of Lords, to make a motion relative to the conduct of the war in the Peninsula. "What secret cause (said his Lordship), what malign influence, amidst the rejoicings and acclamations of triumph, has counteracted the brilliant successes of our arms, and has converted the glad feelings of a just exultation, into the bitterness of regret and disappointment?" After some other questions to this purpose, which, he said, deserved their most serious attention, he concluded, that if their lordships should find that these events are not to be attributable to want of resources in the empire, but to the imbecility of those who direct them, it would be their duty to pronounce judgment upon the men who have enfeebled our meaus, and betrayed a mighty cause; but if it should appear that England has done her utmost, and her exertions are vain and hopeless, it would be for them to consider whether we should not tread back our steps, and cease to contend against an impossibility. He then stated the object of his inquiry to be, whether the ministers had adequately managed the resources of the country during the last year;

Spain, and the exertions of this country in her aid. The object of our policy, he said, was to admonish those nations which required our assistance, that they had only to assert their independence in order to obtain it. It was always his own firm conviction, expressed both in and out of the house, and in the cabinet, that the hope of Europe lay in the exertions of Spain and Portugal, aided by the British arms, It was perfectly known to his Majesty's ministers, that as early as April, 1811, Russia was laying the foundation of the great effort she has made, and is now making. The disposition of a large part of the army and population of Prussia was in favour of the cause of Russia; and Austria was desirous of asserting her independence, but did not dare to do it. The situation of Sicily also, through the wise conduct of lord W. Bentinck, was become such as to set at liberty the great British force by which it was held, to cooperate in the common cause, These and other advantages rendered it now proper to make great exertions on the peninsula, where the experiment had first been tried on a smaller scale.

On the opening of the campaign in that country, our situation became totally different from what it had been at any time before since the commencement of the war. Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos were reduced, and these advantages were accompanied with an extraordinary failure in the means, and relaxation in the efforts, of the French. Nothing could be more contemptible than the central government of Joseph; and in the army, there was no mutual assistance or cooperation between the commanders of the north and the south. The British system therefore should have been, to have had a force able to maintain active operations in the field, and another competent to keep in check the main body of the French army. The important crisis was now come in which the grand effort was to be made for the redemption of Spain. A comparison of the exertions made, with the nature of the crisis, was the next point to which the Marquis would direct their lordships' attention; and it would be his endeavour to show, that in every instance in which the campaign had failed, and the expectations from success been frustrated, it was owing to the insufficiency of the means afforded to the general. He had abstained from holding any correspondence with his noble relation on the subject, and professed. 'to know nothing but what the rest of the public know. He began with the sequel of the reduction of Badajos, when it might have been expected that lord Wellington would have seized the French depots at Seville, and destroyed the main foundation of their power in that part of Spain, and perhaps

have found an advantageous opportunity of bringing Souit to action; but he was under the necessity of marching northwards, in order to meet Marmont, and protect the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. If at this time there had been a sufficient force to keep in check the army of Marmont, as sir R. Hill had before done that of Soult, this necessity would have been prevented. Here then was a case in which a small addition of men and resources would have obviated the loss of a most favourable opportunity.

The Marquis then proceeded to the next stage, when the British general was called to the north. After victualling Ciudad Rodrigo, which operation required the whole force of his army, he advanced to Salamanca, where he was again encountered with inefficiency of means. He was opposed by Marmont, who had been joined by Bonnet, and he had heard nothing of the Sicilian expedition, on the co-operation of which he mainly relied. He found it necessary to retreat-not a feigned movement to deceive the enemy, but a plain and real retreat. During this operation, an accidental opportunity enabled him to attack the enemy at an advantage, and convert retreat into victory; but he could not convert a system of retreat to a system of advance; and instead of being at liberty to pursue the vanquished enemy, he was obliged to turn his attention to the corps of Joseph, reinforced from the army of Suchet. He entered Madrid, and if he had possessed the means of keeping Marmont in check, he might have pursued Joseph, and united with the English army at

Alicant,

Alicant, but he was obliged again to turn northwards. As to the siege of Burgos, if its success was important, and its failure was through want of means, whose was the fault? Here was again ground for inquiry.

