tenced to imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail in such reasonable sum as may be required by the court, or by any justice, or any judge, or any district court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia.

"Sec. 22. That nothing herein contained shall be construed to relate to contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of or on behalf of the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not specifically embraced within Section 19 of this act, may be punished in conformity to the usages at law and in equity now prevailing.

"Sec. 23. That no proceeding for contempt shall be instituted against any person unless begun within one year from the date of the act complained of; nor shall any such proceeding be a bar to any criminal prosecution for the same act or acts; but nothing herein contained shall affect any proceedings in contempt pending at the time of the passage of this act."

The Clayton Bill, H. R. 15657, is now under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Let every worker, every member of organized labor, every friend of labor and humanity impress upon the members of that committee and upon their respective members in the Senate the imperative necessity for taking immediate and favorable action upon labor's needs and demands. Demand the bill as it passed the House.

Enlightened public opinion everywhere. approves labor's cause as just. Let no one underestimate the thought and the determination which lie back of this demand for justice. Industrial statesmanship and industrial justice are demanded of the representatives of the millions of working people.

The results of a twenty-four-year struggle for justice, the cogency of labor's arguments, the persuasive power of justice

for human rights, are reflected in the following:

In the unanimous non-partisan action of the House of Representatives in Committee of the Whole in adopting Section 7 and in the overwhelming majority by which the House adopted all of the labor sections.

In the decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the lower court which held that the efforts of the United Mine Workers of America to unionize the mines of the Hitchman Coal and Coke Company corstituted a conspiracy.

In the decision of the United States Supreme Court in International Harvester Company versus Missouri, upholding the constitutionality of the Missouri anti-trust law which by omission removes labor organizations from its provisions. The opinion of the court justifies the legislative classifications thus:

"If this power of classification did not exist, to what straits legislation would be brought. We may illustrate by the examples furnished by plaintiff in error. In the enumeration of those who, it is contended, by combination are able to restrain trade are included, among others, 'persons engaged in domestic service' and 'nurses' and because these are not embraced in the law, plaintiff in error, it is contended, although a combination of companies uniting the power of $120,000,000 and able thereby to engross 85 per cent or 90 per cent of the trade in agricultural implements, is nevertheless beyond the competency of the legislature to prohibit. As great as the contrast is a greater one may be made. Under the principle applied a combination of all the great industrial enterprises (and why not railroads as well?) could not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of maid servants or to infants' nurses, whose humble functions preclude effective combination. Such contrast and the consideration they suggest must be pushed aside by government, and a rigid and universal classification applied, is the contention of plaintiff in error; and to this the contention must come. Admit exceptions, and you admit the power of the legislature to select them."

In the section of the Sundry Civil Bill, H. R. 17041, reported from the Committee on Appropriations, June 4, 1914, under the section Miscellaneous Objects, Department of Justice, is incorporated the following:

"For the enforcement of anti-trust laws, including not exceeding $10,000 for salaries of necessary employes at the seat of government, $300,000: Provided, however, that no part of this money shall be spent in the prosecution of any organization or individual for entering into any combination or agreement having in view the increasing of wages, shortening of hours, or bettering the conditions of labor, or for any act done in furtherance thereof not in itself unlawful."

The cause of labor carries conviction to the general public. That conviction must be embodied in legislation assuring justice to America's workers. Public opinion not only favors but stands stanchly back of these demands.

Federal Judge Humphrey's injunction against striking workers and sympathizers at Granite City, Ill., is one more reason why the Clayton anti-trust bill, containing provisions for injunction regulation, should be passed by the United States Senate.

Every constitutional right is stripped from these workers by this judge who has exhausted his vocabulary and his ingenuity in defining unlawful acts and utterances by the strikers "and all others."

A request to employes of the company to join the strikers, that conditions may be bettered, is even prohibited.

In his injunction, Judge Humphrey commands that the strikers "and all others" shall not "in any way or manner whatsoever by use of persuasion" interfere with any person engaged by the company.

Webster's Dictionary defines "persuasion" as: "The act of influencing the mind by arguments or reasons offered, or by anything that moves the mind or passions or inclines the will to a determination."

Under this clear definition, the court has paved the way for an attack on the public

press if it dare espouse the strikers' cause. The court not only suppresses free speech, but serves notice that a free press will be included if its advocacy of the workers' attempt to improve conditions interferes with the company's business.

No amount of verbal jugglery or dollar logic can confuse this plain denial of the constitutional rights of workers and those who would aid them in a lawful manner.

It is no defense of this injunction to say that it prohibits violence or the destruction of property. Every one knows that violence and the destruction of property is unlawful. Statutory law provides penalties where guilt is proven, after a trial by jury and the rights of the accused are protected. This is a guarantee assured the most humble. It assumes that a man is innocent until proven guilty, and even assists him in proving his innocence.

But Judge Humphrey sets this theory aside. He would order arrests of persons charged with violence, and, without jury or trial, command the accused to show the court why he should not be punished.

