Issues of Stocks and Bonds. Many controversies have been waged over the question of the capital stock of our railways. A conservative student of the question has placed the capitalized value of the railways of the country at $60,000 per mile, and this he does not consider excessive nor appreciably above the real value of the plants as they exist at the present time. So far as state laws are concerned, it would be difficult to determine the truth of this matter on the basis of information railway companies have been obliged to furnish under the statutes. In Massachusetts an increase in capital stock or signs of indebtedness may be made only on authority of the commission before which such questions are determined on hearing. Ohio railways shall report to the commission the cost of the road, the amount of capital stock, indebtedness, etc. The aggregate indebtedness shall not exceed the capital stock. In Pennsylvania railway stock is limited to $150,000 per mile, bonds to the same amount, and the total of the stock, bonds, and other paper to $300,000 per mile. In Arkansas consolidated companies shall not cause the aggregate of their stocks and bonds to exceed the sum represented by constituent companies. By a majority vote of the stockholders the company may borrow, at seven per cent, an amount not greater than the total capital stock. In Colorado all stock shall represent labor, services, money, and property; the same shall be increased only under general law and by a majority vote of the stock

holders. Kentucky companies can increase capital stock only on recommendation of the commission. The amount of indebtedness shall never exceed the total cash paid in. In Indiana boards of directors may not increase capital stock; capital stock may not be increased to exceed $15,000 per mile, and a certificate stating the amount of such increase shall be filed with the secretary of state. The New York commission may regulate stock issues and pass upon an increase or a reduction in the same. Other states having similar provisions are Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

This leaves a group of more than one-half of the states which do not attempt directly to regulate the issuance of stock by law. In some of them it is provided that a certificate of increase shall be filed with the secretary of state or some other state officer, and that a two-thirds vote of the stockholders is necessary before directors may authorize an increase in capital stock or the issuance of bonds.1

State Railway Commissions. The railway commission laws sometimes embody all the railway

1 These states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.

legislation in existence in the state. This was true in Oregon; and when, in 1898, the commission law of that state was repealed, Oregon was left practically without any legislation on the subject of railways. In addition to Oregon, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Arizona Territory are the only states which have failed to legislate on railways to any considerable extent. In states where the commission laws embrace only regulative features, questions of organization and management are treated in the general corporation laws or in subtitles under these. The general statement, however, holds true that the regulative features of railway legislation of the different states of the Union are embodied in our commission laws in all states in which commissions exist. The railway commissions represent the only active administrative agent which our laws have provided, and the adequacy or inadequacy of state administration depends upon the authority vested in this agent.

In their composition our commissions represent the same degrees of variety that exist in legislative provisions on most other railway topics. In the number of members they vary from one to five; in the number of years during which they hold office, from two to six. In the manner of their appointment we find popular suffrage, appointive power of a governor, and the advisory power of a branch of the legislature. Their salaries vary from $1000 to perhaps more than five times that amount, being entirely independent of the duties performed by

them, and bearing no relation whatever to the responsibilities vested in them. The funds from which the salaries are paid are sometimes provided. by general taxation, sometimes by an assessment on railways in proportion to mileage, and again by levying a certain per cent on the net income of the railways in the state. The absolute lack of system will be apparent to any one who makes even a cursory examination of these provisions.

In qualifications we find less although some variety. It is generally provided that the commissioner or commissioners shall be qualified voters of their respective states; that they shall be citizens of the state, and, in some instances, of the United States; that they shall have attained a certain age, usually that of qualified voters, and finally that they shall have no financial interests in any of the railroads over which they are expected to exercise control.

The jurisdiction of railway commissions varies from controlling railway companies alone, on the one hand, to exercising administrative control over a large combination of corporate interests representing practically the entire industrial life of the commonwealth on the other. The latter is strikingly illustrated by the industries over which the corporation commission of North Carolina is legally bound to exercise supervision. These embrace street railways, steam railways, steamboat and canal companies, express companies, sleeping-car companies, telephone and telegraph companies, banks,

building, loan, and trust associations. The Pennsylvania bureau is required by law to exercise administrative control over railways, banks, mining, and manufacturing establishments. The Illinois, Nebraska, and Minnesota commissions exercise. control over railways and warehouses. The New York commission, in addition to railways, has charge of sleeping and drawing-room car companies. Others are charged with railway and street railway companies. Others also with bridges and ferries. Not a few of the commissions are by law obliged to devote more or less of their time and energy to institutions which lie entirely outside of the means of transportation and communication. From the point of view of efficient administration the tendency, if such exists, to empower a single administrative organ to exercise control over a great variety of industrial establishments cannot receive the approval of thoughtful men. All of our great industrial establishments represent interests which are peculiarly their own, and other features which are characteristic only of similar establishments. This calls for special agencies, whose duty it should be to concentrate all their efforts in that particular field. The inclusion of so many industries inevitably leads to a division of interests, and the equally inevitable diminution in concentration and efficiency. Special types of industry require special administrative agents, and that tendency in our laws which burdens a single administrative organ with a great variety of complex duties can