CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSE-LETTER MAILED IN ENGLAND FOR FRANCE. A false pretense was made by letter in N., England, and posted there to, and received by a person in France. In consequence of the letter that person drew a check in France, payable at N. in England, and sent it to the prisoner at N. in England, who cashed the check in England. Held, that the prisoner was properly indicted and tried at N. in England. Crown Cases reserved. November 24, 1883. Regina v. Holmes. Opinion by Lord Coleridge, C. J. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 540.)

PROMISSORY NOTE-INDORSEMENT-INDORSER'S CO SURETIES. The whole facts and circumstances at tending upon the making, issue, and transfer of a bil or note may be referred to in order to ascertain the true relations of the parties who have put their signature upon it. The respondent was sued as indorser of a promissory note, and was held liable to pay the amount. He then brought an action against the appellant as prior indorser. It appeared that the note in question had been made by a company of which the appellant and respondent were both directors, and had been deposited with the bank as security for an overdraft by the company, and had been indorsed by the appellant, the respondent, and two other directors of the company, at the request of the bank, who asked for the personal guaranty of the directors. Held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that under these circumstances the proper legal inference was that the parties had indorsed as co-sureties, and that the ordinary principles of the law merchant as to the liabilities inter se of the successive indorsers of a note did not apply. Privy Council. July 11, 1883. MacDonald v. Whitfield. Opinion by Lord Watson. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 446).

FINANCIAL LAW.

CURRENCY-FEDERAL TAX ON NOTES ISSUED FOR CIRCULATION-NOTES PAYABLE IN GOODS.~(1) Section 19 of the act of Congress, of February 8, 1875, which provides, "that every person, firm, association, other than National bank associations, and every corporation, State bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of 10 per cent on the amount of their own notes used for circulation and paid out by them," must be construed as limited in its effect to notes payable in money; otherwise all sorts of negotiable paper, such as grain receipts," fare tickets, and the like, might be subject to the same taxation. (2) Section 2172, United States Revised Statutes, provides how the notes contemplated by the National Bank Act shall be printed and what they shall contain. No provision is made for a note for less than one dollar. A note for a fractional sum is not only unknown to the law, but its issue is unlawful. Section 3583. The Supreme Court, by deciding that an obligation "payable in goods " was not illegal, has left the inference to follow almost necessarily that it was not such a note as was contemplated by the statute, and therefore not taxable. U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. New York, March, 1883. Matter of Aldrich. Opinion by Coxe, J. (16 Fed. Rep. 369.)

INDORSEMENT-RESTRICTED ONE TO AGENT- EVIDENCE.-An indorsement, "Pay B. or order, for account of C," is a restricted indorsement, vests no general property in B., but simply constitutes him the agent of C. for the purpose of collection. Such an indorsement is a contract in writing, and not subject to contradiction by parol testimony. Kansas Supreme Court, July Term, 1883. Armour Brothers' Banking Co. v. Riley County Bank. Opinion by Brewer, J. (30 Kans. 163.)

LETTER OF CREDIT-LIABILITY FROM AGREEMEN TO ACCEPT.-(1) In order to render the writer of a let ter of credit liable, either upon an implied acceptanc or an agreement to accept drafts taken on the faità o such letter, the drafts must be taken for a valuable consideration. A promise to have the drafts dis counted, and to take up notes on which the person taking the drafts are liable as indorsers, is not a vas able consideration. (2) If a letter of credit provides that drafts drawn under its authority shall be us only for the purpose of being discounted at a partice lar bank, persons taking such drafts, with notice tha they have been offered to the bank for discount an refused, cannot recover thereon. Ohio Supreme C January Term, 1883, Sherwin v. Brigham. Opinion be Upson, J. (39 Ohio St. 137.)

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT INDORSEMENT COS STRUED A GUARANTY-LIABILITY OF INDORSER. — Y sold and delivered to B., before it was due, the promi sory note of H., payable to K. (but which had nev been indorsed by K.), and at the time of the deliver M. indorsed it "holden without demand or notice" H. was solvent at the time of the maturity of the note, and for about three years thereafter, when he becas utterly insolvent. In the meantime M. made one more requests of B. to collect the note of the make In a suit afterward brought by B. against M. to cover the amount of the note, held, that M. wail guarantor; that by the terms of his indorsement waived a demand and notice; that he was liable to for the amount of the note. Birchard v. Bartlett, Mass. 279; Irish v. Cutter, 31 Me. 536; Bickford v Gibbs, 8 Cush. 156; Wildes v. Savage, 1 Story, Maine Supreme Judicial Court, December 14, 188. Bray v. Marsh. Opinion by Danforth, J. (75 Me. 40

SAVINGS BANK-DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE-PAT MENT TO WRONG PERSON.-A stipulation between savings bank and a depositor, that his deposit may paid to any one presenting his book, does not reler ! the bank from the duty of exercising reasonable car | New Hampshire Supreme Court. Kimball v. Noris Opinion by Doe, C. J. (59 N. H. 6.)

