Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263. ting the two provisos of the later statutes first, and the general rule of the earlier statute last, but hardly changing the words of either, except so far as necessary to connect them together, cannot be held to have altered the scope and purpose of these enactments, or of any of them. It is not to be inferred that congress, in revising and consolidating the statutes, intended tochange their effect, unless an intention to do so is clearly expressed. Potter v. National Bank, 102 U. S., 163; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S., 619; United States v. Ryder, 110 U. S., 729, 740. It may be added that congress has enacted that any person. convicted of perjury, or subornation of perjury, under the laws of the United States, shall be incapable of giving testimony in any court of the United States until the judgment is reversed; Rev. Stat., § 5392, 5393; and has made specific provisions as. to the competency of witnesses in criminal cases, by permitting a defendant in any criminal case to testify on the trial, at his own request; and by making the lawful husband or wife of the accused a competent witness in any prosecution for bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation. Act of March 16, 1878, c. 37; 20 Stat., 30; Act of March 3, 1887, c. 397; 24 Stat., 635. For the reasons above stated, the provision of section 858 of the Revised Statutes, that "the laws of the state in which the court is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States in trials at common law, and in equity and admiralty," has no application to criminal trials; and, therefore, the competency of witnesses in criminal trials in the courts of the United States held within the state of Texas is not governed by a statute of the state which was first enacted in 1858, but, except so far as congress. has made specific provisions upon the subject, is governed by the common law, which, as has been seen, was the law of Texas before the passage of that statute and at the time of the admission of Texas into the union as a state. At common law, and on general principles of jurisprudence, when not controlled by express statute giving effect within the state which enacts it to a conviction and sentence in another state, such conviction and sentence can have no effect, by way Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263. of penalty, or of personal disability or disqualification, beyond the limits of the state in which the judgment is rendered. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S., 265; Commonwealth r. Green, 17 Mass., 515; Sims v. Sims, 75 N. Y., 466; National Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y., 400; Story on Conflict of Laws, 92; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 376. It follows that the conviction of Martin in North Carolina did not make him incompetent to testify on the trial of this case. The competency of Spear to testify is equally clear. He was convicted and sentenced in Texas; and the full pardon of the governor of the state, although granted after he had served out his term of imprisonment, thenceforth took away all disqualifications as a witness, and restored his competency to testify to any facts within his knowledge, even if they came to his knowledge before his disqualification had been removed by the pardon. Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S., 450; United States v. Jones (before Mr. Justice Thompson), 2 Wheeler Crim. Cas. 451, 461; Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. App., 498; s. c. 51 Am. R. 330; Thornton v. State, 20 Tex. App., 519. Whether the conviction of either witness was admissible to affect his credibility is not before us, because the ruling on that question was in favor of the plaintiffs in error. Note on the Removal of the Disqualifications of Felons. NOTE ON THE REMOVAL OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS OF FELONS. At common law neither mere verdict of guilty, nor plea of guilty, unless followed by sentence, disqualifies one from testifying as a witness. People v. McGloin, 12 Abb. N. C., 172; s. c. 91 N. Y., 241. The rule was the same under the New York and Massachusetts statutes. Ib. Fay v. Harlan, 128 Mass., 244. Modern statutes have removed this disqualification (for New York statute see N. Y. Code Crim. Pro., $413). And such a statute applies even though the felony was perjury, and perjury committed in the same matter. People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y., 251, 266. Under such statutes the previous conviction for crime of one called as a witness, may, for the purpose of affecting the credit due to his testimony, be shown, either by the record or by his cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry; and the party cross-examining him is not concluded by his answer to such a question. People v. McGloin (above cited). So