master in chancery, the witness had a right, in the presence of the master, to consult his own counsel as to the propriety, or duty, of answering any question proposed to him

We are therefore of the opinion

1. That the questions put were immaterial and that the witness was not bound to answer them.

2. That the witness had a right to have the advice of counsel, in an orderly manner, and that when this was refused, he was justified in withdrawing.

3. That except when engaged in the judicial functions authorized by the Constitution, neither branch of the Legislature has any power to punish as for contempt for a refusal to answer a question.

4. That the order refusing to discharge McDonald should be reversed and that he should be discharged.



INSURANCE SOCIETIES.- Plaintiff brought suit, claiming to be the widow of Robert Story, deceased, to recover $1,025 of the defendant by reason of her husband's membership in said corporation at the time of his death. She was designated as the wife of deceased in the certificate of insurance issued by defendant. It was conceded that the deceased and plaintiff lived and held themselves out as man and wife for many years and up to his death. The plaintiff, on the trial, testified to a ceremonial marriage. The defendant did not take issue in such marriage, or ask that the question be submitted to the jury, but insisted that the marriage was void, because at the time of its alleged occurrence the deceased had a wife living in England, who survived him. Held, that the certificate operated as an assent by the association to the appointment of the plaintiff as the beneficiary of the fund, which should become payable on the death of Robert Story, and entitled her, upon his death, in the absence of any other or different appointment to demand and receive it. A by-law contemplating payment to the lawful widow was not a limitation of the power of the company so as to prevent it from recognizing as the beneficiary a person who might be designated by a member as holding to him the relation of wife. Story v. Williamsburgh, etc., Benefit Association, affirming 29 Hun, 278. Opinion by Andrews, J. [See

62 How. 336.-ED.]

[Decided April 15, 1884.]

CLOUD ON TITLE-VOID TAX SALE-ACTION PREMATURE.-On November 15, 1881, the comptroller sold and bid in lands of the plaintiff for non-payment of taxes from 1873-1876. A certificate of sale was made as required by law. A short time before the sale plaintiff made objections to alleged irregularities of the assessments, and requested the comptroller to annul or stop the sale, which was refused. In Decem

ber, 1881, this action was commenced to have the sale declared null and void, the certificates surrendered and the execution of a deed enjoined. Held, that although the assessments were in fact irregular, the action was premature. Plaintiff must await the two years which must elapse before the giving of the deed. It is settled by the decisions of this court that to authorize the interposition of the court to remove the lien of an assessment as a cloud upon title it must appear that the record of proceedings are not void upon their face, and that the claimant under it would not, by the proof which he would be obliged to produce in event of an attempt to enforce his claim, develop the defect rendering it invalid. Dederer v. Voorhies, 81 N. Y. 156; Guest v. City of Brooklyn, 69 id. 506. While a court of equity may entertain a suit to remove a cloud upon title, and also to prevent one, in the latter

case it must be made to appear that there is a determination on the part of the defendant to create the cloud, and it is not sufficient that the danger is merely speculative. Sanders v. Yonkers, 63 N. Y. 489. Clarke v. Davenport. Opinion by Miller, J. [Decided April 15, 1884.]

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE OF OTHER ASSAULTS— DEFENDANT AS WITNESS-CROSS-EXAMINATION--DANGEROUS WEAPON-PISTOL-On the trial of defendant for assault and battery, on cross-examination he was asked whether he had assaulted a fellow member of the Legislature and was expelled from that body. He admitted the assault. He confessed what unexplained was the commission of a crime, aud as was said in People v. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, tended to impair the credit of the witness "by its tending to establish a bad moral character." Held, that the question was within the discretion of the court, and its permission was no abuse of that discretion. In People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 143-4, the cases were reviewed, and we held on an indictment and trial for selling lottery tickets, that the defendant, testifying in his own behalf, might be asked on cross-examination not only whether he had been convicted for sending lottery papers through the mail, but also whether, for a period extending before the offense with which he was charged, he had been engaged in the lottery business. (2) Mere charges or accusations or even indictments may not be inquired into,since they are consistent with innocence, and may exist without moral delinquency. People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288; People v. Brown, 72 id. 571; Ryan v. People, 79 id. 594. (3) Whether the pistol in the hands of defendant was an instrument or thing likely to produce grievous bodily harm was a question for the jury. Nelson v. People, 23 N. Y. 298; Abbott v. People, 86 id. 471. People v. Irwing. Opinion by Finch, J. [Decided April 15, 1884.]