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE POLICY-SOLE AND UNCONDITIONAL OWNER.A policy of fire insurance described the property i sured as "his two-story dwelling-house," etc., and appeared that he had purchased the fee and taken a bond for a conveyance, but that the vendor had only a life estate in the property, with a remainder in siz sevenths thereof; that a suit had been instituted (x perfect the title, to which the insured was a party: and that there was an outstanding purchase net which he owned at the time of the insurance and the loss. Held, that the outstanding note, and the fa that the insured only held under a title bond, was nod material to the risk, and that the fact of the outstand ing seventh interest or remainder did not prevent Lic from being "the sole and unconditional owner, within the meaning of the policy. See Insurance Co v. Haven, 95 U. S. 245; Hough v. City Ins. Co. Coun. 10; Wineland v. Security Ins. Co., 53 Md. 26. American Basket Co. v. Farmville Ins. Co., 3 Hughes 251; Washington Mills Co. v. Commereial Ins. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 646; Waller v. Northern Ass. Co., 10 id. 233. Rumsey v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 1 id. 396. U. S. Gir Ct., Kentucky, Feb. 19, 1883. Williams v. Bufald German Insurance Co. Opinion by Barr, J. (17 Fed Rep. 63.)

FIRE POLICY-PAROL APPLICATION-OPINION AS TO ATTERS MATERIAL TO RISK DOES NOT AVOID.-PlaintI's agent, an insurance broker, applied to the agent Boston of the defendant insurance company for an surance on certain property of the plaintiff in ridgewater. When he made the application, he owed a printed list which he stated he believed was correct list of the existing insurance on the plaint's property at Bridgewater; but this list did not conin a policy then existing and issued by the defendit, in part covering a portion of this same property. his error in the expression of belief was wholly uninntional, and the defendant's agent, by looking at e books and records in his office, could have ascerined in a few minutes whether the list was correct. le defendant's agent made a verbal contract to effect e insurance, and subsequently a policy was issued the plaintiff. The policy contained the warranty at all the facts and circumstances in regard to the 'operty insured, as far as known to the assured and aterial to the risk, had been truly stated in the ap. ication for insurance; and provided that "if any aterial fact or circumstance shall not have been irly represented," the risk should cease and deterine and the policy be null and void. Held, that the licy was valid and binding on defendant. There as no written application such as was apparently ntemplated by the provisions of the policy; and pressions of opinion and belief made in good faith to matters material to the risk are not to be taken misrepresentations of fact. National Bank v. Inrance Co., 95 U. S. 673; Wood v. Firemen's Insurice Co., 126 Mass. 316. If the insurance company is ntent with expressions of belief, if they are honestly ade, it has no right to complain that facts or cirmstances have not been fairly represented. Especially ust this be so, when the means of correcting any ror are in its own power, and it fails to avail itself of em. Massachusetts Sup. Jud. Ct., March, 1883. ridgewater Iron Co. v. Enterprise Ins. Co. Opinion Devens, J.

LIFE POLICY-FAILURE TO PAY PREMIUM-DECLAATION OF AGENT EVIDENCE OF WAIVER NOTICE AND ROOF OF DEATH-NOTE GIVEN FOR PREMIUM-WHEN

