and under a claim of right, restraint in equity seems to be essential in order to prevent vexatious litigation, and a multiplicity of suits. Garwood v. Ry., 83 N. Y. 404; Tipping v. Eckersley, 2 Kay & J. 264; Clark v. Stewart, 56 Wis 154; S. C., 14 N. W. Rep. 54. So it has been held that where parties have regulated their rights in water by contract or grant, the meaning and breach of which is clear, it is not a question of damage, but the mere breach affords sufficient ground for equitable intervention. Tipping v. Eckersley, supra; Dickenson v. Grand Junction Can. Co, 15 Beav. 260; Olmstead v. Loomis, 9 N. Y. 423. So it has been held that where there is an admitted common right among several owners of the same water-power, equity will interpose to regulate the common use, to determine the extent of their respective rights, and the proper mode of exercising and enjoying them, as tending to prevent litigation, and as affording a more complete and perfect remedy than could be obtained at law, and as furnishing, in fact, the only adequate means of ascertaining and determining the respective rights of the parties. Burnham v. Kemptom, 44 N. H. 100; Caulet v. Cook, id. 512; Hanna v. Clarke, 31 Grat. 36; Adams v. Manning, 48 Conn. 477; Sanborn v. Braley, 47 Vt. 170; Markham v. Stowe, 66 N. Y. 574; Comstock v. Johnson, 46 id. 615; Corning v. Troy I. & N. Fact., 40 id. 191; Erie Canal Co. v. Walker, 29 Penn. St. 170; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Society, 30 N. J. Eq. 145; City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588. In Lyon v. McLaughlin, 32 Vt. 425, both parties had rights to the privilege of water under their respective deeds, and the court aptly stated the rule thus: "It would seem to be well settled, as shown by the text-books and the cases, that when the evasion of a right in this kind of property is threatened and intended, which is necessarily to be continuing and operating prospectively and indefinitely, and the extent of the injurious consequences is contingent and doubtful of estimation, the writ of injunction is not only permissible, but is the most appropriate means of remedy. It affords, in fact, the only adequate and true remedy. For the very doubtfulness as to the extent of the prospective injury, and the impossibility of ascertaining the measure of just reparation, render such injury irreparable, in the sense of the law relating to this subject." Lawson v. Menasha. Opinion by Cassoday, J. [Decided Jan. 29, 1884.]

NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT

ABSTRACT.*

MORTGAGE-WHEN PAYMENT OPERATES AS ASSIGNMENT.-Payment of a mortgage debt by one having an interest to protect will operate as an assignment of the mortgage whenever justice requires it. Stantons v. Thompson, 49 N. H. 272; Moore v. Beasom, 44 id. 215; Rigney v. Lovejoy, 13 id. 247; Robinson v. Leavitt, 7 id. 73, 100. Bacon v. Goodnow. Opinion by Smith, J.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-PETITION WHEN TO BE FILED. -A petition for the removal of a cause to the Federal court filed at the fifth term, the pleadings being complete at the second term, is not filed at the term when the cause can first be tried. The term at which a cause can first be tried is the term at which the cause is first triable on its merits. Huddy v. Havens, 3 W. N. C. 432; Am. Law Reg., May, 1879, p. 312. It is the first term at which the case is at issue for trial and might be ordered to be tried. New York Warehouse & Security Co. v. Loomis, 122 Mass. 431. It is the term when the cause is ready for trial, although the court and parties may not be ready to try it. Gurnee v.

* To appear in 59 New Hampshire Reports.

City of Brunswick, 1 Hughes, 270; Forrest Home v. Keeler, 9 Rep. 432. The fact that there is other business entitled to precedence on the docket does not obviate the necessity of filing the petition for removal at the first term when the case could otherwise be tried. Preston v. Ins. Co., 58 N. H. 76; Murray v. Holden, 10 Rep. 162. Nor does the time when a cause may first be tried depend upon the diligence of counsel in completing the pleadings. Fulton v. Golden, 8 Rep. 517. The object of the statute of 1875 was to abridge the right of removal by fixing a definite time within which it might be exercised. Stebbins v. Lancashire Ins. Co. Opinion by Smith, J.

