69: 1003 17. In determining the fair average value of the capital stock of a corporation for the purpose of assessing the excise tax under the Revenue Act of 1918 [February 24, 1919, chap. 18], the fair net value of the assets of the corporation is a relevant fact to be considered, and the value is not confined to the fair average value of the aggregate shares of its stock. Ray Consol. Copper Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 373, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, 69: 1003 Estate tax. 267 U. S. 442, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 348, 69: 703, take into consideration every relevant fact, 10. A domestic corporation engaged in Ray Consol. Copper Co. v. United States, manufacture is not absolved by the due 268 U. S. 373, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, process clause of the Federal Constitution from liability to an income tax on the profits of the business by the fact that no such tax is imposed upon foreign corporations engaged in the same character of business. Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 442, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 135, 69: 703 11. A domestic corporation engaged in the business of buying goods in this country and selling them in foreign countries is not absolved by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution from liability to an income tax on the profits of the business by the fact that no tax is imposed upon foreign corporations engaged in the same character of business. National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U. S. 373, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 133, 69: 331 Equal protection of law as to, see Constitutional Law, 12. Taxes by state on inheritance, see Taxes, 17-23. 18. The provision of the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919, chap. 18, including in the estate of a deceased person subject to tax, insurance under policies taken out by deceased upon his own life does not apply to policies the right to the proceeds of which had vested in other beneficiaries before the passage of the statute. Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487, 69: 934 12. Subsidies of lands, physical property, and money paid by the government of Cuba for the construction of railroads on that island, in consideration of which the roads were, inter alia, to reduce certain tariffs, were not income of the roads, subject to taxation under the 16th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. 268 U. S. 628, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 614, 69: 1124 13. Money expended by a railroad company for improving a wharf and terminating private interests therein, under the provisions of a long-term lease, is not rental or other payment required to be made as a condition to continued use or possession of the property within the meaning of that phrase in § 12 (a) of the Revenue Act of 20. Certificates representing the interSeptember 8, 1916, chap. 463, allowing de-ests of subscribers to a railroad equipment ductions from gross income in the assess-trust, which are to be paid out of rentals ment of income taxes against corporations. for the equipment, are corporate securities Duffy v. Central R. Co. 268 U. S. 55, 45 within the meaning of the Act of February Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, 69: 846 24, 1919, chap. 18, imposing a stamp tax 19. Neither the state nor the United States, in determining the amount of tax to be imposed upon the transfer of a decedent's estate, is under any constitutional obligation to make deductions on account of the tax of the other. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 603, Stamp tax. 206, Criminal prosecutions. 69: 1058 69: 494 14. Allowances for annual depreciation on corporate securities. Lederer v. Fidelmay be made in assessing income taxity Trust Co. 267 U. S. 17, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. against a railroad lessee which is required to make improvements which will be consumed long before the expiration of the lease. Duffy v. Central R. Co. 268 U. S. 55, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, 69: 846 15. In assessing an income tax upon a railroad lessee whose lease requires the making of improvements which will outlast the term, deductions of proportional annual allowances for exhaustion may be made. Duffy v. Central R. Co. 268 U. S. 55, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, 69: 846 Special tax on corporations doing busi ness. 16. The Revenue Act of 1918 [February 24, 1919, chap. 18], imposing a tax upon corporations with respect to doing business, of $1 for each $1,000 of so much of the fair average value of its capital stock as is in excess of $5,000, means the entire potentiality of the corporation to profit by the exercise of its corporate franchise, to be determined by the sound judgment and discretion of the Internal Revenue Commissioner, subject only to the obligation to 21. The relations of a manager of a corporation which alone, under the state laws, can secure a license to conduct a boxing match, to the corporation, are not conclusive upon his relations to the United States with respect to accounting for the revenue tax on the fees collected for admissions to the entertainments, and therefore he may be convicted for failure to account for such tax, if it is found that the corporation was organized merely to enable him to give the exhibitions and collect the fees. United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 220, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496, Recovery back of taxes paid. 69: 925 22. Under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 3386, as amended, which allows a drawback for taxes paid on tobacco by suitable stamps "affixed before removal," "equal in amount to the value of the stamps found to have been so aflixed," the drawback should include the amount paid under the Act of February 24, 1919, chap. 18, as a floor tax on goods al 69: 1020 ready removed from the factory, but sub- 4. The pendency of a reargument besequently exported, in addition to the value fore a public service commission of an apof the stamps attached and canceled before plication for modification of a rate for pubremoval, where the practice is to treat ad-lic service, which has been in force for ditional tax payments on tobacco which has eight years, and is confiscatory, does not not left the factory as adding to the value prevent the maintenance of a suit in the of the stamps already affixed, if that fiction Federal court to enjoin further enforceis necessary to secure the rebate. United ment of the confiscatory rate, on the theory States v. P. Lorillard Co. 267 U. S. 471, 45 that the rate-making process is not comSup. Ct. Rep. 359, 69: 741 pleted, and the complainant has not ex23. A protest is not necessary when pay-hausted its legal remedies in the state triing a tax, to secure a right to relate if the Lunals. Banton v. Belt Line R. Corp. 268 property is subsequently exported, where U. S. 413, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 534, the event creating the right to rebate had Jurisdiction and powers. not come to pass at time of payment. UnitJurisdiction and power of Interstate ed States v. P. Lorillard Co. 267 U. S. 471, Commerce Commission, see Inter45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 359, 69: 741 state Commerce Commission, 5-8. 