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- necessity of.

United States, 268 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. | warrant may issue under the Federal PreRep. 546, 69: 1032 hibition Act of October 28, 1919, chap. 85, 9. A search warrant authorizing the is not confined to such officer in the constisearch of a building used as a garage, lo- tutional sense, and therefore the warrant cated on the first floor of the building con- may be executed by a general prohibition taining two street numbers, and "any build-agent, who is a mere appointee of the Coming or rooms used in connection with said missioner of Internal Revenue. Steele v. garge," will justify the search of rooms United States, No. 2, 267 U. S. 505, 45 Sup. on the upper floors of the building, used Ct. Rep. 417, 69: 761 for storage purposes, and connected with the garage by elevator. Steele v. United States, No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414, 69: 757 10. A description for a search warrant of a place consisting of a building with two street numbers, the ground floor of which is used as a garage, and the upper floors for storage purposes, as a garage and for business purposes, specifying one of the street numbers, is sufficient if the entire building is served by one elevator, the rooms above both numbers having access to it. Steele v. United States, No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414, 69: 757

- probable cause for.

11. Sufficient probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists where an experienced man sees cases labeled "Whisky" being unloaded from a dray into a building for the storage of whisky in which, according to the official records, no permit exists. Steele v. United States No. 1, 267 U. S. 498, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 414, 69: 757 12. If the apparent facts set out in an affidavit for a search warrant are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a search warrant. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, 69: 1032 13. Probable cause for the search of property operated under government license for the manufacture of wine for nonbeverage purposes, for liquors possessed with intent to violate the National Prohibition Act of October 28, 1919, chap. 85, is shown by an affidavit that affiant saw the sale by members of the family of the owner of the suspected premises without inquiry as to the right to purchase, on premises adjoining those licensed, of wine containing more than of 1 per cent of alcohol, to persons having no permit to purchase it, and that the wine was apparently procured by the salesmen from the licensed premises. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, 69: 1032

14. If probable cause is shown for the search of premises upon which wine may be manufactured under government license for nonbeverage purposes, for intoxicating liquor possessed on such premises with intent to violate the National Prohibition Act of October 28, 1919, chap. 85, the war rant for search of the premises and seizure of the liquors may be lawfully issued. Dum bra v. United States, 208 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546,

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16. The search, without warrant, of an automobile engaged in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor, is not prohibited by the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280,

69: 543

17. If a search and seizure without warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon the belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which, by law, is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280,

69: 543

18. Travelers crossing an international boundary may be stopped and their vehicle searched without warrant, because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering a country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup: Ct. Rep. 280, 69: 543

19. Where the securing of a warrant before seizure of property being transported on a highway is reasonably practicable, it must be secured, and, when properly supported by affidavits and issued after judicial approval, it protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 69: 543

20. The seizure, without warrant, of an automobile for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor, is legal if the seizing officer has reasonable or probable cause for belief that there is contraband liquor therein, which is being illegally transported. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280, 69: 543

21. The right to search for and seize, without warrant, intoxicating liquor being transported along a public highway, does not depend upon the right to arrest the one in charge of it. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280,

69: 543

22. Officers engaged in patrolling for seizure of contraband liquor a highway along which liquor is transported may seize and search, without warrant, an automobile of persons whom they know, or have convincing evidence to make them believe, are plying the unlawful trade of transporting and selling such liquor, and which is the same car which they used in trying to fill an order for liquor to the officers themselves a short time before, and is, at the time, 15. The "civil officer" to whom a search coming from known sources of liquor sup

who may execute. See also ante, 8.

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SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

Authority of, to require guardian of Indian to invest or dispose of funds paid to him, see Indians, 2. Mandatory injunction to compel allotment by, of Indian lands, see Indians, 3.

As necessary party to mandatory in-
junction to compel payment to In-
dian, see Injunction, 17.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.
Court's power to review direction to, by
Secretary of State, see Courts, 11.

SECRETARY OF WAR.
Act of Congress authorizing sale of war
supplies by, as requiring written
contract, see United States, 12.
Authority of, essential to change in
any navigable waters of United
States, see Waters, 3.

SECRET SOCIETIES.

Jurisdictional amount of suit in Fed

eral court to enjoin prosecution of claims for expenses in attending sovereign camp, see Courts, 31. Jurisdiction of action to enjoin prose

cution of claims against it brought
under conspiracy, see Courts, 43.