FORMER ADJUDICATION-DECREE. IN EQUITY CONCLUSIVE AS TO ALL MATTERS PARTIES BOUND TO LITIGATE-NEGLECT TO PRESENT CLAIM-SUPPLEMENTAL

BILL.-A final decree in a bill in equity is conclusive upon all the parties in respect to all matters of claim aud defense determined by it, and as to all incidental matters which the parties were bound to litigate and bring to decision. Neglect to present a claim, which might have been litigated in a bill in equity, until after a final decree, on a motion for a rehearing, is a waiver of the claim, and after such decree leave will not ordinarily be given to file a supplemental bill to enforce it. Freem. Judg., § 249; Story Eq. Pl., §§ 790, 791; Story Eq. Juris., § 547; Clemens v. Clemens, 37 N. Y. 59, 74; Malloney v. Horau, 49 id. 111, 116; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351; Case v. Beauregard, 101 id. 688; King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9, 15. Ashuelot Railroad Co. v. Cheshire Railroad Co. Opinion by

Clark, J.

--

PRIVATE WAY-OBSTRUCTION DEVIATION FROM NECESSITY-NEED NOT REMOVE NOR SUE FOR DAM

AGES.-An obstruction of a private way of prescription, by the land-owner, making the way impassable, may create a reasonable necessity that the owner of the way should deviate from it, and go over another part of the land. The doctrines of reasonable necessity, reasonable care, and reasonable use prevail in this State in a liberal form, on a broad basis of general principle. Brown v. Cram, 1 N. H. 169, 172; State v. Elliot, 11 id. 540; Graves v. Shattuck, 35 id. 257; A. M. Company v. Goodale, 46 id. 53; Closson v. Morrison, 47 id. 482; Sterling v. Warden, 51 id. 217; 52 id. 197; Aldrich v. Wright, 53 id. 398; Brown v. Collins, id. 442; Hoit v. Stratton Mills, 54 id. 109, 116; Jones v. Towne, 58 id. 462, 465; Garland v. Towne, 55 id. 55; Gilman v. Laconia, id. 130; Rowe v. Portsmouth, 56 id. 291; Bassett v. S. M. Company, 43 id. 569; Swett v. Cutts, 50 id. 439; Hayes v. Waldron, 43 id. 580; Varney v. Manchester, 58 id. 430. The rights of necessity are a part of the common law. The necessity is generally a reasonable one, and determined by the application of reason to the circumstances of the case, and not prescribed as an arbitrary, verbal formula. Daniels v. Brown, 34 N. H. 454. A ground on which, in many cases, the law allows a remedy without legal process or judicial procedure, is the inadequacy of such process and procedure. The law adopts the natural right of self-defense, because it considers the future process of law an inadequate remedy for present injuries accompanied with force. It adopts the natural right of recapturing property, real and personal, by the mere act of the party injured, because legal process may be an inadequate remedy. It adopts the natural right of abating nuisances by the mere act of the party injured, because he cannot reasonably be required to wait for the slow progress of the ordinary forms of justice. 3 Bl. Com. 3-6; Cooley Torts, 45-58. The owner of the right of way could lawfully go round the nuisance and out of the way, doing no unreasonable damage, because such deviation, like an abatement of the nuisance, was a remedy of necessity. If he removes the

obstruction and makes the way passable, the necessity of going out of the way will cease (State v. Northumberland, 44 N. H. 628, 631, 632); but there is no reasonable necessity for leaving the owner of the right of way to the inadequate remedies of his own removal of the obstruction, and a suit for damages. Haley v. Colcord. Opinion by Doe, C. J.