ESCAPE-BOND VOID-SHERIFF NOT LIABLE.-In a creditor's action to set aside a general assignment plaintiff obtained judgment adjudging said assignment fraudulent as against creditors. Subsequently a receiver was appointed and the assignee ordered to account and pay over to the receiver. By same order a referee was appointed to pass an assignee's account, who thereafter made an order that the assignee, after

deducting an amount allowed him, pay the remainder to the receiver. Refusing so to do, the assignee was arrested under Revised Statutes, part 3, chapter 8, title 13, and gave a bond to the predecessor of the plaintiff in this action, and escaped while plaintiff was sheriff. In an action on the bond held, that plaintiff was not liable, as the bond was void. No final judgment had been entered on the order requiring the assignee to pay over to the receiver. The last two orders should have been attached to the judgment roll in the creditor's action and a final judgment entered thereon (Geery v. Geery, 63 N. Y. 252), which could have been enforced by execution, and not in the manner as was done. Code, § 1240, 1241. The provisions of the Revised Statutes under which the assignee was arrested do not apply to a case where money has been ordered paid by a final judgment. Lansing v. Lansing, 4 Lans. 377; Strobridge v. Strobridge, 21 Hun, 288; Baker v. Baker, 23 id. 356: People ex rel. Fries v. Riley, 25 id. 587; Randall v. Dusenbury, 41 N. Y. Supr. 456; Watson v. Nelson, 69 N. Y. 536; O'Gara v. Kearney, 77 id. 423. Myers, Sheriff, v. Becker. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided April 15, 1884.]

WILL-SALE OF REAL ESTATE-DISCRETION OF EXECUTOR-COMMISSIONS.-The testator by a clause in his will authorized and empowered his executors" to let or lease my real estate and to receive the rents and profits thereof, and after the decease of my wife to sell and

convey the same for such prices and upon such terms as they may deem best for the interests of my estate." On the final accounting the appellant, who is a daughter of defendant intestate, claimed that it was the duty of the executors, under the will of the testator, to have sold certain unproductive real estate and so much of the productive as was not needed for certain trusts created by the will, forthwith after the testator's death, and to have sold all the real estate forthwith after the death of his widow. Held, that taking the various parts of the will which have been referred to into consideration, it is a reasonable presumption that the testator intended to leave the question as to the sale of the real estate before the death of his wife to the judgment and sound discretion of his executors. While perhaps they might have the right to sell, they at the same time were authorized to retain and hold the same until the death of testator's widow. If it was desired to com. pel the executors to sell under the provisions of the will the proper course would seem to have been to institute a suit for that purpose. Hancox v. Wall, 28 Hun, 214. The power to sell after the death of the widow was also discretionary. Where there is a voluntary accounting and a settlement between the parties, as appears to bave been the case here, it may well be doubted whether the right to commissions retained could be afterward questioned by the parties who had assented to the retention of them by the trustees. Hurlburt v. Durant, 88 N. Y. 121. The general rule that executors and administrators cannot retain commissions, and can only be allowed them upon an accounting would seem to be inapplicable to the case at bar. Here the income was required to be paid periodically, and the trustee stands in the same position as a trustee who holds an estate, and is required to pay the annual income arising from the same to the cestui que trust. Such a trustee is entitled to full commissions on each year's receipts and disbursements. Vanderheyden v. Vanderheyden, 2 Paige, 288; Matter of Bank of Niagara, 6 id. 216; Matter of Kellogg, 7 id. 266; Hosack v. Rogers, 9 id. 467; Fisher v. Fisher, 1 Bradf. 336. Hancox v. Meeker. Opinion by Miller, J.

[Decided April 15, 1884.]