OLICY FORFEITED-NET VALUE POLICY.-(1) The decration of the agent of a life insurance company, havog notice of the death of the assured, that the policy as forfeited by a failure to pay the premium when e, and making no objection to the want of formal tice and proof of death, is evidence of a waiver of e provision in the policy requiring due notice and oof of death within a given time. Goodwin v. Insurce Co., 73 N. Y. 480. (2) The occasional payments premiums and notes given for premiums, after due, d consequent renewals of the policy by the company e not a waiver, as to premiums subsequently due, of e stipulation in the policy making a failure to pay y premium or premium note when due condition forfeiture of the policy. When the annual premium paid partly in cash and partly by a note payable bere the end of the year, and a receipt renewing the licy for a year is given, the policy is forfeited when в note is due on a failure to pay it at that time. See ew York Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24; Howell v. nickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 19 Abb. Pr. 217; tch v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 44 Vt. 481: Robert v. New gland Life Ins. Co., 1 Dis. (Ohio) 355; Thompson v. ickerbocker Life Ins. Co., U. S. Cir. Ct., So. Dist. a., 1876; 3 Am. L. T. Rep. 370; Mutual Benefit Ins. - v. French, 2 Cin. Sup. Ct. Rep. 321; Roehner v. nickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 4 Daly, 512. (3) Under e non-forfeiture law of Massachusetts (Gen. Sts. of ss., ch. 186), providing for extending life insurance mpanies (otherwise forfeited for non-payment of a

premium) by the net value of the policy as a single premium, all unpaid notes given for annual premiums, including those for the part of the year subsequent to the forfeiture, are deducted in determining the net value of the policy. Foster v. Hill, 36 N. H. 526; Pitt v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 100 Mass. 500. New Hamp. shire Sup. Ct. Marston v. Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Allen, J. (59 N. H. 92.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

-

INDICTMENT-AVERMENT AS TO TIME. The averment of time in an information, as in indictments, must be of a day certain before the time of filing the information, and within the period in which by the statute of limitations the offense is punishable. Hinson v. State, 7 Mo. 244; State v. Pratt, 14 N. H. 459; State v. Caverly, 51 id. 446; Com. v. Doyle, 110 Mass. 103; State v. Davidson, 36 Tex. 325; 1 Arch. Cr. Pl. 257; 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 25, § 77. New Hampshire Sup. Ct. State of New Hampshire v. Ingalls. Opinion by Allen, J. (59 N. H. 88.)

INCEST-BROTHER-IN-LAW AND SISTER-IN-LAW.-A brother-in law and sister-in-law are, within the meaning of the statute prescribing the punishment of incest, nearer of kin, by affinity, thau cousins. Supreme Ct. of Ohio, Jaunary Term, 1883. Stewart v. State of Ohio. Opinion by the Court. (39 Ohio St. 152.)

ARSON

VARIANCE "ADJOINING."- An indictment, charging that the respondent attempted to set fire to an out-building adjoining a dwelling-house, is not supported by evidence that the building was near to but not in contact with the dwelling-house. "Adjoining" is a synonym for "adjacent to,' 'contiguous, ," that is, in contact with. Arkell v. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 192; Rex v. Hodges, 1 Moo. & M. 341; Peverelly v. People, 3 Park. 59; 2 Russ. Cr. 557-561. New Hampshire Sup. Ct. State of New Hampshire v. Downą. Opinion by Stanley. (59 N. H. 320.)

PLEA IN ABATEMENT-INDICTMENT PENDING, BAD— CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL.-It is well settled, on both reason and authority, that the pendency of an indictment is not good ground for a plea in abatement to another indictment in the same court for the same cause. Whenever either of them-and it matters not which is tried and judgment pronounced thereon, such judgment will afford a good plea in bar to the other, either of autre fois convict, or autre fois acquit; but nothing short of a conviction or acquittal will support such a plea. Commonwealth v. Drew, 3 Cush. 279; Regina v. Goddard, 2 Ld. Raymond, 920; Whart. Crim. Plead. and Prac., § 431; 4 Hawk. P. C. 309; Fost. C. L. 105; 1 Chit. C. L. 446. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., Nov. 5, 1883. Smith v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Opinion by Sterrett, J.

VARIANCE -MISNOMER IN INDICTMENT FOR NUISANCE. (1) The State's attorney filed an information under the liquor law against the respondent, as "Thomas, J.," for maintaining a nuisance. The respondent pleaded in abatement that his name was "Timothy, J." Held, that the information was amendable. As said by the court in Turns v. Commonwealth, 6 Metc. 224: "The issue for the jury of trials is not what is the individual's name, but whether the person who has pleaded in chief on his arraignment is guilty of the offense charged upon him. The conviction, therefore, must follow the indictment. The exception can be taken only in abatement." It could not be reached by demurrer. Scott v. Soons, 3 East, 111. It, at most, is a formal defect within the

scope of State v. Arnold, 50 Vt. 731. Such defects and greater in informations were amendable at the common law. Regina v. Steadman, 2 Lord Raymond, 1307; Rex v. Seawood, id. 1472; Rex v. Harris, 1 Salk. 47; State v. Weare, 38 N. H. 314. Vermont Supreme Court, May Term, 1883. State of Vermont v. Murphy, Opinion by Ross, J. (55 Vt. 547.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