TRESPASS ACTION BY MORTGAGEE ACTS DONE WHEN OUT OF POSSESSION-LICENSE BY MORTGAGOR.

A mortgagee of land, who has entered and taken actual possession under his mortgage, may maintain trespass for an injury done to the freehold while the mortgagor was in possession; and it is no defense that the acts causing such injury to the freehold were done by license from the mortgagor, given subsequent to the execution of the mortgage. Jones Mort., § 687; Pettengill v. Evans, 5 N. H. 54; Smith v. Moore, 11 id. 55; Sanders v. Reed, 12 id. 558. Bellows v. Railroad. Opinion by Clark, J. [Decided Dec. 1879.]

In an action for damages for withholding property from, or not conveying property to the plaintiff, a tender of the property or part of it, or a conveyance of it or part of it, to the plaintiff, may be allowed at the trial in mitigation of damages, when such a course is reasonable. Toule v. Lawrence. Opinion by Doe, C. J. (See Moak's Underhill on Torts, 95-8.-Ed.) [Decided June, 1880.]

BOUNDARIES-QUESTION OF FACT.-The location on the ground of boundaries described in deeds is a question of fact. Madden v. Tucker, 46 Me. 367; Abbott v. Abbott, 51 id. 575; Tebbetts v. Estes, 52 id. 566; Williston v. Morse, 10 Metc. 17, 27. Tasker v. Cilley. Opinion by Bingham, J.

[Decided June, 1880.]

MONEY PAID-REFUSAL TO PERFORM CANNOT RECOVER ESTOPPEL.-Money paid on a contract for the purchase of land cannot be recovered by one who refuses to complete the contract and take a deed, the other party being in no fault. Lane v. Shackford, 5 N. H. 133; Ayer v. Hawkes, 11 id. 148, 152, 153; Ketchum v. Evertson, 13 Johns. 365; Green v. Green, 9 Cow. 46; Rounds v. Baxter, 4 Greenl. 454. Having abandoned the contract and refused to perform, and not being entitled to recover the money which he has paid, he has no interest to protect, and equity will not uphold the mortgage for that purpose. Refusing to perform the contract on his part, and standing by and seeing the property sold without claiming title or interest, he is estopped from setting up or making claim under a mortgage, which, to the extent of his claim at least, was understood by the defendants and himself to have been paid. Thompson v. Sanborn, 11 N. H. 201; Parker v. Brown, 15 id. 184. Bill dismissed. Hill v. Grosser. Opinion by Allen, J. [Decided June, 1880.]

FAILURE TO INVEST

- WHEN

ADMINISTRATOR CHARGEABLE WITH INTEREST.-In Lund v. Lund, 41 N. H. 355, 359, it is said: "The true rule to be applied, in charging administrators with interest, is well settled. In all cases where the administrator, without any just reason or excuse, retains the money in his own hands unemployed, when it ought to be paid over, in all cases where he receives interest for money which belongs to the estate, and in all cases where he applies money belonging to the estate to his own use, he ought to be charged with interest," citing Stearns v. Brown, 1 Pick, 530; Wyman v. Hubbard, 13 Mass. 232; Griswold v. Chandler, 5 N. H. 492, 497; Mathes v. Bennett, 21 id. 188, 199; Wendell v. French, 19 id. 205, 213. In the last case it is said: "An administrator is not chargeable with interest except he receive it, or make

profitable use of the money, or unreasonably detain it." In this case, it is claimed that the administratrix should be charged with interest on the $198.61 found in her hands upon the settlement of her first account. But she was not required to pay this sum to the creditors till after a decree of distribution, and she could not settle the estate till after the sale of the real property. Not having unreasonably detained the money, or invested it, or in a conveyance of his title to the plaintiff in mitigation of damages. Bartlett v. Fitz. Opinion by Foster, J.

[Decided June, 1880.]