LIMITATION-FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT-KNOWL EDGE OF ASSIGNEE-LETTERS MAILED PRESUMED RECEIVED. (1) An assignee in bankruptcy, from whom a fraudulent transfer by the bankrupt has been concealed until the expiration of the period within which the statute requires all actions for the recovery of property thus transferred to be brought, may nevertheless bring his action upon discovering the fraud. The statute of limitations cannot be made an instrument of fraud. In Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, the court held, that "as the bill contained a distinct allegation that the defendants kept secret and concealed from the parties interested the fraud which was sought to be redressed," the case was not subject to the bar of the statute. The court added: "To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure." The court also declared that the exception to the bar of the statute was applicable to suits at law as well as in equity. The case of Bailey v. Glover is a decision construing the statute which is relied on in this case, and unless

subsequently overruled by this court, is conclusive of the point under discussion. It has never been overruled. The plaintiff in error relies on the case of Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, and National Bank v. Carpenter, id. 567. The first was an action at law; the second a suit in equity. The court in both cases was called on to construe a statute of limitations of the State of Indiana, and it followed the adjudications of the Supreme Court of that State upon the same statute. Neither case refers to the opinion of the court in Bailey v. Glover, or can be held to overrule or modify it. The case of Bailey v. Glover has been often cited by this court, but has never been doubted or qualified. Wood v. Bailey, 21 Wall. 640; Wiswall v. Campbell, 93 U. S. 347; Gifford v. Holmes, 98 id. 552; Upton v. Mc. Laughlin, 105 id. 640. (2) Knowledge on the part of the assignee that the bankrupt has refused, at a judicial examination, to answer certain questions regarding his property, on the ground that his answers would criminate him with respect to an indictment then pending against him for a criminal offense under the bankrupt laws, is not sufficient to make it the duty of the judge to rule, as a matter of law, that the assignee had constructive knowledge of the fraud. His knowledge is a question for the jury on all the evidence. (3) The rule is well settled that if a letter properly directed is proved to have been either put into the postoffice or delivered to the post-man it is presumed, from the known course of business in the post-office department, that it reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. Saunderson v. Judge, 2 H. Bl. 509; Woodcock v. Houldsworth, 16 M. & W. 124; Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381; Callan v. Gaylord, 3 Watts, 321: Starr v. Torrey, 2 Zabr. 190; Tanner v. Hughes, 53 Penn. St. 289; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 392. As was said by Gray, J., in the case last cited, "the presumption so arising is not a conclusive presumption of law, but a mere inference of fact founded on the probability that the officers of the government will do their duty and the usual course of business, and when is is opposed by evidence that the letters never were received, must be weighed with all the other circumstances of the case by the jury in determining the question whether the letters were actually received or not." (4) The court, having in its own way fairly presented the issues, was not bound by its duty to give the charges requested, had they been unobjectionable. The Schools v. Risley, 10 Wall. 115. Rosenthal v. Walker. Opinion by Woods, J. [Decided March 31, 1884.]

LIMITATION-RUNS FROM RETURN OF ́EXECUTION.Suit was brought upon a judgment after a return of nulla bona upon the execution writ. Held, that the statute of limitatious commenced to run at the time of the return of the execution, and not the entry of the judgment. Taylor v. Bowker. Opinion by Harlan, J. [Decided March 24, 1884.]


PATENT-COMBINATION-INFRINGEMENT VOID-DISCLAIMER DOES NOT REVIVE ORIGINAL.—(1) A patent for a combination of several parts is not infringed by the use of the combination of any number of those parts less than the whole. Brooks v. Mears, 16 Pet. 336. (2) In a patent for a soldering-iron, claiming a hollowed disk combined with a movable rod passing through it to hold the lid while the solder hardens, the disk is an indispensable element; and all claims of the reissue which do not restrict the soldering-iron to the form of disk are void. No combination having a soldering iron of different form is an infringment. Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 1; The Wood Paper Patent, 23 id. 560; Powder Company v. Powder Works, 98 U. S.; Ball v. Langles, 102 id. 128; Miller v. Brass Co., 104 id. 350; Jones v. Campbell, id 356; Heald v. Rice, id.737;

Johnson v. Railroad Co., 105 id. 539; Bantz v. Frantz, id. 160; Wing v. Anthony, 106 id. 142. (3) Where the original claim was for a hollow soldering iron with a handle and beveled rim, in combination with a rod to hold the cap firm, and the specifications showed that the hollow iron was intended to fit upon a cap of any shape, held, that a claim in the reissue for "a tool consisting of a soldering-iron revolving about a central pivotal rod" was broader than the original, and void. (4) Where a patent has been declared on the oath of a patentee to be invalid and inoperative, been surrendered and canceled, and reissued letters patent granted in its place, it is not competent for the patentee or his assignees, by merely disclaiming all the changes made in the reissued patent, to revive and restore the original patent. This could be done only, if it could be done at all, by surrender of the reissued patent and the grant of another reissue. McMurray v. Mallory. Opinion by Woods, J. [Decided March 24, 1884.]

