CHAP. ment. Small cities, in particular, are not in a position to employ men of high skill, and are frequently led into error and wasteful expenditure; and, although many of their local problems are alike, they generally act independently, and often in complete ignorance of the experience of other cities. They would be specially helped by the central agency suggested. REFERENCES C. A. Beard, American City Government (New York, 1912), Chap. II. F. J. Goodnow and F. G. Bates, Municipal Government (New York, 1919), A. C. McLaughlin and A. B. Hart, Cyclopedia of American Government (New H. L. McBain, The Law and the Practice of Municipal Home Rule (New H. N. Shepard, "The Thraldom of Massachusetts Cities," Nat. Mun. Rev., L. A. Tanzer, “Legislative Interference in Municipal Affairs and the Home O. K. Patton, "Home Rule in Iowa," Iowa Applied History, II, 87-210 (Iowa M. Fesler, "The Progress of Municipal Home Rule in Ohio," Nat. Mun. Rev., Ill. Const. Conv. Bull. No. 6, "Municipal Home Rule" (Springfield, 1920). For a brief note on the Pennsylvania state bureau of municipalities, see CHAPTER XLVI THE MAYOR-COUNCIL TYPE OF CITY GOVERNMENT No matter in which of the ways described in the preceding chapter a city obtains its charter, the scheme of government that it will have is almost certain to conform to one of three distinct types: mayor-council, commission, commission-manager. The principal features of the first type will be described in the present chapter, those of the second and third types in the chapter immediately following. The mayor-council form, which is still found in a decided majority of cities of more than thirty thousand inhabitants, is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers, and its most distinguishing feature is the conspicuous and influential position assigned to the chief executive. This chief executive is the mayor, who, accordingly, will first occupy our attention. American mayors are uniformly elected by direct popular vote, The mayor never by the council, as in Europe. Their term ranges from one year in some of the smaller cities, especially in New England, up to five years; in the largest cities, i.e., New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, St. Louis, Boston, and Baltimore, it is four years, but elsewhere it is most commonly two years. Mayors generally receive some compensation for their services, varying from a mere nominal sum in small places up to $10,000 in Boston, $12,000 in Philadelphia, $15,000 in New York, and $18,000 in Chicago. In the last three cities named the mayor's salary is greater than that of the governor of the respective states. and duties As the city's chief executive, the mayor is expected to enforce Powers the ordinances or local laws passed by the city council and to maintain order. He represents the city in its dealings with other municipalities and upon all ceremonial occasions. He is sometimes. given the right to pardon violators of municipal ordinances. He may also exercise more or less general supervision over the work of the various city departments, although in practice this function depends largely on his power to appoint and remove department 1 Except in some commission or commission-manager cities. See Chap. XLVII. CHAP. XLVI Appointments Removals Budgetmaking heads. The tendency in charter revisions where the mayor-council type of government has been retained is to increase the mayor's power and responsibility in appointments and removals. But in the great majority of cities his appointments do not take effect until they are approved by the council. This requirement was originally designed to check a possible abuse of the appointing power by an unscrupulous mayor, but it has often facilitated the shifting of responsibility for bad appointments back and forth between the mayor and the council and has furnished the occasion for many malodorous political trades between the mayor or his friends and the political factions represented in the council. The system is fraught with more possibilities for evil than for good, and it might well be superseded by a concentration in the hands of the mayor of entire authority and responsibility for the appointment of department heads, as has come about in New York and a few other places. In the national government the president, as we have seen, may remove officials without any action on the part of the Senate, even though the consent of that body was necessary for the original appointment.1 Many cities, however, not only require councilmanic confirmation of appointments but make the council's consent necessary to removals. This, of course, greatly reduces the effectiveness of the mayor's removing power, correspondingly diminishes his responsibility for the proper conduct of the city administration, and is sometimes a serious obstacle to the introduction of needed reforms. The tendency in recent charters has been to discard this feature along with councilmanic confirmation of appointments. Where the power of removal resides in the mayor alone, he is in a position not only to supervise but to control all departments of the city government. Closely related to the mayor's power over the administrative departments is the part which he frequently, although not in a majority of cities, plays in the preparation of the annual budget or financial program. This work used to be an exclusive function of the council, and in most cities it is still performed by a committee of that body. None the less, in an increasing number of cities the budget is drawn up by the mayor alone. Where this system prevails, as in