GOING FOR MR. GOEPP

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I have tried hard to keep informed upon the discussion, to which you have given up so many pages, about the proposed Civil Code. I have read most of the letters you have published, and all but one I hope understandingly. I refer to Mr. Goepp's letter on page 280. As I fear there are others who cannot comprehend it, I trust you will in some way make plain the utility of its publication.

Mr. Goepp first said-page 219-that one reason why we need a Civil Code is because a friend of his had to travel 120 miles to find a decision upon a point in Criminal Procedure and then could not find the book.

Mr. Hornblower then said-page 259-that this shows no reason for a Civil Code, because we already have a Code of Criminal Procedure where the principle of such a decision ought to be codified, if at all.

Now Mr. Goepp says, and I wonder what he means, that with regard to this single illustration, his object in addressing it was to show how the absence of a code, by leaving us without a standard for distinguishing important doctrines from unimportant, makes it necessary to hunt for a decision which is now worth citing, but which with a code would rank only as an unimportant gloss.

Now I venture to ask: How does the absence of a Civil Code leave us without a standard for distinguishing the doctrines of Criminal Procedure, which are already codified?

Why if we had another code, would the decision referred to rank as an unimportant gloss any more than it does now?

The story told by Mr. Goepp seems to me to illus. trate, more than any thing else, the thought which forces itself upon every practical lawyer, that in spite of the enormous multiplication of decisions which everybody bewails continually, there is always a great dearth of cases directly in point upon the question which you happen to have on hand. Instead of studying the great principles of the law which can be found tersely stated in any good text-book, lawyers in their desperation travel hundreds of miles to find some nisi prius case, perhaps where another lawyer, no better than themselves but only earlier, has discussed the question.

Considering that this case, if it could have been found, would be law only so far as its reason and good sense commended it, is it not a little wild to say, because this friend could not find the book in New York, that "it is a matter of proof that there is in America no place where a man can be informed of the law he is expected to obey?

valuable as a book of reference, and though I have read with much interest the various pamphlets issued, and the editorials and communications to the JourNAL, yet I cannot quite answer to my own satisfaction many objections to civil codification.

Without presuming to obtrude any views of my own, I desire to cite the preface to the first edition of "Byles on Bills," as embodying tersely and concisely, what appears to be the main, though perhaps not unanswerable objection to a Civil Code. He

says:

"Simple as the form of a bill or note may appear, the rights and liabilities of the different parties to those instruments have given rise to an infinity of legal questions, and multitudes of decisions. A striking proof of what the experience of all ages had already made abundantly manifest-that law is, in its own nature, necessarily voluminous; that its complexity and bulk constitutes the price that must be paid for the reign of certainty, order and uniformity; and that any attempt to regulate multiform combinations of circumstances by a few general rules, however skilfully constructed, must be abortive." EDWIN QUACKENBUSH.

BALLSTON SPA, April 7, 1884.

[We have outgrown Byles on Codification, just as we have outgrown Noah on Navigation.-ED. ALB. LAW JOURNAL.]

FOX ON WARRANTY IN FIRE INSURANCE.

A Treatise on Warranty in Fire Insurance Contracts. By Fontaine T. Fox, Jr., late vice-chancellor of the Louisville Chancery Court. Chicago; Callahan & Co., 1888 Pp. 268.

This work appears to have been written with the purpose of establishing as law the views of the author upon the subject of warranty in the fire insurance contract, rather than for the purpose of exhibiting what the conclusions of writers and courts in reference thereto really are. He dissents from the views of both Mr. May and Mr. Wood, who are well-known writers. and whose works we believe to be standard authority upon the law of insurance. Whether Mr. Fox has in his treatise established the fact that his rule is the better one we do not pretend to say; but his production is well written, and worthy of consideration by all who have an interest inats subject-matters.

HEARD'S PRECEDENTS OF EQUITY PLEADING. Precedents of Equity Pleadings. By Franklin Fiske Heard. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1884. Pp. x and 247.

