to evade their duty as citizens by presenting the indictment or information must contain excuses when called upon to serve as jurors, and many others, when examined upon their voir dire, through a lack of comprehension of their duties as jurors, or from pride of opinion, refuse to express a willingness to lay aside from their minds an opinion based solely upon street rumor or newspaper reports and decide the case solely under the law and upon the evidence produced upon the trial. The examination of the juror in question showed, not only that he was competent, but that he possessed more than an ordinary understanding of his duties as a juror.

(316 Ill. 502)

(147 N.E.)

a judgment to him by means of a false and

PEOPLE ex rel. CHICAGO BAR ASS'N v. worthless check. The proof shows that for

HANSEN. (No. 14362.)

(Supreme Court of Illinois. April 24, 1925.) 1. Attorney and client 38-Duty of Supreme Court to discipline attorneys doing acts tending to reproach legal profession.

With the privilege which the Supreme Court enjoys of placing the names of suitable persons on its roll of attorneys comes the responsibility of disciplining such of its officers as commit acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession.

2. Attorney and client 37-Power to discipline attorney ought to be exercised with judgment and great moderation.

Power of Supreme Court to discipline attorney ought to be exercised with judgment and great moderation.

3. Attorney and client 53(2)-To Justify disbarment, proof of misconduct and of fraudulent and dishonest motives must be clear and satisfactory.

To justify disbarment of attorney, proof of misconduct, and of fraudulent and dishonest motives accompanying it, must be clear and satisfactory.

a number of years he had acted as the attorney for the F. S. Ketcham Company; that the company owed him fees amounting to about $2,000; that the company became insolvent, and several judgments were entered against it; that in 1919 the Waukesha Lime & Cement Company recovered a judgment for $1,100 against the company; that about the same time the Susquehanna Coal Company recovered a judgment for $2,200; that a decree of foreclosure was entered against the company, and the time within which the company could redeem expired in August, 1920. The judgments held by the Waukesha Company and the Susquehanna Company were worthless, and neither of them cared to exercise the creditor's right to redeem. Shortly before November 19, 1920 (the date when the right of the creditors to redeem would expire), each of the judgments mentioned was sold to respondent for $200. Respondent and his brother were law partners, and it was necessary for both of them to sign a check in order to draw against the partnership fund.

It is at this point in the evidence where the dispute begins. Respondent says the at

4. Attorney and client 53(2)—Evidence held insufficient to disbar attorney. Evidence held insufficient to disbar attor-torneys for the Waukesha Company solicited ney as for obtaining assignment of judgment by false and worthless check, and for unprofessional conduct in handling litigation, and for fraudulently converting certain property. 5. Attorney and client 38-That attorney's conduct placed him in position raising question as to his integrity as lawyer held not willful professional misconduct.

That conduct of attorney in engaging in business ventures and extending his credit further than his resources justified was subject to criticism, in that he placed himself in a position where his integrity as a lawyer could be questioned, held not alone sufficient to constitute willful professional misconduct.

him to buy their judgment and that negotiations continued for several days; that his client had no funds with which to pay the price demanded, and that he finally agreed to buy the judgment himself, in the hope that by redeeming from the foreclosure proceedings he might secure some satisfaction of his claim for fees against the Ketcham Company; that he and his brother had dissolved partnership some months before, and that he was winding upon the partnership business; that he told Daniel S. Jerka, the attorney then representing the Waukesha Company, that he did not then have the cash to pay for the assignment, but that he would give him a check which Jerka should hold until he could settle up some matters and get the funds to meet it; that he told Jerka where he could reach his brother by tele

Disbarment proceeding by the People, on the relation of the Chicago Bar Association, against Otto S. Hansen. Rule discharged. John L. Fogle, of Chicago, for relator. William Friedman, of Chicago, for respond-phone, and that he should have him counter

ent.

THOMPSON, J. This is an original proceeding to strike the name of Otto S. Hansen from the roll of attorneys of this court. The commissioner to whom the cause was referred for hearing has reported that the conduct of respondent is subject to criticism, but that the acts of which complaint is made were not done with fraudulent and dishonest motives. He recommends that the rule be discharged.

sign the check before it was presented for payment.

