1

Character of Plutarch

In the morning of our days, the seeds of general knowledge should be sown, and the mind be induced to nurture the plants as they spring, and to grasp at information on many subjects. Then, though unforeseen difficulties and disappointments arise, it will not lose itself in astonishment and surprise, but retire to its own resources with confidence; and, relying on its innate strength, will dare lofty and original acts.

I submit to the judgment of the more experienced, whether the system of education now in use at public schools does not tend to enlarge the ideas and expand the mind, and consequently to form great military characters, rather than the establishments of Marlow and Wycomb, (into which interest alone can open admittance). Could not a professor of military tactics be added to the masters of Eton, Westminster, &c. &c. in order that youths intended for the army might imbibe professional instruction without being deprived of the general knowledge essential for those who are to figure in the grand world? Although characters' competent to the task are difficult to be found, yet some few surely may be selected, and if royal patronage followed their exertions, others would rise from obscurity, warmed by the rays which beam kindly on their humble merit. MILES BRITANNICUS.

CHARACTER OF PLUTARCH.

SIR-I have seen with a great deal of pleasure, that in your last number of the M1LITARY CLASSICs you are giving Plutarch to the army, and I hope every officer will avail himself of this cheap method of obtaining a copy of this most inestimable author, (whether we consider him as a soldier, a statesmen, or historian), which the stream of time has brought down to us without merging him in its wave. The following, Sir, is an extract from a speech of the great Lord Chatham, when Mr. Pitt, in the House of Commons" The book from which I have quoted, Sir, in enforcement of my sentiments, "is one of those which has always been my study and delight. No book, I say, Sir, "was ever perused by me with equal satisfaction to that which I experienced from the "lives of Plutarch." Another great and learned man expressed himself equally warmly in praise of this admirable author. The following is an extract from the works of Guy Patin." Pliny's Natural History is one of the best books in the world, and is of itself a library; but if to this you add Plutarch and Seneca, you have then the whole family "of good books; the father, mother, and son."

"

The praise of Budæus, however, another very eminent scholar, is still more pointed. Budæus was the favourite and chancellor of Francis the first, King of France; he was always with this sovereign in his hours of leisure, and accompanied him to the splendid interview he had with Henry the Eighth, near Ardres. He asked him one day-Were all the books to be burned, which book he would choose to have exempted from the general destruction. "The works of Plutarch, Sir," replied he, "for they contain the ele"ments of every thing that is known." It may not be amiss to mention, for the encou ragement of some of your military readers, that Budæus, to use his own words, was "both self-taught, and late taught." He supplied these defects by his great pains, and became one of the profoundest scholars of his age, and this without neglecting the duties of his chancellorship. He was at the same time, as I have said, the favourite of Francis the first, and the correspondent of Erasmus,

X.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES

OF THE

STRENGTH OF FRANCE AND RUSSŤA.

SECOND PART. RUSSIA:

Concluded from page [227].

THE Russian cabinet knew, that in terminating a war such as that carried on by revolutionary France, no government could be at liberty to adhere so far to hacknied precedents and principles long disregarded by all its neighbours, as to compromise the safety of the state. Who first settled at the cape of Good Hope, colonized Brasil and Surinam, or conquered St. Domingo*, and to whom had belonged Malta, Candia, Egypt, and Bassora,

* Since the House of Bourbon ascended the throne of Spain, the separation of the colony of St. Domingo from France, was, in as far as relates to Great Britain; the most important event that has occurred in the politics of the world. It should have been considered by the British government as brought about by the guardian-angel of the empire, to affirm our national existence, and perpetuate our maritime grandeur!

Of every twenty years that have elapsed since the peace of Utrecht, we have had to fight ten with monarchical France, in defence of our foreign possessions and maritime trade. In that period all that we have acquired is Canada in farm, and have lost in property that immense empire which now makes the United States of America; we have incurred a debt that absorbs twenty millions sterling annually, of the industry of the public; we have lost the naval support of Holland, the markets of Europe for our manufactures, and all political connexion with the continent. In the mean time, France is become a military state, has doubled her national powers, tripled her military force, disembarrassed herself from debt, roused the moral energy of the public by her conquests, extended her political influence from Washington to Moscow, and her military command from Bergen in Norway to Madagascar. In this relative situation we had the most indisputable of all rights, that of self-preservation, to have used every means in our power to prevent the French republic ever again acquiring possessions abroad. The revolution of France in itself was a matter of indifference to Great Britain as a state; her Jacobinism was a bugbear wherewith to frighten fools; or had she conquered continental Europe, what was that to us? It was our business to care, that neither France nor any power under her influence and authority should either conquer or retain a single post or settlement out of Europe; and above all things, Great Britain should have spent her last shilling to maintain a separation between France, republic or monarchy, and St. Domingo. Rather than suffer that island to fall under the dominion of the consulate, it would be good policy on our part to give to any power, Russia or America, no matter which, that would protect it, either independent or as a colony, the island of Jamaica as a douceur.

