tion, manufacture, purchase, or sale, in the State, of any product, commodity, article, or thing whatsoever.1

1 Missouri, R. S., chap. 98, sec. 10298, as amended in 1913.

Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 71 S. W., 691 (Mo., 1903).—Plaintiff and the other brewery corporations of Kansas City, Mo., agreed not to sell to any one who was in debt for beer to any of the others. Plaintiff sued the defendant for beer sold on account. Defendant urged that the agreement was in violation of the Antitrust Law. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal, the court holding that the agreement was in conflict with the Missouri statute relating to pools and trusts.

Finck et al., Trustees, Appellants, v. Schneider Granite Co., 187 Mo.,244 (1905).—Five concerns manufacturing practically all the crushed granite sold in St. Louis for concrete sidewalk uses, organized a corporation, with a nominal capital and with their officers as sole stockholders, to purchase and sell crushed granite at a time when there was an unusual demand. The five concerns entered into separate agreements with this corporation to sell to it at a stipulated price all their product with a fixed penalty per ton for any sold to outsiders. Thereafter all sales were made to the public in the name of the nominal company which kept a record of sales, received the money, and distributed the profits. The price of crushed granite was increased 80 cents per ton when these agreements went into effect and maintained until one of the parties refused to be bound longer, when the price fell to the old level. On suit being brought to recover the penalty from a company which violated the agreement, it was held that the agreements were void, being necessary links in a combination in restraint of trade, which was illegal under the statutes of 1889 and 1891; and that a corporation, ostensibly organized for a legal purpose, may be attacked collaterally to show that it is used to cover unlawful conspiracy.

State v. Kansas City Live Stock Exchange et al. and Traders' Live Stock Exchange et al., 109 S. W., 675 ( Mo., 1908).-Defendants were voluntary associations, the members of which were engaged in and practically controlled the live-stock trade at Kansas City, Mo. The members of the Kansas City Exchange were chiefly commission merchants, while those of the Traders' Exchange were buyers and speculators. The rules of the Traders' Exchange provided in effect that no one should deal in live stock in the Kansas City market unless a member of said exchange. It was alleged that in conformity with said rules the members of the Traders' Exchange refused to deal with persons or corporations not members, and by boycotts and threats of boycotts so intimidated members of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange that they would not deal with those not members of the Traders' Exchange. Violations of sections 8978 and 8979, Revised Statutes, 1899, and the common law were charged and an injunction to restrain such practices prayed for. The lower court sustained a demurrer on the part of defendants. On appeal the State supreme court affirmed the judgment as to the Kansas City Exchange, but overruled it as to the Traders' Exchange. The court expressed the opinion that the conditions complained of would be corrected if an injunction issued against the members of the Traders' Exchange only, since the refusal of the members of the Kansas City Exchange to trade with others than members of the Traders' Exchange was due to fear of boycott by members of the latter.

State v. Standard Oil Co. et al., 116 S. W., 902 (Mo., 1909).-The respondents, the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, Waters-Pierce Oil Co., and Republic Oil Co., which companies controlled more than 85 per cent of the oil business of Missouri, acquired a knowledge of all sales by independent oil dealers through a system of espionage. They then limited the independents' share of the aggregate business of the State to 10 or 15 per cent by offering rebates to customers of the independents and cutting prices. Prices were published by the Waters-Pierce Co. which were followed by all the respondents and also the independents generally. Two of the respondents, the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana and the Waters-Pierce Co., divided the State into two districts and agreed not to sell in each other's territory. The Standard Oil Co. of Indiana was both a dealer and a manufacturer, and in its capacity as a manufacturer it agreed not to sell to any dealer but the Waters-Pierce Co. in said Waters-Pierce territory; it agreeing in return not to purchase from any other refiner, and both agreeing not to sell to any other dealer except at retail prices. The Republic Oil Co. had no fixed territory, posed as an independent and sold anywhere. It was used largely as the instrument by which the fight was waged against the independents. The Republic Oil Co. was a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, and was organized as a successor to the largest competitor of the other respondents, this competitor having been taken over by the New Jersey company. The New Jersey company also owned practically all the stock of the Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, and 60 per cent of the stock of the Waters-Pierce Co. In proceedings on information in the nature of quo warranto it was held that the respondents had violated the State statutes and a judgment of ouster was entered as to all three corporations, but this was later suspended as to the Waters-Pierce Co., a domestic corporation, upon proof of their compliance with certain requirements of the judgment.

