CARS. Necessity of writing in order for cars, States where the case tendered by the petimissed by the Supreme Court of the United see Carriers, 7. CASES CERTIFIED. 1. Unquestioned jurisdiction by the district court of the United States over the principal cause of action in a suit by Upon what whole case. questions; 2. A certificate for the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States which does not submit one or more definite questions of law arising upon the record, but, in effect, asks decision of the whole case, will be dismissed. Biddle v. Luvisch, 266 U. S. 173, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 88, 69: 229 CERTIFIED QUESTION. See Cases Certified. CERTIORARI. tion is radically different from that set up upon the argument. Erie R. Co. v. Kirkendall, 266 U. S. 185, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33, 69: 236 United States when the inducing petition 4. A writ of certiorari ordinarily will be dismissed by the Supreme Court of the fails to give adequate information cerning the record and essential facts. Erie R. Co. v. Kirkendall, 266 U. S. 185, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33, To state courts-when allowed. con 69: 236 5. Certiorari is a proper remedy to review a judgment in a suit in which a right under an act of Congress was claimed v. Northern P. R. Co. 266 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. and denied. Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. Ct. Rep. 143, 69: 367 reviewing a judgment of a state court de6. Certiorari is the proper remedy for termining title to land lying within a former Indian reservation. Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 317, 69: 652 7. A judgment of the highest court of a state, affirming a judgment refusing to continue a temporary order restraining the execution of a judgment and make it permanent, is final within the provisions ments of the highest court of a state subof the Judicial Code making final judgject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of certiorari, and it is immaterial that the trial judge refused the relief because of lack of jurisdiction, if the supreme court decided the case on its merits. North Carolina R. Co. v. Story, 268 U. S. 288, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531, - dismissal. 69:959 8. A petition for certiorari which declares that the sole question presented is, Can damages for humiliation and wounded feelings be awarded against the United Error or certiorari, see Appeal and States Railroad Administration? will be Error, 5. To circuit courts of appeals-when allowed. 1. The Supreme Court of the United States will not grant a writ of certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts. United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496, 69: 925 inal. 2. The United States may secure a review of a criminal case by writ of certiorari under § 240 of the Judicial Code, providing that "in any case, civil or crim it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, upon the petition of any party thereto, any such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review," and it is immaterial that the circuit court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial, and did not render final judgment therein. United States v. Gulf Ref. Co. 268 U. S. 542, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597, 69: 1082 -dismissal. 3. A writ of certiorari will be dis1218 CHINESE. Immigration of, see Aliens, 2-5. CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS. CITIZENS. Ap Sufficiency of allegation as to citizenship of parties, see Pleading, 1. Who are citizens of United States. 1. Chinese women marrying American citizens do not, under the statutes, become American citizens, and are incapable of naturalization. Chang Chan v. Nagle, 268 69: 988 U. S. 346, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, 2. The naturalization of the father of a minor child who, although in this country, could not lawfully have landed here, under the provisions of the statutes, because feeble-minded, and who was in fact stopped at the boundary line and temporarily committed to the custody of a charitable society, does not render it a citizen. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257, CITIZENSHIP. 69:585 Federal jurisdiction based on diversity Damages for property taken for government use, see Damages, 11, 12. Conclusiveness of decision of court of claims awarding pay to retired naval officer, see Judgment, 13. Discretion as to allowance of, see Mandamus, 4-6. Against receiver, see Receivers, 1, 2. Release by railroad of claims against government, see United States, 18. Claims allowable. United States under the Tucker Act of Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278, 69: 643 6. A subcontractor for government supplies who surrenders his contract on fraudulent misrepresentations by the contractor that he had been compelled, on cancelation of his contract by the government, to settle at less than the contract price, cannot recover from the government under the Dent Act, the amount which it exacts as repayment from the contractor upon learning of the fraud, where there is no agreement between him and the government officer, or performance or expenditure made, or obligation incurred by him, or presentation of the claim, as required by the provisions of that act. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 278, 69: 643 war claims. 7. No claim can be enforced against the United States upon an award by contracting officers of the government for losses caused by cancelation of a contract, which is not to become binding until approved by the Board of Contract Review, if it is never so approved. Kunhardt v. United States, 266 U. S. 537, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 158, 69: 428 1. In the absence of authority to take, an intentional taking of a business by the 8. No recovery can be had for loss ocgovernment will not support an action for compensation under the Tucker Act. Mit-casioned by notice of requisition by the chell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. government of cotton linters which were 69: 644 afterwards released, as upon an implied conCt. Rep. 293, tract, under § 10 of the Lever Act, of August 10, 1917, chap. 53, since the proceedings un 2. There can be no recovery under the Tucker Act of March 3, 1887, chap. 359, for the destruction of business located on prop erty taken by right of eminent domain, where the intention to take the business was lacking. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 69: 644 3. The provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3477, rendering void all transfers and assignments of claims against the United States, applies only to voluntary assign ments, and does not affect transfers under a judicial sale. Western P. R. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503, 69: 951 4. No recovery can be had against the der that section are not based on contract. United States Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, 69: 399 9. No recovery can be had under the provisions of § 145 of the Judicial Code for loss caused by withholding from sale cotton linters, after receipt from the government of notice of their requisition, until they were released, when the price had fallen, since the contract was not reduced to writing and signed, as required by U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3744. United States Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182. 63: 300 1219 69: 947 10. The provision of the Dent Act of subsequently. Southern P. Co. v. United March 2, 1919, chap. 94, relating to the States, 268 U. S. 263, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500, settlement of claims under war contracts, giving jurisdiction to the court of claims, precludes resort to the provision in 20, §ment transportation at land-grant rates, and 24, of the Judicial Code, giving the district courts jurisdiction of claims against the United States for less than $10,000, and founded upon act of Congress or contract, express or implied. Nassau Smelting & Ref. Works v. United States, 266 U. S. 101, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, 69: 190 11. The owner of cotton linters, who, after notification that they were requisitioned by the government, withheld them from sale until after the government released its claim, when their value was much less than it was when the notice was given, cannot recover the loss from the government under the Dent Act of March 2, 1919, chap. 94, since there was no agreement performed in whole or in part, and no expenditure made or obligation incurred on the faith of the same. United States Bedding Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 491, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 182, Abandonment; waiver; defenses. 69: 399 12. One who, in order to settle a dispute under a government contract, agrees to abandon and settle all claims growing out of the contract if the government will revise its suspension order so as to accept deliveries made, can recover no damages for termination of the contract with respect to the undelivered portion, notwithstanding the fact that, after the agreement is reached, the claimant attempts to reserve its right to recover all profits which it could have made had it been permitted to complete the contract. Savage Arms Corp. v. United States, 266 U. S. 217, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30, 69: 253 13. The indorsement upon a land-grant form of vouchers presented for government transportation, of a statement that the claimant does not waive its right to full tariff rates, and payment of any less amount will be accepted as part payment only for the services performed, is sufficient to notify the accounting officers of the government that payment of land-grant rates is not accepted as final settlement of the claims, and will prevent acceptance of the rates claimed from barring recovery for the full rates. Western P. R. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503, 69: 951 14. Presentation of claims for govern ment transportation on land-grant vouchers does not constitute a waiver of a claim for full tariff rates, if it is accompanied by a protest that full rates are due: and it was unnecessary to present the claims for full compensation in the first instance. Southern P. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 263, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500, 69: 947 15. The indorsement of protests upon part of the land-grant forms of vouchers for claims for government transportation is not suflicient to preserve the right to recover full tariff rates upon vouchers not so indorsed, which are presented contemporaneously or 16. The presentation of bills for governacceptance of the amount claimed without protest or objection, establishes an acquiescence on the part of the claimant which operates as a discharge of the claims for full tariff rates. Southern P. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 263, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500, 69: 947 17. Acquiescence by the claimant in the payment by the government of a smaller amount than is due will, ordinarily, effect a discharge of the claim. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 169, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472, 69: 899 18. Acquiescence in the allowance by the government of less than is due on a claim may be established by showing conduct before payment which may lead the government to believe that the amount allowed will be received in full satisfaction of the claim, or by showing conduct after payment which may lead the government to believe that the amount received is accepted in full satisfaction of the claim. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 169, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 472, 69: 899 19. The mere fact that compensation for the taking of land needed by the government for a proving ground was fixed and accepted does not bar a recovery for loss occasioned by the destruction of the business located on the property. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 293, 69: 644 A. 22. The court of claims has jurisdiction of a claim by the owner of a leasehold in a dock for compensation when the dock is taken by the government for public use. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 69: 216 149, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 38, Payment. 23. An allowance by the court of claims, followed by settlement by the government, of a claim in which several items were included, discharges, under § 178 of the Judicial Code, included items, although they are not mentioned as among the component parts making up the amount allowed, if the CLASSIFICATION. exact compensation therefor, and, if the on interstate comDuke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, Michigan Public Utilities Co. v. 69: 445 What is interstate or foreign commerce. 3. Transportation between two points in the same state over a route partly within commerce. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243, 69: 683 For rate-making purposes, see Carriers, and partly without the state is interstate 3, 4. CLOUD ON TITLE. Federal jurisdiction of suit to quiet Right of buyer of coal to inspect at Passing of title on sale of, to govern- COCAINE. for shipment to markets in other states con- 5. The operation of a pipe line across another is interstate commerce, which is a state to carry crude oil from one state to beyond the power of the state to tax. Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 69: 439 State and Federal power generally. right to carry on interstate commerce with 6. A state has no power to fetter the tions or regulations which are unnecessary, in its borders by the imposition of condisonable and suitable for the proper exercise and pass beyond the bounds of what is reaMichigan Public Utilities Co. v. Duke. 266 of its powers in the field that belongs to it. U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, Congressional inaction. 