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CHAP. VI.]

DIFFICULTIES OF THE FRENCH.

353

One of the Guerrilla chiefs, a gentleman whose whole family had been slain before his face, was called L'Empecinado: a title which was heard over all Europe, through the boldness of his deeds. He made Joseph tremble on his throne, by watching Madrid with a body of 8000 men. No French courier attempted to go the smallest distance without an escort of 200 soldiers at least. Despatches for Paris were sent to the frontier under a guard of 1400 dragoons. Soon after, it became necessary to detach 3000 of the troops, whenever any person or letter of importance was to be conveyed from one point to another; and yet, letters were intercepted so abundantly as that the French could rarely keep a secret from the enemy, while they learned little or nothing in return, and knew less than the Spaniards of the intentions and movements of their own leaders and distant bodies of troops.

Again, the provisions of the country became less and less procurable by the French, owing to their habits of rapine, and their established method of making the inhabitants support the soldiery without pay. Everything portable was snatched from the French who would not pay, and brought to the British who did. Again, Napoleon was growing restless, and discontented with his generals. We find his rebukes and hasty judgments more frequent, and more harshly expressed, at this time and onwards, than at the beginning of the struggle. It was his doing that Massena made his disastrous march to Torres Vedras and back again; and that Estremadura and Portugal were attacked at the same time: and, when misfortune ensued, he blamed his generals, instead of doubting his own power of judging from a distance. All these things were now working together, as the retrospective observer perceives. We have now to see how the good cause gained upon the bad by what degrees, and with what checks.

Difficulties

In June, 1811, Marshal Bessières wrote thus, from the army, to Paris. It must be premised that "insurrection " here means the warfare carried on under the Guerrilla of the chiefs.1 "The army of the north," wrote Bessières,

French.

is composed, it is true, of 44,000 men; but, if you unite 20,000 together, all communication ceases, and the insurrection makes great progress. The coast will soon be lost as far as Bilboa. We are destitute of everything. It is with the greatest difficulty we can live from day to day. The spirit of the country is frightful. The journey of King Joseph to Paris - the retreat from Portugal the evacuation of the country as far as Salamanca have elevated their minds to a degree I cannot express. The bands enlarge and recruit daily at all points." At the same 1 Alison's History, viii. p. 293.

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354

Of the
British.

BRITISH DIFFICULTIES. — SET-OFF.

[Воок II. time, Wellington was writing, "The loss of Badajoz I consider as by far the greatest misfortune which has befallen us since the commencement of the Peninsular War." The recovery of this fortress the point d'appui of western Spain was, of course, the first object. But new vexations and ́impediments were arising. The disastrous effects of the Walcheren expedition extended even into Spain. The reinforcements from England brought the Walcheren fever with them; and as the heats of summer increased, the fever spread, till, in October, there were no less than 25,000 men in hospital, of whom 19,000 were British. Multitudes of Portuguese who escaped the sickness dropped back into their own country and native districts. Not more than 14,000 of the whole army could be depended on for service, at the beginning of the new campaign, though the nominal amount of force was 30,000. The French had, at the same time, 40,000 of cavalry alone; and their whole force was about 370,000. It seems wonderful that there should have been any hope for the cause, in the face of so enormous a disproportion of numbers. However and wherever the French armies might be employed, it was certain that at any point where the British might show themselves, treble their numbers might at once be brought up to meet them. The set-off against this was that the forces of the British could keep together, while the French were compelled to dissolve perpetually in search of food. Wellington's great care was to keep open the roads from the respective bodies of his troops back to Torres Vedras, and to place these bodies within reach of constant mutual communication. Another care was to secure the navigable rivers; and even to make portions of the rivers navigable, for the bringing up of stores from the sea. He so contrived this water-carriage, as that even to Badajoz the land-carriage did not exceed 100 miles. In December, 1811, Wellington, who kept on the cautious side in his correspondence, wrote home to his government 1 that the situation of the allies was improving; and that if the Spanish people held out, he believed it was still possible to save them. He went to work to save them, undeterred by the miserable jealousies and faithlessness, amounting to treason, of their generals and their government; by the sickness around him, the embarrassing weakness of the Portuguese regency behind him, and the penury of the government at home, which frustrated his best schemes, by leaving him destitute of money and stores. It saddens the heart to read his correspondence of this year, through which are scattered expressions which reveal the bitterness and occasional exasperation of his mind. Under this weight of cares, his indomitable spirit braved all impediments,

1 Despatches, viii. p. 437.

1

CHAP. VI.]

ALBUERA.

CIUDAD RODRIGO.

355 and impelled him to set forth on his magnificent career of victory.

Albuera.

First, in May, he ordered the investment of Badajoz. As soon as ground was broken before it, the French army Campaign under Marshal Soult marched on to its rescue. When of 1811. they came in sight of the valley of the Guadiana, Marshal Beresford withdrew his force from the siege of Badajoz, and went forth to meet the enemy, seeing that there must be a battle before the fortress could be gained. It was on the 15th that the French appeared on the heights of Albuera; and there, on the 16th, the battle was fought. It was a tremendous fight; and so nearly lost by the British, that Beresford was preparing for a retreat, when Colonel (now Lord) Hardinge dared one more retrieving effort, and changed the aspect of the struggle. After such a carnage as can scarcely be equalled in all military history, the mighty mass of the hostile army was driven, as by an avalanche, down the hill, and the remnant of the British stood victors at the top. Of 6000 who had mounted it, only 1500 remained on their feet; and the dead and wounded lay heaped on the ridge. Others crowded up from below, and pursued the French, who saved their artillery, but little else. In four hours, 8000 French and nearly 7000 of the allies had been struck down. The distress was so fearful that no one seems to have been certain whether there was victory on either side, till Soult made the matter clear by retreating to Seville, leaving the British to resume the siege of Badajoz. The place was not then taken. The battle of Albuera answered a great purpose in compelling Napoleon to displace his armies, and change his plans; but this again compelled Wellington to raise the siege, and retire into Portugal, early in June. Badajoz reThere his sick were nursed, and his resources improved, linquished. in preparation for the next advance.