SECURITY.

SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.
Counterclaim against United States in

action for injury to vessel, see Ad-
miralty, 6.

Right of bank to set off claim against bank deposit, see Bankruptcy, 17. Bank's right of set-off against special deposit, see Banks, 5.

Mutuality.

1. Where, under a contract between the government and its contractor, the government undertakes to advance money for construction of a plant, which shall be kept in a special deposit in bank and any unused balance returned to the government, the bank cannot, with knowledge of such agreement, set off against balances in such account its own claims against the contractor. United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp. 267 U. S. 387, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 338, 69: 672 Effect of insolvency.

2. A surety which has satisfied the liability of an insolvent bank upon a deposit account, and become subrogated to the rights of the depositor, cannot set off its claim thereunder upon its liability as surety for the president of the bank, in an action by its receiver to enforce such liability because of fraud of the president, which rendered the bank insolvent. United States 234, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 489, Fidelity & G. Co. v. Wooldridge, 268 U. S. 69: 932

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New trial on appeal in admiralty for
loss of government owned vessel,
see Appeal and Error, 53.
Liability of Director General for neg-
ligent operation of vessel, see Car-
riers, 11, 13.

Jurisdiction of suit to enjoin action at
law for death of seaman, see
Courts, 44.

Repeal of statute permitting limitation of shipowner's liability by statute giving right of action at law for death of seaman, see Statutes, 23. Liability for rent under charter party. 1. A charter by the government of tugs

Fraud in transferring property as, see at a specified price for each and every day

Fraudulent Conveyances.

SEIZURE.

See Search and Seizure.

SELF-CRIMINATION.

of the charter period, the owner to furnish everything except coal and water, amounts to a demise of the tugs to the government, so that it is liable for the per diem compensation even while the use of the tugs is

Privilege of witnesses against, see Wit- not available because of sinking and time

nesses, 2-5.

SERVANT.

See Master and Servant.

SERVICE.

consumed in raising, or because of shortage
in crew, or other lack of condition to per-
form service, or too long time consumed in
taking on supplies. United States v. Cor-
nell Steamboat Co. 267 U. S. 281, 45 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 239,
69: 613

Process, jurisdiction obtained by, see Receiving and carrying goods.
Courts, 39.
2. The Harter Act of February 13, 1893,

requiring the issuance of bills of lading by | STATE HIGHWAYS.

vessel carriers, showing, inter alia, the ap-
parent order and condition of the property
received, and imposing a penalty on agent,
owner, or master of vessel guilty of viola-
tion of its provisions, does not make a bill
of lading without notation affirmatively rep-
resent good order and condition of the ship-
ment. Austin Nichols & Co. v. The Isla De
Panay, 267 U. S. 260, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269,
69: 603
BOARD EMERGENCY
FLEET CORPORATION.
Effect of stipulation by, see United
States, 15.

SHIPPING

SILK.

Placing of embargo by railroad admin-
istration on shipment of silk as
violation of government's contract
to ship silk, see United States, 21.

SITUS.
Of property for tax purposes, see Tax-
es, 8, 9, 20-23.

SOCIALISTS.

Finding by jury in action against, see
Anarchy.

SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' RELIEF
ACT.

Effect of, on foreclosure of mortgage, see
Moratorium, 1, 2.

SPECIAL APPEARANCE.
See Appearance, 2.

SPECIAL DEPOSIT.

Bank's right of set-off against special
deposit, see Banks, 3-5.

Bank's right to set-off, see Set-Off and
Counterclaim, 1.

SPECIAL TAX.

Applying for certificate to operate mo

STATES.

tor vehicles on, as preventing attack on statute requiring certificate, see Statutes, 4.

Boundary of, see Boundaries.
Powers as to interstate commerce, see
Commerce, 6.

Conflicting state and Federal regulation
of commerce, see Commerce, 9-13.
Power of state to regulate use of motor
vehicles on interstate highway, see
Commerce, 18-20.

Court's power to declare unconstitution-
al state regulation in interest of
public safety and welfare, see
Courts, 8.

Estoppel to exercise police power, see
Estoppel, 2.

Power to prohibit use of intoxicating

liquor, see Intoxicating Liquors, 1. Right to exact license for oil production from property of United States, see License, 2. Taxation by, on privilege of taking property by devise or descent, see Taxes, 17-23.

