Service of complaints, orders and other processes; return (f) Complaints, orders, and other processes of the Commission under this section may be served by anyone duly authorized by the Commission, either (a) by delivering a copy thereof to the person to be served, or to a member of the partnership to be served, or the president, secretary, or other executive officer or a director of the corporation to be served; or (b) by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or the principal office or place of business of such person, partnership, or corporation; or (c) by mailing a copy thereof by registered mail or by certified mail addressed to such person, partnership, or corporation at his or its residence or principal office or place of business. The verified return by the person so serving said complaint, order, or other process setting forth the manner of said service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt for said complaint, order, or other process mailed by registered mail or by certified mail as aforesaid shall be proof of the service of the same. Finality of order (g) An order of the Commission to cease and desist shall become final(1) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if no such petition has been duly filed within such time; but the Commission may thereafter modify or set aside its order to the extent provided in the last sentence of subsection (b); or (2) Upon the expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed, or the petition for review dismissed by the court of appeals, and no petition for certiorari has been duly filed; or (3) Upon the denial of a petition for certiorari, if the order of the Commission has been affirmed or the petition for review dismissed by the court of appeals; or (4) Upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court, if such Court directs that the order of the Commission be affirmed or the petition for review dismissed. Same; order modified or set aside by Supreme Court (h) If the Supreme Court directs that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside, the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court shall become final upon th expiration of thirty days from the time it was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected to accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. Same; order modified or set aside by Court of Appeals (i) If the order of the Commission is modified or set aside by the court of appeals, and if (1) the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired and no such petition has been duly filed, or (2) the petition for certiorari ras been denied, or (3) the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered in accordance with the mandate of the court of appeals shall become final on the expiration of thirty days from the time such order of the Commission was rendered, unless within such thirty days either party has instituted proceedings to have such order corrected so that it will accord with the mandate, in which event the order of the Commission shall become final when so corrected. Same; rehearing upon order or remand (j) If the Supreme Court orders a rehearing; or if the case is remanded by the court of appeals to the Commission for a rehearing, and if (1) the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari has expired, and no such petition has been duly filed, or (2) the petition for certiorari has been denied, or (3) the decision of the court has been affirmed by the Supreme Court, then the order of the Commission rendered upon such rehearing shall become final in the same manner as though no prior order of the Commission had been rendered. Investigations of violations of antitrust statutes (d) Upon the direction of the President or either House of Congress to investigate and report the facts relating to any alleged violations of the antitrust Acts by any corporation. Readjustment of business of corporations violating antitrust statutes (e) Upon the application of the Attorney General to investigate and make recommendations for the readjustment of the business of any corporation alleged to be violating the antitrust Acts in order that the corporation may thereafter maintain its organization, management, and conduct of business in accordance with law. Publication of information; reports (f) To make public from time to, time such portions of the information obtained by it hereunder, except trade secrets and names of customers, as it shall deem expedient in the public interest; and to make annual and special reports to the Congress and to submit therewith recommendations for additional legisiation; and to provide for the publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for public information and use. Classification of corporations; rcgulations (g) From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of sections 41-46 and 47-58 of this title. Investigations of foreign trade conditions; reports (h) To investigate, from time to time, trade conditions in and with foreign countries where associations, combinations, or practices of manufacturers, merchants, or traders, or other conditions, may affect the foreign trade of the United States, and to report to Congress thereon, with such recommendations as it deems advisable. Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311, § 6, 38 Stat. 721. APPENDIX B INSOFAR THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT The Federal Trade Commission Act, which became law in 1914, during President Wilson's administration, was significant, innovative legislation. Its precise terms were carefully considered and thoroughly debated. The reported history is full enough to shed light on what Congress meant by what it finally enacted. Insofar as the history of the Federal Trade Commission Act bears on the question whether the Commission was given power to promulgate substantive or legislative-type rules, its import is unmistakable. Congress repeatedly rejected proposals to supply what is lacking in the Act-a provision conferring substantive or legislative-type rule-making authority on the commission. The rejection was deliberate and unambiguous. The first rule-making amendment was offered by Congressman Lafferty, a member of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, which had reported a bill similar to the one that later passed the House. That bill created a Commission only to investigate and gather information. See Federal Trade Commission bill, Comparative Print, S. Doc. No. 573, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1914). Congressman Lafferty filed a minority report in which he proposed to give the Commission enforcement powers as well. See H.R. Rep. No. 533, Part 3, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 19-22 (1914). The specific provisions he proposed included: "Sec. 19. That unfair or oppressive competition and unfair trade practices in commerce among the several States and with foreign nations as hereinafter defined are hereby declared unlawful. "Sec. 20. That the Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent all corporations or associations subject to the jurisdiction of said Commission from engaging in such unfair or oppressive competition or unfair trade practices. "Sec. 21. That unfair or oppressive competition and unfair trade practices as used in this Act are hereby defined to include the following: “(j) Any other methods involving unfair or oppressive competition or unfair trade practices, contrary to the provisions of this Act, or contrary to the provisions of any of the antitrust Acts now existing or which may hereinafter be enacted. "Sec. 22. That the Commission is empowered to make, alter or repeal regulations further defining more particularly unfair trade practices or unfair or oppressive competition made unlawful by this or any other Act." (Emphasis supplied.) Sections 