Siege of

It was on the 8th of January, 1812, that the French won their last great victory in Spain, by the fall of Valen- Campaign cia, in the far east of Spain. It was on the next day of 1812. that Wellington set forth again, crossing the Agueda, on his way to Ciudad Rodrigo. His late reinforcements did not immediately avail him much; for most of the soldiers who arrived had to go through the Walcheren fever before they were fit for service. Ciudad Rodrigo was so strong that the final storming was fearful; but it availed. The General's order, on the 17th of January, was "Ciudad Rodrigo must be carried Ciudad by assault this evening at seven o'clock." It was Rodrigo. done first under the faint light of the young moon, and afterwards by the glare of the flames which began to spread in the town; and in the morning the governor yielded up his sword to

356

SIEGE OF BADAJOZ.

[Book II. Mr. (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel) Gurwood, at the gate of the castle. The deed was disgraced by the violence and brutality of the soldiery, to whom victory of this kind was new, and thoroughly intoxicating after years of hardships and mortification. This was the great drawback upon the satisfaction of capturing the strong frontier fortress of Spain, with the whole battering train of Marmont's army, and vast stores. As often happened now, Marmont was kept in the dark to the last moment; and had scarcely heard of the British having left Portugal, when the news arrived of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Be fore he could collect his troops, the British had repaired their fortifications, and laid in provisions for six weeks; and Wellington was secretly maturing his plans against Badajoz.

This

So secret were his preparations that the Emperor would not believe Marshal Marmont's warnings of the danger, but was positive that it was Salamanca that was threatened. was, in a manner, true. Wellington meant to have them both; but Badajoz first. His patience was cruelly tried, and a host of lives was afterwards lost, by the timidity and dilatoriness of the Portuguese regency, who caused a delay of six days in crossing the rivers, for want of the means of transport. During those days, the defences had been improved to a degree which rendered the capture of the fortress a work of desperate difficulty. Two thousand men fell, under horrible circumstances, in one ineffectual attempt, before a great beam thick-set with sword-blades, which had very lately been fixed in its place, and which made the assailants certain prey to the defenders. Five thousand were killed or wounded before Badajoz; but it was taken, Badajoz. after a siege of nineteen days. On the night of the 6th of April, the brave governor sent out some horsemen, while the drawbridge was yet in his power, to inform Soult of what was happening, and then surrendered the place. During the awful hours of the storming, Wellington stood on one spot, "near the quarries," where the necessary information was brought to him, and whence he issued his orders. No one perceived that he was moved by repeated news of the desperate slaughter of his troops that was going on. He had settled that Badajoz must be carried, and he did not flinch in the doing it. But, the deed achieved, his tears showed what it had cost him. "When," says Napier,1 1"the extent of the night's havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers." At the same moment, strange spectacles were seen in the squares and streets. French officers, their wives and children, were besetting the English offi

1 Peninsular War, iv. p. 433.

HONORS TO WELLINGTON.

CHAP. VI.] 357 cers, frantically imploring that protection from the soldiery which it was not possible to afford. While the prisoners stood or fled their children in their arms, and packets of valuables in their hands—the delirious soldiers masqueraded as monks and friars, or in court-dresses, or any finery that they could lay their hands on. They played antics in the churches, while robbing them of plate and vestments; they carried furniture about in the streets, and got at the military chest. While the dying were groaning in the trenches, and Wellington was mourning his dead, and the officers used every conceivable tone of command and remonstrance, in vain, brutal laughter went up from the streets, mingled with shrieks of fear and agony, and with the crash of doors and windows, and with the hissing of fire, and the report of muskets in the hands of drunken banditti ; for two days a drunken banditti. was nothing more to be had, the look to their wounded and dead. his army 66 a perfect machine.”

for the British soldiers were When, on the third day, there soldiers were at last induced to Wellington could not yet call

The final rescue of the Peninsula was owing to this conquest, more than to any other. The stores of guns and ammunition were vast, the prisoners many, and of importance; but it was of more consequence that the maintenance of Badajoz was the chief point of honor with the French, whose three great armies had not prevented their losing their two great frontier fortresses at the outset of the campaign. The Spaniards had Honors to made Wellington a grandee of the first class, on the Wellington. capture of Ciudad Rodrigo; and in England, he was made an earl, with the pension of 2000l. a year. Almost before this was settled, the news arrived of the greater conquest of Badajoz; and this taught men to look for something more.

Soult had come up from Seville, just as he had done when Badajoz was in danger before; but there was now no second battle of Albuera. The horsemen that Philippon, the brave governor, had sent forth, before he lost the drawbridge, met Soult, and gave him news which made him hasten back to Seville with all speed. Wellington longed to follow, and annihilate this branch of the great French force, so that from Badajoz to Cadiz the Spaniards might hold their own again; and it appears that he actually designed this brilliant enterprise.1 But there was other work for him to do. The authorities had failed in their promises, as usual. They had not provisioned Ciudad Rodrigo; and Marmont, having moved heaven and earth to obtain fifteen days' food for his army, was moving down upon the frontier. He invested Ciudad Rodrigo, and ravaged some districts of Portugal. On Wellington turning his face northwards, Marmont

1 Despatches, ix. p. 43.

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