Jerka testifies that respondent proposed buying the Waukesha judgment and agreed to pay $200 for an assignment; that he executed the assignment and received a check signed, "Hansen & Hansen, by O. S. Hansen;" that nothing was said about his holding the check, and that he does not remember that he was told that the check must be countersigned by Walt Hansen; that the following day he received a telephone call from The first count of the information charges Walt, advising him that he was coming over respondent with obtaining the assignment of to countersign the check; that he held the For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

check for about 10 days, waiting for Walt, by the Consumers' Company. No useful purto countersign it; that witness telephoned | pose will be served by setting out at greater him repeatedly, demanding that he come and length the details of this transaction. It is countersign the check, and that finally Walt sufficient to say that the officers of the Contold him that it would be all right to de- sumers' Company testified on the hearing beposit the check; that the check was later fore the commissioner that there had been returned marked, "Insufficient funds." some misunderstanding between them and respondent, but that they were now convinced that respondent did not intentionally mislead them; that respondent had represented them for a number of years in many matters, and that they were satisfied with his services; that the difficulty with respondent arose because he undertook to engage in business be

Walt Hansen testifies that Jerka called him and said that he had a check which it was necessary for Walt to countersign; that he told Jerka that he would consult his brother before he decided what to do; that he saw his brother, and learned for the first time about the purchase of the Waukesha judgment; that he protested against advanc-yond his credit, but that they had no eviing more money for the benefit of the Ketcham Company, and refused to countersign the check. It further appears from the evidence that respondent agreed to become personally responsible for the $200 and promised to pay it as soon as he could get the money. He did pay it in February, 1921.

dence of fraudulent or dishonest conduct on the part of respondent.

The third count charges respondent with fraudulently converting to his own use certain property of E. F. Johnson. During the time respondent was attorney for the Consumers' Company, Johnson was its cashier. They were friends, and for five or six years joined in small business ventures in their own behalf. At first the amounts invested by each were small, but the ventures were uniformly successful. Respondent handled all the business as an individual, and never acted for Johnson as an attorney. When respondent became interested in the Caton street apartment building, it required all the funds he had, and all he could borrow, to complete the building. Johnson joined him in this venture, and advanced sums of money aggregating about $5,000. As long as the ventures proved successful, Johnson was satisfied, but when it appeared that respondent might not make a profit on this undertaking Johnson began to demand personal security. Respondent complied with this demand and gave Johnson his note for $5,000. This was not given in payment of Johnson's claim but as security for it. Later the note was taken up, and certain notes signed by L. E. Poole and Hazel S. Poole, aggregating $4,680, were delivered to Johnson, who says they were delivered to him as his property, and that he required respondent to indorse them before he would accept them.

The second count charges respondent with unprofessional conduct in handling litigation for the Consumers' Company of Chicago. The evidence shows that one Ferngren, a contractor, bought building materials from the Consumers' Company which he used in the construction of several buildings; that one of these buildings was at 2121-2129 Caton street, Chicago; that this building was being erected for one Protowski; that notices for mechanic's lien were served by the employee of the Consumers' Company who had charge of such matters; that the Ferngren account was placed in the hands of respondent for collection; that he ascertained that the notices had not been served within the time required by the statute, and that he could not perfect a lien against the Caton street property. He reported to the Consumers' Company the condition of the title to the Caton street and other properties, and suggested to those in charge of this branch of the company's business that he would undertake to borrow the money and complete the apartment building on Caton street, and thereby make it possible for the company to collect its claim, if they would authorize him to clear up the title, so that he could offer the property for security. After considerable negotiation the property was conveyed to a trustee, and respondent proceeded with the construction of the apartment building. Subsequently new attorneys were employed by the Consumers' Company, and liti-ent. gation arose with respect to the Ferngren account.

Respondent was charged in the pleadings with misrepresenting to the Consumers' Company the facts with respect to the Caton street property. He denied the charges of unprofessional conduct, but authorized his attorney to consent to the entry of a judgment against him for the amount claimed

Respondent says they were delivered to Johnson, so that the latter could negotiate them and get the cash to use in their joint building venture. Johnson had a third interest in the Caton street property and made many trips to the property with the respondWhen Johnson failed to negotiate the notes they were delivered to respondent, who finally secured $2,500 on them. When Johnson became alarmed, and thought the venture was not going to show a profit he employed an attorney, and through him charged respondent with fraudulently converting the Poole notes to his own use. Respondent says he did not want to have a criminal charge filed against him, notwithstanding his inno

(147 N.E.)

ence, and sò he agreed to Johnson's demand, | with respect to the Caton street property as and made substantial payments to him, and agreed to personally assume the balance claimed.

soon as it was completed and sold. His error was in engaging in business ventures foreign to the practice of law and in extending his credit further than his resources justified.

