spect to the time limits within which railways may be constructed; the amount of capital stock, and the subscriptions thereon per mile of railway; the degree of publicity given to the applications for charters, and other things. A fee for filing certificates is charged in a number of states. For instance, in North Carolina $250 must be paid before a bill can be introduced to incorporate or amend. In Maine a fee of $20 is exacted, and similar fees are charged in Wisconsin, Washington, and other states. The laws are weak in the financial requirements which they exact of railway companies. It would seem that some definite proportion should exist between the amount of the capital stock and the length and characteristics of the projected road; but such is not generally the case. Idaho and Indiana require a subscription of $1000 per mile; Kentucky, $250 per mile, of which twenty per cent must be paid in cash; Arkansas, $2000 per mile; Maryland, ten per cent payment on shares; Virginia, a payment of $2 per share when subscriptions are made; New Jersey, $10,000 per mile, and a deposit of $2000 per mile when the articles of association are filed, which latter sum, however, is returned to the board of directors when the road is completed. This is sufficient to show existing variations.

Corporate Life and Reserved Rights of the State. While many of the early charters and general laws were unrestricted in their nature, it was not long before a reaction against this lack of restraint

set in, and regulating features, more or less adequate in their nature, were introduced in charters and certificates. Many such charters contained in one of their concluding sections the proviso that the charter in question should be considered a public act, and, as such, to be construed favorably for the purposes for which the company was organized. Both in England and the United States, however, it has been held that the mere insertion of such a clause does not make a special or private law a public act, and that unless a charter is public by the nature of its contents it will be construed as a special act when passed with reference to a particular company organized to construct a certain road. The public importance of railways and the vital connection between them, and the social and economic interests of the states, frequently led legislators into a good deal of indulgence, especially during the early period of railway development. The limitations of charter rights had not yet been established; and it was not uncommon for incorporators to maintain that the rights and privileges granted by their charter were absolute and unrestricted. Not until the advent of Granger legislation, culminating in the leading case of Munn v. Illinois, had the right of the state to interfere in the management of railways incorporated under special charters been established; and at the present time nearly two-thirds of the states have statutory provisions reserving to the respective states the right to alter, amend, or repeal the fran

chise of any corporation, whether organized under special or general law. Reference to chapter III, on constitutional provisions, will show similar limitations placed upon franchises by state constitutions.

The nature of the reserved rights of the states and the limitations placed upon the corporate life of railway companies are illustrated by provisions in several states here inserted:

Maine. The laws of Maine provide that "no corporation can assign its charter or any rights under it; lease or grant the lease or control of its right or any part of it, or divest itself thereof, without consent of the legislature." In addition, all corporations, whether organized under special or general laws, shall be subject to general laws. In Maine and Massachusetts the state may amend or repeal the charter, or the commonwealth may purchase railways on one year's notice after twenty years' corporate existence.

Illinois. In Illinois charters are granted for fifty years, with the privilege of renewal for the same length of time; and a law of 1895 reserves to the legislature power to enact laws on all the leading topics relating to corporate existence.

Iowa. — In Iowa companies may likewise be chartered for fifty years, with the privilege of renewal for as many more, and they shall eventually be subject to legislative control. The legislature may alter, abridge, set aside the charter, or impose new conditions which it deems necessary for the public good.

Kansas. Special charters which do not designate the period of corporate life continue ninetynine years. The legislature has power to extend the charter period as it may deem proper.

Wisconsin. The legislature of Wisconsin expressly reserves the power to pass laws relating to reasonable maximum rates, the correction of abuses, unjust discrimination, and for the protection of the just rights of the public. Corporations, however, under the laws of this state, "shall continue perpetually."

North Carolina. - Sixty years, unless otherwise provided for in the act creating the same, is the corporate life under the laws of North Carolina.

Louisiana. This state limits the corporate existence to ninety-nine years.

Texas. In Texas a charter is forfeited if ten miles of the proposed road are not put into running order within two years, and twenty miles during every year thereafter until the road is completed. Charters may be granted for a period of fifty years, with the privilege of renewal for an equal number of years.

Maryland and Rhode Island illustrate an entirely different type of statutory provision :

Rhode Island. The laws of Rhode Island prescribe a course of procedure which appears to be entirely in harmony with the needs of our growing railway and industrial systems. In that state the general law alters special charters whenever the latter are found to be inconsistent with the former,

Maryland. Exactly the opposite is true in Maryland, where the adoption of the "general code" is not to affect the rights and privileges granted by special charters.

Provisions found in the laws of all the other states dealing with this subject at all do not contain anything not found in what has here been presented.1

Determination of route. Under early railway methods the route was very indefinitely indicated, the best of all descriptions being frequently contained in that clause in the charter naming the termini of the road; and it will be remembered that not all of the termini were mentioned in some charters, but that merely certain zones thought to contain "eligible points" were loosely indicated. In other charters not only the termini but one or more important intermediate points were designated; in but very few, often insignificant, charters was the entire route described with sufficient definiteness to enable one to tell beforehand exactly where the railway would be constructed. course of a railway is a matter in which the public has an interest. The manner in which the right of eminent domain has been exercised has de

The

1 States having statutory or constitutional provisions, or both, directly reserving to those states the power to alter, repeal, or amend charters, are the following: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.