PAYMENT-TAKING NOTE NOT, UNLESS AGREEDWHEN ACTION NOT PREMATURE OFFER TO RETURN.—

The plaintiffs, by taking two notes, equal in amount to the bill, neither of which was due and payable when this suit was commenced, did not extend the time of payment, and this action was not for that reason, premature. A note is not payment of a pre-existing debt,' unless specially agreed to be received as such. Wright v. First Crockery Ware Co., 1 N. H. 281; Jaffrey v. Cornish, 10 id. 505; Johnson v. Cleaves, 15 id. 332; Clark v. Draper, 19 id. 423; Randlet v. Herren, 20 id. 103; Whitney v. Goin, id. 354; Smith v. Smith, 27 id. 244; Ladd v. Wiggin, 35 id. 421, 426. Whether a note was agreed to be received in payment is a question of fact. Wilson v. Hanson, 20 N. H. 375; Foster v. Hill, 36 id. 526. So is the question, whether it was agreed to extend the time of payment for the goods. The mere reception of the notes, assuming them to have been given for the goods, as it was not a payment for them, did not have that effect. The offer to return the notes to be cancelled was seasonably made, and the plaintiff, on filing them with the clerk, is entitled to judgment. Moore v. Fitz. Opinion by Stanley, J. [Decided June, 1880.]

MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

NEGLIGENCE-GETTING OFF REAR OF CAR NOT PER SE DUTY OF RAILROAD COMPANY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE

—QUESTION FOR JURY.-Plaintiff, a woman sixty years of age, was travelling on defendants' road. The night was dark and cloudy. On arriving at her destination she and her husband who was with her got out at the rear end of the car. There was a crossing there, and she was familiar with the locality. Instead of being over the level road as she expected, the end of the car was a depression at the side of the road, and when her foot left the step she went down so far that her hold of the iron was broken and she fell to the ground. During all this time, no one connected with the train or employed by the defendant was giving her assistance or looking after passengers at the rear end of the car. Held, that under such circumstances it cannot be said that it is negligence per se for a passenger to leave the car at the rear. If there was negligence in this case it must arise from the fact of the darkness, the known fact that the rear of the car was not at the landing, and the uncertainty in respect to the ground where it stood. If the front end of the car had been at the platform, there would have been more reason for insisting that the plaintiff should have gone in that direction, But we think a woman is excusable for not desiring to pass through the smoking car, and she has a right to assume it is not expected of her. We also think that passengers, where not notified to the contrary, may rightfully assume that it is safe to alight from the car wherever it is stopped for passengers to leave it. And if no light is given them to leave the car by, they are not to be charged with fault for leav ing in the darkness. If a car in which there were passengers was not standing where it would be safe for

cases.

them to alight without assistance, it was the duty of the company to provide assistance, or give warning, or to move the car to a more suitable place. This was decided in Cockle v. London & S. E. R. Co., L. R., 7 C. P. 321, a case on its facts very similar to this; and the same principle has often been laid down in other Nicholson v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 534; Foy v. London, etc., R. Co., 18 C. B. (N. S.) 225; Brassell v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 84 N. Y. 241; S. C.,3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 380; Penn. R.Co. v. White,88 Penn. St. 327; and Balt. & O. R. Co. v. State (Md. Ct. App.), 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 149, are among those so holding. There was therefore evidence to go to the jury on the question of negligence in the defendant. And the peculiarity of the case is such that the same facts which tend to show negligence in the railroad company tend in the same degree to show that the plaintiff was without fault. If she had a right to assume that the lauding place was safe, she was not negligent in stepping down as she did. It must be conceded that she did not exhibit a very high degree of caution, but we cannot say that it was not as much as the average passenger would have shown under like circumstances. Cartwright v. Chicago. Opinion by Cooley, C. J.

[Decided Feb. 8, 1884.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. WILL-GIFT-INDIVIDUALS OR CLASS-LAPSE.- A testator, by his will, gave his residuary estate to trustees in trust for my son George, my daughters, Lydia, Mary Ann, Alice, and Frances, and such of my child or children, if any, hereafter to be born, as shall attain the age of twenty-one years or marry, in equal shares as tenants in common, but subject as to the share of any daughter whether now living or a child hereafter to be born, to the trusts following." Then followed the trusts of the share of "such daughter." The testator had six children only, those named in the will and one other, all of whom had attained twenty one at the date of the will. Two of the children named in the will died in the testator's life-time without issue. Held, that the gift was a gift to a class and not as individuals, and that the residue was divisible amongst the three children who survived the testator. Re Stanhope's Trusts, 27 Beav. 201, followed. Shires v. Ashworth, Ch. Div. Opinion by Chitty, J. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 18.)

WILL-ABSOLUTE GIFT-QUALIFICATION OF LAPSEWhere in a will there is an absolute gift, followed by a qualification of the mode of its enjoyment to secure certain objects for the benefit of the legatee, then if the objects fail, the absolute gift remains. But if there is an absolute gift followed by a clause diminishing the estate so given to the first taker, the absolute gift has, in effect, been cut down, and the court can only give effect to it as so diminished. A testator gave property to trustees upon trust out of the rents and income to pay annuities to his wife and daughter H., for their lives, and subject thereto to invest and accumulate the rents and income, and stand possessed of the property and accumulations on trust for the children of the daughter absolutely as tenants in common; "provided always that as to such of the children of H. as may be born in my life-time the share of each such child, instead of being in fee simple, shall go and belong to such child for his or her life only," with remainder absolutely to the children of such child in equal shares and proportions as tenants in common. H. had several children, who were all born in the testator's life-time, and one of whom survived him and attained twenty-one, but died unmarried. Held, that there was a lapse of so much of the property as would have been taken by the children of such child if there

had been any. Gompertz v. Gompertz, 2 Phil. 107, and Lassence v. Tierney, 1 M. & G. 551, followed. Williams v. Gorvin. Ch. Div. Opinion by Pearson, J. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 22.

WILL-CONSTRUCTION-FORFEITURE OF ESTATE IN CASE OF NON-RESIDENCE-WHAT IS RESIDENCE.-Testator gave his real estate, including specifically his house, to the use of his son for life, provided as a síne qua non that he should, within six calender months after the testator's decease, take actual possession of the house as his residence and place of abode, and should thereafter, during his life, continue to reside there for at least six calendar months (but not necessarily consecutively in every year). After the son's death, or his failing to take possession of, and reside in, the house, the estate was given to his first and other sons in tail male. There were also certain articles given to go as heirlooms with the estate. The testator's son took possession of the house within the time required, but during the year following his doing so he only spent a few days there. He had however kept the house and garden in good order, paid the rates and taxes, and kept a sufficient staff of servants to wait upon himself and his family if they should come there, and rooms were always kept ready for his son, who frequently spent two or three days there, and generally the place was kept up and regarded as one of his actual places of residence. The question was raised whether he had forfeited his interest in the real estate and heirlooms by not residing in the house for six months of the year. Held, that it was not necessary for him to reside personally upon the estate for the whole period, but it was sufficient to satisfy the condition if he kept it up as one of his actual places of residence during the time; this he had done, and his interest under the will was not forfeited. Warner v. Moir, Ch. Div. Opinion by Bacon, V. C. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 10).