At war with France, she being unable to conquer our possessions, could, not impose upon us any obligation to respect hers. Or, for what purpose go to war? If we went out to fight merely in our own defence, in that case, we had certainly, when it was in our power, a right to provide for our future safety. Our allies subdued, and the conti"nent of Europe under the dominion of our enemies, the future safety of the British 24

VOL. IV. No. 22.

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

were, in the court of Petersburgh, considerations of no sort of political import the government of Russia believed, that it was now the question, who should hereafter possess those and other such settlements that concerned the interests and safety of the British empire; and it was thought that overtures drawn up, upon that principle, would have been made by the British ministry. Indeed all Europe expected that such would have been our line of conduct at this auspicious moment. Those who were in anywise interested for the future prosperity of the British empire and peace of the world,. ardently wished that a cordial and solid arrangement between the governments of Great Britain and Russia might take place, and our enemies almost trembled for the consequence. But here again Buonaparte's stars came

empire undoubtedly required, that sources of maritime trade and naval power, sufficient to oblige those very enemies to open their ports to our commerce, and their councils to our political influence, should have been retained. As France extended her dominions in Europe, it was our duty to have confined her to that continent, and to have increased and secured our own possessions abroad. If the republic should recover the island of Hispaniola, that settlement alone, will, in spite of the world, give her a preponderance upon the ocean, equal to the superiority she now assumes on land!

* When the Chief Consul heard that our fleet was returning from the Baltic through the Belts and the Sound unmolested, knowing that his army in Egypt could neither hold out, nor be reinforced, he looked upon an alliance between Great Britain and Russia as certain. It is no secret, that under this apprehension, Buonaparte hastened to offer his mediation between the Bashaw of Widdin and the Grand Signior; he at the - same time, proposed to His Sublime Highness, to send a troop of French soldiers and engineers from Otranto in Italy, through Macedonia, to defend the canal of Constantinople; and he sent his most confidential adherents loaded with intrigues and diamonds to Petersburgh, Berlin, Copenhagen, and to other quarters; as we shall particularize in the second part of these sketches. He lavished his eulogies on the Prince Royal of · Denmark, and pressed him to accept succours of men, officers, and arms; and he used all his art to bring about an accord, or rather a co-operation between the courts of Berlin and Vienna. In this last negociation the Consul was seconded by certain men, who little suspected his motives!

What made the French government more anxious, and almost alarmed at the proba bility of an alliance between Great Britain and Russia was, that in a correspondence between General Duroc and some persons near the court of Berlin, a grand treaty was stated to be really in agitation and far advanced, and which was said to have for its basis a plan, that had been proposed to the First Consul, and demurred upon, during the life of Paul I. viz.-1. To re-establish the Greek erupire, to be confined to the Turkish deminions in Europe. 2. To erect Natolia, Candia, and Cyprus, into an hereditary monarchy for the exiled princes of the House of Bourbon, under the guarantee of Russia. 3. That the Ionian Republic of the Seven Islands, and the island of Malta be given to the order of the St. John of Jerusalem. 4. That Egypt be an independent state under the protection of Russia and France.

To these four articles Great Britain was said to have acceded, taking upon herself the guarantees which the Emperor Paul had offered to France; and to have likewise agreed with Russia and Denmark upon the following clauses, to wit:-St. Domingo, (or the the Island of Cuba if America should prefer St. Domingo) ceded to Russia. Porte

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

Lound, and cast their baneful shade over all the hopes of his adversaries! Our cuckoo-song on subsidy, the dangers of Jacobinism, export-duties on hemp, tallow, and iron; and the import-duties on coals, calicoes and cutlery; with a long chapter on the formalities under which a British officer Rico given to Denmark and guaranteed by. Russia and England. Another sugar island to Sweden, to be guaranteed by the same powers. Holland, as far as the Scheld, to be given to Prussia; and the Prince of Orange to be indemnified in Poland. The Cape of Good Hope should be a free municipal settlement under the immediate protection and support of Great Britain and Russia. That Russia should enjoy a free and unrestricted trade from the Elbe to India, China, &c. With some efficacious measures to be adopted for the delivery and independency of Spain and Italy from the yoke of France; for the security of the Portuguese settlements abroad, and for the exploration of the country and improvement of the trade of Brasil.