them orders for their wages, stating that they would regard themselves in that case as discharged. The master gave them the orders, and the saiiors left the vessel. Held, that they were discharged, and were not to be looked ou as deserters. Granon v. Hartshorne, Blatchf. & H. 458; The David Faust, 1 Ben. 187. (2) Upon the wrongful discharge of a workman engaged under an entire contract, he is entitled to recover his wages during actual service. (3) The remedy afforded seamen by sections 4546 and 4547 of the Revised Statutes is not exclusive, and the usual process in rem against the vessel is still open to them. Murray v. Ferryboat, 2 Fed. Rep. 88; The William Jarvis, Spr. Dec. 485; The M. W. Wright, 1 Brown, Adm. 290; The Waverly, 7 Biss. 465. Dist. Ct., D. N. J. Feb. 2, 1884. The Frank C. Burker. Opinion by Nixon, J.


PATENT-SUSPENDING INJUNCTION-PUBLIC INTEREST. After a final decree establishing an exclusive right to the use of a patent and awarding an injunction to protect it, the injunction will not be suspended while the decree stands unreversed, unless some extraordinary cause outside of the interests of the parties is shown. Public necessity may bo a cause for such suspension; but the defendant, after insisting that the invention is of no use and benefit, and thus defeating the orator's claim for substantial damages on account of infringement will not be heard to allege that it is of such public importance as to warrant a court in suspending the injunction. Potter v. Mack, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 428; Brown v. Deere, 6 Fed. Rep. 487. Cir. Ct., S. D. N. Y., 1884. Munson v. Mayor, etc., of New York. Opinion by Wheeler, J.

WHARVES--RIGHT TO MOOR VESSELS-COLLISIONDAMAGES.—(1) The right of mooring vessels at public wharves is as much to be protected as that of navigation itself, but it is to be exercised with due regard to the rights of passing vessels, and any unnecessary encroachment upon the channel-way which greatly imperils passing craft is without justification. (2) A steamboat lying at a wharf-boat at the public landing of Pittsburgh threw her stern out in the way of a descending coal-tow, when she might have lain broadside to the wharfboat, and thus afforded a sufficient passage-way for the towboat and tow. A collision occurring, held, that the steamboat was answerable to the owner of a coalboat thereby lost. (3) In case of a collision between a descending coal-tow and a vessel wrongfully obstructing the channel-way, the previous fault of another vessel, in striking and throwing out of shape the coal-tow, is not to be imputed to the towboat if the latter were free from blame. (4) An innocent party who sustains loss by reason of the concurrent negligence of two vessels may pursue and recover the entire damages from either wrong-doer. The Atlas, 93 U. S. 302; The Franconia, 16 Fed. Rep. 149. Dist. Ct., W. D. Penn. Jan. 23, 1884. The St. Lawrence. Opinion by Acheson, J.

SHIPPING AND ADMIRALTY-DISCHARGE OF SEAMEN -RECOVERY OF WAGES REMEDIES.—(1) In consequence of a disagreement between the master of a vessel and his seamen about the amount of wages due them, the mariners were ordered to go to work or go on shore. They agreed to go on shore if he would give *Appearing in 19 Federal Reporter.


DAMAGES-RAILROAD ON PUBLIC STREET-SPECIAL INJURY.—(1) In a suit for damage to property by a railroad running along a public street; near such property, evidence going to show damage from smoke, cinders, unusual noises from the ringing of bells, blowing of whistles, etc., is admissible. Sutherland on Damages, pp. 436-7; Wilmington, etc., R. Co. v. Stauffer, 60 Penn. St. 374. (2) Where the continued presence and operation and operation and operation of such road along the street inflicts such special injury to the property of the abutting owner as to practically deprive him of the ordinary use and enjoyment of it, that such special injury is of such a nature that an action for damage will lie. Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296; Pumpelly v. Green Bay R. Co., 13 Wall. 166. Hooker v. New Haven, etc., R. Co., 14 Conn. 146; Grand Rapids Boom Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308; Armond v. Green Bay R. Co., 31 Wis. 316. In order to give the party injured a right of action the street need not be entirely destroyed or wholly or exclusively used by the appellant. Where, as the result of the occupation of it by the railroad company, the use of the street by the adjoining owner is very greatly impaired and the injury in this respect one special in its nature, and not one common to the community at large, an action to recover damages will lie. G. C. & S. Fe R. Co. v. Eddins. Opinion by West, J. [Decided Jan. 29, 1884.]