ANNUITY-PROPERTY GIVEN SUBJECT TO-RIGHT TO HAVE SECURED.-The testator gave all his real and personal estate to his son upon trust to pay thereout weekly and every week to the testator's wife during her life the sum of 1l. 10s., and subject thereto, upon trust for his said son absolutely. The testator had been dead four years, and the weekly payment had been regularly made during all that period. The widow now asked that its future payment should be secured by the sale of the property and the investment of the proceeds. The estate consisted substantially of a leasehold public-house, and the business carried on there, and the total amount of it, if realized, would not have been equal to the amount of the capitalized value of the annuity. Held, that the property was given to the son absolutely, subject only to the payment of the annuity, and so long as he paid that he was entitled to the quiet possession of his property, and the widow was not entitled to have it sold.. Potter v. Potter, High Ct. Justice, Ch. Div. Opinion by Bacon, V. C. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 8.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

LARCENY-WANT OF CONSENT-CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVI DENCE OF-PLEADING PURCHASE-ERROR IN CHARGE.

-The prisoner was convicted of horse stealing. "Ou the trial it was proved by the State that the alleged owner, who was an aged lady, in very feeble health, was not able to appear in court and testify in the case. It was further shown that W. C. Turnbo, her son, at the time of the alleged theft, was managing and controlling her business affairs, and that said son had not consented to the taking of the alleged stolen horse by the defendant or any one else. The court instructed the jury that it devolved upon the State to prove satisfactorily and beyond a reasonable doubt that the

the date of loss for the commencement of a suit thereon. In an action on the policy for a loss, held, that plaintiff could not avoid limitation on the ground that R. had no authority as agent to assent for it. R.'s authority to make the contract, as agent of the plaintiff, included authority to know what the contract was that he made. The plaintiff, in this suit upon a written contract made injhis behalf by his agent, is charged with his agent's knowledge of the contract. The case is as if the plaintiff had written the contract himself. He cannot enforce stipulations favorable to himself, and reject the rest. A written contract that does not express the intention of the parties may be reformed in equity; but in this suit at law the policy cannot be altered by parol evidence. Preston v. Insurance Co., 58 N. H. 76; Webster v. Webster, 33 id. 18; Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24. New Hampshire Supreme Ct. Tasker v. Kenton Insurance Co. Opinion by Doe, C. J. (59 N. H. 438.)

LIFE POLICY-NON-PAYMENT PREMIUM -FORFEITURE COMPEL COMPANY TO RECEIVE PREMIUMS—WHEN COMPANY PRECLUDED FROM OBJECTING TO PAYMENT

TENDERED OVERDUE.—(1) Where an insurance company refuses to receive from the assured a premium on a life policy, on the ground that the policy has lapsed by reason of the non-payment of such premium on the day stipulated for its payment, and the assured claims that the company has waived the right to assert such forfeiture, equity has jurisdiction to determine, on the petition of the assured, the rights of the parties under such policy, and if the policy is found to be in force, to compel the company to receive the premiums thereon, and issue renewal receipts. Union Cen. L. Ins. Co. v. Pottker, 4 Am. L. Rec. 111; S. C., 33 Ohio St. 459; 31 Am. Rep. 555; Meyer v. Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 516; 29 Am. Rep. 200; Day v. Connecticut Gen. L. Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480; 29 Am. Rep. 693; May on Ins., §§ 356 et seq. (2) Although a life policy and the renewal receipts may contain a stipulation or notice that agents of the company shall not have authority to waive forfeitures where premiums have not been paid on or before the day designated for their payment, yet the course of business between the agent, the assured, and the company, in giving effect to payments made when overdne, may be such that the company will be precluded from objecting to a payment tendered when overdue, where no notice had been given the assured that in the future such overdue payments would not be received. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Doster, 106 U. S. 30; Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Rudwig (Ky. Ct. of App., 1882), 11 Ins. L. Jour. 603; May on Ins., § 361. Ohio Supreme Court, January Term, 1883. National Life Insurance Co. v. Tullidge. Opinion by Okey, J. (39 Ohio St. 240.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

ETERNAL VIGILANCE.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

You are right in your conclusion that the author of the celebrated sentence," Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty," is unknown. Had it been uttered by John Adams it would have added to the fame of that great statesman, as the passionate exclamation, "Give me liberty or give me death," added to the fame of Patrick Henry.