Whether, by this presumed treaty, it was intended to secure as much of the Consul's influence as possible on the side of Brandenburgh, in the general partition of Germany, or whether a plan for such an arrangement did really exist, we shall not here give any opinion. Certain it is, however, that to prevent its being carried into effect, all the talents and invention of the cabinet of Malmaison were occupied; and what, we must allow, 'did more credit to the capacity of Buonaparte's ministers than to the diplomatic sagacity of some other parties, before it was either known at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, or London, that any intercourse between France, Russia, and Turkey, was opened, the conventions now subsisting between the Emperor Alexander and the Consul, and between the latter and the Grand Signior, were signed and ratified. It was then that Buonaparte resolved upon the entire subjugation of Italy, the partition of Germany, the acquisition of the kingdom of Fez, and the dominion of Brasil.

With respect to Brasil, next to Indostan, that country is the object that most immedi ately occupied the cabinet of St. Cloud. The Consul knows, that were it possible to dispossess Great Britain of her settlements abroad, should the British government secure the empire of Brasil, our maritime and naval superiority would be consolidated in spite of all his efforts. It is the only country on the globe which neither France nor her allies could ever molest; she cannot approach it by land, and in our possession, it could alone maintain a navy that would bid defiance to the naval power of the rest of the world. To prevent Brasil falling under our dominion, the Consul lately spread out his protecting arm over Lisbon, and forbade his soldiers, as well as those of the king of Spain, to pillage that capital. Had General Lasnes managed his instructions more French-like, than he did, or until the British troops had evacuated the posts and places ceded, or given up by the late truce, we should have heard of another cause for his quarrel with the Regent of Portugal than the entry of a pair of lace ruffles! and by this time Brasil would have been guaranteed in a more effective manner than it has been on our sheep-skins at Amiens!

When Buonaparte guarantees the settlements of his allies, he secures the contract in its full sense, by either the possession of the settlement itself, or by taking his ally under the dominion of the republic. But when we send out our ambassadors to guarantee the domir.ions of our friends, they are not instructed to forbid such a friend to cede these same dominions to the Consul next day; any such restriction would be to interfere in the affairs of other states! When the rulers of France see a post or country, which in other hands might, on some future occasion, prove detrimental to their projects, as a duty they owe to the republic, they secure it, Although we know, that settlements, or naval and military posts, in our power by conquest, are by their former owners ceded to our

Estimates of the Strength of France and Russia.

may yet be permitted to go on board of a Russian or Danish vessel at sea, loaded with timber or stockfish, made up the whole amount of our negociations with the court of Petersburgh. So that our political relationship with the northern states, stands now (in January 1803) nearly upon the same footing as it did in January 1801*. During this period, however, the connexions between Russia and France were strongly cemented..

The Chief Consul negociates with foreign states on more liberal principles than we do. Where he can command by force, friends, or foes, he does it without reserve; and when conditions are necessary, his propositions are regulated by circumstances. Instead of asking Russia to fight his battles for a paltry subsidy, he offers her an empire to remain at peace; in place of menacing her with visionary dangers from abroad, he asks the support of the Czar, for the republic; and rather than wrangle about port charges, sugar and muslin duties, Buonaparte will stipulate with the senate of Petersburgh, that the Russian flag shall have open and free intercourse with the Havanna, Rio Janeiro, the Gangest and Japan. Such propositions as

enemies, ye should our dearest interests depend upon the possession of them, our magnanimity disdains to retain them! Worthy John Bull! We sincerely wish, that your magnanimity, so tempered as it frequently is, with other heavy ingredients, may not one day meet with such a reward as will make you stare and say, who could have thought it!

* With that difference, however, which the change of leading characters may have produced; and, that in 1801 our naval and military posture commanded the respect and admiration of our enemies, and our national means were sufficient to have secured the lasting friendship of the world: whereas a general belief that our powers are reduced, and our nationel means absorbed or given away, makes the world now seek cause of enmity against us.

The power of a state no longer formidable, and when more may be gained by its ruin than can be acquired by its friendship, it is the direct interest of its neighbours to become its enemies,

+ The British parliament might perhaps be as well employed in providing efficacious means to preserve Indostan, as in quibbling about the legality of our sovereignty over that country.

To insinuate that the safety of our possessions in India can be in any wise affected by the growing powers of our enemies, we know, will be sneered at in England, and we are sorry for it: we have already noticed the facility of marching Russian army through Persia, &c. And as the cousulate may now muster a French army in the plains of Syria, Egypt, and Asiatic Turkey, with the same facility and safety as in Italy or Sicily, to tell Buonaparte that such an army could not reach the frontiers of Indostan, he might sneer likewise.

But then say the folks in Leadenhall-street, our European army, with the native troops, tributary priņces, and dependent allies in India, will repel any force that Russia and France can ever march, or carry out against them, We wish this may prove to be the case, for we have little doubt but a trial will soon be made. We must acknowledge our ignorance of the state of our army in India, as well as of the disposition and means of our allies there. It should not be forgotten, however, that in these times, we see that generals like to be kings, soldiers to become legislators; and that, to have faithful allics, we must make them obedient subjects.