Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

continental Europe and Asia, is open to the inroads, of her armies. Commanding as she doth, the Sound and the Belts, if she do not loose the Bosphorus, no check whatever can be set upon her future operations. That immense monarchy can neither be controuled by power, nor has it yet any common interests to bind its government to the rest of the world. Russia is therefore neither naturally, nor in politics the ally of any other state. In England we say, 16 we can block up the Baltic and ruin her trade, or we can send a fleet to Cronstadt, and compel her to accede to terms." Although we may applaud the spirit of our countrymen, we cannot but regret their confined knowledge of other states! The fact is, that since the kings of Denmark and Sweden were reduced, and driven by our ill calculated mercantile politics, to hold their crowns and dominions of the Russian government in Fee; we can no more annoy that power in the Baltic than we can on the Oby. And we may, with as much effect,

veterans on the banks of the Boristhenes, it is by no means likely that he would risk a journée de Pultava.

* But suppose the Baltic were accessible, what could a British fleet do there without a port or an anchorage? In friendship with Denmark, and in co-operation with Sweden, and all their ports and arsenals open to us, what did Norris with 50 sail of men of war, do there in 1720 and 1721? He cruised between Stockholm and Revel, and saw the Russians with 42 sail of the line, 300 gallies, 480 flat-bottom boats, and 24 bomb-vessels, lay waste the coast of Sweden for 300 miles round Stockholm, and to within 20 miles of that capital. The British fleet dared not to attempt the passages through which the Russians sailed, nor to approach any part of the enemy's coast; at any rate, they did not try: nor did they during the two campaigns ever fire a gun. After having extorted from Sweden, the cession of the Dutchy of Bremen and Verden to the elector of Hanover, as the price of our succours, we are unwilling to presume that the British admiral could have been instructed to remain a voluntary spectator of the terrible ravages then committed in that unfortunate country by the Russian armies.

Prior to our last expedition to the Baltic, the unfortunate Paul, actuated more by candor than guided by policy, declared war six months before either himself or any of his maritime allies could move. The Danish hulks, which fought Admiral Nelson, were cut out through the ice to their station after the British fleet was in the Categate. And what could that campaign, had it been persisted in, have produced? The destruc tion of Copenhagen? Be it so, what then? We must then have put a garrison in it; and 20,000 men could not have defended it three weeks. What further could even Lord Nelson have done? gone off Carlscrona and looked in, for to go in is impossible. He could not have gone so uear as to look into Cronstadt. By the time he had made that cruise, the season would have obliged him to retire. Supposing the islands of Zealand and Amak in the possession of hostile armies, were the whole British navy in the Baltic, they might be land-locked there in one night.

Our late convoy-wat, which we always reprobated and will ever regret, has produced more effects than were in all probability expected to arise from it. In the first years of the war with France, the numbers of American vessels taken by our cruisers, and detained for, we know not what, created reiterated altercation, and produced Mr. Jay's treaty, those altercations, and this treaty, changed the whole political system of the United States, and we may say, revolutionized their government. President Adams, VOL. IV. NO, 21.

F

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

employ the British navy to arrest the currents in' the Pacific ocean, as to attempt to check the progress of the political arrangements and military operations of Russia by interrupting her maritime trade. The trade of the Baltic, Black and white seas, is to Europe in general, and to Great