The striker is assumed to be guilty and must prove his innocence before an injunction judge.

Neither is it an answer to say that a higher court will set aside, or modify, Judge Humphrey's order. Appeals cost money and justice involving the right to strike, and induce others to join the strikers, free speech and free press should not be a matter of dollars. Our laws should protect workers, even if they are not backed by powerful trade union organizations.

If Americanism is to remain a force and an inspiration, an end should be made of injunction rule by passing the Clayton bill, now pending in the United States Senate. No judge should be allowed to retain powers that only the czar of Russia would

assume.

Free speech and free press is not a thing for bandy and play by irresponsible courts who make law, judge law and enforce law. regardless of legislatures or constitutions.

AN IMPORTANT DECISION.

HE United States Supreme Court,

TH

on June 8th, in the case of the International Harvester Company of America, plaintiff in error, vs. the State of Missouri, rendered an important and far-reaching decision, which will in effect have a great bearing on the Clayton antitrust bill, which has been passed by the House of Representatives and which is now pending before the United States Senate, as the main arguments used by the opponents of that bill has been that it was "class legislation" and therefore unconstitutional, but the United States Supreme Court in its decision has held that legislative bodies have the right to make distinctions between organizations for trade and organizations of workers.

The case was originally one to forfeit the charter of the Harvester Company for violation of the Missouri Statutes governing "pools, trusts and conspiracies and discriminations." The Supreme Court of Missouri found against the defendants and the case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which, in its decision, affirmed the decision of the Missouri Courts, and in doing so made it clear that organizations of workers are not to be considered in the same light as organizations for trade. The Harvester Company contended that they should be considered in the same light. The court in reply to this contention, said in effect that if the Harvester Company's position was right "a combination of all the great industrial enterprises could not be condemned unless the law applied as well to a combination of maids, servants or to infants' nurses, whose humble functions preclude effective combinations."

"Admit exceptions to this rule," said the court, "and you admit the power of the Legislature to select them," therefore, the Missouri Legislature had the right to pass an anti-trust law that did not include trade unions. The court made clear its views that the Legislature had the right to classify labor and property and held that this classification was perfectly legal.

As the decision is of such far-reaching effect and so important to organized labor, it is here published in full, as follows: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

of

No. 166-October Term, 1913. International Harvester Company America, plaintiff in error, vs. the State of Missouri, on the information of its Attorney General-In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, June 8, 1914.

Information in the nature of quo warranto brought in the Supreme Court of the State to exclude plaintiff in error from the corporate rights, privileges and franchises exercised or enjoyed by it under the laws of the State, that they be forfeited, and all or such portion of its property as the court may deem proper be confiscated or in lieu thereof a fine be imposed upon it in "punishment of the perversion, usurpation, abuse and misuse of franchises."

The ground of the action is the alleged violation of the statutes of the State passed respectively in 1899 and 1909 and entitled "Pools, Trusts and Conspiracies" and "Pools, Trusts and Conspiracies and Discriminations."

The facts alleged in the information are these: Plaintiff in error is a Wisconsin corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of agricultural implements, binders. mowers, etc., and was licensed on the 5th of April, 1892, to do business in Missouri under the name of the Milwaukee Harvester Company, and on September 18, 1902, became licensed to do and engaged in such business in the State. In that year the International Harvester Company of New Jersey was organized with a capital stock of $120,000,000 for the purpose of effecting a combination of plaintiff in error and certain other companies to restrain competition in the manufacture and sale of such agricultural implements in Missouri, and the New Jersey company has maintained plaintiff in error as its sole selling agent in Missouri. Before the combination the companies combined were competitors of one another and of other corporations, individuals and partnerships engaged in the

same business in the State and that thereby the people of the State, and particularly the retail dealers and farmers of the State, received the benefit of competition in the purchase and sale of farm implements. The combination was designed and made with a view to lessen, and it tended to lessen, free competition in such implements, and thereby the said corporations entered into and became members of a pool, trust, combination and agreement. In furtherance thereof and for the purpose of giving the International Harvester Company of New Jersey a monopoly of the business of manufacturing and selling agricultural implements in the State, and for the purpose of preventing competition in the sale thereof, plaintiff in error has compelled the retail dealers in each county of the State who desire to handle and sell or act as agent for it to refrain from selling implements manufactured or sold by competing companies or persons. By reason thereof competition in such implements has been restrained, prices controlled, the quantity of such implements has been fixed and limited, and plaintiff in error has been able to secure, and several years enjoy, from 85 per cent to 90 per cent of the business, all to the great damage and loss of the people of the State, and by reason of its participation in the pool, trust and combination and by reason of the acts and things done by it plaintiff in error has been guilty of an illegal, willful and malicious perversion and abuse of its franchises, privileges and licenses granted to it by the State.

The answer of plaintiff in error denied that it had become a party to any combination or that in its transactions there was any purpose to restrain or lessen competition, or that trade had been or was restrained.