Boston, no proposal to spend the city's money can legally be considered by the council unless it emanates from the mayor; all that the council can do is to reduce or strike out recom1See p. 259. XLVI mended appropriations. In New York City the budget is pre- CHAP. pared by the board of estimate and apportionment, of which the mayor is a member and in which he is given three votes. In many other places a tendency is manifest to allow the mayor a larger share in allocating city revenues. Furthermore, the mayor presides in council meetings in cities of Illinois and of some other states; and everywhere he is given a direct share in the enactment of such local legislation as is authorized by the city charter. He transmits to the council messages and recommendations, together with the reports of various city officials, and in all cities of the type now under consideration he may prevent or delay the enactment of ordinances, including the granting of franchises, by the use of the veto power, although his veto may usually be overridden by a two-thirds or three-fourths vote. Where the veto extends to separate items in appropriation bills, the mayor is in a position to prevent or check waste and extravagance, if he will, in the use of the city's funds. Although much more frequently exercised than the veto of the governor or the president, the mayor's veto has not contributed greatly to the efficiency of our city governments. In marked contrast, but contemporaneous, with the rise of the mayoralty in American cities has been the decline of the law-making branch, commonly known as the council or board of aldermen ; and it is interesting to observe in passing that these two tendencies in municipal affairs, the exaltation of the chief executive and the decline in popular confidence and esteem of the legislative branch, almost exactly synchronize with similar tendencies in the state and national governments. Why the council, which completely overshadowed the mayor and dominated the entire city administration before 1850 and still exercises important legislative powers, should to-day almost everywhere enjoy only a modicum of popular respect, is partly explained by the decline in the caliber of councilmen which set in about the middle of the nineteenth century when our cities were growing with unprecedented rapidity. With this growth came a corresponding expansion in the variety of municipal activities. At first, the administration of these services fell to committees of the council. But their incompetence led state legislatures very generally to strip the council of most of its administrative responsibilities and transfer them to independently chosen heads of departments, to popularly elected boards, even to state commissions, or else to entrust them to the mayor. Thus shorn of The council: decreased importance CHAP. XLVI Structure of the council most of its former administrative functions, the council now finds its legitimate activity almost wholly restricted to the sphere of municipal legislation-a sphere which in the average city is not sufficiently broad to challenge the interest and activity of men of first-rate ability; while in the largest cities, where the opportunities for distinction in the field of local legislation are more abundant and varied, adverse political conditions usually serve to deter men of more than fair ability from entering upon service in the council. Another partial explanation of the council's decline is to be found in the common practice of electing councilmen from small districts or wards, instead of on a general ticket for the entire city. The general ticket system is not without serious disadvantages, especially in our largest cities, but it could hardly prove less productive of high-grade councilmen than the ward system. Then, too, the matter of compensation, or the lack of it, enters into the explanation. Many cities either pay their councilmen nothing or allow them only nominal sums for which properly qualified men cannot afford to make the sacrifices which service in the council entails. Few facts connected with the mayor-council type of government are more to be regretted than that the council, with all its potentialities for good, should have so degenerated in many cities as to become a byword among the best citizens. It is truly "the lowest rung in the ladder of American public life," and, unfortunately, few of its members ever manage to rise above it; whereas, it ought to be at once the starting-point and the incentive for long, useful, and conspicuous political careers. There is no uniformity of size among city councils; seldom, indeed, outside of Illinois,2 does the size of the council bear any definite relation to the size of the city. New York has a board of aldermen of seventy-three members; 3 Chicago has a council of seventy members, although the number is soon to be reduced to fifty; and the number elsewhere runs downward all the way to nine, even in such large cities as Boston and Pittsburgh. Some councils, fur In the 99 cities of over 30,000 population in 1916 which had a singlechambered council, 46 elected councilmen by wards, 11 at large, and 42 by a combination of the two methods. In this state the number of council members is graduated by law according to population. The New York board of aldermen consists of the president of the board elected by the voters of the city at large, the five borough presidents (one elected in each borough), and sixty-seven aldermen elected from single-member districts. 'Most commission-governed cities have councils, or commissions, of five members. |