69: 445 7. In matters affecting interstate and Liability for administering to addict, portance is imminent and direct, the silence foreign commerce, where the national imsee Food and Drugs, 2. COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX. COLLATERAL SECURITY. Finality of decree confirming sale of COLLISION. Loss of vessel by, see Damages, 6-8. COMBINATIONS. In restraint of trade, see Monopoly. COMITY. Breach of comity by one court as affecting jurisdiction of other court, see Courts, 48. COMMERCE. of Congress does not authorize action by the 8. In the absence of legislation by Con- 9. There can be no divided authority over interstate commerce, and the acts of Congress on that subject are supreme and 267 U. S. 404, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243, conclusive. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Stroud, 69: 683 10. The authority of the United States to remove obstructions to interstate and for Necessity that orders for cars be in eign commerce is superior to that of the writing, see Carriers, 7. 1. The protection against the imposition of burdens upon interstate commerce is practical and substantial, and extends to whatever is necessary to the complete enjoy ment of the right protected. Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. Ozark Pipe Rep. 184, 69: 439 2. A state which, at its own expense, furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in interstate commerce, may 69 L. ed. states to provide for the welfare or necessi- act in a manner affecting interstate or for- sible frauds does not justify state legislation which really interferes with the free flow of interstate commerce. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525, 69: 982 13. Congress may regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345, 69: 699 Control of navigable waters and navigation. See also supra, 8. 14. The power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states extends to the authorization of a railroad bridge with draws over a navigable bay within a state. Newark v. Central R. Co. 267 U. S. 377, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 328, 69: 666 Regulating carriage and transportation. 19. A state cannot prohibit the use on an interstate highway of auto vehicles by common carriers for hire, over regular routes, without securing a certificate from a public official declaring that public convenience and necessity require such operation. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 69: 623 20. A state cannot forbid the use on its highways of motor vehicles operated by common carriers for hire, over regular routes, in interstate commerce, merely because existing lines of transportation would be prejudiced thereby. George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326, 69: 627 transportation of stolen automobiles. 21. Congress has power to punish interstate transportation of a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345, 69: 699 22. Congress has power to punish the receiving, concealing, storing, bartering, selling, or disposing of a motor vehicle transported in interstate commerce with knowledge that it has been stolen. Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 45 Sun. Ct. Rep. 345, 69: 699 15. The imposition by the state upon one engaged in transporting merchandise for a single manufacturer from his plant to a destination in another state, of the duty to use his equipment as a common carrier, and preventing him from using it exclusively to license taxes on pipe lines. perform his contracts, and imposing upon 23. That a foreign corporation engaged him all the duties and strict liability of a in transporting crude petroleum by a pipe common carrier, and the obligation of fur-line across a state applies for and receives nishing an indemnity bond, is an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. Michigan Public Utilities Co. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, 69: 445 16. Requiring a foreign railroad company to submit to jurisdiction of the courts of a state in which it maintains no office, upon garnishment of traffic balances due it by local roads, in suit by a resident of such state for negligence with respect to goods deliverable there, and which negli gence occurred there, does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. R. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47, 69: 247 17. A provision in a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing through freight rates between a point in one state and points in another state, under authority of the second Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, permitting limitation of liability based on rates for declared value for local transportation between points in the latter state, is effective so far as the transportation occurs on the interstate line, as against a provision in a statute of the state, forbidding limitation of the carrier's common-law liability. Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U. S. 427, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, 69: 696 -use of motor vehicles on interstate highway. 18. A state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce. Michigan Public Utilities Co. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, 69: 445 a license from the state to do business within its limits, which empowers it to exercise the power of eminent domain, does not render it subject to the payment of an annual franchise tax. Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 69: 439 24. The maintenance by a foreign corporation operating a pipe line within a state in interstate commerce, of telephone and telegraph lines exclusively in furtherance of its interstate business, does not render it subject to payment of an annual license fee to the state. Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 69: 439 25. The maintenance by a foreign corporation operating a pipe line to carry crude oil in interstate commerce across a state, of an office within its limits, where its accounts are kept, and from which it purchases supplies, employs labor, and enters into contracts, and of pumping stations to accelerate the passage of oil, and of automobiles and other property used exclusively in the prosecution of its interstate business, does not render it subject to pay ments of an annual license tax to the state. Ozark Pipe Line v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555. 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 69: 439 - license taxes on motor vehicles. 26. A reasonable, graduated license fee imposed by a state on motor vehicles used in interstate commerce does not constitute a direct burden on such commerce. Michigan Public Utilities Co. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 191, 69: 445 Regulating sales. 27. The right to buy grain for shipment and to ship it in interstate commerce can |