 51-56.

Menaces actionable when followed by damage. Note of Cases, Bigelow's Lead. Cas. Torts (1875) 226227.

Duress of goods. Note of Cases, Ewell's Lead. Cas. (1876) 775, 785-787; John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 1 Am. Dec. (1878) 644-645; A. C. Freeman's Notes of Cases, 26 Am. Dec. (1881) 376-878; 45 id. (1883) 159-160.

Duress of real property. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 46 Am. Dec. (1883) 160-161.

Res gesta; declarations in criminal cases. J. G. Thompson's Note of Cases, 10 Am. Rep. (1874) 28-29; Stewart Rapalje's Note of Cases, 1 Criminal Law Mag (1880) 69-71; Irving Browne's Notes of Cases, 34 Am. Rep. (1881) 479-482; vol. 4 Central Law Journal (1877), 435-439; vol. 21, Albany Law Journal (1880), 484, 504; vol. 22, Albany Law Journal (1880), 4-6; vol. 24, Journal of Jurisprudence, Edinburgh (1880), 75-81, The Bedingfields case. Cockburn and Taylor's Letters (1879-80), reviewed by J. B. Thayer, 14 Am. Law Rev. (1880) 817-838; 15 id. (1881) 1,71; reprinted in 15 Irish Law Times, Dublin (1881), 33 61, 102, 119, 140; criticism of L. C. J. Cockburn's views, 68 Law Times, London (1879), 58, 146.

Expressions of mental and bodily feelings; declarations to surgeons by the injured party. 22 Albany Law Journal (1881), 364-365.

Hearsay evidence; imposition, fraud or duress. John Anthon, 24 Am. Jurist (1840), 118-162.

Law in relation to threats. Notes of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 612-615.

Threats of the deceased as evidence in criminal cases. Joel P. Bishop, 4 Central Law Journal (1877), 435-439.

Evidence of previous threats in mitigation of the quantum of punishment. Note of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 475.

Threats of the deceased when evidence in favor of the defendant. John Proffatt's Note of Cases, 1 Am. Dec. (1878) 373.

Nervous fears no excuse for homicide. Notes of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1874), 242, 309, 687.

Fear of danger which will excuse homicide. A. C. Freeman's Note of Cases, 26 Am. Dec. (1881) 279-280. Fear from threats. Francis Wharton, 15 Central Law Journal (1882) 262-265.

Scientific aspects of fear. A. Wilson, 159 Colburn's New Mo. Mag., London (1876), 67-72.

Communicated threats. Note of Cases, Horrigan and Thompson's Cases (1876), 589-596.

Uncommunicated threats. By S. G. Graham with Note by George L. Christian, 3 Va. Law Journal (1879), 65-72; note by Joel P. Bishop, 4 Central Law Journal (1877). 354.

Confessions obtained by threats or undue influence. A. C. Freeman's Notes of Cases, 20 Am. Dec. (1880) 505-506.

In November, 1872, the General Term of this third department, Miller, Potter and Parker, justices, in Harding v. People (not reported), but a case singularly like People v. Woodward, 31 Huu, 57, said, Miller, P. J., writing the opinion: "After a careful examination I am satisfied that the tenor and weight of the authorities to which I have referred is, that when the prisoner intends to deprive the owner of the property permanently a case of larceny is made out. The taking and killing of the horse in the present case, clearly shows such intent, and it follows, that no error was committed by the judge in refusing to charge that the lucri causa was an essential element of the crime and must be proved, or stated in the various requests made by the prisoner's counsel on this subject."

The judgment however was reversed and a new trial ordered, upon the ground that under the third count of the indictment, "evidently framed to meet a case of cruelty to animals," no conviction for burglary or larceny could be had.

Were this case reported, Justice Learned need not have searched in vain for a "decision on the point in this State" fully sustaining his position in People v. Woodward."

ELIZABETHTOWN, March 26, 1884.

HARRY HALE.

LAWYERS AS SPEAKERS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I think you are in error in the "impression that the office of speaker in our National House of Representatives, has not been generally held by lawyers." Mr. Carlisle is a lawyer, a member of the Lexington, Ky., bar of good standing. And Mr. Keifer is also a law

LEGATEE FORFEITING LEGACY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

"A Reader," [whose letter is published on page 260 of the current volume asks for cases on a question which he will find discussed and decided by Justice Van Vorst, in his opinion in the case of Jackson v. Westerfield, Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, N. Y. Co., July 14, 1881, published in New York Daily Register of August 6, 1881.

If he has not happened to see the case mentioned, this may be of service.