23 and 24 of the Lafferty amendment went on to provide that the Commission could find a corporation to be engaged in unfair competition and issue an order restraining the unfair competition which it could if necessary petition a United States district court to enforce. The Lafferty amendment would also have left intact the provision in Section 8 of the original House bill that empowered the Commission to "from time to time make rules and regulations and classifications of corporations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act." See H.R. Rep. No. 533, Part 3, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1914). The Lafferty amendment thus contained the basic statutory provisions that were eventually enacted, as well as a specific provision authorizing general substantive or legislative-type rule-making by the Commission. It included in Section 19 (taken together with Section 21(j)) the equivalent of what is now codified Section 5(a) (1). Section 20 was a close equivalent to the present Section 5(a) (6) and Sections 23 and 24 were the equivalent of the present Section 5(b). Section 8 of the original House bill as retained in the Lafferty amendment is the forerunner of the present Section 6(g). Included also in the Lafferty amendment was Section 22, a specific authorization to the Commission "to make, alter, or repeal regulations further defining more particularly unfair trade practices or unfair or oppressive competition." This piece of history alone makes untenable the Commission's reliance on Sections 6(g) and 5(a)(6) as authority for its rule-making power. For when the predecessors to these provisions first appeared it was thought necessary that they should be accompanied by an explicit provision granting to the Commission rule-making authority. The House committee rejected Congressman Lafferty's proposal and reported the original bill granting only investigatory powers to the Commission. Thus, the subsequent appearance of provisions similar to present Sections 6(g) and 5(a) (6) without the accompanying section explicity granting to the Commission substantive or legislative-type rule-making power demonstrates both that Congress rejected the proposal that the Commission should be granted the power here asserted and that these other provisions cannot be interpreted to grant that authority. When the House bill reached the floor (without the Lafferty amendments described above) there were a number of additional explicit indications that any grant of substantive or legislative-type rule-making authority to the Commission was unacceptable to Congress. During the debate on May 19, 1914, reference was made to another House bill, H.R. 1890, which would have pro. vided: "The Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to make and establish rules and regulations not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States to aid in the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this act, and may, by such rules and regulations, prohibit any particular or specific act or acts, practice, method, system, policy, device, scheme, or contrivance that is contrary to any of the provisions of this act." 51 Cong. Rec. 8856 (1914). No such provision became part of the Act. Later in the debates Representative Morgan sought to replace Section 8 of the House bill with a provision that— "The Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to make and establish rules and regulations not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States to aid in the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this act, and may by such rules and regulations prohibit corporations subject to the provisions of section 9 of this act in conducting their business from engaging in any practice or from using any method or system, or from pursuing any policy or from resorting to any device, scheme, or contrivance that constitutes unfair competition or unjust discrimination as between competitors, individuals, or communities." 51 Cong. Rec. 9047 (1914). The proposed amendment was then explained by its sponsor as follows: "Mr. Chairman, under section 8, which says that the commission, from time to time, may make rules and regulations and classifications of corporations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this act-under that section the commission has very limited power to make rules and regulations, because under the provisions of the act the commission virtually has no power to enforce laws or to regulate the practices of corporations subject to the provisions of the bill. Now, the amendment which I have offered gives to the commission the power to make rules and regulations that would prohibit specifically the particular practices which constitute unfair competition or unfair discrimination. The amendment is drawn on the idea that some place along the line Congress will prohibit in general terms unfair competition and unfair discrimination. Then, of course, unfair competition or unjust discrimination would be unlawful. Then we give the commission power to make rules and regulations that would prohibit a specific practice that constitutes unfair competition. Now, then, gentlemen, we never will control the corporations of this country properly by simply prohibiting certain acts. I believe it is well enough where there is some conspicuous practice that is well known to be obnoxious and dangerous to the people to prohibit that, and perhaps at this session of Congress in all of our antitrust legislation we may prohibit one or two or three or four things; but then Congress adjourns. Business will comply with these prohibitions, will abstain from the few things we prohibit; but the next day, the next month, or the next year business concerns will invent other practices which are unfair and destructive of competition, which are dangerous to the people, and which enable the big corporations to go on in the same course as before. "Therefore, the proper thing to do is to legislate in general terms, to comprehend and include all kinds of acts and practices which are objectionable. Then give this great commission, to be composed of men of the highest grade and character, the authority to make rules and regulations that will prohibit specific acts and practices coming within the general classes prohibited by the general terms of the act. I have had considerable experience in the administraton of the public-land laws. The statute gives to the Secretary of the Interior the power to make rules and regulations to govern the disposition of the public lands, and the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Interior, an execu. tive officer, have the force and effect of law." 51 Cong. Rec. 9049-50 (1914). Representative Morgan's amendment was rejected by a division vote. 51 Cong. Rec. 9050 (1914). Yet another unsuccessful substantive or legislative-type rule-making proposal was put forward by Representative Dillon. He would have left Section 8 of the House bill intact but added to another section a provision that— "[T]he commission is hereby empowered to make all necessary rules, regulations, orders, and decrees for the enforcement of the powers herein granted, and the rules, regulations, orders, and decrees of such commission in any such matters shall be binding and conclusive against all persons, firms, and corporations." 51 Cong. Rec. 9056 (1914). Representative Dillon defended his proposal as follows: "Give the commission power to enforce its rules, its regulations, and its decrees and the trade commission will be able to restore competition . . . The commission should be given the right to give standards of conduct in corporate affairs and to prepare a moral code in the conduct of corporate affairs Congress has the power to enact rules for the regulation of future conduct, future rights, and future controversies. Give the trade commission the |