PAYMENT APPLICATION NO CHANGE WITHOUT DEBTOR'S CONSENT.-The debtor may designate to what particular debt a payment shall be applied where he owes more than one distinct separate debt to the creditor. Such designation precludes the creditor from otherwise appropriating it. Proctor v. Marshall, 18 Tex. 66; Taylor v. Coleman, 20 id. 776. If a creditor receive money, with directions to appropriate it on a named debt, it must go to the specified debt, no matter what the creditor may say at the time; and an ap propriation once designated cannot be changed by the creditor without the debtor's consent. Whart. Cont. 923; Levystein v. Whitman 59 Ala. 345; Reed v. Boardman, 20 Pick. 443; Benj. Sales, 746. Eyler v. Read. Opinion by Stayton, J. [See 1Am. Rep. 109; 16 Eng. R. 273.-ED.] [Decided Nov., 1883.]

JUDGMENT-NUNC PRO TUNC-FOR COSTS NOT FINAL. -(1) Judgments nunc pro tunc are never permitted to affect the rights of such persous as have acquired rights between the time a judgment is really rendered and the time at which the judgment is entered upon the minutes, now or then, such persons having no notice of the judgment. Freem. Judg., 66; Jordan Petty, 5 Fla. 326; McCormick v. Wheeler, 36 Ill. 114;

Graham v. Lynn, 4 B. Mon. 18: Acklen v. Acklen, 45 Ala. 609; Ligon v. Rogers, 12 Ga. 281; Perdue v. Bradshaw, 18 id. 287. It is well settled that no judgment other than a final judgment can give a lien. Freem. ou Judg. 340, and citations. The statute expressly restricts such effect to final judgments. Acts of 1866, p. 118. (2) A judgment for costs, which does not dispose of the subject-matter of the suit, has been often held by this court not to be a final judgment. Warren v. Sherman, 25 Tex. 319; Martin v. Wade, 22 id. 224; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 24 id. 416. Eastham v. Ralston. Opinion by Stayton, J.

[Decided Jan. 15, 1884.]


PROMISSORY NOTE-BONA FIDE HOLDER-WHO NOT. -Where a bank transfers a promissory note to a party to secure a pre-existing indebtedness, there being no new consideration beyond a mere forbearance to secure the claim by attachment, such party is not a bona fide holder for value, and cannot recover on the note. Sup. Ct., Iowa. Bone v. Tharp. Opinion by Seevers, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 906.) [See 16 Eng. Rep. 169.-ED.]

PROMISSORY NOTE-WARRANTY OF COLLECTION.The waranty that a note is as good as gold, or as good as money, is not in legal effect a warranty that it is collectible by due process of law, and it is not necessary to exhaust the legal remedies at law against the maker before suing the assignor of the same for a breach of warranty. Sup. Ct., Mich. Taylor v. Soper. Opinion by Champlain, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 570.)



PROMISSORY NOTE ALTERATION SIGNING SURETY AFTER EXECUTION.-In this case the note was given for money borrowed by Rudisill of plaintiff, and one Fuller signed it as surety upon the request of plaintiff, and without the assent or knowledge of the makers of the note. Rudisill signed it as surety after its maturity. This was innocently done, without any fraudulent intention on the part of any one, for the purpose of better securing the note after unsuccessful efforts to collect it. Held, that the signing of a promissory note by one as a joint maker, after the execution by the original maker without his knowledge and consent, is a material alteration which will defeat the instrument. Hamilton v. Hooper, 46 Iowa, 515; Dickerman v. Miner, 43 id. 508; Hall's Adm'x v. McHenry, 19 id. 521. When a promissory note has been innocently altered, without any fraudulent purpose, the payee may recover in an action brought upon the original consideration. Krause v. Meyer, 32 Iowa, 566; Clough v. Leay, 49 id. 111; Morrison v. Huggins, 53 id. 76; 4 N. W. Rep. 854; Eckert v. Pickel, 59 Iowa, 545; 13 N. W. Rep. 708. Sup. Ct., Iowa, Apr. 8, 1884. Sullivan v. Rudisill. Opinion by Beck, J. (18 N. W. Rep. 856.) [See 12 Am. Rep. 306; 8 id. 48; 20 Eng. Rep. 594.-ED.]


NEW YORK CRIMINAL REPORTS. Reports of cases decided in all the courts of the State of New York involving questions of criminal law and practice, with notes and references by Theodore Connoly and Henry L. Vilas. Vol. 1. Albany, N. Y.; W. C. Little & Co. Pp. xxiv, 627.

This series purports to give the current criminal decisions of the various courts of the State, the majority of which appear in the regular reports. Some of the cases are reported twice, and in one instance three

and in another four times over. This is an objectionable feature. In a note on pages 29-32 the editors give the leading authorities in the various States on the burden of proof when insanity is the defense, and the degree sufficient to justify acquittal.

COWEN'S Criminal Reports.

Reports of criminal cases decided in the appellate courts of the State of New York and of other States, with notes by Patrick H. Cowen, counsellor-at-law. Vol. 1 Albany, N. Y.: Weare C. Little & Co. 1884.

This volume contains 108 cases culled from the State reports, as follows: Connecticut, 7; Massachusetts, 8; New York, 79; Rhode Island, 6; United States Supreme Court, 2; Vermont, 6; and covers 609 pages. The index contains 111 pages. The annotations, with a single exception, are confined to New York cases, and consist principally of the insertion of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Penal Code.


A Digest of statutes, admiralty, rules and decisions upon the jurisdiction, pleadings and practice of the District Courts of the United States. By Erastus Thatcher, author of Di gests upon the Jurisdiction and Practice of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Circuits of the United States. Boston: Little, Brown & Co 1884. Pp xxvi.

This volume completes the author's series on the Practice of the Federal Courts. It contains all the decisions upon the jurisdiction, pleadings and practice of the District Courts to be found in 246 volumes of the reports, which have been arranged under appro priate headings. The provisions of the Revised Statutes relating to the jurisdiction of said courts, Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Causes, prescribed by the Supreme Court, Rules of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and the Standing Interrogatories in Prize Cases. This series is, we believe, destined to maintain a foothold among the books which it is absolutely necessary to have.


Of this series, published by Baker. Voorhis & Co., of New York, we have heretofore found cause and occasion to speak well, and this volume gives no reason for reversing or modifying our opinion. The volume contains 93 cases, well-selected, furnished with clear and concise head-notes, and occasionally and judiciously annotated.


A Digest of the Reports of the United States Courts from the organization of the government to the year 1884, comprising the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, those of the Circuit and District courts, of the court of claims, and of the courts of the District of Columbia; together with leading provisions of the statutes and important auxiliary information upon the National Jurisprudence. By Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, New York: Geo. S. Diossy. 1884. Pp. xxiv, 816. Abandonment-Conversion.

The former edition of this work is well known, and has answered a good purpose. We spoke of the supplementary volumes, 6 Alb. Law Jour. 68: 11 id 242. The present is not a mere new edition, but is largely a new work. Among the new matter are bibliographic notes, referring to the discussions in leading law journals and in the notes of the American Reports and the American Decisions. The work is not to exceed five volumes. The abstracts are very full, and the ed

iting seems thorough and precise. When completed the work will be very important, and of great practical value. It is well printed.

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A Treatise on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Bills, with a discussion of void and voidable acts. By Frederick S. Wait. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1884. Pp. li,


missioners set aside with costs and a renearing ordered before commissioners to be appointed by the Supreme Court-In re Water Commissioners of Amsterdam, etc.

-Order reversed and judgment entered on referee's report affirmed with costs-Joseph Kohn, respondent, v. Joseph Koehler, appellant.-Judginent affirmed with costs-Jesse Hoyt and others, respondents, v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., appellant.-Judgment affirmed-People, respondents, v. Ellen E. Peck, appel

ordered against the defendants on the stipulation with costs-Casper Speiss, respondent, v. Constantine Rossway and another, appellants.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Lyman Bradley, respondent, v. James Manning and others, appellants.-Order affirmed and judgment absolute ordered against the plaintiff with costs—John J. Duffield,appellant,v. Thomas Johnson. —

This seems a very complete treatise on a sub-lant.-Judgment affirmed, and judgment absolute ject of considerable practical importance. The discussion on void and voidable acts may perhaps be deemed superfluous, but it hurts nothing. The author shows title to call his work his treatise, for he really treats the subject, and does not merely make up a mosaic of cases. He cites nearly 4,800 cases, but they are not burdensome, typographically or mentally. We think his work commendable, and that it will make a place Order of General Term reversed and judgment for the for itself. It is sumptuously printed.