BAPTISMAL NAMES.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

If the author of "A Dictionary of Baptismal Names, etc.," noticed in your last number, is not more accurate in his other definitions than in those which you cite, the lack of an "alphabetical sub-arrangement" is by no means the "gravest defect" of his performance. Arnold, e. g., which he defines "a maintainer of honor," denotes rather a combination of strength with amiabilty or affection; Aristides and Austin were both, doubtless, "lovers of justice," but one signifies the illustrious, while the other is simply a contraction of Augustine, Augustinus, a diminutive of Augustus; Brian is the Celtic for strong, without special reference to the voice; Hector means holding fast, or perhaps holding off, restraining from attack; Hortensius was unquestionably a great "orator," but 'his name signifies gardener; Ibzan is Semitic for tin; Lycurgus was probably a wolf-slayer; Marcus is a hammer, like its diminutive Marcellus or Martellus, French Martel; Othniel was "a judge," in the sense of a chief magistrate of Israel, but his name means "the hour of God; " Solon is the man of quoits, the quoitpitcher, discobulus; Sergius was "the silken," and was perhaps distinguished, like our Court of Appeals, by his robe; Torquil, one would say, must mean twister;" and William is the German Wilhelm, "hel met of resolution." I congratulate the author on the happy hit he has made in Harold; his other definitions are all astray.

NEW YORK, April 1, 1884.

"the

A. V. S.

NECESSARY IMPLICATION IN THE CONSTITUTION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Some years ago, there was a society formed for the purpose of advocating an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, so that it should contain an express recognition of God as the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. If I am not misinformed, Judge Strong, of the Supreme Court of the United States, was its president. Of course nothing could be more flattering

to the Almighty, or better calculated to assure Him a firm seat on the throne of the universe, than the existence of a society of this description. But for several years past, nothing has been heard of this society, and its annual proceedings and resolutions have ceased to gladden the hearts of the few chosen ones, who have not "bowed the knee to Baal." Why is this thus? I am sure I don't know, but since reading the recent "legal tender" decision, I have a theory which I desire to submit to your candid judgment. I hold that Judge Strong and a majority of the Supreme Court have discovered that no amendment is necessary, inasmuch as a recognition of the Deity is found in the Constitution by "necessary implication." The rea soning, upon which this conclusion is founded, is remarkably clear and convincing.. We learn, from the legal tender decision, that all the "powers, universally understood to belong to sovereignty," were conferred by the Constitution upon the government and executive of the United States, where such powers were not expressly prohibited. But one of the universal attributes of sovereigns in Europe, is that they govern by Divine right. This idea is expressed in their formal titles. The ancient title of the kings of England was: "Edward, Charles and James, by the Grace of God, of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, King." "It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence;" that the constitutional title of our present executive is: "Chester, by the Grace of God, of thirty-eight States, nine Territories, and Alaska, President;" and that here is an acknowledgment of the Deity, plainly implied in the Constitution. Again we learn, from the legal tender decision, that the power to borrow money not only implies the power to emit bills of credit, but to annex to those bills of credit any advantage to the holder thereof, which in the judgment of Congress will render them a more desirable acquisition. It follows therefore that the Constitution au. thorizes Congress to provide by statute that every clergyman in the country, "without respect to race, color, or previous condition of servitude," shall each Sunday, after putting up the usual petition to the Almighty, for "the heathen in distant lands, and the sister churches, and all them in authority," add a spe-. cial prayer for the holders of the National bills of credit Such a prayer, among pious people like ours, would certainly dispose them to acquire all the National currency they could honestly obtain-if not more-and we are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that it is an appropriate means conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress. It will be seen therefore that the Constitution not only recognizes an overruling Providence, but prays for its aid in borrowing money, and that an acknowledgment of God, as the ruler of the universe, is clearly implied in the clauses conferring upon Congress the power to borrow money, and provide a National currency. Q. E. D.

93

I have no doubt that your readers will perceive that the reasoning of this article, and that of Judge Gray in the case of Julliard V. Greenman, are almost identical, but it does not follow that I have copied from Judge Gray, or Judge Gray from me. The tendency of great minds to come to like conclusions upon the same state of facts is sufficient to account for the resemblance. But I flatter myself that I have settled-in accordance with the latest decisions-a vexed question, one that since the adoption of the Constitution has proved a stumbling block to many, and there is no use in denying that I am experiencing at this moment that general warmth adown the small of the back, which one feels when he has said a good thing."

Yours, exultantly,

THE MODERN WEBSTER.