Pope-Turnbo v. Bedford, 127 S. W., 426 ( Mo., St. Louis Court of Appeals, 1919).—The parties to this suit entered into a contract by which plaintiff was to teach defendant her method of treatment of the scalp and hair and the use of certain hair remedies, in consideration of which defendant agreed (1) not to use any hair remedies but plaintiff's in connection with said treatment, (2) not to mention having learned plaintiff's method of treatment except in connection with use of her remedies, (3) if defendant taught such method to any other party it was only to be after obligating said party to a similar contract. After making this contract, defendant used some of her own remedies instead of plaintiff's in connection with the treatment and advertised both verbally and in the press as a pupil of plaintiff after she had ceased to use plaintiff's remedies. It developed that the only part of the process of treatment not a common method was the use of plaintiff's remedies. Held, that the agreement not to use any but plaintiff's remedies was in restraint of trade and fostered monopoly, and that it was unreasonable at common law and in contravention of

Nebraska and Idaho prohibit restraint of trade by adopting section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Law, but limiting its application to com

the statute. (Sec. 8966, Mo. Ann. St., 1906, p. 4152.) An injunction was granted, however, restraining the defendant from advertising herself as a pupil of the plaintiff unless she used the plaintiff's preparations and also from mentioning to her patients the fact that she had learned the plaintiff's method of treatment. State v. Arkansas Lumber Co. et al., 169 S. W., 145 ( Mo., 1914).—This was a proceeding in quo warranto to oust the defendants, members of the Yellow Pine Manufacturers' Association, from doing business in the State of Missouri. The court found that the association fixed, maintained, and advanced prices of yellow pine, mainly by the issuing of market reports and a so-called "price current," curtailed production by agreements and concerted movements, and that it was in alliance with the Southwestern Lumbermens' Retail Association, the Lumber Secretaries' Bureau of Information, and the National Lumber Manufacturers' Association, by which alliance said defendants either themselves (1) divided territory among retail dealers, (2) agreed not to sell so-called "poachers," farmers' cooperative yards, and consumers, or (3) agreed to sell only to so-called legitimate retail dealers, who were members of or under the protection of the said Southwestern Association, or consorted, with knowledge of the fact, with those who did these things. A number of the defendants were found to have violated the State antitrust law, fines wereimposed, and a conditional ouster decreed dependent upon good behavior, the payment of the fines, and the making of affidavits to discontinue all practices held to be in violation of the antitrust laws of the State. As to certain defendants, additional fines were to be imposed upon any failure to comply with any of these conditions, or upon the infraction of any law of the State. The final judgment was in part as follows: "The writ of ouster from corporate rights and franchises will be suspended as to all of the respondents, who within thirty days from this date shall have paid to the clerk of this court one-half of the fine or portion of the fine it is required to pay, and who within sixty days from date shall have paid the remaining onehalf, and the costs of this proceeding, and who shall have, at the end of such sixty days, complied with the following conditions: (1) That they have paid the fine and costs as above stated and (2) that such respondents show by competent evidence, by way of affidavits from its managing officers the following things: (a) that such respondents or respondent has withdrawn from the Yellow Pine Manufacturers' Association, and from all associations of a like character; (b) that such respondents or respondent have no officer, agent, director, stockholder, or employee which is a member of such Yellow Pine Manufacturers' Association, or one of similar import or character; (c) that such respondents or respondent will not in the future become a member of such association or any similar association, or permit any officer, agent, director, stockholder, or employee to become a member thereof; (d) that such respondents or respondent will in the future sell lumber in Missouri in open and honest competition with all other wholesale dealers in lumber; (e) that such respondents or respondent will not discriminate between buyers of lumber and other material sold by them, and will treat all purchasers alike, and such respondents will not agree in any way to discriminate against purchasers; (f) that such respondents or respondent have and will discontinue the practice of blacklisting any retail dealer who sells or undertakes to sell within the territory of another retail dealer, and to this end will discontinue the publication of any credit report based upon the idea that any retail dealer is one who has been selling in the territory of another retail dealer; (g) that such respondents or respondent will give no recognition to the demands of any organization of retail dealers, but will treat all retail dealers alike in making sales to them, whether such purchaser is a member of a retail dealers' association or not; (h) that such respondents or respondent will not be a party to any agreement or understanding to control the amount of the production of lumber; (i) that if any retail dealers' association or one or more retail dealers undertake, with respondents or any respondent, to inaugurate any system or systems by which honest and real competition in the sale of lumber, by retail or wholesale, in the State, is or will be restricted, such respondent or respondents will promptly lay all such facts before the Attorney General of this State; (j) that such respondents or respondent will not be a party to the publication or circulation of any price current, except such a price current as gives actual and bona fide sales of such products and the prices paid therefor, for the honest information of dealers therein; (k) that such respondents or respondent are not now engaged in, and will not in the future engage in any practice or practices which violate either the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws of this State." International Harvester Co. of America v. State of Missouri, 237 Mo., 369; 234 U. S., 199 (1914).—In a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, in the State supreme court, charging a violation of the statutes of 1899 and 1909 (sec. 8966, R. S., 1899, and sec. 10301, R. S., 1909), it was alleged that in 1902 and 1903 the principal companies engaged in the harvesting machinery business in the United States were merged into one company, the International Harvester Co. (of New Jersey). This company limited its operations to manufacturing and made the Milwaukee Harvester Co., one of the principal companies merged, its selling agent under the name of the International Harvester Co. of America. It was alleged further that the combination was designed to lessen, and tended to lessen, free competition in the manufacture and sale of agricultural implements and that the selling company compelled the retail dealers of Missouri who desired to act as agents to refrain from selling implements of competitors, and thus secured from 85 to 90 per cent of the business. It was held that the International Harvester Co. (of New Jersey) was an unlawful combination to suppress competition and regulate prices within the meaning of the statute, but as it was not a party to the suit, the selling company only could be reached, and its license to do business in the State was revoked and a fine imposed. On writ of error from the United States Supreme Court the Missouri antitrust statutes were held to be constitutional and judgment aflirmed, the court declaring that it was not a violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution for a State to forbid combinations of competing dealers, including those formed with good intentions and having some good effects or to pass legislation embracing vendors of commodities and not vendors of labor and services, such a classification not being unreasonable and arbitrary.

merce within the State; and the substance of this section, limiting it to intrastate commerce, has been adopted in Maine and Wisconsin.1 The Louisiana statutes contain substantially the same provision regarding restraint of trade as is found in the laws of Nebraska and Idaho, the only difference being that the words "or otherwise" are omitted. The laws of this State also prohibit any combination, agreement, or arrangement to create or carry out restrictions of trade.3

Oklahoma prohibits "every act, agreement, contract or combination in the form of trust, or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce within this State which is against public policy." 4 Porto Rico prohibits "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, commerce, business transactions, and lawful and free competition in a town, or among the several towns of Porto Rico." 5

Indiana prohibits "every scheme, design, understanding, contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce.'

New Mexico prohibits every contract or combination having for its object, or which shall operate, to restrict trade or commerce.7 New York prohibits any corporation from combining with any other corporation or person for the unlawful restraint of trade.

1 Nebraska, Laws 1905, chap. 162, sec. 1; Idaho, Laws 1911, chap. 215, sec. 1; Maine, Laws 1913, chap. 106, sec. 1; Wisconsin, Stats. 1913, sec. 1747e.

