through the negligence of its agents or the mismanagement of its
employés. Chicago, Kansas & Western Railroad Co. v. Pontius, 209.
5. The Pennsylvania Company notified the Wabash Company that after
a date named no ticket sold by that company would be recognized as
entitling the holder to pass over the Pennsylvania road. The Wabash
Company after that date sold a ticket for a passage over the Pennsyl
vania road. When the purchaser reached that road he offered his
ticket to the conductor. The conductor refused to take it, and, when
the holder of it declined to pay his fare, caused him to be put off the
train. Held, That the refusal to recognize the ticket was within the
right of the Pennsylvania Company, and that that closed the matter,
as between the two companies in respect of the unauthorized sale;
but that the ejection from the train was done by the Pennsylvania
Company on its own responsibility, and was not made legally neces-
sary by anything done by the Wabash Company which the Pennsyl
vania Company was bound to recognize or respect. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co. v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co., 225.
REASONABLE DOUBT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 17.
1. A Circuit Court of the United States has not the power to appoint a
receiver of property already in the possession of a receiver duly and
previously appointed by a state court, and cannot rightfully take the
property out of the hands of the receiver so appointed by the state
court. Shields v. Coleman, 168.
2. The mere forcible continuance of possession wrongfully acquired by the
Federal court does not transform that which was in the first instance
wrongful, into a rightful possession. Ib.
When a defendant in a state court removes the cause to a Circuit Court of
the United States on the ground of diverse citizenship, and the Cir-
cuit Court gives judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff below
brings the case here, and it appears, on examining the record, that the
pleadings do not disclose of what State the plaintiff was a citizen, this
court will of its own motion reverse the judgment, remand the cause
to the Circuit Court, with costs against the defendant in error, and
further adjudge that defendant must also pay costs in this court.
Neel v. Pennsylvania, 153.
SMUGGLING.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 18;
WITNESS, 2.
The doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary one, and is to be adhered to on
proper occasions, in respect of decisions directly upon points in issue;
but this court should not extend any decision upon a constitutional
question, if it is convinced that error in principle might supervene.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 429.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. When the language used in a statute is plain and unambiguous, a
refusal to recognize its natural obvious meaning may be justly re-
garded as indicating a purpose to change the law by judicial action,
based upon some supposed policy of Congress. Bate Refrigerating
Company v. Sulzberger, 1.
2. United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S. 508, cited approvingly to the point
that "the Revised Statutes must be treated as the legislative declara-
tion of the statute law on the subjects which they embrace on the
first day of December, 1873," and that "when the meaning is plain,
the courts cannot look to the statutes which have been revised to see
if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to
construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Con-
gress." Ib.
3. Where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and
are not absolutely irreconcilable, and no purpose to repeal the earlier
act is expressed or clearly indicated, the court will, if possible, give
effect to both. Frost v. Wenie, 46.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 4, 10, 18;
CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 2, 4, 5;
INDICTMENT, 1;
JURISDICTION, B, 1, 6; C, 1;
JURY;
LONGEVITY PAY;
MINERAL LAND, 2;
NATIONAL BANK;
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT;
PRACTICE, 2;
PUBLIC LAND, 1;
1. Questions affecting the validity of a tax deed of real estate in a State
must be disposed of in accordance with the interpretation of the
statutes of the State by its highest judicial tribunal. Bardon v. Land
& River Improvement Co., 327.
2. In Wisconsin when a tax deed is in due form and recorded in the
proper office, and the lands described therein remain vacant and
unoccupied for three years or more after the recording thereof, the
tax title claimant is deemed to be in constructive possession, the
statute of limitations runs in his favor, and the original owner is
barred from attacking the validity of the tax deed. Ib.
3. The introduction of certain evidence by the appellee held not to be
a waiver of its right to rely on the statute of limitations. Ib.
4. In considering the acts and proceedings of county boards acting under
Rev. Stats. Wis. of 1858, c. 13, § 28, they must be liberally construed.
Ib.
5. The Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1858 provided that the register
of deeds should keep a general index, each page of which should be
divided into eight columns, with heads to the respective columns, as
follows: "Time of reception. Name of grantor. Name of grantee.
Description of land. Name of instrument. Volume and page where
recorded. To whom delivered. Fees received;" that such register
should make correct entries in said index of every instrument or
writing received by him for record, under the respective and appro-
priate heads, entering the names of the grantors in alphabetical
order; and should immediately, upon the receipt of any such instru-
ment or writing for record, enter in the appropriate column and in
the order in which it was received the day, hour, and minute of its
reception, and the same should be considered as recorded at the time
so noted. By section 759 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 it is directed
that the division shall be into nine columns, the first column being
headed: "Number of instrument," and the others as in the act of
1858. In this case the tax deed was entered in the index under the
name of Douglas County by which it was issued, although running
in the name of the State as well as of the county. The original
index had the eight divisions required by the statute, but the fourth
column, under the heading " Description," was subdivided as shown in
the opinion. This index becoming dilapidated was laid aside, and a
new one was prepared under the provisions of the laws of 1860,
c. 201, which complied with the provisions of the statute in that
respect, and was substituted for the original. Held, (1) That it was
not necessary to insert in the index the name of the State as a grantor;
(2) that taking the page of the original index as a whole, no one
could be misled by it who was not wilfully misled, and it was suffi-
cient to set the statute of limitations in operation; (3) that the new
and correct index, having been properly certified to according to law, was from that date as effective as the original; (4) that the appellant could not question the complainant's title on the ground of informality in the original. Ib.
1. When a person accused of crime offers himself as a witness in his own behalf, the court is not at liberty to charge the jury directly or indirectly that the defendant is to be disbelieved because he is a defendant; but, on the other hand, the court may, and sometimes ought to, remind the jury that interest creates a motive for false testimony; that the greater the interest the stronger is the temptation; and that the interest of the defendant in the result of the trial is of a character possessed by no other witness, and is therefore a matter which may seriously affect the credence that shall be given to his testimony. Reagan v. United States, 301.
2. In this case the defendant, accused of the offence of smuggling, was a witness on his own behalf. The court instructed the jury thus: “You should especially look to the interest which the respective witnesses have in the suit or in its result. Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts. The law permits the defendant, at his own request, to testify in his own behalf. The defendant here has availed himself of this privilege. His testimony is before you and you must determine how far it is credible. The deep personal interest which he may have in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence and in determining how far or to what extent, if at all, it is worthy of credit.” Held, that there was, in this instruction, nothing of which complaint could reasonably be made. Ib.
3. The accused was a witness in his own behalf. The court instructed the jury: "The defendant goes upon the stand before you and he makes his statement; tells his story. Above all things, in a case of this kind you are to see whether that statement is corroborated substantially and reliably by the proven facts; if so, it is strengthened to the extent of its corroboration. If it is not strengthened in that way you are to weigh it by its own inherent truthfulness, its own inherent proving power that may belong to it." Held, that, taken in connection with the rest of the charge, there was no error in this. Johnson, alias Overton, v. United States, 320.
1. A writ of error, which names, as the plaintiff in error, a certain person as administrator of a certain estate, may be amended by substituting
the name of another person who appears by the accompanying record to have claimed to succeed him as such administrator, tendered the bill of exceptions, and given bond to prosecute the writ of error. Walton v. Marietta Chair Company, 342.
2. A writ of error should state the Christian name of the plaintiff in error, and not the initial letter thereof only. Ib.
|