CHAP. XLVI of organization which have rapidly displaced the mayor-council type in this period will be described in the following chapter. REFERENCES W. B. Munro, Government of American Cities (3rd ed., New York, 1920), Government of European Cities (New York, 1909), 253-295. A. C. McLaughlin and A. B. Hart, Cyclopedia of American Government (New F. J. Goodnow and F. G. Bates, Municipal Government (New York, 1919), J. A. Fairlie, Municipal Administration (New York, 1901), Chaps. XVII, XIX; IV, VII. F. C. Howe, The British City (New York, 1907), Chap. III. R. M. Story, "The American Municipal Executive," Univ. of Ill. Studies, VII, J. P. Mitchel, "The Office of Mayor' [in New York], Acad. Polit. Sci. Pro- CHAPTER XLVII COMMISSION AND MANAGER GOVERNMENT mayor ment: The fundamental defect of the mayor-council type of city gov- Defects of ernment is the division of authority and consequent scattering of council responsibility. Legislative authority, for example, is divided be- governtween the council and the mayor, and each may, with some show of right, claim that the ultimate responsibility rests with the other. In administration, likewise, authority is diffused and responsibility scattered. Administrative functions are placed in the hands of a group of officials separate and distinct from the legislative body, and formal contacts between the two arise only when the council is called upon to confirm the appointment of department heads by the mayor, to vote the annual appropriations for the work of the 1. Fundadepartments, and to pass ordinances creating, reorganizing, or abolishing departments. Because of their joint participation (usually) in the selection of department heads, the mayor and council divide responsibility for the efficiency or lack of efficiency in the city's administrative services. As the legislative body, the 'council has no legal right to meddle with the details of city administration. In practice, however, few city activities are found to be outside the sphere of councilmanic influence. Over and over it has been proved that the body which provides the money to carry on departmental activities will in one way or another have something to say concerning the expenditure of its appropriations. mental dental The foregoing defects seem to be inherent in, if not inseparable 2. Incifrom, the system of checks and balances, "another name for which is friction, confusion, and irresponsibility." But there are certain other shortcomings which, although not fundamental and inherent, are almost universally associated with the mayor-council form. In the first place, the council is usually a much larger body than is necessary in order to represent the various elements in the city and to transact the city's legislative business satisfactorily. Where the bicameral plan persists, the division of authority and responsibility is carried still farther, and the ordinary citizen is usually completely in the dark as to who is to blame for what passes the council CHAP. XLVII Reformed mayorcouncil government Commission government or is smothered in committee. In almost every mayor-council city there is, too, an unnecessarily large number of elective officers who have purely routine functions, all or practically all minutely prescribed by state law or city ordinance. Besides dividing responsibility for the city administration, the popular election of such non-policy-determining officers lengthens the ballot, confuses the voter, and serves no purpose except to enable political machines more easily to secure and retain control of the city government. To these defects must be added the evils arising from the almost universal ward system of electing members of the council, from their nomination and election by a cumbersome and expensive partisan primary and election system, from the absence of any method of quickly removing unsatisfactory officials from office, from the inability of the people to secure needed ordinances if the council fails to enact them, and from the absence of any popular veto upon legislative acts of the mayor and council which may be opposed to the best interests of the community. Not a few cities, attributing the unsatisfactory character of their government merely or mainly to these incidental defects, have simply lopped off one or more of them or, more rarely, have attempted to graft upon the old stock some of the newer political devices. Thus many cities have reduced the size of the council and the number of elective officials, or abolished the bicameral council, or replaced the ward system with election at large, or discontinued partisan primaries and substituted either nomination by petition or non-partisan primaries and elections, or concentrated the appointing power in the mayor, or authorized the popular referendum in the case of all franchise ordinances, or even provided for the popu lar initiative and referendum in connection with other ordinances. Such piecemeal reforms have produced some good results. But they do not go to the root of some of the most serious municipal ills. Recognizing this fact, more than five hundred cities have openly repudiated the old doctrine of separation of powers, with its checks and balances, divided authority, and diffused and diluted responsibility, and have substituted therefor either the commission. or the manager form of government. The first step in this direction was taken by Galveston in 1900. Progress was slow for a few years, but after Des Moines reconstructed its government on the commission basis in 1907 the plan spread rapidly, especially among the smaller cities of the country, although it has also been adopted XLVII in almost a hundred cities of more than 30,000 inhabitants, in- CHAP. cluding half a dozen with populations in excess of 200,000, namely, Buffalo, New Orleans, Jersey City, Newark, St. Paul, and Portland, Oregon. Commission government is now authorized by law in all but four states-New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Delaware. features Commission government involves greatly simplified machinery. Essential In place of a bicameral council, or the large and unwieldy single chamber, in place of a mayor and a council each having some of the powers which belong primarily to the other and each serving as a check upon the other, in place of theoretically separate and independent legislative and administrative departments, one finds a small commission, consisting usually of five members elected by popular vote and made conspicuous by the smallness of their number and the abolition of practically all other elective municipal offices. In this commission are concentrated all the legislative and all the administrative authority of the city government. As the legislative body, the commission has the ordinance power enjoyed by the council in mayor-council cities, including the right to fix the tax rate and pass the annual appropriation bills. As an administrative body, it exercises all of the administrative authority which in mayor-council cities is shared by the mayor, administrative departments, and council. Each member is assigned to serve as the head of one of the five departments into which the administrative work is usually divided; and the commission appoints the subordinate officials unless the selection has been left to individual commissioners or to a special civil service commission. In brief, the essence of commission government is the complete fusion of both legislative and administrative duties, and a consequent centralization of responsibility in the hands of a very small group of conspicuous officials. features The foregoing constitute the essential features of the commis- Incidental sion system. But, in addition to them, certain non-essential or incidental features are almost invariably found and contribute in no small measure to the success of the plan. For example, almost everywhere the ward system has been abolished and the members of the commission are elected from the entire city, an arrangement which helps to make the office of commissioner more conspicuous and attractive. Moreover, candidates for the commission are generally nominated either by petition or by non-partisan primary, and are voted for on election day by means of a non-partisan bal |