State v. Adams Lumber Co., 81 Nebr., 393 (1908).-Defendants were members of the Nebraska Lumber Dealers' Association, the articles of which provided, among other things, that members "may" notify the secretary of any sale by a manufacturer or wholesaler to any consumer within the territory of such member. On being so notified, it was the practice of the secretary to write such wholesaler, etc., for an explanation of the sale. The association, its officers and directors were enjoined from this practice or any others which tend to prevent or preclude full and free competition in the sale of lumber and building materials in the State or to stifle competition or restrain commerce in such articles.

Bratt v. Swift et al., 99 Wis., 579 (1898).--Action for damages, founded on chapter 219, Laws 1893 (similar to Stats. 1913, sec. 1747e). Plaintiff alleged that he was a retail butcher at Superior; that on account of the interference of defendants he was forced to sell out and abandon his business; that defendants had entered into an agreement and conspiracy in restraint of trade, to menace, hinder, and control plaintiff's business, which combination was called the "Retail Butchers' Association," some of the purposes of which were to monopolize the sale of meats in Superior at the expense of the people and to control and manage that trade solely in their own interests and in the interests of others united with them, and to coerce plaintiff into joining said combination or to drive him from business in case he refused to join; and to that end certain defendants reported that he had been guilty of unmercantile conduct, promoting excessive competition, house-to-house peddling, selling adulterated goods, etc., in consequence of which the defendant packing companies refused to sell to plaintiff meats or other goods except for prices far above those at which they sold to other defendants, and in excess of the market price, and in pursuance of said scheme the retail butchers refused to sell plaintiff except at excessive prices, etc., in consequence of which plaintiff became unable to purchase meats and other necessary goods, was forced to sell out at a loss and was prevented from engaging in the retail butcher business and from earning a living. There was evidence tending to sustain the allegations and the jury found for plaintiff. The case was reversed on a question of damages.

2 Louisiana, Laws 1890, act 86, secs. 1, 2.

Louisiana, Laws 1892, act 90, séc. 1.

4 Oklahoma, Laws 1908, p. 750, sec. 1.

5 Revised Statutes and Codes of Porto Rico, 1911, sec. 2373.

❝ Indiana, Laws 1907, chap. 243, sec. 1.

New Mexico, C. L. 1897, sec. 1292.

8 New York, S. C. L., sec. 14.

North Carolina prohibits (1) every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, in the State; and (2) every such contract, etc., in restraint of trade or commerce which violates the principles of the common law. Every such contract is declared to be unreasonable unless the parties can show affirmatively that it does not injure the business of any competitors or prevent any one from becoming a competitor because his or its business will be unfairly injured by reason of any such contract, etc.1

New Jersey prohibits combinations or agreements to create or carry out restrictions in trade (or to acquire monopoly) either in intrastate or interstate business or commerce; and prohibits any corporation from purchasing the stock of any other corporation, or any property, for the purpose of restraining trade or commerce.3 This State prohibits also the organization of any domestic corporation to be used in restraint of trade (or in creating a monopoly), or any officer, director, manager, or employee of any corporation organized under its laws from using such corporation, directly or indirectly, to restrain trade (or acquire a monopoly), when such corporation engages in interstate or intrastate commerce.*

Massachusetts requires the attorney general to take cognizance of all violations of law or orders of courts, tribunals, or commissions affecting the general welfare of the people, including combinations, agreements, and unlawful practices in restraint of trade."

A Vermont statute provides that no corporation shall be organized with a capital stock of over $10,000,000, nor shall the capital stock of any corporation be increased to over this amount, until there has been a determination by a judge of the supreme court that such organization, or increase in capital stock, is not liable to result in restraining competition in trade.

A Kansas statute prohibits and declares to be in restraint of trade (a) any agreement, expressed or implied, or combination by which any shipper of seeds, grain, hay, or live stock is defrauded out of any portion of the net weight of any consignment of grain, seeds, etc.;7 (b) any agreement, expressed or implied, made by any person as agent for any person, firm, or corporation, stipulating that grain, seeds, or hay shall not be shipped by the producer or local buyer unless accompanied by warehouse receipts, or that the same shall in any

1 North Carolina, Laws 1913, chap. 41, secs. 1, 2, 3.

2 New Jersey, Laws 1913, chap. 13, sec. 1.

* New Jersey, Laws 1913, chap. 15, sec. 1. See also New Jersey, Laws 1913, chap. 18, as amended by Laws 1915, chap. 114, noted under "Holding companies," p. 200.