The case was referred to a special commissioner to take the evidence and report his conclusion. He found, as alleged in the information, that the International Harvester Company of New Jersey was a combination of the properties and business of formerly competing harvester panies, and plaintiff in error being one of such companies and, thereafter by selling the New Jersey company's products in Mis

com

souri, had violated the Missouri statute against pools, trusts and conspiracies.

In exceptions to the report of the special commissioner plaintiff in error urged that the statute of Missouri violated the equality clause and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: "(1) Because said statute arbitrarily discriminates between persons making or selling products and commodities and persons selling labor and service of all kinds: In that each section of said statute applies only to articles of merchandise and not to labor or services and the like, the prices of which are equally and similarly determined by competition, and may be equally and similarly the subject of combination and conspiracy to the detriment of the public. (2) Because said statute arbitrarily discriminates between the makers and the sellers of products and commodities and the purchasers thereof: It prohibits manufacturers and sellers from making contracts or arrangements intended or tending to increase the market price of the articles they make or sell, but does not prohibit purchasers from combining to fix or reduce the market price of the commodities or articles to be purchased by them. (3) Because said statute, as construed by the commissioner, unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with plaintiff in error's right to make proper and reasonable business contracts, and deprives it of property rights in respect thereto."

These exceptions were urged and argued in the Supreme Court upon the filing of the commissioner's report. Judgment was entered upon the report, in which it was adjudged that by reason of the violation of the statutes of the State as charged in the information, plaintiff in error had forfeited the license theretofor granted to it to do business in the State, and it was adjudged that the license be forfeited and canceled and the company ousted from its rights and franchises granted by the State to do business in the State, and a fine of $50,000 was imposed upon it. It was, however, provided that upon payment of the fine on or before the first of January, 1912, and immediately ceasing all connection with the International Harvester Company of New

Jersey and the corporations and co-partnerships with which it had combined, and not continuing and maintaining the unlawful agreement and combination with them to lessen and destroy competition in the sale of the enumerated farm implements and giving satisfactory evidence thereof to the court, the judgment of ouster should be suspended. The company was given until March 1, 1912, "to file its proof of willingness" to comply with the judgment. It was also adjudged that upon a subsequent violation of the statute "the suspension of the writ of ouster shall be removed" by the court "and absolute ouster 'be enforced," and to that end the court retained "its full and complete jurisdiction over the cause." 237 Mo. 369.

A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff in error in its answer simply denied that it had violated the antitrust laws of the State, and it is contended, that by not alleging in its answer that those laws violated the Constitution of the United States it waived such defense. It is further contended that because the Federal right was not asserted in the answer the Supreme Court of the State could not have considered and did not consider or decide it. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri are cited to sustain the contentions. The decisions declare the proposition that constitutional questions must be raised at the first opportunity or, as it is expressed in one of the cases (Brown v. Railway Co., 175 Mo. 1), "the protection of the Constitution must be timely and properly invoked in the trial court."

In Milling Company v. Black, 242 Mo. 31, it is said: "The ruling of this court is that so grave a question (constitutional question) must be lodged at the first opportunity, or it will be deemed to have been waived. If it can be properly and naturally raised in the pleadings, and thereby be a question lodged in the record proper, such is the time and place to raise it," and that it is too late to raise the question after judgment in a motion for new trial. In Hertzler v. Railway Co., 218 Mo. 1, it was held: "A motion for a new trial was not the first door for the question to enter,

and in our later decisions we have ruled that a question of such gravity must be raised as soon as orderly procedure will allow. This in order that the trial court may be treated fairly and the question got into the case under correct safeguards and carmarked as of substance and not mere color."

It is manifest, we think, that the court only intended to express the condition of appellate review to be that in the trial court constitutional questions should not be reserved until the case had gone to judgment on other issues, and then used to secure a new trial. The principle of the rulings is satisfied in the case at bar. It is, as we have seen, an original proceeding in the Supreme Court and upon the report of the commissioner which brought the case to the court for decision of the issues and questions involved in it the Federal questions were made "under correct safeguards and earmarked as of substance and not mere color." It is true the court has not referred to them in its opinion, but we can not regard its silence as a condemnation of the time or manner at or in which they were raised. The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.

The assignments of error necessarily involve a consideration of the statutes. The relevant provisions are contained in Section 10301 of the Revised Statutes of the State of 1909, and Section 8966 of the Revised Statutes of 1899.

Section 10301 provides, "that all arrangements, contracts, agreements, combinations or understandings made or entered into between two or more persons, designed or made with a view to lessen, or which tend to lessen, lawful trade, or full and free competition in the importation, transportation, manufacture or sale" in the State "of any product, commodity or article, or thing bought or sold,” and all such arrangements, etc., "which are designed or made with a view to increase, or which tend to increase, the market price of any product, commodity or article or thing, of any class or kind whatsoever, bought and sold," are declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void, and those offending "shall be deemed