Relation to national government.

Supremacy of, over states, see United
States, 1.

Relative rights in waters, see Waters,
1-3.

1. The powers reserved by the Federal Constitution to the states are not infringed by designating the order or purpose for which coal may be shipped in interstate commerce in case of emergency. Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34,

69: 202

2. Any provision of an act of Congress ostensibly enacted under power granted by On corporations doing business, see In- the Constitution, not naturally or reasonternal Revenue, 16, 17.

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Appellate jurisdiction of Federal Su-
preme Court over, see Appeal and
Error, III. a, 5.
Conflicting, concurrent, and exclusive
jurisdiction of, see Courts, III.
Federal courts following decisions of,
see Courts, 51–55.

ably adapted to the effective exercise of such power, but solely to the achievement served to the states, is invalid, and canof something plainly within the power renot be enforced. Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, 69: 819

3. An act of Congress establishing a national park within a state will not be construed to curtail the jurisdiction or rights of the state over the highway within the limits of the park without an act of cession from the state and an acceptance by the national government. Colorado V. Toll, 268 U. S. 228, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 505, 69: 927

Admission of.

Effect of former laws and rights, see
Boundaries, 1.

4. A territory, upon admission into the Union as a state, cannot disavow the recognition by the United States government of one of its boundaries prior to the time of its admission. New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U. S. 30, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 69: 499

5. The right of a state, upon its admission into the Union, to rely upon its estab

69: 202

lished boundary line, cannot be impaired, Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 45 by subsequent action on the part of the Sup. Ct. Rep. 34, United States. New Mexico v. Colorado, Invalid in part. 267 U. S. 30, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 202, 69: 499

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
See Limitation of Actions.

STATUTES.

:

Constitutionality of, see Constitutional Law.

Review of, by courts, see Courts, 5-9. Federal courts following state decisions construing, see Courts, 51-55. Presumptions as to, see Evidence, 5, 6. Injunction against criminal proceedings under unconstitutional statute, see Injunction, 5, 6. Interruption or suspension of statute,

see Limitation of Actions, 4, 5. Duty to conform to provisions of statute, see Procedure, 1.

Validity generally.

Constitutionality of statutes generally, see Constitutional Law.

6. The provisions of a statute requir ing a license to engage in the business of reselling tickets to places of amusement, and fixing the resale price, are severable, so that a conviction for engaging in such business without a license may be sustained, although the provision fixing the resale price may be found to be invalid. Weller v. New York, 268 U. S. 319, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 69: 978

Construction generally.

Meaning of term "citizen or subject" in act dealing with custody of enemy property, see War, 1.

7. A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 446, 69: 819

8. The Act of Congress of March 2, 1827, chap. 51, granting land to Illinois 1. The invalidity of the provision of for the purpose of uniting the waters of the Lever Act of August 10, 1917, chap. 53, the Illinois river with those of Lake Michmaking it unlawful for any person to make igan, vested no irrevocable discretion in an unjust or unreasonable charge in deal- the state with regard to the amount of ing with any necessaries, because of indefi- water to be withdrawn from the lake. Saniniteness, obtains in actions for breach of tary District of Chicago v. United States, contract, defended on the ground that the 266 U. S. 405, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176, 69: 352 contract violates such provision. A. B. 9. The provision in the Oklahoma EnSmall Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. abling Act of June 16, 1906, chap. 3335, 267 U. S. 233, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295, 69: 589 that, where any lands granted to the state 2. A statute providing punishment for are valuable for minerals, they shall not one who, with intent to defraud, sells any be sold before a specified date, but may be meat and falsely represents the same to be leased upon royalty, providing that the kosher, or as having been prepared under mining lessee shall reimburse the agriculthe orthodox Hebrew religious require- tural lessee for damage done by the minments, is not so indefinite and uncertain asing operations, applies not merely to lands to render it unconstitutional for want of known to be mineral at the time of its any ascertainable standard of guilt. Hy- passage, but to those that might thereaftgrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. er be found to be valuable for such pur497, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, 69: 402 poses. Price v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. Who may assail validity. 267 U. S. 415, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312, 69: 689 Legislative intent.

