CHAP.
XXXIX

3. Inadequate unifying and directing authority

arate boards for each penitentiary and reformatory, half a dozen
boards dealing with agricultural interests, almost a score of more
or less independent state agencies having to do with labor and
mining, a series of distinct departments dealing with corporations
of one kind or another, a number of boards working in the interest
of public health, numerous uncorrelated educational agencies; while
even a single finance department could hardly be said to exist when
duties relating to state finance were divided among the governor,
the treasurer, the auditor, the attorney-general, the secretary of
state, the insurance commissioner, and other officers. Overlapping
functions, and sometimes needlessly duplicated offices, were con-
spicuous in the inspectorial work carried on by some of the state
departments: inspectors from the health department, from the
food commission, and from the department of factory inspection
might visit the same places at different times for much the same
purpose and give conflicting orders, when one visit by a single set
of inspectors would have been sufficient.1

Over the scores of administrative agents, boards, and commis-
sions there is, as a rule, no unifying or coördinating, and only
very slight directing or supervisory, control. A proper degree
of responsibility to the governor, to the legislature, or to the peo-
ple is almost everywhere lacking. Elective officers are practically
independent one of another, and of the chief executive of the state
as well; and the control of the governor over the appointive
agencies is usually slight. With no single officer responsible for
the proper functioning of the organs of state administration, it is
not surprising to find the different administrative agencies look-
ing after their legislative needs quite independently and some-
times urging the enactment of measures which are in direct con-
flict. The public is accustomed to hold the governor responsible

Mathews, Principles of American State Administration, 169-170. In New
York, in 1919, there were five departments and numerous independent boards
having authority over the custody of state parks, reserves, and places of in-
terest; more than seven departments assessing and collecting taxes; more than
ten departments, boards, and commissions for state correctional and charitable
institutions. Legal functions were scattered through ten departments besides
that of the attorney-general; and there were numerous uncorrelated educa-
tional agencies. Committee on Reconstruction Report (1919), 7. Before re-
cent changes in Michigan, "responsibility and authority for dealing with
state financial problems had been distributed among every elected state officiai
and board except the lieutenant-governor. Thirty authorities divided responsi-
bility with the governor in administering state welfare work. Problems re-

lating to trade and commerce were divided among thirteen authorities. Educa-
tion and related questions were dealt with by five elected officials and twenty-
seven other authorities. . L. D. Upson, "Unscrambling Michigan's Gov-
ernment,” Nat. Mun. Rev., X, 361-362 (July, 1921).

25

XXXIX

for the success or the shortcomings of the state administration, CHAP. when in reality he can exercise little or no effective control over so large a number of administrative agencies, selected in such diverse ways, serving for such varying terms, and rarely removable by his independent action. Under the circumstances that exist "it is manifest that the governor does not govern, that he cannot govern, however serious his intentions to do so may be. Indeed, the whole administrative system on its legal and official side seems definitely calculated to prevent his governing."

Whatever unifying and harmonizing force there is comes, in many states, from the outside, being exerted by the "invisible government" of political organizations. "Here," in striking contrast to the state administrative system itself, "is leadership, here is a directing will, here is organization in such perfection that it is commonly spoken of as 'the organization' or 'the machine,' and these terms are descriptive." In these organizations "there are no loose ends, no irresponsible agents, no scattered bureaus and commissions. From the head downward authority is clearly defined, obedience is punctiliously exacted, the hierarchy is closely interlinked, complete, effective." In a few states "its work is manifest in all parts of the government; its hand guides every public act," although the public interest is rarely the dominant motive.1

Unity

imparted

only by the

"machine"

ness of

admin

istration:

The uneconomical character of state administration is partly 4. Costlitraceable to the unscientific way in which it is organized, as indi- state cated in the preceding pages. Other causes are to be found in the general absence of a modern or uniform system of accounting for the different executive departments and administrative boards and commissions; and especially in the absence, until very recently, of any arrangement for centralized purchasing of supplies and materials used by the various state offices and institutions. As in county and city administration, it has been the almost uniform practice to allow each state department or institution to purchase its own materials and supplies, subject to certain statutory regulations. For this disjointed and needlessly expensive system, centralized purchasing substitutes a purchasing bureau or agent to attend to these matters for the different administrative units.

1 E. Dawson, "The Invisible Government and Administrative Efficiency," Annals Amer. Acad. Polit. and Soc. Sci., LXIV, 11-30 (March, 1916). See also in this connection Elihu Root's address to the New York constitutional convention of 1915 entitled "Invisible Government," Rev. of Revs., LII, 465-467 (Oct., 1915).

(a) lack accounting purchasing

of proper

and

methods

CHAP. XXXIX

(b) lack

of a

budget

making authority

There are, of course, limits to the economies which can reasonably be expected from centralized purchasing, but there is no doubt that a great saving might be effected by its wider adoption, as the experience of the dozen states where the system has been tried abundantly proves.1

The high and increasing cost of state administration is also responsible traceable to the lack of a central agency or authority whose duty it is to study the financial needs of the various administrative departments, to collect and revise the estimates submitted by the several departments, and to prepare and submit for legislative consideration a definite and specific schedule of appropriations needed to insure the proper performance of the administrative functions of the state without waste or extravagance. In the lack of a carefully prepared budget covering all phases of state administration, the independent and uncorrelated officers, boards, and commissions are found vigorously competing one with another before the legislature, each striving to obtain the most generous appropriations possible, without reference to the needs of the others, and without much reference to the probable revenues of the state. Furthermore, there has been no effective centralized control over the expenditure of appropriations thus obtained; whence has arisen still farther waste and extravagance.

Movement for reform of state administration

Besides bringing to light these fundamental defects of state administration, the reports of economy and efficiency commissions have usually embodied certain definite suggestions and recommendations for a reorganization of the state administrative services; and these proposals have formed a starting-point for the movement for administrative consolidation which has developed in about a dozen states since 1916.2 By administrative consolidation is meant, chiefly, (1) reorganization of the numerous administrative offices into a few coördinated departments with heads; (2) authorization of the governor to appoint these department heads, who become directly responsible to him and serve as his cabinet; and (3) careful adjustment of the terms of department heads with reference

These states are Alabama, California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. On the subject of centralized purchasing, see A. G. Thomas, Principles of Governmental Purchasing (New York, 1919); A. E. Buck, "The Coming of Centralized Purchasing," Nat. Mun. Rev., Supplement, IX, 117 ff (1920).

Excellent summaries of this movement are to be found in the New York Committee on Reconstruction Report (1919), 233 ff, and A. E. Buck, "Administrative Consolidation in State Government,'' Nat. Mun. Rev., Supplement, VIII, 639 ff (Nov., 1919).