the reinsurance of risks insured by sented for consideration by the courts those companies. Premiums for this below was whether this transfer of the reinsurance were collected by Meinel general reinsurance agency from the from the companies which had thus Mutzenbechers to Meinel was made in ceded insurance to appellant, and, good faith, or whether it was formal after depositing the required reserve only, and a mere cover under which the for unearned premiums with the business was intended to be conducted trustee of appellant, pursuant to by the Mutzenbechers as it had been the New York statute, the balance, previously conducted. On that question together with documents giving particu- of fact, both the district court and the lars of all reinsurance to be effected by circuit court of appeals found for the the Mutzenbechers for account of appel- Alien Property Custodian and against lant, was transmitted to them in Ham- the appellant. That finding we adopt. burg. From the premiums thus re- The evidence was sufficient to support it ceived, the Mutzenbechers paid the and will not be discussed here, except expenses of their business, including in so far as it may be necessary to inditheir own commissions, amounting to 3 cate what the legal relationship of per cent, and remitted to Meinel in New Meinel to the Mutzenbechers was, so York, out of their own commission, cer- that the question of law presented here tain expenses and of 1 per cent of the may be adequately dealt with. premiums thus transmitted, as commissions to Meinel for doing the business in New York. This continued to be the method of doing business after the outbreak of the World War until January 1, 1915, when the remittances from Meinel to the Mutzenbecher firm ceased because of war conditions. During the calendar year 1916, until November, Meinel paid to the Mutzenbechers from premiums received, 2 per cent commission payable to them, and retained its own commissions and expenses. In October, 1916, the Russian government promulgated a ukase by the terms of which all Russian subjects were forbidden to enter into any agreement or commercial relations whatever with citizens of enemy countries, and which proclaimed that all existing relations, by virtue of contracts, with enemy firms, must be considered as at an end from the date of promulgation. Violation of the decree was punishable by imprisonment and fine. The appellant, [556] which, up to that time, had continued its ordinary business relations with the Mutzenbechers, then found it necessary to terminate its relations with them, which it did, in form, at least, by the appointment of Meinel, as its general agent, to effect reinsurance, and to carry on the business which had previously been carried on by the Mutzenbechers at Hamburg. By the terms of this appointment Meinel was appointed general agent for the appellant, authorized to effect reinsurance for appellant's account, and to retain for itself, as compensation for handling the business, commissions at the rate of 3 per cent of the net premiums received. The principal question of fact pre No further remittances were made by Meinel to the Mutzenbechers after November 22, 1916, but it deducted from all net premiums received 3 per cent commission, as stipulated by its agency appointment. Of the commission thus deducted it retained for itself a com mission of of 1 per cent, plus its expenses, and the balance was deposited in a special bank account in its name, and carried on its books as a "suspense reserve account." The account remained undisturbed until July 26, 1918, when the Alien [557] Property Custodian, having begun an investigation of the books and records of Meinel, the fund which is the subject of this suit was then turned over by it to the New York Life Insurance & Trust Company, the trustee for appellant, and was by it later paid over to the Alien Property Custodian. The inference drawn by the courts below from these facts and from voluminous testimony, which need not be here reviewed, was that the transfer of the agency from the Mutzenbechers to Meinel was merely colorable; that the commissions segregated in the suspense reserve account, which were commissions from old business, that is, premiums earned under reinsurance treaties effected before the transfer of the agency, notwithstanding the formal terms of the written appointment of Meinel, were commissions to which Mutzenbecher was entitled under the contract or arrangement existing between Mutzenbecher, Meinel, and appellant before the transfer of the agency, and that Meinel had in fact received and set them apart as the property of the Mutzenbechers. These findings, so far as they relate to what the parties did in these somewhat was authorized to do so by the Mutzencomplicated transactions, and the pur- bechers. Appellant having formally aupose and intent with which they acted, deal with questions of fact, and, as they are supported by the evidence, they are controlling here. that the appellant [559] is in any different situation with respect to this fund than it would have been if it had paid over the commissions directly to the Mutzenbechers or to their authorized agent. thorized Meinel to deduct and retain 31 per cent commission for conducting the business, and Meinel having actually deducted and retained it, and the court The proposition of law which is pre- having found that that portion of the sented, and on the basis of which we commissions placed in the suspense acare asked to reverse the judgment be- count was placed there by Meinel for low, rests upon the asserted illegality of the benefit of the Mutzenbechers, with appellant's own conduct. It is argued the knowledge and consent of the appelthat the effect of the Russian ukase of lant, and they having formally claimed October 29, 1916, was to make unlawful the segregated fund, we are unable to see the agency of the Mutzenbecher firm for appellant, and all further relations between them; that the Mutzenbechers were accordingly not entitled to earn or receive further commissions even from "old business;" that the fund segregated in the suspense reserve account by At the time the agency was transferred Meinel was therefore at all times prop-to Meinel, the United States was at peace erty of appellant, and not subject to with. Germany. The action of Meinel, seizure by the Alien Property Custodian, an American corporation controlled since the illegal conduct of appellant by American stockholders, in taking [558] had prevented the acquisition of over the German agency, did not violate any rights in the fund or against the any law or policy of the United States. appellant by the German firm. It was not unlawful for it to stipulate that it should receive commissions for doing the business, or to agree to receive them for the Mutzenbechers, and, having received them, it was not unlawful for it to hold the commissions as the agent of the German firm, for its account and benefit. Whatever view we take of the arrangement entered into by the appellant with Meinel, appellant can claim under it no ownership in the deducted commissions. By appellant's formal agreement with Meinel, it relinquished all claims to the commissions. By the secret understanding between appellant, Meinel, and the Mutzenbechers, the segregated fund was received and held for account of the Mutzenbechers. til the declaration of war by the United States against Germany, the Mutzenbechers, in this state of facts, could have maintained a suit against Meinel for an accounting and payment over of the segregated fund. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 40 L. ed. 95, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Taylor v. Benham, 5 How. 233, 274, 12 L. ed. 130; Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693; Kohler v. Stanly County, 89 Fed. 257, 260; Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City R. Co. 124 C. C. A. 463, 206 Fed. 663, 665; Re Interborough Consol. Corp. 32 A.L.R. 932, 288 Fed. 334, 347. To sustain this proposition it is necessary for the appellant to maintain, (1) that it has retained some form of legal interest in the 3 per cent commission deducted by Meinel under the terms of its agency appointment of November, 1916; and (2) that the Russian ukase should be given an extraterritorial effect such as to render the acts of the appellant within the United States, which were otherwise lawful and proper according to the laws of the United States, unlawful and void, and thus prevent the Mutzenbecher firm from acquiring any interest in the segregated fund. We think appellant does not succeed in establishing either proposition. Although Meinel was the statutory agent of appellant in the state of New York, and transacted there certain business for the appellant, it was also, and had been for many years before the outbreak of the war, the subagent of the Mutzenbechers in handling the business which was transmitted to the German firm to be distributed in the reinsurance pool. The commissions for this service were paid to Meinel by the Mutzenbechers. After the outbreak of the war it became their agent to receive and remit to them commissions for carrying on the reinsurance business for appellant. When the colorable transfer of the Mutzenbechers' agency was made to Meinel, it was accepted by Meinel only after it Un In view of the legal relationship existing between Meinel and the Mutzenbechers, and the legal consequences which flow from it, we find it unnecessary to Russian nationals for its violation, but speculate as to the precise meaning and rendered unlawful and void all contracts effect of the Russian ukase. The circuit and commercial intercourse within our court of appeals below rejected the con- own territory, between Russian nationals tention [560] that it should be given and Russian enemies, we still do not find extraterritorial effect so as to make il- in that assumption any basis for the legal the transactions had in New York reversal of the judgment below. Had between appellant and Meinel with re- the obligation of appellant to pay the spect to their dealings with the German commissions in question remained execfirm. Certainly such an application of utory, the assumption that our courts foreign law to acts done within the ter- should give an extraterritorial effect to ritorial jurisdiction of the forum car- the Russian ukase and disregard the ries the principle of the adoption of German law affecting the rights of the foreign law by comity much beyond its Mutzenbechers upon their contract with limits as at present defined; the more appellant, to be performed in German so as the contract between a Russian territory, might have been of some avail and a German which we are asked to to it. But, as we have seen, the findhold illegal on the basis of Russian law ings of the court below establish that is shown by the expert testimony in the payment of the commissions was made case to be valid according to the Ger- as effectually as if the payment had been man law. The contention runs counter by cash in hand. When Meinel set apart to the reasoning of such cases as Bank the fund for the Mutzenbechers nothing of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 598, further remained to be done by appel10 L. ed. 274, 312; Hilton v. Guyot, lant with respect to the payment. It supra: Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomo- had relinquished all claim to the fund, tive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. ed. 1003; and Meinel held it for the MutzenbechRose v. Himely, 4 Cranch, 241, 2 L. ed. ers. When the United States declared 608; Polydore v. Prince, 1 Ware, 402, war, the fund was one held by an Fed. Cas. No. 11,257; Dike v. Erie R. American national for the benefit of an Co. 45 N. Y. 113, 6 Am. Rep. 43. Nor alien enemy; and, on passage of the does Canada Southern R. Co. v. Geb- Trading with the Enemy Act (October hardt, 109 U. S. 527, 27 L. ed. 1020, 36, 1917), it became its duty to report Sup. Ct. Rep. 363, relied upon by appel- the fund to the Alien Property Custodilant, support the contention. That case an (Trading with the Enemy Act, § only laid down the doctrine recently af-7(a), 40 Stat. at L. 416, chap. 106, Comp. firmed by this court (Modern Woodmen Stat. § 31153d, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. v. Mixer, No. 308, decided April 13, 1918, p. 853), and to surrender it to the 1925 [267 U. S. 544, ante, 783, A.L.R. Custodian on demand (§ 7(c), 40 Stat. -, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389]), that the legal at L. 418). relations of the members of a corporation to the corporation and to each other must be regulated and controlled by the law of the jurisdiction in which the corporation is organized, and it extended the doctrine so as to make it applicable to mortgage security holders having a common interest in the corporate property. The Russian ukase, however, did not purport to regulate the internal relations of the corporation to its members or lien holders. By its terms it is applicable indiscriminately to individuals and all classes of associations and corporations, and apparently undertakes to deal with contracts of every kind. It cannot be brought within the purview of the rule established in Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhardt and Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, supra. If, however, it be assumed that its true meaning and purpose were to control extraterritorially Russian subjects, [561] and that it not only imposed penalties on To hold that money thus situated was not subject to the seizure and retention under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act would be going very far; but, quite apart from the operation of that act, we find no basis for the contention that the principle of comity would require us to recognize any right in appellant to recover back the money thus paid because the payment of it was forbidden by the Russian ukase. No foundation [562] for it in the Russian law is suggested. By our own law payments made under contracts which are illegal, where the parties are in pari delicto, may not ordinarily be recovered. The law leaves the parties where it finds them and gives no relief. Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 20 L. ed. 453; Higgins v. McCrea, 116 U. S. 671, 684, 29 L. ed. 764, 769, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 557; White v. Barber, 123 U. S. 392, 423, 31 L. ed. 243, 254, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 221; Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U. S. 50, 33 L. ed. 242, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. | sons and associations in disseminating in13; St. Louis, V. & T. H. R. Co. v. Terre formation with respect to prices of comHaute & I. R. Co. 145 U. S. 393, 407, modities passing in interstate commerce 36 L. ed. 738, 754, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 953; was to become law-abiding members of the Harriman v. Northern Securities Co. 197 community or lawbreakers is not material U. S. 244, 294, 49 L. ed. 739, 762, 25 lation of the Anti-trust Act, unless the upon the question of their liability for vioSup. Ct. Rep. 493; Farrington v. Stucky, court can infer from their course of con91 C. C. A. 311, 165 Fed. 325, 330; Levy duct a specific and continuing purpose, v. Kansas City, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 862, 93 agreement, or understanding on their part C. C. A. 523, 168 Fed. 524. While there to effect an actual restraint of trade, or are exceptions to this rule, appellant's unless it is established that the combinacase does not fall within any recognized tion entered into, and its activities as carexception, and the record suggests no on, must necessarily result in such restraint. special considerations of equity or of our own public policy which would jusMonopoly tify an exception in this ease. We therefore reach the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to recover the fund as against the Mutzenbechers. Such being the rights of the parties while the fund remained in the hands of Meinel, their rights could not be altered to the prejudice either of the Mutzenbechers or that of the government by payment over of the fund by Meinel to the trustee for appellant. The trustee was not a purchaser, and could not take the fund free of the legal or equitable rights of the Mutzenbechers (Central Nat. Bank v. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. 104 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 693), although it might and did discharge itself under the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act by payment of the money over to the Alien Property Custodian (Trading with the Enemy Act, § 7(e), 40 Stat. at L. 418). The appellant establishes no right in the fund which is the subject of litigation; we find no error in the record. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed. ried distribution of knowledge of business conditions. tion of wider and more scientific knowledge purpose of Sherman Act. the Sherman Anti-trust Law to inhibit the 3. It was not the purpose or intent of intelligent conduct of business operations. Monopoly validity of gathering and disseminating information. 4. Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in trade journals and statistical reports on industry, who gather and publish statistics as to the amount of production of commodities in interstate commerce, and who report market spiracy in restraint of trade merely beprices, are not engaged in unlawful concause the ultimate results of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or limit production through a better understanding of economic laws and a more general ability to conform to them. what act lawful. 5. Members of a trade association who are engaged in the production of a particular commodity do not violate the Sherman Anti-trust Act by computing and distributing among the members of the association information as to the average cost of the centrally located point, or product, or as to freight rates from a statistics, such as production and aggregate as to trade surplus stock and prices received in actual course of business, or by holding meetings at which trade conditions are discussed, in the absence of proof of agreement or concerted action actually reached or attempted to lessen production or arbitrarily raise prices beyond the level of production or prices which would prevail if no such agreement or concerted action ensued. Note.-On exchange of trade infor- men's agreement," and the like, as viomation as violation of anti-trust acts-lation of anti-trust acts-see note to see note to American Column & Lumber American Column & Lumber Co. V. Co. v. United States, 66 L. ed. U. S. United States, 21 A.L.R. 1109. 284. As to monopolies, generally-see notes On "open competition plan," "gentle- to Fowle v. Park, 33 L. ed. U. S. 67; 69 L. ed. Monopoly acts of association in gath- | ry Jackson Darby, filed a brief for apering and disseminating information. pellants: 11 Coke 84b, 87a; Atty. Gen. v. AdeDarcy v. Allein, 77 Eng. Reprint, 1260, laide S. S. Co. 109 L. T. N. S. 258, Ann. 6. Trade associations or combinations Neither the contract nor the conduct of persons or corporations which openly of defendants has unreasonably reand fairly gather and disseminate informa- strained interstate trade or commerce. tion as to the cost of their product, the volume of production, the actual price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost of transportation Cas. 1914A, 417; Cade v. Daly [1910] from the principal point of shipment to the points of consumption, and who meet to discuss such information without reaching or attempting to reach any agreement or concerted action with respect to prices or production or restraining competition, do not engage in unlawful restraint of com merce. [No. 342.] Argued December 1 and 2, 1924. Restored to docket for reargument January 5, 1925. Reargued March 3, 1925. Decided June 1, 1925. A PPEAL by defendants from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan enjoining acts of defendants as constituting unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Edward R. Johnston argued the cause on original and rearguments, and, with Messrs. Jacob Newman, Conrad H. Poppenhusen, Henry L. Stern, and Hen United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight A.L.R. 1140. As to agreements collateral to contracts forming illegal combinations, and the enforcement thereof by members of such illegal combinations-see notes to Freed v. American F. Ins. Co. 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 368; Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Lewis Voight & Sons Co. 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 143; International Harvester Co. v. Smith, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 580; and Brent v. Gay, 41 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1034. On contracts in partial restraint of trade as affected by modern anti-trust acts-see notes to Lanyon v. Garden City Sand Co. 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 446, and Baird v. Smith, L.R.A.1917A, 379. On illegal trusts under modern antitrust laws-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689. As to what relation a contract or combination must bear to interstate commerce in order to bring it within the scope of the Federal Anti-trust Actsee notes to Loewe v. Lawlor, 52 L. ed. U. S. 488, and Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268. V. 1 Ir. R. 306; United States v. Trans- States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & The government's petition should have been dismissed. United States v. United States Steel Corp. 251 U. S. 417, 447-449, 64 L. ed. 343, 352, 353, 8 A.L.R. 1121, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293. The necessity for the collection and distribution of trade statistics for the benefit of both buyers and sellers is recognized by all modern economists. United States v. Quaker Oats Co. (C. C. A. 7th C.) 232 Fed. 502; United States v. American Can Co. 230 Fed. 900; United States v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466. Special Assistant to the Attorney General James A. Fowler argued the cause on original and rearguments, and, with Solicitor General Beck and Special Assistant to the Attorney General C. Stanley Thompson, filed a brief for appellee: Defendant's articles of association and activities thereunder were violative of the Anti-trust Act. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. v. United States, 234 U. S. 600, 58 L. ed. 1490, L.R.A.1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 951; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 179, 55 L. ed. 663, 693, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 66 L. ed. 268 U. S. |