held under N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., $2832. Comin. v. Ford, 15 Northeast. Rep., 153. Where a felon is incompetent, oral evidence of his conviction, etc., drawn out on his cross-examination without objection, is sufficient to entitle the objecting party to have his testimony struck out. People v. Perry, 86 N. Y., 353. The record of a former conviction received in evidence cannot be contradicted by testimony that the convict was innocent. Comm. v. Gallagher, 126 Mass., 54. S. P., Myers v. State, 92 Ind., 390 (holding that it cannot be attacked collaterally). For recent cases on the removal of the DISQUALIFICATION BY STATUTE, see the following: Florida: Williams v. Dickenson, 28 Fla., 90; s. c. 9 Southern Rep., 847 (conviction for statutory offense of house burning does not disqualify). Georgia: Brunswick, etc., R. Co. v. Clew, 1888, 7 Southeast. Rep., 84 (Ga. Code §3854). Note on the Removal of the Disqualifications of Felons. Kentucky: Commonwealth v. Minor, 1890, 13 Southwest. Rep., 5 (Ky. Gen. Stat. C. 29, Art. 8); Commonwealth v. McQuire, 84 Ky., 57. Louisiana: State v. McManus, 42 La. Ann., 494 (La. Act, 1886, No. 29); State v. Mock, 41 id., 1079. New York: People v. O'Neil, 48 Hun, 36; Affd. in 16 Northeast. Rep., 68 (under N. Y. Penal Code, $714, even conviction for perjury does not disqualify). Tennessee: Rayland v. State, 1888, 7 Southwest. Rep., 456 (Tenn. Acts, 1887, C. 79, $1). United States United States v. Hollis, 43 Fed. Rep., 248 (under 20 U. S. Stat. at large, 30, permitting accused to testify in his own behalf does not render him competent if previously convicted of an infamous crime); but compare Ransom v. State (Ark. 1887), 4 Southwest. Rep., 658. CONVICTION.-Missouri: State v. Rose, 1887, 4 Southwest. Rep., 733 (unless the witness is identified as the person named in the record of conviction, he may testify). Texas: Petner v. State, 1887, 5 id., 210 (conviction in another state disqualifies under Tex. Code Crim. Pro., $730). Jones v. State, Tex. App., 1893, 22 Southwest. Rep., 404, (before sentence is actually pronounced or pending an appeal from a sentence of conviction, the accused is not a convict as defined by Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 27, and is not therefore disqualified as a witness); contra, Woods v. State, 26 Tex. App., 490; s. c. 10 Southwest. Rep., 108. United States: United States v. Hall, D. C., 1893, 53 Fed. Rep., 352 (upon a criminal trial in a federal court in Pennsylvania, a person convicted of murder by a court of that state is disqualified as a witness. Virginia: Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va., 935; s. c. 11 Southeast. Rep., 759 (one found guilty of a felony, but not sentenced, is not disqualified as a witness). People v. Dohring, 59 N. Y., 374. PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. DOHRING. New York Court of Appeals, 1874. [Reported in 59 N. Y., 374.] It seems that a juror may be a witness on the trial before himself and his fellows, first being sworn as a witness, besides having been sworn as a juror. It seems that where the judge is actually trying the cause and his presence is necessary to constitute the court, he cannot against objection testify as a witness in such cause. A justice of the peace, while sitting as an associate judge in the Court of Session on the trial of a prisoner, was examined as a witness, and gave material evidence in the case without objection. Held, that though [reviewing authorities] this was error for which conviction might have been reversed had exception been taken, yet the court did not thereby lose jurisdiction; for all the component parts of the court remained present taking part in the trial. The defendant, Charles Dohring, was indicted at the Court of Sessions for rape committed upon one Frederica Brussow, a girl of about fourteen years of age, while she was living with him as a servant. The power to hold Court of Sessions is given by the constitution of the state of New York (article VI, § 15) in these words: "The county judge, with two justices of the peace, to be designated according to law, may hold Courts of Session, with such criminal jurisdiction as the legislature shall prescribe, and he shall perform such other duties as may be required by law." At the trial, Alden S. Baker, one of the judges, was called from the bench to the stand as a witness on the part of the prisoner, and also recalled by the prosecution, and he gave substantial testimony during the progress of the trial, without objection. In the Court of Sessions defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court at General Term reversed the judgment, being of the opinion that while Justice Baker was upon the witness stand, there was no lawfully constituted court. It was disorganized by calling him from the bench and subjecting him to examination as a witness, and there was no court to pass upon the |