3. One engaged in the business of selling kosher meat cannot enjoin the enforcement of a statute making it unlawful, with intent to defraud, to sell a preparation falsely represented to be kosher, because of fear of hazard of prosecution, due to the uncertainty of the statute, since liability depends upon specific intent to defraud. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141, 69: 402

10. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a rule of construction to be used as an aid in the ascertainment of the intention of the lawmakers, and not for the purpose of subverting such intention when ascertained. Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268 U. S. 45, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440,

69: 841

11. The court will not be prevented from giving effect to a legislative intention of which it is satisfied by a too rigid adherence to the very word and letter of the statute. Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, 69: 857

4. The mere fact that one wishing to operate motor vehicles for hire on an interstate highway applied to the state officials for a certificate, as required by a state statute, does not prevent his assailing the 12. Section 9 of the Trading with the statute as unconstitutional in case the cer- Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, chap. 106, tificate is denied. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 which gives a right of suit for debts owing U. S. 307, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 69: 623 by alien enemies, is highly remedial, and 5. One charged with violation of an should be liberally construed to effect the order of the Interstate Commerce Com- purpose of Congress, and to give a remedy mission as to order of purposes for which in all cases intended to be covered. Miller coal may be shipped in interstate commerce v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 45 Sup. Ct. in cases of emergency cannot avoid liability Rep. 73,

69: 265

on the ground that the statute discrimi- Interpretation of language. nates against certain ports of shipment. 13. The words of a statute are to be

21. Implied repeals of statutes are not favored. United States v. Noce, 268 U. S. 613, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610,

69: 1116

read in their natural and ordinary sense,, Repeal. giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity unless some strong reason to the contrary appears. Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22. A statute providing for arbitration 73, 69: 265 in case of a claim of excessive assessment Particular words and provisions. for taxation is repealed by a later statute Construction of statute restricting im- authorizing a petition in equity to test the migration, see Aliens, 2, 3. Construction of license tax statute, see License, 1.

14. In the construction of a statute the word "damaged" may be read "damage" if necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature. Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 | U. S. 85, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, 69: 857

Punctuation.

15. Punctuation is a minor, and not a controlling, element in the interpretation of a statute, and courts will disregard punctuation or repunctuate if necessary to give effect to what otherwise appears to be the purpose and true meaning of the statute. Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 437, 69: 857

Reference to other laws.

16. The Federal Boiler Inspection Act of February 17, 1911, chap. 103, was passed to promote the safety of employees, and is to be read and applied with the Federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, chap. 149. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 521, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 69: 419

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18. The general office of a proviso is to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify and restrain its generality, and prevent misinterpretation. United States v. Morrow, 266 U. S. 531, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 173, 69: 425

19. The proviso in chap. 176 of the Cummins Amendment of March 4, 1915, to

the Interstate Commerce Act of February
4. 1887, chap. 104, that "if the loss, dam-
age, or injury complained of was due to
delay or damage while being loaded or un-
loaded, or damaged in transit by careless-
ness or negligence, then no notice of claim
nor filing of claim shall be required as a
condition precedent to recovery," should be
read as though the word "damaged" was
"damage," and the comma omitted after
"unloaded," so that carelessness or negli-
gence is an element in every case of loss
where notice of claim cannot be required.
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U. S. 85, 45 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 437,
69: 857

Retrospective laws.

20. All statutes are to be construed prospectively unless the language is expressed to the contrary, or there is necessary implication to that effect. Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 266 U. S. 435, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143,

69: 367

question, and repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the later act. Bohler v. Callaway,.267 U. S. 479, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431,

69: 745

23. Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, chap. 250, giving an action at law, with right of trial by jury, in case of death of a seaman, does not repeal the statute permitting the limitation of liability of shipowners so far as it affects claims for compensation for such deaths. Re East River Towing Co. 266 U. S. 355, 45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114, 69: 324

STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS.
See Corporations, 2-4.

STOLEN PROPERTY.
Sufficiency of indictment for trans-
porting stolen automobile in inter-
state commerce, see Indictment and
Information, 1.

STONE, HARLAN FISKE.
Appointment of, as Associate Justice,
see Appendix, II. ante, p. 1173.

STREET RAILWAYS.
Due process in refusing permission to
abandon portion of track operated
at loss, see Constitutional Law, 20.
Due process in compelling operating
of property of, without just com-
pensation, see Constitutional Law,

24.

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Subrogating injured person to rights
of insured in case of insolvency,
see Bankruptcy, 8.

SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS.
Contracts by, see Corporations, 1.
See also Corporations, 5, 6.

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