[5] While respondent's conduct in placing himself in a position where his integrity as a lawyer could be questioned merits criticism, yet we cannot hold that he was thereby guilty of willful professional misconduct. The rule is discharged. Rule discharged.

[1-3] With the privilege which this court enjoys of placing the names of suitable persons upon its roll of attorneys comes the responsibility of disciplining such of its officers as commit acts which tend to bring reproach upon the legal profession. It is essential to the orderly administration of justice that the respectability of the bar. be maintained, and while the power to discipline, which resides in this court, ought to be exercised with judgment and great moderation, we have not hesitated to strike from the roll of attorneys the names of those guilty of unprofessional conduct. To justify such action on our part, proof of misconduct, (Supreme Court of Illinois. and of the fraudulent and dishonest motives accompanying it, must be clear and satisfac-1. Wills 543-Rules as to interpretation of

tory. People v. Pio, 308 III. 128, 139 N. E. 45; People v. Lasley, 302 Ill. 595, 135 N. E. 50;

People v. Matthews, 217 Ill. 94, 75 N. E. 444; People v. Barker, 56 Ill. 299.

[4] We fail to find in this record evidence of that clear and positive character which the law undoubtedly requires to establish a charge so grave in its nature and so farreaching in its consequences. The evidence shows that respondent has by his conduct injured no one but himself. The evidence under the first count shows that, in his effort to save something from the wreck of his client's business failure, he obligated himself to pay $200 for a worthless judgment. If his story of the transaction is true, he is guilty of no offense, except that of contracting a debt he could not readily pay. He is corroborated to some extent by the testimony of his brother and by other matters in evidence, and is contradicted only by the testimony of Jerka. If we give to Jerka's testimony, standing alone, as much credit as we give to all of the evidence to the contrary, there is not then a preponderance of the evidence supporting the charge against respondent made in the first count.

DRAGER v. MCINTOSH.

devise over stated.

(316 Ill. 460) (No. 16365.)

April 24, 1925.)

in case of his death to another in fee, devise When a devise is made to person in fee and, over will be interpreted as referring only to death in testator's lifetime, but when death of first taker is coupled with other circumstances, as death under age or without children, devise over takes effect on death under circumstances indicated, whether before or after death of testator, unless controlled by other provisions of will.

2. Wills 540, 601 (1)-Will devising property to children with devise over on death of any such children held to refer to death at any time and to vest life estate in each of such children.

Under devise in fee to testator's children and, in case of death of any child, leaving bodily heirs, then to such children, but, in case of death without surviving children, his interest held, that devise over contemplated death at any should go to remainder of testator's children, time, whether before or after that of testator, and each child of testator takes a life estate, not a vested fee.

3.

Wills

634 (8)-Rule stated where devise

to children with devise over on their death with or without issue is preceded by particular life estate.

Where devise to testator's children is preceded by particular estate as to testator's wid-, ow for life, and further provision is made for devise over on death of any of testator's children with or without children surviving them, estate dependent on death of previous taker will take effect, if contingency happens at any and death without issue means death before time during continuance of particular estate, death of life tenant, unless will shows that testator intended to refer to a later date than termination of life estate.

The officers of the Consumers' Company entirely exonerate respondent from any wrongdoing in connection with the charges made in the second count. In so far as the charges contained in the third count are concerned, it seems clear that there was no intent on the part of respondent to defraud Johnson. As long as their joint business ventures proved successful, Johnson was satisfied. He had full confidence in respondent, and let him manage their business undertakings according to his judgment. All Johnson expected was an accounting when the transaction was closed. There is no evidence in this record to indicate that respondent did not expect to Though certain language in will is sufficient make an honest and complete accounting to devise a fee simple, testator's intention is

4. Wills 597(1)-Intention of testator to devise fee simple not to be ascertained from particular item of will but from consideration of whole will.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 147 N.E.-28

not to be ascertained from that item alone, but | ascertaining testator's intention as well as in if, from consideration of whole will, intention determining effect of provisions of his will, and expressed is that estate should be less than language must be construed according to rules fee simple, it is wholly immaterial in what of construction prevailing in Illinois. part of will such intention is manifested.