A Treatise on the Public Land System of the United States, with references to the land laws, rulings of the departments at Washington, and decisions of courts, and an ap

pendix of Forms in United States Landing and Mining Matters. By George W. Spaulding: San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1884. Pp. xxxii, 523.

This is a subject of importance in the new States. So far as we can judge of a subject with which our acquaintance is very small, we regard the work as very complete and exact, and as forming a very convenient manual.

A treatise on the Law of Warranties in the Sale of Chattels.
By Arthur Biddle. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother. 1884.
Pp. xx, 308.

The author's apology for this large-type monograph is the brevity of the treatment of the topic in the general works on Sales. This being so, we think he might well have expanded his own treatment. It consists in very little more than a statement of the principal cases. Even these are not all mentioned. It is very disrespectful to old age to leave out, for example, Passinger v. Thorburn, on the subject of implied warranties of seed, which is certainly the leading American So far as he goes however Mr. Biddle is judicious and useful. The index is rather crude and inad




The Law and Practice of Surrogates' Courts in the State of
New York. By Amasa A. Redfield. Third edition. New
York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1884. Pp. xxxvi, 1022.

We have referred to the former edition of Mr. Redfield's work (12 Alb. L. J. 46; 23 id. 478), and can but reiterate what then was said. The cases from 50 volumes of reports and changes by legislation affecting the subject-matter make up the material which justifies this present edition, and rendered it a necessity to the practitioner in the probate court. It is printed on excellent paper and well bound. One case (Matter of Simpson's Will, 56 How. Pr. 125), holding that a revoked will may be revived by parol, seems to have escaped notice.

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defendant ordered, upon the verdict, with costsHiram Purdy, respondent, v. Rochester Printing Company (The Rochester Democrat and Chronicle).— Judgment affirmed with costs-Morris Solomon, respondent, v. City of Kingston, appellant.-Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed with costs-John D. McLean, respondent, v. Andrew McLean, appellant.

-Judgment affirmed with costs-Christianne R. Althaus, respondent, v. James R. Sharp, as receiver, etc., appellant. Order affirmed with costs-Elijah II. Purdy et al., respondents, v. Edward J. Dunning, Jr., appellant.- -Order affirmed with costs-In re Edward B. Long, guardian, etc. -Appeals dismissed with costs-People ex rel. James Preston, appellant, v. Stephen B. French et al., commissioners, etc., respondents.

Appeal dismissed with costs-Henry Hoffman v. William S. Marrin and another.-Order affirmed with costs-In re Charles F. Hunter to vacate an assessment. Order affirmed with costs-In re Knicker

bocker Life Ins. Co.; claim of Grigg.—Appeal dismissed with costs-Theron S. Atwater, appellant, v. American Bay Loaning Co. et al., respondents.—-Order affirmed with costs in both cases-Stephen Tarns

tall, respondent, v. Walter W. White, appellant.—Or

der affirmed with costs-Dwight L. Dewey v. J. Barton Finn. Motion to put case on preferred calendar granted, on condition that the case be submitted, on

printed briefs, at this term-Lizzie Hannon, an infant, appellant, v.John F. Agnew et al., respondents.-Mo

tion to amend remittitur denied without costs-In re Alleged Will of Eliza M. Smith, deceased.-Motion to open judgment by default for not filing return granted on service of papers, within ten days, and payment of costs of motion-Wm. G.Shanks, respondent, v. Joseph Hart, appellant.-Motion to set aside judgment denied with costs-In re. Estate of Sarah Boston, deceased.



American Law Review for May-June contains the following leading articles: Formation and Validity of Voluntary Trusts, by Simon Greenleaf Croswell; "Legal Tender" Decision of 1884, by D. H. Chamberlain; Codification of Commercial and Maritime Law, by Harrington Putnam; Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, by James Schouler. The "Notes" continue the most readable and the book reviews the most excellent of their kind.It is well for the profession to know in this weather, that although a man is seen coming out of a saloon intoxicated, and having left his hat inside, this is no evidence that he was made drunk at that place. So held in Lovelace v. Briggs, 32 Hun, 477. Also that the Fourth of July "is notoriously hard upon livery horses." So held by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Homan v. Boyce, May 8, 1874, 19 N. W. Rep. 590.

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