think they cannot appeal to it always, let them appeal to it where they can. If they cannot persuade themselves to avoid hostilities when some injury is committed by another nation, let them avoid them when "another nation's greatness merely awakens their alarms."

II. That the law of nations is wholly nugatory with respect to those states which are not parties to it, is a truth which, however sound, has been too little regarded in the conduct of civilized nations. The state whose subjects discover and take possession of an uninhabited island, is entitled by the law of nations quietly to possess it. And it ought quietly to possess it; not that in the view of reason or of morality, the circumstance of an Englishman's first visiting the shores of a country, gives any very intelligible right to the King of England to possess it rather than any other prince, but that, such a rule having been agreed upon, it ought to be observed; but by whom? By those who are parties to the agreement. For which reason, the discoverer possesses no sufficient claim to oppose his right to that of a people who were not parties to it. So that he who, upon pretence of discovery, should forcibly exclude from a large extent of territory a people who knew nothing of European politics, and who in the view of reason possessed an equal or a greater right, undoubtedly violates the obligations of morality. It may serve to dispel the obscurity in which habit and self-interest wrap our perceptions, to consider, that amongst the states which were nearest to the newly-discovered land, a law of nations might exist which required that such land should be equally divided amongst them. Whose law of nations ought to prevail? That of European states, or that of states in the Pacific or South Sea? How happens it that the Englishman possesses a sounder

right to exclude all other nations, than surrounding nations possess to partition it amongst them?

Unhappily, our law of nations goes much further; and by a monstrous abuse of power, has acted upon the same doctrine with respect to inhabited countries; for when these have been discovered, the law of nations has talked, with perfect coolness, of setting up a standard, and thenceforth assigning the territory to the nation whose subjects set it up; as if the previous inhabitants possessed no other claim or right than the bears and wolves. It has been asked (and asked with great reason,) what we should say to a canoe-full of Indians who should discover England, and take possession of it in the name of their chief?

Civilized states appear to have acted upon the maxim, that no people possess political rights but those who are parties to the law of nations; and accordingly the history of European settlements has been, so far as the aborigines were concerned, too much a history of outrage and treachery, and blood. Penn acted upon sounder principles; he perfectly well knew that neither an established practice, nor the law of nations, could impart a right to a country which was justly possessed by former inhabitants; and therefore, although Charles II. "granted" him Pennsylvania, he did not imagine that the gift of a man in London, could justify him in taking possession of a distant country without the occupiers' consent. What was “granted" therefore by his sovereign, he purchased of the owners; and the sellers were satisfied with their bargain and with him. The experience of Pennsylvania has shown that integrity is politic as well as right. When nations shall possess greater expansion of knowledge, and exercise greater purity of virtue, it will be found that many of the principles which regulate international intercourse, are foolish as well as vicious; that whilst they disre

gard the interests of morality they sacrifice their

own.

III. Respecting the third consideration, that the law of nations is of no force in opposition to the moral law, little needs to be said here. It is evident that, upon whatever foundation the law of nations rests, its authority is subordinate to that of the will of God. When, therefore, we say that amongst civilized states, when an island is discovered by one state, other states are bound to refrain, it is not identical with saying that the discoverer is at liberty to keep possession by whatever means. The mode of asserting all rights is to be regulated in subordination to the moral law. Duplicity, and fraud, and violence, and bloodshed, may perhaps sometimes be the only means of availing ourselves of the rights which the law of nations grants; but it were a confused species of morality which should allow the commission of all this, because it is consistent with the law of nations.

A kindred remark applies to the obligation of treaties. Treaties do not oblige us to do what is morally wrong. A treaty is a string of engagements; but those engagements are no more exempt from the jurisdiction of the moral law, than the promise of a man to assassinate another. Does such a promise morally bind the ruffian? No: and for this reason, and for no other, that the performance is unlawful. And so it is with treaties. Two nations enter into a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. Subsequently one of them engages in an unjust and profligate war. Does the treaty morally bind the other nation to abet the profligacy and injustice? No: if it did, any man might make any action lawful to himself by previously engaging to do it. No doubt such a nation and such a ruffian have done wrong; but their offence consisted in making the engagement, not in breaking it.

if ordinary wars were defensible, treaties of offensive alliance that are unconditional with respect to time or objects, can never be justified. The state, however, which, in the pursuit of a temporary policy, has been weak enough, or vicious enough to make them, should not hesitate to refuse fulfilment, when the act of fulfilment is incompatible with the moral law. Such a state should decline to perform the treaty, and retire with shame—with shamẹ, not that it has violated its engagements, but that it was ever so vicious as to make them.

SECTION II.

THE LAW OF HONOR.

Authority of the Law of Honor-Its character.

The law of honor consists of a set of maxims written or understood, by which persons of a certain class agree to regulate, or are expected to regulate, their conduct. It is evident that the obligation of the law of honor, as such, results exclusively from the agreement, tacit or expressed, of the parties concerned. It binds them because they have agreed to be bound, and for no other reason. He who does not choose to be ranked amongst the subjects of the law of honor, is under no obligation to obey its rules. These rules are precisely upon the same footing as the laws of free-masonry, or the regulations of a reading-room. He who does not choose to subscribe to the room, or to promise conformity to masonic laws, is under no obligation to regard the rules of either.

For which reason, it is very remarkable that at the commencement of his Moral Philosophy, Dr. Paley says, The rules of life “are, the law of honor, the law

of the land, and the Scriptures.' It were strange indeed, if that were a rule of life which every man is at liberty to disregard if he pleases; and which, in point of fact, nine persons out of ten do disregard without blame. Who would think of taxing the writer of these pages with violating a "rule of life," because he pays no attention to the law of honor? "The Scriptures" communicate the will of God; the law of the land" is enforced by that will; but where is the sanction of the law of honor?-It is so much the more remarkable that this law should have been thus formally proposed as a rule of life, because, in the same work, it is described as “unauthorized.” How can a set of unauthorized maxims compose a rule of life? But further: the author says that the law of honor is a "capricious rule, which abhors deceit, yet applauds the address of a successful intrigue"-And further still: "it allows of fornication, adultery, drunkenness, prodigality, duelling, and of revenge in the extreme." Surely then it cannot, with any propriety of language, be called a rule of life.

Placing, then, the obligation of the law of honor, as such, upon that which appears to be its proper basis— the duty to perform our lawful engagements-it may be concluded, that when a man goes to a gaming-house or a race-course, and loses his money by betting or playing, he is morally bound to pay: not because morality adjusts the rules of the billiard room or the turf, not because the law of the land sanctions the stake, but because the party previously promised to pay it. Nor would it affect this obligation, to allege that the stake was itself both illegal and immoral. So it was;

but the payment is not. The payment of such a debt involves no breach of the moral law. The guilt consists not in paying the money, but in staking it. Nevertheless, there may be prior claims upon a man's prop