5. Wills 602, 603 (1)-Fee simple may be granted subject to termination on happening of future event.

An estate in fee simple may be granted subject to a condition that it shall terminate on the happening of some future event.

6. Wills 601(1)-Intention to limit estate in fee simple given effect, where intention clearly shown.

The language of a clause in a will, creating a limitation on the grant of an estate in fee simple, must be as clear as clause creating estate, and, if it shows clearly an intention to impose limitation upon estate, intention will be given effect.

7. Wills 472-Later clause repugnant to earlier prevails, where irreconcilable.

Every clause and provision of will should be given effect according to testator's intention, if possible, but, where later clause is so repugnant to an earlier that reconciliation is impossible, later clause is considered as intended to modify or abrogate earlier.

8. Wills 598-Words of inheritance were not necessary to transfer estate of inheritance before enactment of statute.

Prior to enactment of section 13 of statute on conveyances, words of inheritance were not necessary to transfer an estate of inheritance, but any words fairly indicating intention to devise fee simple were sufficient.

9. Wills 470-Testator's intention to be determined from consideration of all language of will.

The whole will should be considered in interpreting it, and testator's intention should be determined from consideration of all language in whatever portion of will it might be found. 10. Wills 470-Statute held not to establish rule of construction of wills which would prevent consideration of entire will.

Section 13 of statute on conveyances does not establish a rule of construction which would prevent consideration of all language in will, and its only effect is to make every devise of an interest in lands a devise of fee-simple estate, unless otherwise limited.

11. Wills 436-Will of real estate construed according to law of jurisdiction in which property situated.

Will of real estate is construed according to law of jurisdiction in which property is situated and, where testator by single will devises lands lying in two or more states, courts of such states will respectively construe it as to lands situated in them.

12. Wills 436-In construing foreign will affecting real estate in Illinois, laws of linois govern in ascertaining testator's inten

tion and in determining effect of will.

In construing a foreign will affecting real estate in Illinois, the laws of Illinois govern in

13. Wills

638-Conveyance by owners of life estate and reversions held to destroy contingent remainders, vesting grantee with title in fee.

Where testator's children on his death became entitled to life estates in property devised to them, with contingent remainders on their death to their children who might survive them, or to their surviving brothers and sisters, the reversion descends to testator's children as his heirs, and the conveyance by such children, who owned both the life estate and reversion, destroyed the contingent remainders, so that grantee in deed became owner of premises in fee, and such conveyance was not affected by Laws 1921, p. 470, which was passed subsequent to such conveyance, as such act is not retroactive.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Livingston County; Stevens R. Baker, Judge.

Bill for specific performance by Gustav G. Drager against William G. McIntosh. From a decree for specific performance, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

H. G. Greenebaum, of Pontiac, and Cyril A. Burns, of Fairbury, for appellant. Kennedy & Kennedy, of Bloomington, for appellee.

DUNN, J. The appellant and appellee entered into a contract for the exchange of real estate in Livingston county, each to give to the other an abstract showing a "good, merchantable, and sufficient" title to the property he agreed to convey. Abstracts of title were exchanged, and the appellee on the date fixed for that purpose offered to perform the contract, but the appellant refused to accept the offer, because he had been advised by his attorney that the title offered was not good. The appellant concedes that the appellee has fully complied with the contract if his title is good, and that is the only question presented for decision. The appellee filed his bill in the circuit court of Livingston county for the specific performance of the contract. The appellant demurred, the demurrer was overruled, and a decree for specific performance was rendered, from which the defendant appealed.

The premises in question were formerly owned by John Crabb, a resident of Jasper County, Ind., where he died on September 1, 1916, having on July 17, 1909, executed his will, which was probated in the circuit court of Jasper county, Ind., and on February 25, 1918, was probated in Livingston county, IlI. His heirs were his seven adult children. The will in three items made a complete disposition of the testator's property, as follows:

"Item 1. It is my will that all my just debts and funeral expenses be all first fully paid.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes