Smith et al v. Crawford et al. [Vol. 22 (N.S.) number of signers that their names be stricken from the remonstrance. In the last mentioned case the court criticises the practice where men are solicited to withdraw their names from a remonstrance, thus compelling other remonstrants to be obtained and thereby causing bitterness in a community, and they speak of the mischief that can arise from permitting withdrawals; that the peace of communities and the good of the people forbid such methods of causing bitterness and opportunities for unfairness to be introduced. And in the case of Brewery Co. v. Jersey City, 42 N. J. Law, 575, the court, on page 577, in speaking on the same subject says: That it may be that others who decide to object refrain from doing so upon ascertaining that a sufficient remonstrance was already filed, and intimate that the proper method is not to permit withdrawals, but to institute new proceedings and give the required notice to the public, de novo. It seems to this court that G. C., Section 4736, should not be construed in such a way that trickery must be resorted to in order to obtain benefits or rights thereunder, but should recognize the right of a remonstrance filed in good faith, and cause remonstrators to feel that they will receive a square deal when their remonstrance is filed. If a remonstrance speaks only from the last day of the thirty, then a remonstrance must be held off the files until two or five minutes before the expiration of the last day so as to prevent any withdrawal. Surely the law should not be so construed, but should be construed to mean what it says, so as to permit people to file their remonstrances at any time, and to know that when they have filed it they may go to their homes feeling secure that their rights have been preserved. It may often happen that more than the fifty per cent. are opposed to a new arrangement of school districts, but it is not necessary that more than that number sign a remonstrance, for as stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court, some who are opposed refrain from signing and do not take the time. to object when they ascertain that a sufficient remonstrance was already signed. The thirty day period fixed in Section 4736 is not, strictly speaking, a referendum. For a referendum is a method of 1919.] Smith et al v. Crawford et al. submitting a legislative or other measure to a direct vote of the whole people, and in such cases the whole people are asked to give their expression at a certain time. If this had been submitted to the whole people at a certain time and fifty per cent. had voted against it, could it be said that any part thereof might change their vote so as to change the result? This could not be done unless the question be re-submitted to the whole people at another time. Under 4736 the county board has nothing more to do after passing the resolution and giving the notice. While it is authorized to appoint a board of education for a newly created school district, it requires no action on their part on the filing of the remonstrance; for such authority to appoint a board of education is also conferred upon the county commissioners under 4736-1. Referring again to the Ashland County case, the court, in the syllabus, say: "Electors signing a remonstrance against the re-arrangement of the school districts are at liberty to withdraw their names at any time within the thirty days, or until official or judicial action has been taken." This latter, underscored, portion might indicate that the names could be withdrawn after the thirty day period. If so, such holding would be in direct conflict with opinion. of Henry County Court of Appeals decision in the case of Hartman v. Darby et al (unreported), in which it was held that the withdrawal of names from a remonstrance after the period of thirty days time prescribed in G. C., 4692, is of no effect; and further held that no authority is by statute conferred upon the county board to determine the validity of a remonstrance. Counsel for defendants, herein, called to the court's attention an appellate court decision in Crawford county-Lyons v. Jenner et al (unreported)-in which the Supreme Court overruled a motion to certify record, and in which the appellate court stated the holding was that signers of a remonstrance might withdraw their names, but as this court has no information as to the conditions and facts upon which that decision was rendered it is compelled to entirely disregard it. [Vol. 22 (N.S.) Smith et al v. Crawford et al. It was suggested by counsel for defendants that the county board took the action they did, on account of some letter from state authority stating that unless a new high school building was erected in the village of Chesterville and new equipment provided, that its second grade high school would have to be discontinued; and that for such reason, to increase the tax duplicate and to enable the accomplishment of such requirement such action was taken for the benefit of pupils in the village and township who desired to attend a high school. The desire to provide such building and equipment