This is a book of forms for equity pleading, and is to be commended as attempting to introduce into this branch of the law of pleading brevity, simplicity, and directness. The precedents given seem to cover almost every conceivable case wherein equitable relief is likely to be sought, and very many of them, we should judge, are reproduced from actual pleadings in court. The book is excellently printed and bound, but the advertisement of the publishers opposite the title page is inexcusable.

BAIRD AND BABCOCK'S GUIDE TO THE LAW.

A Guide to the Principles of the Law. By Wm. Raimond Baird, LL. B., and F. Sherrill Babcock, LL. B. New York; George S. Diossy, 1884. Pp. xxiv, 284 and xxxvii.

This little book aspires to contain something about every department of the law, which so far as we can judge it does, although it has very little about any one of them. Its chief value, we believe, will be to students who are preparing themselves for admission to the bar, as they can learn or refresh their memory as to sufficient legal knowledge herein, to pass the ordinary investigation prescribed by the courts to determine whether or not a man is fitted to be a lawyer. In addition to its condensation of the law, the work contains several tables, the most valuable of which to the student is that containing a list of books recommended for reading.

TIDY'S LEGAL MEDICINE.

LAWSON ON INSANITY.

notes. By John D. Lawson

Co., 1884. Pp. xlviii, 953.

DAVIS' LAW IN SHAKESPEARE.

to

HUN'S COURT RULES.

Rules of all the Courts of Record of the State of New York. With notes, references, and an index. By Marcus T. Hun, Reporter of the Supreme Court. New York; Banks & Brothers, 1884. Pp. xii and 394.

A collation of the rules of the State courts of record is among the indispensable requisites of a lawyer's office. A practitioner who is furnished with the several codes, the rules and a book or two of forms may be said to have a good working library, especially if the various volumes are judiciously annotated. The work before us is in its previous editions well-known to the profession, and we need only say that it seems to be all that could be desired in its department. It contains the rules of Court of Appeals, and the general rules of the Supreme Court, also the special rules of the Circuit, County, and City Courts. The rules of the Court of Appeals and the general rules are copiously annotated with references to decisions and statutes. One feature which strikes us as possessing peculiar merit is, that under each rule a reference is made to every section of the Code of Civil Procedure to which it may apply, and a summary of the contents of the section given. The book appears to be carefully indexed, and is well printed and bound.

PEELER ON LAW AND EQUITY.

A Treatise on Law and Equity as distinguished and enforced in the courts of the United States. By A. J. Peeler. Austin: Swindell's Printing House, 1883. Pp. xlviii and 425. The purpose of this work is to present clearly the distinction between law and equity in the administration of remedial justice in the courts of the United States. That such a work is needed is shown by the fact that the dismissal of a case because brought on the wrong side of the court is a very frequent occurrence in the Federal tribunals, that result often happening in the court of last resort. A modification in the rules of practice of the courts mentioned might prevent such apparent injustice, but as there is no probability of any modification in the direction needed, those of the profession who do business in these courts will welcome any treatise that promises to aid them to avoid mistakes in this matter.

How far this volume will accomplish its professed purpose it is not possible to say from simply reading it. The author seems to have examined exhaustively both the statute law and the decisions, and if the principles deducible therefrom are not as clearly and concisely stated as might be wished, the entire field is covered, and what has been enacted or determined is before the reader, and he can draw his own conclusions.

We believe that the work is the first which has appeared in its special department. The book is fairly printed and bound.

PARTIES TO ACTIONS.

The Law Respecting Parties to Actions, Legal and Equitable. By Horace Hawes, counselor at law, San Francisco. Sumner, Whitney & Co., 1884. Pp. 534.

This volume covers the subject-matter fully and is designed, as the author says in the preface, "to place this information at the finger tips' of the busy lawyer, and is intended for him rather than for the self of the scholar." That the author is one of those who have no desire to wade through a volume to find what he wants, is shown by the most excellent index which alone is worth the price of the book.

DESTY'S FEDERAL PROCEDURE.

A Manual of Practice in the Courts of the United States, embracing the provisions of the Constitution, the Revised Statutes, and amendments thereto, relating to Federal Courts, together with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, with Notes of Decisions. By Robert Desty; sixth edition, revised. San Francisco, Sumners, Whitney & Co., 1884 Pp. 934.

