XXIV times even exceeded that of the president. To this exaltation of CHAP. the speakership several different, although related, factors contributed. In the first place, with but few exceptions, the speakers have been men endowed with natural qualities of leadership which have brought them to the front in their respective parties even before their elevation to the speakership; in proof of which one needs but to glance over the long list of persons who have held the office and observe the names of Henry Clay, James K. Polk, Robert C. Winthrop, Schuyler Colfax, James G. Blaine, Samuel J. Randall, John G. Carlisle, and Thomas B. Reed. Despite the high political importance which has attached to the office in times past, however, only one speaker ever succeeded in reaching the presidency, although Blaine narrowly missed it. This result has not been altogether fortuitous; for whoever holds the speakership is almost certain to rouse antagonisms within his party, as happened notably in the case of both Blaine and Reed, and this, of course, makes the attainment of the presidency difficult or impossible. Personality and standing as a party leader may account for the promotion of an individual to the speakership, but they only partially explain the extraordinary power and influence which the speakership, as an office, early developed and to a considerable extent retains. The reasons for this weight of authority are to be found in certain of the speaker's well-known prerogatives. In the first place, the speaker has the right not only to put questions and to decide votes and points of order, as indicated above, but also to assign the floor to members who want a hearing. This is called the power of recognition. Without formal recognition by the speaker, no member can obtain the ear of the House. This right the English speaker endeavors to accord impartially to members of all parties; but the American speaker is quite a stranger to any such sense of obligation. To be sure, he is bound to follow the rules of the House, and the rules give a certain precedence to some committees or to their chairmen, and certain days are set apart for the consideration of special classes of business. But with all due allowance for such limitations, the speaker still has wide opportunity to exercise quite arbitrarily the right of assigning the floor to members. Again and again when members have sought to obtain recognition without having previously arranged with the speaker to be recognized, that officer has inquired, "For what purpose does the gentleman rise?"—and then has decided whether or not to recognize him, 1See p. 383. Preroga tives of the speaker 1. Power of recog nition CHAP. 2. Power of appointment The "revolution" of 1910-11 according to whether the member's purpose met with the speaker's approval. In this way speakers have been able to prevent to a greater or less extent the consideration of motions and bills to which they personally, or the groups to which they belonged, were opposed. Closely related to this power of recognition has been the power, assumed in 1890, to refuse to entertain dilatory motions, i. e., motions which are clearly intended to delay action by the House as a means of obstructing the program of the majority party. Another factor which added immeasurably to the speaker's power in the recent past was his right to appoint all committees. Although a sense of obligation to influential leaders who assisted in his election to the speakership, and loyalty to the traditional seniority rule governing committee promotions, tied his hands to some extent, abundant opportunities remained to advance the political fortunes of his friends by appointing them to important committees; and, on the other hand, to inflict punishment upon those who incurred his displeasure, by relegating them to unimportant committees, some of which, for lack of anything to do, have not met for upwards of thirty years. At the same time, the speaker could make up committees having charge of leading measures, like tariff and appropriation bills, in such a way as to have a decisive influence upon both the form and the fate of these measures. Especially important was the power to appoint the most highly privileged and most powerful committee of all, namely, the committee on rules, with which went also the right to serve as that committee's chairman.1 Concentration of such prerogatives in the hands of dominating personalities and recognized party leaders virtually converted the speakership in the days of Reed and Cannon into an instrument of autocratic control over the destiny of both men and measures.2 The number of members who chafed under the yoke of "Cannonism," as the system came to be called, increased year by year with the growth of the progressive movement in the ranks of the Republican party; and, after long waiting, a promising opportunity to rise in revolt appeared in March, 1910. At that time a combination of "progressive" Republicans and the Democratic minority, 1See p. 372. 2 W. B. Hale, "The Speaker or the People," World's Work, XIX, 1280512812 (Apr., 1910). XXIV after a prolonged and dramatic session,1 succeeded not only in CHAP. deposing Speaker Cannon from membership in the committee on rules, but in enlarging that committee from five to ten members, in the hope of making it somewhat more representative of party sentiment in the House; and at the same time the speaker was deprived of the right to appoint the committee. When the next Congress organized, in the following year, the speakership was stripped completely of the power of appointment, except in the case of select and conference committees. As a result, the only prerogatives which the speaker enjoys today are the limited power of appointment just mentioned, the very important power of recognition, and the sometimes important power of reference, i. e., the power to decide to what committee a public bill shall be referred, provided the clerk of the House (who normally makes the assignments, according to the nature of the bill) is in doubt.2 caucus To the power of appointment, as exercised for more than a The party century by the speaker, the party caucuses, especially the caucus of the majority party, immediately fell heir; and before explaining how committee assignments have been made since the change took place it will be well to say something about the highly important, extra-legal, and little understood aspects of House organization involved in the caucus system. It is not always easy for an outsider to appreciate the dominant position which the majority party caucus now holds in controlling the formal action of the House in all matters of the first importance. To understand it, one must have a clear conception of the effectiveness of party discipline in a body elected, organized, and largely conducted on strictly party lines. The caucus is naturally controlled by a comparatively small group of experienced leaders, well versed in the intricacies of House procedure and skilled in the art of managing their less experienced colleagues. In the hands of these leaders the majority caucus has become a powerful instrument of control over the rank and file, especially over the new members, unfamiliar with the ways of the House. 1E. H. Abbott, "The Liberation of the House," Outlook, XCIV, 750-754 (Apr. 2, 1910); C. R. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon (New York, 1911). C. R. Atkinson and C. A. Beard, "The Syndication of the Speakership," Polit. Sci. Quar., XXVI, 381-414 (Sept., 1911). For a fuller discussion of this important institution, see L. Haines, Your Congress, Chap. IV. Party disthe House cipline in CHAP. Defense of the system Fallacy of the argument For example, all members who participate in a party caucus are bound by the caucus action, unless released by the caucus itself. Consequently a member who, having participated, afterwards refuses to abide by the decision of the majority-who, in other words, commits the unpardonable sin of "bolting" the caucusmay almost be said to take his political life in his hands. At any rate, he is certain to be marked for discipline in various effective ways: he is likely to lose his place on important committees when the next committee assignments are made; the measures in which he has a peculiar personal interest are likely to be side-tracked, perhaps smothered; appropriations to be expended in his district may be cut off, or greatly reduced in amount; and in various other ways he can be made to feel the wrath of the leaders for his refusal to "go along." Such power to mar, if not actually to ruin, a member's career in the House goes far toward explaining the futility of spasmodic, isolated, and unorganized revolts against the prevailing system. The system is not, of course, without its apologists, and the argument which they put forth has a plausible appearance. The rules of the House, they say, must be taken as reflecting the wishes of the majority of the members. A dissatisfied majority can change the rules at any time. An arbitrary speaker can be overruled, or even deposed, by a majority vote. Committees may be reconstituted and compelled to report upon any matter referred to them if a majority of the House so orders. Therefore, runs the argument, since the rules and the other features of the system remain substantially unaltered from Congress to Congress, they must be regarded as fairly satisfactory to all but a few unreasonable members who are unable to adapt themselves to the ways of the majority. Speaking strictly, all this, of course, is true. None the less, the argument is fallacious. The majority referred to is usually fictitious; the existence of the two rival party organizations, functioning through caucus action, in which the influence wielded by the experienced managers who profit by the old system is decisive, makes House majorities for any of the purposes named practically impossible. Actually, the degree of independence enjoyed by individual members is extremely small. Opportunities in connection with really important matters to act solely as their best judgment dictates rarely arise; and situations in which a coalition between a united minority party and a dissatisfied or insurgent faction within XXIV the dominant party are still more uncommon. It is, therefore, much CHAP. nearer the truth to say that the rules of the House and the degree of power wielded by the speaker and by the committees are in reality determined, not by the majority of the entire House, but rather by the majority in the caucus of the dominant party, which, quite possibly, may in fact represent the views of only a minority of the House as a whole. of the caucus 1. Selec tion of the Long before 1911, members of both the majority and minority Functions parties were accustomed to meet from time to time in secret caucus. But during the past decade new and extremely important functions have been assumed by the caucus, especially the majorityparty caucus. The operations of the latter now extend to not fewer than five important matters: (1) the selection of House officers, (2) agreement upon plans of united action on policies or measures before the House; (3) designation of members to be elected to the various standing committees; (4) supervision and control of the reports of important committees; and (5) the actual shaping of the detailed provisions of the most important legislative measures.1 The constitution provides that the House shall elect its speaker and other officers; and in form the regulation is complied with, as we have seen. Actually, however, what the House does is merely to ratify the slate of officers previously agreed upon in the secret, unofficial, caucus of the majority party; and, in view of the strict ness of party discipline which usually prevails, the decision of a majority of that unofficial body determines the formal action of the House as a whole. It has long been quite possible, therefore, for a member to be elected speaker who is not favored by a majority of the House as a whole, especially when there has been a close caucus vote in the choice of candidates. In other words, owing to the binding nature of caucus decisions, it is possible for a minority of the entire House to dictate the choice of this most important House officer. The use of the caucus to bring about united action of the party members in supporting or opposing measures of exceptional importance after they have come before the House reaches back almost equally far in our legislative history. But to these original functions recent developments have added the others enumerated above, which are even more important and far-reaching. First of all, the majority caucus inherited, as we have observed, the speaker's power 1 W. G. Haines, "The Congressional Caucus To-day," Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev., IX, 696-706 (Nov., 1915). speaker and other officers 2. Control of commit tees and legislation |