5. That 85 per cent of the business done on a railroad switch track is interstate does not bring the question of discontinuance of the service within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission rather than that of a state commission, in view of the provision of the Transportation Act that the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall not extend to the construction of industrial or side tracks. Western & A. R. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, INTERPRETATION. Of Federal Constitution, see Constitu- Of statute, see Statutes, 7-20. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS- Delegation of powers to, see Consti tutional Law, 7. Resort to courts before or pending pro- 69: 150 2. A railroad company cannot apply to the courts for relief from an order of a state commission requiring continuance of switch-track service on the ground that it effects undue discrimination in interstate commerce until it has invoked the investigation and decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon the concrete facts in a proper manner. Western & A. R. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 267 U. S. 493, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409, 69: 753 3. An action does not lie to annul a valuation of railroad property by the Interstate Commerce Commission where the same grounds of protest relied on in the action are pending before the Commission, and there is nothing to indicate that the Commission wilfully disregarded the law, or failed to proceed in an orderly manner, or that it will not pass upon all the matters set up in the protest. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, 266 U. S. 438, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153. 69: 369 69: 753 6. A railroad terminal association and its subsidiaries handling freight which enters a city are common carriers by railroad, subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Terminal R. Asso. v. United States, 266 U. S. 17, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 5, 69: 150 7. Two of three railroads serving a particular town, which accord free switching service to plants connected with either by switches within a limited zone, the effect of which is to give such plants an unfair advantage over others not so connected, may be required by the Interstate Commerce Commission to desist from such discrimination. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 266 U. S. 191, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43, 69: 243 8. Under the provisions of the Act of Congress of February 4, 1887, chap. 104, to regulate commerce, that it shall apply to any common carrier engaged in the transportation of passengers or property by railroad, the Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction to prevent unjust discrimination by interurban electric railroads against interstate commerce, although such railroads are not engaged in general transportation of freight in addition to their passenger and express business; especially in view of later congressional legislation dealing with the jurisdiction of the Commission over such rates. United States v. Hubbard, 266 U. S. 474, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, Findings by. 69: 389 9. The tentative valuation of railroad property by the Interstate Commerce Commission, provided for by the Interstate Commerce Acts, is no more than an ex parte appraisement, without probative effect. Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, | JAPANESE. 266 U. S. 438, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153, 69: 369 INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 57. Officer's liability for seizure of, without warrant, see Officers, 2. Assumption on demurrer to petition to prevent destruction of, see Pleading, 9. Search for, and seizure of, see Search and Seizure. Constitutionality of statutes. 1. The state has the power to subject those members of society who might indulge in the use of intoxicating liquor without injury to themselves, to a deprivation of access to liquor in order to remove tempta tion from those whom its use would demor- -effect of constitutional prohibition. 2. Congress has power, under the provisions of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, to regulate the manufacture and distribution of completely denatured alcohol, although it is not fit for beverage purposes. Selzman v. United States, 268 U. S. 466, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574, 69: 1054 3. The power of the Federal government, granted by the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, to enforce the prohibition of the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquors, carries with it power to enact any legislative measures reasonably adapted to promote that purpose. Selzman v. United States, 268 U. S. 466, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574, 69: 1054 Possession. 4. A government permit to manufacture wine for nonbeverage purposes does not authorize possession of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, and affords no protection to one possessing such liquors with intent to use them in violation of the National Prohibition Act of October 28, 1919, chap. 85. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, INVENTORY. 69: 1032 Of property of foreign corporation in imposing franchise tax, see Taxes, 6. IRRIGATION PROJECT. Immigration of, see Aliens, 7-9. JOINT CREDITORS AND DEBTORS. 1. In case of the settlement by the owner of a steamship lost by negligence of another vessel, and the Director General of Railroads, in whose possession the lost vessel was, of claims against the Director General, including others than the one in question, without any agreement as to the amount allowed for loss of the vessel, the rule that settlement with one joint tortfeasor precludes recovery from another joint tort-feasor does not apply. Standard Oil Co. v. Southern P. Co. 268 U. S. 146, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465, 69: 890 2. The Director General of Railroads, in possession of the vessel of a corporation which is lost through negligence of himself and another vessel, and the owner of the lost vessel, may adjust their interests under the contract by which he has possession without affecting the liability of the other Southern P. Co. 268 U. S. 146, 45 Sup. Ct. vessel for the loss. Standard Oil Co. v. Rep. 465, JUDGES. 