ings from which they are deduced. I hope he will not find himself invited to alter his opinions or his conduct without being shown why; and if he is conclusively shown this, that he will not reject truth because it is new or unwelcome. With respect to the present influence of the principles which these essays illustrate, the author will feel no disappointment if it is not great. It is not upon the expectation of such influence that his motive is founded or his hope rests. His motive is, to advocate truth without reference to its popularity; and his hope is, to promote by these feeble exertions, an approximation to that state of purity, which he believes it is the design of God shall eventually beautify and dignify the condition of mankind. ESSAY I. PART I. PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY. CHAPTER I. MORAL OBLIGATION. Foundation of Moral Obligation. THERE is little hope of proposing a definition of moral obligation which shall be satisfactory to every reader; partly because the phrase is the representative of different notions in individual minds. No single definition can, it is evident, represent various notions; and there are probably no means by which the notions of individuals respecting moral obligation can be adjusted to one standard. Accordingly, whilst attempts to define it have been very numerous, all probably have been unsatisfactory to the majority of mankind. Happily this question, like many others upon which the world is unable to agree, is of little practical importance. Many who dispute about the definition, coincide in their judgments of what we are obliged to do and to forbear; and so long as the individual knows that he is actually the subject of moral obligation, and actually responsible to a superior power, it is not of much consequence whether he can critically explain in what moral obligation consists. The writer of these pages, therefore, makes no attempts at strictness of definition. It is sufficient for his purpose that man is under an obligation to obey his Creator; and if any one curiously asks "Why?"-he answers, that one reason at least is, that the Deity possesses the power, and evinces the intention, to call the human species to account for their actions, and to punish or reward them. There may be, and I believe there are, higher grounds upon which a sense of moral obligation may be founded; such as the love of goodness for its own sake, or love and gratitude to God for his beneficence: nor is it unreasonable to suppose that such grounds of obligation are especially approved by the universal Parent of mankind. CHAPTER II. STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG. The Will of God-Notices of Theories -The communication of the Will of God-The supreme authority of the expressed Will of God-Causes of its practical rejection-The principles of expediency fluctuating and inconsistent-Application of the principles of expediency-Difficulties-Liability to abuse-Pagans. IT is obvious that to him who seeks the knowledge of his duty, the first inquiry is, What is the rule of duty? What is the standard of right and wrong? Most men, or most of those with whom we are concerned, agree that this standard consists in the will of God. But here the coincidence of opinion stops. Various and very dissimilar answers are given to the question, How is the will of God to be discovered? These differences lead to differing conclusions respecting human duty. All the proposed modes of discovering his will cannot be the best nor the right; and those which are not right are likely to lead to erroneous conclusions respecting what his will is. It becomes therefore a question of very great interest-How is the will of God to be discovered? and if there should appear to be more sources than one from which it may be deduced-What is that source which, in our investigations, we are to regard as paramount to every other? THE WILL OF GOD. When we say that most men agree in referring to the will of God as the standard of rectitude, we do not mean that all those who have framed systems of moral philosophy have set out with this proposition as their fundamental rule; but we mean that the majority of mankind do really believe (with whatever indistinctness) that they ought to obey the will of God; and that, as it respects the systems of philosophical men, they will commonly be found to involve, directly or indirectly, the same belief. He who says that the "Understanding "'* is to be our moral guide, is not far from saying that we are to be guided by the Divine will; because the understanding, however we define it, is the offspring of the Divine counsels and power. When Adam Smith resolves moral obligation into propriety arising from feelings of "Sympathy," the conclusion is not very different; for these feelings are manifestly the result of that constitution which God gave to man. When Bishop Butler says that we ought to live according to nature, and make conscience the judge whether we do so live or not, a kindred observation arises; for the existence and nature of conscience must be referred ultimately to the Divine will. Dr. Samuel Clarke's philosophy is, that moral obligation is to be referred to the eternal and necessary differences of things. This might appear less obviously to have respect to the Divine * Dr. Price: Review of Principal Questions in Morals. †Theory of Moral Sentiments. will, yet Dr. Clarke himself subsequently says, that the duties which these eternal differences of things impose, are also the express and unalterable will, command and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect should be observed by them in obedience to his supreme authority." Very similar is the practical doctrine of Wollaston. His theory is, that moral good and evil consist in a conformity or disagreement with truth-in treating every thing as being what it is." But then he says, that to act by this rule must be agreeable to the will of God, and if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it, and, since there must be perfect rectitude in his will, certainly wrong."§ It is the same with Dr. Paley in his far-famed doctrine of Expediency. "It is the utility of any action alone which constitutes the obligation of it;" but this very obligation is deduced from the Divine Benevolence; from which it is attempted to show, that a regard to utility is enforced by the will of God. Nay, he says expressly, "Every duty is a duty towards God, since it is his will which makes it a duty.'|| Now there is much value in these testimonies, direct or indirect, to the truth-that the will of God is the standard of right and wrong. The indirect testimonies are perhaps the more valuable of the two. He who gives undesigned evidence in favor of a proposition, is less liable to suspicion in his motives. But, whilst we regard these testimonies, and such as these, as containing satisfactory evidence that the will of God is our moral law, the intelligent enquirer will perceive that many of the proposed theories are likely to lead to uncertain and unsatisfactory conclusions respecting what that will requires. They prove that Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion. || Moral and Political Philosophy. |