Opinion of the Court.

west, recorded in volume one of tax deeds on pages 378 and 379, and delivered to H. Hayes, who paid the charge of $1. The designation of the range should have been west instead of east, but the owner or any person desirous of obtaining information about the land would know that range 14 west was in Douglas County and that range 14 east was not. At all events, he could refer at once, if he had any doubt, to volume one of tax deeds, pages 378 and 379.

It was said in Oconto Company v. Jerrard, 46 Wisconsin, 317, 322: "The statutory direction is substantially complied with by a certain reference to another book in the same office. No sane man searching the general index for instruments affecting any land would disregard such a reference, and it would be a severe technicality to avoid the registration of a deed for such a failure in the duty of the register, with such present and easy means given on the face of the index of obtaining the information which the index itself should have given. The cruelty of such a technicality would be apparent in any instrument except a tax deed. And, as already seen, what can impair registry of a tax deed impairs the registry of any deed."

Even if a more rigid rule were applied, we should say that, in any view, the index was sufficient to set the statute of limitations in operation.

But it further appeared that under chapter 201 of the laws of 1860, (Laws 1860, 178,) providing that when public records should become dilapidated it should be the duty of the board of supervisors to cause the same to be transcribed and certified, the original index in the register's office was transcribed under certain resolutions of the board of supervisors of Douglas County of May 28, 1872, and July 2, 1873, and that the record was completed November 9, 1875. It is admitted that the index as thus reproduced is not open to the objections raised.

In Hotson v. Wetherby, 60 N. W. Rep. 423, it was held that "it is well settled that an omission to make proper entries in the general index at the time the deed is spread upon the record may be removed after such recording by making the proper entries, and when so made the entry will be good from

Opinion of the Court.

that date, and it will not be necessary to record the deed again at length." And in that case, and in Lombard v. Culbertson, 59 Wisconsin, 433, the doctrine is laid down that the register of deeds may correct a record of his own motion.

The law of 1860 directed the officer making the transcript to "certify that he has carefully compared the matters therein contained and written, and that the same is a correct and literal copy of the book from which the same was transcribed, naming such book," and enacted that "such copy record, so certified, is hereby declared a public record, and as such shall, in all respects, have the same effect as the book from which the same was transcribed." The resolution of May 28, 1872, provided that after the indices should be transcribed, "the old volumes shall be carefully preserved as the records of the county, and the new copy shall be for general use until the legislature shall authorize the use of the copies as records." The resolution of July 2, 1873, requested the register to complete the general index as authorized May 28, 1872, and to examine and correct the index and copy in time for legislation by the next legislature.

By chapter 284 of the laws of 1875, approved March 5, 1875, (Laws 1875, 541,) authorizing the county board of supervisors to replace worn or dilapidated records, it was provided that the officer "shall carefully compare the copy so made with the original, and shall certify thereon that he has carefully compared said copy with such original, and that said copy is a correct transcript from such original and of the whole thereof, and that the same has been so transcribed by him pursuant to the resolution of the board of supervisors of the said county, specifying in the certificate the date of the passage of such resolution;" and that "the copy so made shall have the same effect as the original, and be evidence in all cases where such original would be evidence, and shall be in its legal effect in all respects considered as an original record in such office."

The certificate to the copy in this instance, under date November 9, 1875, was by the register, who certified to this effect: "I have carefully compared this copy of 'grantor's index' with the original in this office, and that said copy is a

Statement of the Case.

correct transcript from such original and of the whole thereof, being up to and including the 31st day of December, a.d. 1871, and that the same has been transcribed by me pursuant to the resolution of the board of supervisors of said county passed May 28th, 1872."

After the index was thus reproduced the original was kept in the vault and the certified copy was in common use from November 9, 1875. It would seem that the new volume was from that date as effective as an original, and that the register of deeds would have the same power to correct mistakes in the latter as in the former. At all events, under the circumstances, appellant occupied no position to question the title of complainant as a bona fide purchaser in 1883, on the ground of informality in the original index.

Decree affirmed.

WALTON v. MARIETTA CHAIR COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.

No. 234. Subinitted March 4, 1895. - - Decided March 25, 1895.

A writ of error, which names, as the plaintiff' in error, a certain person as administrator of a certain estate, may be amended by substituting the name of another person who appears by the accompanying record to have claimed to succeed him as such administrator, tendered the bill of exceptions, and given bond to prosecute the writ of error.

A writ of error should state the Christian name of the plaintiff in error, and not the initial letter thereof only.

THIS was a motion to amend a writ of error from this court to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, by changing the name of the plaintiff in error. The record of that court showed the following

matters:

The original action was brought in November, 1889, by "W. N. Walton, administrator of the estate of Latimer Bailey, deceased," a citizen of New Jersey, against the Marietta Chair

Statement of the Case.

Company, a corporation of Ohio, and having its principal office and place of business in that district, to recover damages in the sum of $10,000, for trespassing upon land of Bailey, and cutting and carrying away timber therefrom in his lifetime.

After the filing of an answer by the defendant, and of a replication by Walton, as Bailey's administrator, "came L. W. Ellenwood," and suggested that Walton's letters of administration had been revoked, and "the said L. W. Ellenwood has been duly appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of said Latimer Bailey, deceased;" and the court, "on motion of the said L. W. Ellenwood," ordered "that the said action do stand revived in the name of said L. W. Ellenwood as such administrator, and proceed in his favor."

The defendant filed an answer, protesting against "the revivor of this action in the name of L. W. Ellenwood, as administrator of the estate of Latimer Bailey, deceased;" and setting up that "said L. W. Ellenwood is not the successor in office of said W. N. Walton, as the administrator of the estate of said Latimer Bailey, deceased," and that Walton never was such administrator, and any appointment of him as such was void for want of jurisdiction in the court which appointed him.

Upon the defendant's application, and after the introduction of evidence, and a hearing, the court adjudged that the order reviving the action in Ellenwood's name be vacated and set aside, and that the action be abated, and stricken from the docket. To this judgment "the said L. W. Ellenwood duly excepted," and "the plaintiff, L. W. Ellenwood, as administrator of the estate of Latimer Bailey, deceased," tendered a bill of exceptions, which was allowed by the court on May 27, 1891.

On June 19, 1891, a bond was filed in the clerk's office, executed by "L. W. Ellenwood, as principal," and by two other persons as sureties, reciting that "the above named L. W. Ellenwood, as adm'r of the estate of Latimer Bailey, dec'd," had taken out a writ of error from this court "to reverse the judgment rendered in the above entitled action;" and conditioned that "the above named L. W. Ellenwood, adm'r as

Opinion of the Court.

aforesaid, shall prosecute his said writ of error to effect, and answer all costs if he shall fail to make good his plea."

On June 20, 1891, there was filed, in the clerk's office of that court, an assignment of errors and prayer for citation, purporting to be made by "L. W. Ellenwood, by his attorneys," three persons named, and signed by them as “attorneys for plaintiff in error."

In all these proceedings, the action was entitled "W. N. Walton, administrator of the estate of Latimer Bailey, deceased," as plaintiff, against the Marietta Chair Company, as defendant.

The writ of error from this court to the Circuit Court was dated June 20, 1891, was signed by the clerk and under the seal of that court, as permitted by Rev. Stat. § 1004, and began thus: "Because in the records and proceedings and also in the rendition of the judgment of a plea which is in the said circuit court, before you, between W. N. Walton, adm'r of the estate of Latimer Bailey, d'c'd, and the Marietta Chair Company, a manifest error hath happened, to the great damage of the said W. N. Walton, adm'r as aforesaid, as by his complaint appears."

In this court, at this term, "L. W. Ellenwood, by his counsel," moved to amend the writ of error, by striking out, in two places therein, the words "W. N. Walton" and substituting the words "L. W. Ellenwood;" and the defendant in error filed an affidavit of a person who testified that he was well acquainted with "L. W. Ellenwood" who had filed the motion to amend this writ of error, and that his Christian name was not L., but Lowell, and his legal name was Lowell W. Ellenwood.

Mr. Edward B. Whitney for the motion.

Mr. A. D. Follett, Mr. R. A. Harrison, and Mr. Joseph Olds opposing.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

By a provision of the first judiciary act of the United States, "no summons, writ, declaration, return, process, judgment, or