with those who were averse to a dependent connexion with France, were held up to public execration, and dismissed from all places of public trust; Mr. Jefferson, and bis friends, attached to the cause of the French revolution, were invested with the govern. ment of the republic; and the influence, power, military and naval force of the United States, were forthwith arraigned on the side of our inveterate enemies. How far they have yet changed their position, we leave to be explained by those, whose immediate duty it is to watch over the vulnerable parts of the-empire. At the commencement of the French revolution, the late Count Bernstorff, who then guided the affairs of Denmark, and influenced the politics of Sweden, foresaw the effects which a maritiine war was likely to have upon the trade of the northern states; and that the mercantile transactions of individuals, might not, in any wise interfere with the political relationship of the several governments, he proposed an arrangement, whereby the trade and maritime intercourse of the respective countries should be publicly and fairly regulated; but he was answered by certain of the leading parties, as the barons of the Exchequer might be expected to answer the petition of a reputed smuggler. When the war broke out, Count Bernstorff was still disposed to favour the interests of Great Britain, that is, in as far as strict neutrality would allow, and would have forbidden the reception of privateers and captured property in the ports of Denmark and Norway; but a diplomatic correspondence, which we shall notice hereafter, having in the mean time made that minister consider his sovereign insulted in his own person, all amicable explanation was at an end. Criminations and recriminations employed the diplomacy of both parties; dismissed clerks, bankrupt brokers, and discharged ship-masters, were paid to rummage countinghouses, store-houses, ships and ship-wharfs for subjects of complaint; and the most ridiculous chapman-dealings were represented as great expeditions, carrying on by that state in favour of France! All vessels displaying Danish and Swedish colours were brought up, and detained to a vexatious length of time; the French imitated the example of Great Britain, and carried their vexations still farther; the neutral governments were then obliged to give way to the clamours of their subjects, and convoys were appointed. The commander of every such ship of war, was instructed to make himself perfectly acquainted with the contents of the cargo and nature of the trade of every vessel, which applied to him for convoy: he was to be fully satisfied that the cargo was fair neutral property, and that the trade was conform to existing treaties before he took the vessel under his protection. By these precautions, it was presumed, that the belligerent powers would shew as much respect to the declaration of the commander of a king's ship, made in the name of his sovereign, as they professed to do to the certificate of a burgomaster, or a custom-house officer. Those precautions, on the part of the neutral governments, were however represented in England, as measures of defiance and hostility. The Swedish convoy was laid wait for, and brought up; restitution refused, the king requested the interference of his neighbour the emperor Paul, and that monarch, with his usual frankness, desired Baron Toll to assure his sovereign, that he would consider the transaction as having happened to himself; that the convoy should be restored, or that he (the emperor of Russia) "would himself come forward and raise a standard of Union, around which, the insulted sovereigns of Europe might

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia

Britain in particular, an object of great importance; but to Russia herself, were those seas dry, her powers of action would be the same; she could then make the Categate, the Mediterranean, Persian-gulph, and Yellow sea, her maritime ports; and the rest of the world would still come there, to carry away the superabundance of her produce. An immense inland world of itself, possessing all the productions of nature which are either necessary or useful; or, that can in anywise contribute to the ease and convenience of mankind; with irresistible powers, not to be collected from, nor depending upon scattered settlements abroad, but issuing spontaneously from its centre, and with inexhaustible sources of wealth yet unexplored, maritime trade will ever be to Russia a subordinate consideration.

However, although trade and navigation will ever be but secondary objects to Russia as a state, yet the unrestricted exportation of the produce of her wide-extended dominions, and the freedom of supplying her internal consumption with foreign produce from the best markets, are two pretensions which the power and political rank of that empire obliges its

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rally in defence of the property of their subjects." This affair was further aggravated by the pitiful puerility of our diplomacy in the north; these busy ambassadors ran from conference to conference, wherever they could get admittance, with Sir William Scott's sentence of condemnation in their hand, bellowing out, that they were specially instructed to cram it down the throats of the neutral governments! About this time, in 1798 and 1799, the court of Denmark made still another attempt to explain and arrange all mercantile differences with Great Britain, and to conciliate and cement a good understanding between the two nations; but this was disregarded, perhaps through misrepresentation in England. The affair of the Frya frigate then took place; and that event, as an almost necessary consequence, organized the enmity of the powers of the north; gave a system to their measures, put the means of Denmark and Sweden under the command of Russia, and added all the powers both political and military of Russia, to those of France. We trust efficacious measures will yet, ere too late, be taken to avert the effects of that formidable combination. As another effect of our war with the neutral states, we are to consider that universal hatred and malignant rancour towards Great Britain, which pervades all classes of people, in every part of Europe and America. This universal spirit of ill-will, doth not appear to us a matter of perfect indifference, especially considering, how Great Britain now stands relatively to her neighbours. When a state once acquires a preponderating power, the ill-will of others, always subsides into harmless envy and good neighbourhood. During the late war, the most violent parties in America were not seriously disposed to a rupture with England; because they dreaded our victorious arms. Had the war continued, and Great Britain refused to acknowledge the neutrality of the north, the maritime states on the Baltic would have, for the same reason as America, rather taken part with us, than against us. The dread of chastisement stifles hatred; and the wise exercise of power converts ill-will into admiration: but the hope of gratifying malice, generally produces rancorous hostility. A hope, of being soon able to gratify the enmity of Europe and America upon the wrecks of the British empire, is now generally entertained; and what people once believe themselves capable of effecting, they sometimes do effectuate.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

government to maintain. Upon these pretensions were grounded those of the armed neutrality of 1780. Upon that convention was avowedly raised the coalition of armed hostility in 1800. This last coalition is now become universal, it is with great regret we dare not venture to except America, and great Britain is the object of its vengeance*.

