Philosophy ever will be, with the principles and interests of correct morals and religion. The aspect of the times evidently demanded that the attempt should be made by somebody. There is no question that a Work of this kind, especially in connexion with the mental training of young persons, has for some time been greatly needed. But whether I have succeeded in meeting the reasonable expectations and wishes of the friends of literature, I must leave to others to decide. The reader will notice that the Work proceeds, after a brief discussion of the doctrine of Primary Truths, and a few other preparatory views, upon the basis of a threefold division of the mind, viz., the INTELLECT, the SENSIBILITIES, and the WILL. This general division, which, notwithstanding its obvious importance, has not generally been made prominent in philosophical writers, and has even been rejected by some, is strictly adhered to throughout. From this general division other subordinate arrangements and classifications, some of which are peculiar to the present Work, naturally and easily flow. And thus the reader will find the whole subject opening itself connectedly and symmetrically, and in such a manner as to present, in its completed outline, not merely a disjointed congeries of philosophical facts, but the regularity and beauty of a philosophical system. The general division of the Sensibilities is into the Natural and Moral. Under the head of the MORAL SENSIBILITIES, I have examined the subject of conscience at some length and in various points of view, and cannot but hope that some of the difficulties which have hitherto attended it have been removed; and that the whole subject is placed, to some extent, in a consistent and satisfactory light. In many other respects, particularly in the classification of the Emotions and the Desires, and their relation to each other, and in some of the doctrines which are contained in the volume on the Will, the reader will find some important views, which I suppose he will not be likely to find in other philosophical works. It has already been intimated, that the method of inquiry which is pursued is rather inductive than speculative. In other words, I have endeavoured in every case, where the nature of the inquiry admitted of it, to make well-ascertained facts the basis of the conclusions which have been adopted. Furthermore, in selecting such facts, it has been an object to take those which not only had relation to the matter under discussion, but which promised a degree of interest to the reader, particularly to young minds. Simplicity and uniformity of style have been aimed at, although, in a few instances, the statements of other writers, which conveyed important and well-ascertained views, have been admitted with only slight variations when it was thought they had been peculiarly happy in them. As I can truly say my object in writing has not been the honour and the rewards of authorship, to which I should consider myself but poorly qualified to aspire, but rather the good of my fellow-men, particularly those who are in a course of education, I did not feel at liberty to prejudice the general design by rejecting the facts, arguments, and, in a few cases, even the expressions of others. I now commend the Work to the acceptance of the public, in the belief that, so far as it is worthy of their acceptance, it will be sufficiently well received. And if it should prove otherwise, I do not know that I shall have occasion to regret the labour I have bestowed upon it. THOMAS C. UPHAM. Bowdoin College, May, 1840. A 2 CONTENTS. 1. Importance of preliminary statements in Mental Philosophy 10. No beginning or change of existence without a cause 11. Occasions of the origin of the primary truth of effects and causes CHAP. II-IMMATERIALITY OF THE MIND. 14. On the meaning of the terms material and immaterial. 15. Difference between mind and matter shown from language 16. Their different nature shown by their respective properties 17. The soul's immateriality indicated by the feeling of identity 18. The material doctrine makes a man a machine 19. No exact correspondence between the mental and bodily state 20. Evidence of this want of exact correspondence 21. Comparative state of the mind and body in dreaming 22. The great works of genius an evidence of immateriality 23. The doctrine of materiality inconsistent with future existence 24. Of belief, its degrees and its sources 25. Of suggestion, consciousness, and the senses, as grounds of belief 41 38 Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin 39. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes CHAP. III.-THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 56. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowledge 57. Of the connexion of the brain with sensation and perception 58. Order in which the senses are to be considered 59. Of the sense and sensation of smell 60. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations 66. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds 69. Of the sense of touch and its sensations in general 70. Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the touch. 98 |