by nearly every minister who had been at the head of affairs; that, if this practice had not been introduced under the prince who was placed upon the throne by the revolution of 1688, it had certainly grown to a kind of system in the hands of the statesmen by whom that revolution was effected, and had attained its greatest height under the first two princes of the house of Hanover; that it was freely and sometimes shamefully applied throughout the American war; and that, down to that day, no British statesman had had the sagacity to discover, and the virtue to adopt, a purer system of administration.' Whether this was a necessary vice of the English constitution; whether it was inherent or temporary; or whether it was only a stage in the development of parliamentary government, destined to pass away when the relations of the representative body to the people had become better settled, could not then be seen even in England. But to our ancestors, when framing their Constitution, it presented itself as a momentous fact; whose warning was not the

1 In Horace Walpole's Memoirs of the Reign of George II., there is an amusing parallel - gravely drawn, however between the mode in which his father, Sir Robert, "traded for members," and the manner in which Mr. Pelham carried on his corruption. Lord Mahon has called Sir Robert Walpole "the patron and parent of parliamentary corruption." (Hist. of England, I. 268.) But both Mr. Hallam and Mr. Macaulay say that

it originated under Charles II., and both admit that it was practised down to the close of the American war. (Hallam's Const. Hist., III. 255, 256, 351-356. Macaulay's Hist. of England, III. 541–549.) The latter, in a very masterly analysis of its origin and history, treats it as a local disease, incident to the growth of the English constitution. It must be confessed, that it had become chronic.

Th

in the appointment of the President, it mere declamation to complain of their terr for undoubtedly the peculiar duties assig Senate could be best discharged by thos had the longest experience in them jection to such a term being removed, th of aristocratic tendencies would be confi who might wish to find plausible reasor tion, and might not wish to be satisfied reasons for the provision.

Having now described the formation cial powers of the two branches of the proceed to inquire into the origin and disqualifications to which the mem jected.

The Constitution of the United St: and established by a generation of observed the operation upon the E. of that species of influence, by the vants, which, from the mode of its dom amounting to actual bribery, appropriate name of parliamentary generation of the American peopl - they cared less-about the o of governing the legislative body. open or a secret venality on the and a willingness on the part of to purchase their consent to its they did know and what they for a long succession of years t of Parliament had been bought,

intentions of

of its policy

asures should ism and sense ve department. a never failing il, to be found; men, with the assions of men;

ceptions of duty

id sometimes inn the other hand, composing every that it will not do 1 intentions as the the public security, the appliances that Ing right ends, and means. One of the lishment of different

overnments to which virtue and unerring ated of any man in a simple despotism

less powerful, because it came from the centre of institutions with which they had been most familiar, and from the country to which they traced their origin, - a country in which parliamentary government had had the fairest chances for success that the world had witnessed.

Yet it would not have been easy at that time, as it is not at the present, and as it may never be, to define with absolute precision the true limits which executive influence with the legislative body should not be suffered to pass. Still less is it easy to say that such influence ought not to exist at all; although it is not difficult to say that there are methods in which it should not be suffered to be exercised. The more elevated and more clear-sighted public morality of the present age, in England and in America, condemns with equal severity and equal justice both the giver and the receiver in every transaction that can be regarded as a purchase of votes upon particular measures or occasions, whatever may have been

1 I am quite aware of the danger

of reasoning from the circumstances of one country to those of another, even in the case of England and the United States. But I avail myself, in support of the text, of the authority of a writer, whose high moral tone, and whose profound knowledge of the constitution on which he has written, unite to make it unnecessary that its history should be written again;-I mean, of course, Mr. Hallam. He pronounces it an extreme supposition, and not to be pretended, that Parliament was

ever "absolutely, and in all conceivable circumstances, under the control of the sovereign, whether through intimidation or corrupt subservience." "But," he adds, “as it would equally contradict notorious truth to assert that every vote has been disinterested and independent, the degree of influence which ought to be permitted, or which has at any time existed, becomes one of the most important subjects in our constitutional policy." (Const. Hist., III. 351.)

the consideration or motive of the bargain. But whether that morality goes, or ought to go, farther, - whether it includes, or ought to include, in the same condemnation, every form of influence by which an administration can add extrinsic weight to the merits of its measures, is a question that admits of discussion.

It may be said, assuming the good intentions of an administration, and the correctness of its policy and measures, that its policy and its measures should address themselves solely to the patriotism and sense of right of the members of the legislative department. But an ever active patriotism and a never failing sense of right are not always, if often, to be found; the members of a legislative body are men, with the imperfections, the failings, and the passions of men ; and if pure patriotism and right perceptions of duty are alone relied upon, they may, and sometimes inevitably will be, found wanting. On the other hand, it is just as true, that the persons composing every administration are mere men, and that it will not do to assume their wisdom and good intentions as the sole foundations on which to rest the public security, leaving them at liberty to use all the appliances that may be found effectual for gaining right ends, and overlooking the character of the means. One of the principal reasons for the establishment of different departments, in the class of governments to which ours belongs, is, that perfect virtue and unerring wisdom are not to be predicated of any man in any station. If they were, a simple despotism