under the foremanship and direction of John Shifkoski, who was also in the service and employment of the defendant during said time; that said laborers were during said time employed in unloading said train of flat cars of such stone and material, while the same was being distributed along the track aforesaid, and such laborers were required to go and be upon said flat cars to perform such service; that during said time the defendant had in its service and employment also a number of other laborers, to-wit, about twenty, (20,) who were engaged in using said stone and material in raising and repairing the defendant's said railroad track, which last named laborers worked under the foremanship and direction of John Pickett, who was also in the service and employment of the defendant during said time; that said laborers, working under Shifkoski and Pickett as aforesaid, lived at various places along the line of said railroad between the city of La Porte, in La Porte county, and Pine Station, in Lake county, and when each day's work was done the servants of said defendant, in charge of said locomotive engine and train of cars, under instructions from the defendant, would leave the flat cars at or near the place of work, and carry and convey said laborers to their respective places of abode in two coaches or cabooses, provided by the defendant for that purpose, and which were drawn and propelled by said locomotive engine, used in running said train of flat cars, and by such means would convey them to their places of work every morning, said engine and coaches remaining at the city of La Porte at night.

"(3) That said defendant had in its service and employment on the 13th day of August, 1883, and for six weeks next before that date continuously, one Walter Pool, as engineer of said locomotive engine used in drawing and propelling said train of flat-cars and cabooses, as aforesaid, who then and there, during all of said time, had the charge, control, and management of said locomotive engine; that it was the duty of said Pool, as such engineer, to start and stop said train of flat-cars carefully, and to give, or cause to be given, signals of warning, either by sounding the whistle or ringing the bell upon his said locomotive engine, before starting said engine and train of flat-cars in motion, but during all of said time said Pool was in the habit of starting said locomotive engine and train of flat-cars, while engaged in said work, with unnecessary and dangerously sudden jerks, and without giving, or causing to be given, any signal or warning, either by sounding the whistle, ringing the bell, or in any other manner, and said Pool, during all of said time, was in the habit of starting said engine and train of flat-cars while hauling and distribut ing stone and material upon and along the defendant's rail

road, as aforesaid, and while men were on said flat-cars, engaged in unloading the same, with unnecessary suddenness, and without giving, or causing to be given, any kind of signal or warning, and was so in the habit of starting said locomotive engine and train of flat-cars on the 13th day of August, 1883, and all the time for six weeks next before that date; that it was dangerous to the men working on and about said train to so start the same without giving, or causing to be given, any signal or warning, or to start the same with such sudden

ness.

"(4) That said Walter Pool, during all of said time, had sufficient skill and knowledge to properly discharge his duties as such engineer, but during all of said time he habitually failed and neglected to discharge such duties with that degree of care and caution which a man of ordinary care and prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances; that during all of said time, to-wit, on the 13th day of August, 1883, and for six weeks next before that date, said Walter Pool was generally reputed and known to be habitually careless and reckless in the discharge of his duties as such engineer generally along the line of the defendant's said railroad, by and among the men who worked under the foremanship and direction of the said John Shifkoski, as aforesaid; that the defendant had sufficient and ample means of knowing the habit and conduct of said Pool, as such engineer, in the discharge of his duties, as aforesaid, before the 13th day of August, 1883, and we find that the defendant did have such knowledge before that date. We also find that at the time said Pool entered into the service of the defendant as an engineer, to-wit, in the year 1880, he was a reasonably careful, skillful, and competent engineer.

"(5) That on the 29th day of June, 1883, plaintiff was employed as a track repairer by the defendant; and entered into its service on its said railroad in using the stone and material distributed along the defendant's railroad, as aforesaid, and continued in such service as such laborer until the 13th day of August, 1883, working all of said time under the foremanship and direction of said John Pickett, except for four days at the commencement of his said service, when he worked under the said John Shifkoski at breaking and crushing stone; that during all of said time plaintiff lived in the country about one and a half miles from Burdick station, on said railroad, in said Porter county, and he got on and off the caboose train of the defendant, as aforesaid, in going to and returning from his work at said Burdick station; that by the terms of his employment it was the duty of the plaintiff to go upon and assist in unloading said train of flat-cars whenever his foreman directed him so to do.

"(6) That at the time plaintiff entered into the service of the defendant, as aforesaid, he had no knowledge whatever of the character of said Walter Pool as an engineer, or in any other capacity, or of his reputation as an engineer, or of his habits and conduct in the discharge of his duties as such engineer; that said plaintiff was engaged at said work of raising the track of the defendant's said railroad during its said service, and was not required to and did not go upon said flat-cars to assist in unloading the same, or for any other purpose, until the 13th day of August, 1883; that the plaintiff was engaged with the force of track repairers, as aforesaid, and did not meet or come in contact with any other servants of said defendant, except for about thirty minutes each morning and evening in riding to and from his place of work in one of the cabooses or coaches, as aforesaid; that during plaintiff's entire service he had no knowledge whatever, from any source, of the reputation or character of said Walter Pool as an engineer, or his manner and habits of starting said locomotive engine and train of flat-cars, and had at no time during his said service for the defendant any means of such knowledge. "(7) That on the 13th day of August, 1883, while so in the service of the defendant, plaintiff was directed by his foreman to go upon said train of flat-cars to assist in unloading the same, and under such direction plaintiff went upon said train, and assisted in unloading the same, and while plaintiff was upon one of said flat-cars, engaged in the line of his duty, and immediately after said car was unloaded, and before plaintiff could or had time to secure a position of safety, said Pool, as such engineer, without giving or causing to be given any signal or warning by ringing the bell, or blowing the whistle, or in any other manner, started said locomotive engine and train of flat-cars in motion with great and unusual suddenness, and plaintiff was thereby thrown down on the railroad track, and run over by one of said cars, and his arms were cut, crushed, and broken, and permanently injured thereby; that at the time plaintiff went upon said car to unload the same, and at the time he was injured, he had no knowledge or intimation whatever of the reputation, character, or habits of said Pool as such engineer, and had no means of such knowledge; that at the time he was injured, and all the time before, the plaintiff was in the exercise of that degree of care and caution for his own safety that a man of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.