4 New Jersey, Laws 1913, chap. 16.

5 Massachusetts, Laws 1913, chap. 709, sec. 1.

❝ Vermont, Pub. Stats., 1906, sec. 4311, as amended by Laws 1910, No. 143, sec. 4.

'Kansas, Laws 1899, chap. 293, sec. 1; G. S., sec. 5177.

manner be under the control of any warehouseman or agent as a condition precedent to the marketing of such grain, etc.1

The Georgia Code declares "contracts in general in restraint of trade" to be unenforceable."

A Michigan statute declares all agreements and contracts by which any person, corporation, etc., agrees not to engage in any avocation, employment, pursuit, trade, profession, or business, whether reasonable or unreasonable, partial or general, limited or unlimited, to be against public policy and illegal and void. It is provided, however, that the statute shall not apply to contracts where the only object of the restraint is to protect the vendee or transferee of a trade, profession, business, etc., or the good will thereof, sold and transferred for a valuable consideration, in good faith, and without any intent to create or maintain a monopoly.3

California, Oklahoma, and South Dakota declare void contracts restraining anyone from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business, except that one who sells the good will of a business may agree with the buyer not to carry on a similar business within a specified county, city, or a part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the good will from him carries on a like business therein, and partners may, before dissolution, agree that none of them will carry on a similar business within the same city or town where the partnership business has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof.1

1 Kansas, Laws 1899, chap. 293, sec. 3; G. S., sec. 5179.

* Georgia, Code 1911, sec. 4253.

* Michigan, P. A., 1905, No. 329, secs. 1, 6.

Grand Union Tea Co. v. Lewitsky, 116 N. W., 1090 ( Mich., 1908).-Defendant was employed by complainants to solicit orders for and deliver its goods over a certain route in Detroit, Mich., agreeing that if he left complainant's employ he would not engage in similar work in the city of Detroit or in any other place where he might have worked during his employment with the plaintiff, for one year after leaving its service. After leaving complainant's service, defendant entered the employ of a rival concern, whereupon complainants prayed an injunction. Defendant demurred, contending among other things, that the above agreement was against public policy, void, and illegal. A judgment sustaining the demurrer was affirmed, the court holding that such contracts were invalid under the provision of act No. 329, public acts of 1905, and that the statute was not in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. 4 California Civ. Code, secs. 1673 to 1675; Revised Laws, Oklahoma, secs. 978 to 980; South Dakota Civ. Code, secs. 1277 to 1279.

Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co. et al., 96 Cal., 510 (1892).—Several California powder companies entered into a contract, for a term of three years, which provided that neither of the parties thereto should ship dynamite to any part of the United States east of a certain line and regulated the manufacture and sale of it in the territory west of this line as follows: (1) Each party was to sell only a certain per cent of the aggregate quantity sold by all; (2) where any party exceeded this proportion he was to pay to the other parties the profits on the excess; (3) a standing committee was given power to fix prices, regulate the manufacturing cost, impose fines for violations of the contract, etc. The contract was to terminate at any time, if any outside party should begin to manufacture and sell dynamite in competition with the contracting parties. Held, to be in violation of section 1673 of the Civil Code and therefore void.

Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 57 Pac., 468 (Cal., 1899).—Plaintiff corporation was engaged in the business of bill posting and other methods of advertising in Los Angeles. Defendant, who owned a number of shares of stock in the plaintiff corporation, sold his stock to one Wilshire, together with all his interest and good will in the corporation and agreed that he would not conduct, or assist in conducting, any billposting business in Los Angeles so long as Wilshire, or any person deriving title to the good will from him, should carry on a like business there. Wilshire then transferred the agreement to plaintiff. Some time after making the agreement plaintiff alleged that defendant helped to form the Los Angeles Bill Posting Co., became a stockholder therein, and conducted its business. In a suit to enjoin defendant from conduct