Their lordships had been told from the opposite side, that the object of the campaign was to compel the French to evacuate the south of Spain, and that this had been effected; but did it enter into the object of ministers, that in forcing them to evacuate the south, we ourselves should be obliged to evacuate the whole of Spain? Was it necessary for this that our army should advance to Burgos The evacuation of the south had been already effected, and it must be with a view of some ulterior operations that the advance was made to Burgos. Lord Wellington was first compelled to withdraw from thence through apprehension for the safety of sir R. Hill's corps; and the force opposed to him in front then became so much superior, through the junction of the French army from the south, that the retreat of the whole allied army was rendered necessary, which, though not inglorious, terminated the campaign in a manner highly detrimental to the cause of Spain and Europe, and the character of our arms.

The Marquis then went to the next part of the question, which, he said, was merely practical, shewing the actual force, which, in his opinion, would bave averted all these misfortunes, and which he stated as low as 12,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry; and he would inquire, first, was there a force in the country to that amount which

could have been sent to lord Wellington's assistance? Secondly, were there financial means for the supply of specie? Of the detail which followed we cannot pretend to give a summary. It was concluded with an animated appeal to the feelings of the house, against the defence which he supposed ministers would make, that our resources and means were exhausted, and we had done all that we could do. He then moved, "That a committee be appointed to inquire into the circumstances and result of the last campaign in the peninsula of Spain."

Earl Bathurst rose to reply to the noble marquis. He began with saying that lord Wellington himself had voluntarily expressed his satisfaction with the conduct of administration during the last campaign; but he admitted that this alone was not a sufficient reason against the proposed inquiry. He then went to an examination of the arguments and assertions of the marquis; and he first contended that the campaign, instead of being a disastrous one, had powerfully aided the common cause by the diversion it gave to the French arms. He made replies to the particular charges on the ministry respecting the supposed deficiency of force which prevented the advance to Seville, the want of co-operation by the force from Sicily, the failure of the siege of Burgos, &c. He affirmed that during the course of the year, very nearly the number of troops for which the marquis had expressed a desire, had been sent to the peninsula, and that, from the disturbed state of this country, more could not have been spared; and he ad.

verted to the disproportionate increase of foreign expenditure in consequence of the course of exchange.

Earl Grey, in a long speech, supported the statements and reasoning of the marquis, and deviated to other charges against the ministry.

The Earl of Liverpool said, that of all the motions which he had heard in that house, the present rested on the slightest grounds, nor did he ever hear a case for inquiry more weakly made out. He asserted that the campaign, instead of being a failure, was the most brilliant achieved by the British arms during a century. He asked what would have satisfied us in January 1812, as the result of the Impending campaign? and was it not more successful than could have been expected by the most sanguine? He then adverted to the particulars which had before been touched upon; and added, that the great object to which they had been looking was, that the whole force of Spain should be placed under the command of one ́individual, who should be the British chie commander, which had been accomplished by the events of this campaign. He denied the possibility of sending out the force required by the noble lord at the time when he stated it to be necessary; and affirmed that we had upon the peninsula a larger force than could ever have been expected, and that a greater would only have been an incumbrance, nfess the means of supplying it were at hand; and that they were not, was no fault of the ministers.

The Earl of Darnley spoke in favour of the motion; after which a division took place, in which

there were, Contents, 39; Noncontents, 115; majority against the motion, 76.

Connected with the preceding discussion in subject, as relating to a part of the conduct of the war, was an inquiry into the naval administration, particularly with reference to the war in which the country is involved with the United States of America.

On May 14th, the order of the day being read in the House of Lords, the Earl of Darnley rose to call the attention of their lordships to our naval disasters. He had hoped that during the interval between giving his notice and bringing forward his motion, something would have occurred to compensate the past disasters; but, on the contrary,another unfortunate event had been reported, attended with circumstances still more melancholy than the former ones. He alluded to the action between the British sloop of war Peacock, and the American brig Hornet, of equal force. He should not now enter upon any question concerning the course or policy of the war, but it could not be disputed that ministers must have been long aware that war, sooner or later, must take place. This being the case, how were we prepared to meet it? With respect to Canada, the events there had greatly added to our military reputation, but they were events entirely unexpected. It was, however, with regard to our naval force that he should confine bis inquiries. It appeared that from April to July in the last year, there were on the Halifax station, under adm. Sawyer, exclusive of smaller vessels, one ship of the line and five frigates. That such a force only should have been stationed

there,