 Then a page or so later: the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the end, to express the matter as nearly as possible. What is truth and what falsehood, we must merely apprehend, for both seem incapable of analysis. And as for the preference which...  Lectures on the Philosophy of Mathematics - Side 162av James Byrnie Shaw - 1918 - 206 siderUten tilgangsbegrensning - Om denne boken
 | 1904 - 618 sider
...the feeling that true affirmative propositions express fact in a sense in which no others do so. Thus the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...express the matter as nearly as possible. What is j truth, and what falsehood, we must merely apprehend, for yboth seem incapable of analysis. And as... | |
 | Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner - 1984 - 420 sider
...prejudice, and in no way to answer to the feeling of truth and falsehood.12 Then a page or so later: the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...long as they are not annoyed by instances - feel in favour of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition:... | |
 | Juliet Floyd, Sanford Shieh - 2001 - 482 sider
...toward the unanalyzable concept good. Indeed, Russell ends "Meinong's Theory" with the remark: Thus the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...analysis. And as for the preference which most people . . . feel in favour of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical... | |
 | Bertrand Russell - 1994 - 1344 sider
...the feeling that true affirmative propositions express fact in a sense in which no others do so. Thus the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...long as they are not annoyed by instances — feel in favour of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition:... | |
 | Nicholas Griffin - 2003 - 572 sider
...respect from the reality to which it was supposed merely to correspond". 8 Russell agreed, and added that "as for the preference which most people - so long as they are not annoyed by instances feel in favour of true propositions, this must be based, apparently, upon an ultimate ethical proposition:... | |
 | Ronald Jager - 2002 - 528 sider
...it were true" (p. 523). On this note he concludes the entire series of Meinong papers by saying that "the analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...merely apprehend, for both seem incapable of analysis" (p. 524). Our preference for * In Principles Russell said "now the truth of a proposition consists... | |
 | James Allard - 2004 - 270 sider
...left the preference for true propositions over false ones unexplained, but he nevertheless concluded, "The analogy with red and white roses seems, in the...end, to express the matter as nearly as possible" (1973, 76). 32 These brief remarks did not stimulate Bradley to reply. They did, however, provoke a... | |
 | 2006 - 1218 sider
...still surrounding the notion of truth, Russell reassures himself that primitivism is all right — 'What is truth, and what falsehood, we must merely...apprehend, for both seem incapable of analysis' — and it turns out that 'our preference for truth' (which we have since learned to re-label as the claim... | |
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