69: 890 JUDGMENT. On appeal, see Appeal and Error, X. Conclusiveness and effect. 1. A judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding can be regarded as conclusive upon the merits, only where the case presented is one which calls for a final determination of the ultimate facts and the law, and not Public supply of water for purpose of, where the proceeding is preliminary and see Waters, 9-12. JAPAN. ancillary to a trial upon the merits. Morse Rights conferred on subjects of, by-judgment of dismissal. treaty with United States, Treaties, 1. rant over the objection that the warrant issued without probable cause is res judicata in a subsequent prosecution against the one from whose premises the property was taken, for its illegal possession. Steele v. United States, No. 2, 267 U. S. 505, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 417, 69: 761 10. The discharge by a Federal court sitting in one state, of one arrested under a commissioner's warrant for removal to another district for trial upon an indictment there found, is not conclusive upon the validity of his arrest under a bench warrant issued by the court of the latter district when he was found within its jurisdiction. Morse v. United States, 267 U. S. 80, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, 69: 522 11. The affirmance by the circuit court of appeals of a decree directing the return to a trustee in bankruptcy of money alleged to have been paid by the bankrupt as a voidable preference, and denial by the Supreme Court of the United States of a petition for writ of certiorari to review the affirmance, is a final adjudication which will prevent the raising of the same questions upon an appeal from an adjudication of contempt for refusal to comply with the order. Farmers & M. Nat. Bank v. Wilkinson, 266 U. S. 503, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 144, 69: 408 4. The principle of res judicata does not apply to points which come into consideration only collaterally or incidentally. Norton v. Larney, 266 U. S. 511, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 145, 69: 413 5. The principle of res judicata is applicable only to the point adjudged, and not to points only collaterally under consideration, or incidentally under cognizance, or only to be inferred by arguing from the decree. North Carolina R. Co. v. Story, 268 U. S. 288, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531, 69: 959 6. A judgment affirming the denial of an injunction to prevent a tax collector from assessing property according to an award of arbitrators, two of the four judges proceeding on the theory that the statute 12. After affirmance by the circuit court providing for arbitration had been repealed, of appeals of a decree affirming an order and therefore the assessment by the col- of a referee in bankruptcy, requiring reslector could be enforced, and the other toration of an alleged preferential payment judges proceeding on the theory that the by a summary order, the power of the disprovision for arbitration had not been re-trict court to punish for contempt for repealed, and that the state had not put itself in a position to object to the assessment of the arbitrators, is not binding upon the question of the validity of the award. Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 69: 745 7. Denial of an interlocutory injunction against proceedings by an arbitration board upon a tax assessment is not res judicata upon the question whether or not the statute providing for such board had been repealed by a later statute which question was not before or considered by the court. Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 69: 745 8. A judgment of a state court in favor of plaintiff in an action upon a judgment against a railroad company for an injury occurring while the road was under Federal control is not res judicata as to the right to an execution upon such judgment, which will prevent the granting of an injunction against its issuance, because of § 206 (g) of the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, chap. 91, that no execution or process shall be levied upon the property of any carrier where the cause of action on account of which the judgment was obtained grew out of the possession, use, control, or operation of the railroad by the President, under Federal control. North Carolina R. Co. v. Story, 268 U. S. 288, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531, 69: 959 fusal to obey the order cannot be chal- 13. A decision of the court of claims awarding pay to a retired naval officer on the theory that his service during the Civil War in the United States Naval Academy was service during the Civil War, within the meaning of the statute fixing compensation in such cases, is res judicata of claims for further instalments under the same act. United States v. Moser, 266 U. S. 236, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66, 69: 262 14. The discharge by a United States commissioner in a habeas corpus proceeding, of one in custody for removal to another district for trial, is not a bar to a proceeding before a United States district judge to secure such removal. United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U. S. 390, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 516, 69: 1010 Enforcement of. 69: 205 Effect of affirming judgment to enforce former judgment, see ante, 8. 9. Refusal of the court to direct a re- 16. A judgment against a railroad comturn of property seized under a search war-pany for an injury occurring while the road Delaware & Hudson Co. v. United States, | JAPANESE. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. 69: 369 Due process in statute for destruction Statute making unlawful possession of 57. Officer's liability for seizure of, with- Search for, and seizure of, see Search Constitutionality of statutes. 1. The state has the power to subject Immigration of, see Aliens, 7-9. JOINT CREDITORS AND DEBTORS. 1. In case of the settlement by the 69: 890 2. The Director General of Railroads, vessel for the loss. Standard Oil Co. v. JUDGES. 2. Congress has power, under the pro- 3. The power of the Federal govern- 4. A government permit to manufac- INVENTORY. 69: 1032 Of property of foreign corporation in 6. IRRIGATION PROJECT. 69: 890 Income tax on salary of, see Internal See also Contempt, 1, 5-9. Special or substitute judge. 1. The scheme of committing acts of 2. A judge called upon to act in a JUDGMENT. 69: 767 On appeal, see Appeal and Error, X. Conclusiveness and effect. 1. A judgment in a habeas corpus pro- Public supply of water for purpose of, where the proceeding is preliminary and JAPAN. Rights conferred on subjects of, |