This coalition might have been prevented by a single act of public justice; the restitution of the Swedish convoy, and the repeal and punishment of those emissaries of discord, who were daily insulting, and by their fallacious reports calumniating the governments of the north. The emperor of Russia considered our attack upon Sweden as a wanton insult; especially, as we condemned that convoy on the principle of a resistance, said to have been made by its commodore, and saw with unmanly indifference, and without offering a word in his behalf, that unfortunate officer brought to the block for not having resisted! This transaction roused the indignation of Paul I. and succeeding events, equally trivial and unprofitable to Great Britain, as we shall explain in the second part of these sketches, blew that indignation into a flame of revenge.

Notwithstanding this state of things, had the British government, after the affair of the Frya frigate, sent out, instead of a contemptible menace lo Copenhagen, a proposition worthy of the high and generous spirit of the British nation, and proportionate to the power and posture of Russia, we might not only have disarmed the enmity of the northern states, but we

That the British government should have drawn on itself the enmity of so many states without having acquired, or even sought for any kind of benefit, or advantage permanent, or temporary, is extremely singular; perhaps unexampled in the history of civilized nations. We can certainly not consider the having intercepted a few cargoes of rotten corn and Norway deal-boards going to France and Spain, as a national advantage; and the whole importance of our ridiculous treaties, which stipulate, what articles are, and what are not to be considered as contraband of war, is not worth to the state, six pounds of gunpowder. In these master-pieces of diplomatic absurdity, the principal chapters run as follow:

Iron-worked into arms is contraband-not worked into arms is fair trade.

Lead-cast into shot is contraband-not cast into shot is fair trade.

Copper-in plates 1-8th of an inch thick is contraband-in plates 3-10ths of an inch

thick is fair trade.

Timber-formed by carpenters into ship-masts is contraband-naturally grown to the shape of ship-masts is fair trade.

Leather-made into soldiers boots and horse-saddles is contraband--not made inte boots and horse-saddles is fair trade!

With other less important articles, classically arranged with equal judgment and political sagacity. It is a curious presumption that the French should employ Danes and Swedes to make muskets, shot, and boots for them! It is more curious still that we should be so anxious to oblige our enemies to maintain manufactures of the utensils of war amongst themselves! yet the fact is, that out of this sort of misérable matters, haye always arisen our quarrels with the secondary maritime states.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

could have secured their lasting friendship and permanent alliance, by the strongest ties of reciprocal national interests. If we had injured the weaker states, it was our duty, and it would have been our glory, to have granted them ample reparation. No concessions on our part, nor arrogance on theirs, could in anywise have affected the dignity of the British government, nor the honor of the nation, Nor could Russia have demanded any condition that was an equivalent for her friendship and certain co-operation*.

As it was not thought proper to enter into any discussion upon the claims of the neutral powers, prior to the battle of Copenhagen, that affair happily terminating in negociation, it was then the duty of the British government to have investigated, with particular attention, the nature of the convention of armed neutrality; whether it was built upon real national interests, or merely upon speculation; if all the parties entered voluntarily into that compact, or if some of the weaker powers acceded to it by compulsion; whether its leading principle was, or was not, a rooted enmity towards Great Britain; and then to have examined the real, or presumed causes of that enmity. We should have likewise calculated fairly and with intelligence, the influence and effects, which the powers of the Northern states, firmly organized under the immediate direction of Russia, and in conjunction with the power of France, could then, or at any future period, bave upon the interests and safety of the British empire. These matters fully ascer tained and duly weighed, the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia would have been clearly seen, and measures adequate to exigent circumstances might then have been adopted.

With respect to the origin and nature of the northern neutralité armée, we believe the idea was conceived in that academy of perverted positions, the cabinet of Versailles; with an intention to arm the navies of Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, as a check upon the naval operations of Great Britain, and partly to prevent a confederacy between Russia and England, in time of maritime war.

The wretched figure which Great Britain made in the war that subsided in the truce of Aix-la-Chapelle, encourged the government of France to form the project of expelling the English from America and the East Indies. To facilitate the accomplishment of that object, the cabinet of Versailles

* At the period we refer to, the emperor was irritated, it is true; but a frank arrangement with Denmark, and the satisfaction we owed to Sweden, agreed to, would have instantaneously reconciled him. An accommodation offered, in the name of our revered sovereign, either direct, through the king of Sweden, or by the Prince Royal of Denmark would have raised his generous mind to ecstacy, and instead of a most formidable enemy, he would have again become our most valuable friend. We speak here from a knowledge of the fact. It is perhaps a pity that sovereigns cannot, now and then take one another by the hand, and eat their beef-steak together téte a téte unmasked. If monarchs were better acquainted with one another, much mischief might be prevented. Official men say no; that is because so many of them would not be wanted.