"(8) That by reason of such injury plaintiff, although properly treated therefor, was rendered sick and sore, and was confined to his bed for one year, during which time he suffered

intense physical pain and mental anguish on account of such injuries, and his right arm was thereby rendered wholly and permanently useless, and his left arm was rendered permanently stiff at the elbow-joint, and plaintiff was by such injuries rendered wholly and permanently disabled from performing manual labor; that at the time of plaintiff's said injury he was twenty-nine years of age, and capable of earning four hundred dollars per year; that he was compelled to and did expend three hundred dollars ($300) in medical treatment for his said injuries; that plaintiff was damaged by such injuries to the amount of eight thousand dollars, ($8,000.)

“(9) The foregoing are all the facts proven upon the trial of said cause. If, upon the foregoing facts, the law is with .the plaintiff, we find for the plaintiff, and assess his damages at eight thousand dollars, ($8,000;) but, if the law is with the defendant, we find for the defendant. JOHN P. MERRILL, Foreman.'

new trial.

Thereupon the defendant filed its motion for a venire de novo, assigning 12 reasons therefor. The court overruled this motion, and the defendant excepted. The defendMotion for a ant then filed its motion for a new trial, assigning 43 reasons therefor. This motion was overruled by the court, and the defendant excepted. The plaintiff moved the court for judgment in his favor on the special verdict. The defendant orally moved the court to render judg ment on said special verdict in its favor. The court overruled the motion of the defendant for judgment on said verdict, to which ruling the defendant excepted. The court sustained the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the verdict, to which ruling the defendant excepted; and thereupon the court rendered judgment for plaintiff for $8,000 and costs.

The errors assigned are the circuit court erred-First. In overruling motion to make amended complaint more certain.

signed.

Second. In overruling demurrer to amended comErrors as- plaint. Third. In overruling motion for venire de novo. Fourth. In overruling motion for new trial. Fifth. In overruling defendant's motion for judgment on verdict. Sixth. In sustaining plaintiff's motion for judgment on the verdict.

ficers having

Under the first assignment of error, it is claimed that the court should have required the appellee to state Pleading- in his complaint the names of the officer or officers Names of of of the appellant through whom he expected to knowledge of bring notice to the appellant of the negligent habits incompetency of the engineer in charge of the train upon which the appellee was injured. We know of no rule of pleading requiring such particularity, and it is evident

that no good result would have been attained by sustaining the motion to make the amended complaint more specific. Had the appellee charged in his complaint that each and all of the officers of the defendant had notice of the negligent habits of Pool, the engineer, it would have been sufficiently specific, and yet the appellant would have had no more information as to the nature of the proof to be offered on the trial of the cause than it had with the complaint in the condition we find it. We do not think the court erred in overruling the motion to make the amended complaint more specific. Nor do we think the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the amended complaint. It is true that the appellee and Pool, the engineer, were fellow-servants, and that ordinarily the master is not liable to his servant for Sufficiency of an injury occasioned by the negligence of a fellow complaintservant. Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181; incompetent Bogard v. Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co., Id. 491; co-employe. Robertson v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 78 Ind. 77,

Retention of

8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 175; Capper v. Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co., 103 Ind. 305, 21 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 525; Boyce v. Fitzpatrick, 80 Ind. 526; Brazil & C. Coal Co. v. Cain, 98 Ind. 282. But it is equally as well settled that the master is bound to employ none but careful servants knowingly, and that, where he negligently employs a careless or negligent servant, or negligently keeps in his employment a negligent or careless servant after notice of such carelessness or negligence, he is liable to one of his servants injured by the negligence or carelessnesss of such servant. Indiana Manuf'g Co. v. Millican, 87 Ind. 87; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Collarn, 73 Ind. 261, 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 554; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 352; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 12 Am. & Eng R. Cas, 223.

to defendant's means of

It is objected that the complaint does not allege that the appellee did not possess equal means of knowing the negligent habits of the engineer with those possessed by the appellant; but it is expressly alleged that the appel- Allegations as lee had no notice or knowledge of the negligent habits or conduct of Pool, and that the appellant knowledge. did have such notice and knowledge. The complaint, in our opinion, states a cause of action against the appellant. Under the fourth assignment of error it is insisted-First. That the evidence in the cause does not tend to support the verdict of the jury. We have carefully read the evidence, and we think it tends to support all the facts found by the jury. We cannot disturb the verdict on the weight of the evidence.

The appellee requested the court to require the jury to find