The quoted sentence was probably an inspired thought dropped from the pen of some obscure but thoughtful patriotic writer, during the stormy struggle for independence; was observed, copied, and became the expression of public sentiment.

Such wise and terse expressions are sure to be attributed to some well-known leader. For example, the well-known sentence, "It is worse than a crime;

it is a blunder," is commonly quoted and attributed to Talleyrand, because it was supposed that such a terse expression could have been conceived by none other than that subtle diplomatist. It was however uttered by Fouché, minister of police under Napoleon, and will be found in his "Memoirs" in this form: "It is more than a crime; it is a political fault."

I could produce many examples of a similar character. Errors of this sort are confined to no age; they come winding down the centuries. W. F. WARNER. WAVERLY, Tioga Co., N. Y., April 29, 1884.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, May 6, 1884:

Order of General and Special Terms reversed and proceedings dismissed, with costs-In re Application of Eureka Basin Warehouse, etc.-Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed-Henry A. Vatable, respondent, v. N. Y., L. E. & West. R. Co., appellant.Judgment reversed and complaints dismissed, with costs-William A. Butler and others, ex'rs; Charles G. Franklyn, ex'r; Theresa W. Seabrook, ex'ex; Sebastian de Neufville, Ernest G. W. Woerz, William Allen Butler, trustee; Michael A. Rahli, Frederick Newcomb and William Cunard, respondents, v. New York, L. E. & West. R. Co, appellant.-Judgment affirmed, with costs to the respondent against the appellant personally, and without costs to the other parties-Alfred A. Freeman, cx'r, appellant, v. Harriet A. Coit and ano., respondents. Judgment affirmed with costs-John W. Stebbins, assignee, appellant, v. Howe Machine Co., appellants: Warren E. Lewis, appellant, v. State, etc., respondent; Ida Duke, respondent, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, appellants; Alice Douglas, respondent, v. Joseph L. Haberstro, sheriff, appellant; William Roeber, respondent, v. Peter Bowe, sheriff, appellant; Shepherd F. Knapp, rec'r, appellant, v. John T. McGowan, ind. and as asse'r, respondent.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Elizabeth Snyder, applt., v. Sylvester Snyder and ors., exr's, rspdts.

-Judgment affirmed with costs to the respondent, against the appellant personally, and without costs to the other parties-Alfred A. Freeman, exccutor, appellaut, v. Harrison A. Coit and another, respondents.

-Judgment affirmed with costs-John W. Stebbins, assignee, appellant, v. Howe Machine Co., appellant; Warrew E. Lewis, appellant, v. State, etc., respondent; Ida Duke, respondent, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, appellants; Alice Douglass, respondent, v. Joseph L. Haberstro, Sheriff, appellant; William Roeber, respondent, v. Peter Bowe, Sheriff, appellant; Shepherd F. Knapp, rec'r, appellant, v. John T. McGowan, ind. and as asse'r, respondent.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Elizabeth Snyder, appellant, v. Sylvester Snyder and others, executors, respondents.- Appeal dismissed with costs-John McEucrae, respondent, v. John White, appellant; People v. Merchants' Bank; William H. Kimball, rec'r, v. Willard Ives and others.-Motion to dismiss appeal denied; $10 costs-Hiram Clark, appellant, v. Sidney Stillman et al., Commrs., respondents.- -Motion to dismiss appeal granted with costs-John Baldwin, appellant, v. Nathan Van Sickle, et al.-Motion to dismiss appeal; appeal dismissed with costs—Hiram W. Whitman, respondent, v. New York Condensed Milk Co., appellant.- Motion for reargument deniedPeople v. James Irving.—Order affirmed with costsAnna E. Comer, respondent, v. Charles Robinson, ap pellant; Moses S. Moak, appellant, v. Helena Craig et al., respondents; Bolton Hall et al., respondents, v. United States Reflector Co., appellant.