In taking up any of Mr. Desty's books, we feel the assurance that the work has been ably and thoroughly done; no decision affecting the matter in hand escapes him. And this volume, to the Federal practitiouer, is the "book of books."

re probate of will of John Darrow, deceased; Stephen D. Callahan, administrator, respondent, v. Thomas R. Sharp, receiver, appellant; Miles B. Briggs, administrator, respondent, v. The American Tract Society, appellant; Samuel J. Mack, appeilant, v. Morton B. Austin, executor, respondent; Mary A. Seybolt, administratrix, v. The New York, Lake Erie & West. R., appellant; Maria Stephens, administratrix, respondent, v. The Jewell Manufacturing Co., appellant.- - Decision of surrogate affirmed, with costs payable out of the fund-In re probate of the last will and testament of Mary O'Hara, deceased.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs in this court to both parties payable out of the fund-Mary O'Hara and another, appellants, v. William H. Dudley and others, executors, respondeuts.- -Orders of General and Special Terms reversed, and motion granted without costs James O'Brien, sheriff, respondent, v. John N. Young and another, appellants.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event Emelia Lane, executrix, appellant, v. Henry F. Lane, respondent; William H. Ellis, administrator, appellant, v. The New York, Lake Erie & West. R. Co., respondents.—Dismissed without costs-Sarah Solomon, administrator. appellant, v. The Manhattan Ry. Co., respondent.Judgment of General Term and of surrogate reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-In re probate of an alleged will of Eliza M. Smith, deceased.

-Judgment of General Term reversed so far as it modifies the decree of the chief judge of the New York Common Pleas, and that decree affirmed with costs against the contestant-Catharine Hancox, respondent and appellant, v. Samuel M. Meeker, surviving executor, respondent and appellant.-Judgment affirmed-The People, respondent, v. James Irving, appellant.-Order affirmed with costs-The People, ex rel. Twenty-third Street Ry. Co., appellants, v. The Commissioners of Taxes, respondents.

Orders of General and Special Terms reversed, and motion granted, with costs in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and $10 costs of motion - John S.

Prouty, respondent, v. The Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co., appellants.- -General Term order of June 1, 1883, is reversed, and the Special Term order of March 5 affirmed, with costs. The General Term order of October 1, 1883, and the Special Term order of March 11, 1883, are both reversed with costs, the exceptions to the report of the referee sustained, and the purchaser, Knowles, required to complete his purchase-William 1. Chase and wife v. Nelson Chase and others, appellants; Marcus L. Stieglitz, purchaser, respondent.Judgment of Supreme Court reversed, and decree of surrogate affirmed with costs. In re accounting of William B. Neilley and another, administrators, William B. Neilley, administratrix, respondent, v. Hannah J. Osborn and others, appellants.- Judgment of the Special and General Terms reversed, and complaint dismissed, with costs-John Roach and others, respondents, v. Isaac F.Duckworth, appellant.-Judg meut affirmed with costs-John B.Johnson, respondent, v. Catharine Williams, executrix, appellant; Robert P. Crowe, ind. and administrator, et al., respondents, v. Frederick O. Lewin, executor, appellant; The Mayor, etc., of New York, appellants, v. Henry Hart and another, respondents; James A. Flack et al., executors, appellants, v. The State of New York; Mary Story, respondent, v. The Williamsburgh Mutual Benefit Association, appellant; George Clark, appellant, v. Ira Davenport, comptroller, respondent; Francis X. Meyers, sheriff, appellant, v. James A. Becker, respondent; In

NOTES.

THE Criminal Law Magazine for March contains a leading article on Criminal Contempts, by Judge Seymour D. Thompson, and one on Relative operation of prohibition, local option, and excise laws, by L. M. Dorman. Mr. Carter's argument against codification is learned and scholarly, but the objections savor more of the metaphysical than of the practical, and will not, in our opinion, stand the test of experience. We heartily indorse Mr. Field's side of the question, for we believe it to be on that of genuine reform and true progress. Judge-made law is a species of usurpation, while codification is evolution. Whatever will tend to decrease the one and promote the other will receive our hearty support at all times.-American Law Record.-We learn that the judges of the Court of Appeals of New York have concluded to don the silken robe. It is well known that the robe is not worn in this country except by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and if our State courts are to follow this practice it is eminently proper that the Empire State should be the first to lead. We are inclined to consider the movement favorably, although we do not wish to be understood as being committed fully to the innovation, but we do not think it necessarily unrepublican, and certainly not undignified. There is ample room, if not pressing need, in the American judiciary for the cultivation of this latter trait.American Law Record.