was natural; the purpose was commendable; but the method of accomplishment, or seeking to attain it, is to be condemned. From all the evidence submitted, and the statutes and decisions called to my attention and examined, I am of the opinion that G. C. of Ohio, Section 4736, does not confer on the county board the authority sought to be exercised by it-to abolish two entire school districts and oust from office their boards and to create a new and distinct district by uniting all of such territory, and appoint a new board therefor; and that even if such authority was given by the statute, that the filing of a remonstrance by electors revoked the board's proposed action; that because of the methods adopted by the county board and superintendents in securing petitions to withdraw names— which was in the nature of a fraud and abuse of the purpose and statutory intendment-such so-called petitions should be disregarded by a court of equity, and the remonstrances as originally signed and filed should be considered as meeting the requirement of the statute to dissolve or rescind the attempted action of the county board. Therefore the finding on the issues joined is in favor of plaintiffs, and the injunction is allowed and made perpetual, both restraining and mandatory, fully as prayed for in plaintiff's petition. Costs assessed against defendant, the county board of education. Entry may be prepared accordingly and exceptions noted. Amount of appeal bond $500. 1920.] Uhlman v. Sherman et al. REGULATION OF THE SALE OF ADVERTISING SPACE Common Pleas Court of Defiance County. FRED W. UHLMAN V. MIRON C. SHERMAN ET AL. Decided, September, 1919. Newspapers—Obligations Involved by Reason of Their Public Chacarter -Discrimination Can Not be Practiced in Sale of Advertising Space -But Reasonable Regulations by Publishers not Open to Attack. While the statutes providing penalties for violation of civil rights do not apply to or affect newspaper publishers, the quasi public character of a newspaper requires that if advertising space is sold to one or more of a certain class it must be sold to others of that class who may desire such space and are willing to comply with reasonable rules as to the character and length of the announcements offered and tender the customary fee therefor. Benj. F. James and Harris & Shaw, for plaintiff. Jno. W. Winn, Jno. P. Cameron and Richard H. Sutphin, contra. HAY, J. Plaintiff in his petition alleges, in substance, that he is now and since April, 1917, has been conducting a general mercantile business in the city of Defiance, Ohio; that the defendants, Whitaker, Sherman and Vandenbroek are competing merchants in said city; that the Crescent Printing Company is an Ohio corporation publishing a daily and a weekly newspaper in said city. That said three competing merchants in April, 1917, conspired and have ever since conspired together to prevent and by threats, coercion and persuasion have prevented said Printing Company from receiving and publishing the business advertisements of Uhlman v. Sherman et al. [Vol. 22 (N.S.) plaintiff, to the great and irreparable injury of said Fred W. Uhlman. Plaintiff prays that said competing merchants be enjoined from so persuading, coercing or intimidating said printing company and that a mandatory injunction be issued restraining said. company from refusing to accept from plaintiff proper and legal advertisements of his said business. Said three competing merchants file answers denying any such conduct or conspiracy on their part, but said Crescent Printing Company has, as yet, filed no answer. This cause was heard and submitted on a motion by plaintiff for the allowance of a temporary restraining order against said Whitaker, Sherman and Vandenbroek and the issuance of the mandatory injunction asked for against said printing company. As to conspiracy branch of the case we find that there is no evidence substantiating the charges made in the petition against the three competing merchants, or either or any of them. Suffice to say that each one of them in his testimony emphatically denies any conspiracy, coercion, threats or intimidation, and Mr. Tustison, the manager of the printing company, corroborates their testimony. Both Mr. Whitaker and Mr. Sherman gave their reasons why they considered some of the business methods of plaintiff unfair to the general public and competing merchants. Mr. Sherman expressed his views to Mr. Tustison, but made no threats of any withdrawal of patronage. The action of the manager of the printing company in this matter seems to have been voluntary and based on what he considered the best interest of his company. The other branch of the case introduces a novel question: can plaintiff compel this printing company to accept and publish his business "ads" on payment of the ordinary and regular rates therefor? In other words, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, has this court the power to issue the mandatory injunction asked for? Learned and diligent counsel on both sides were unable to find a parallel case. We have also been unable to find one. Therefore in assisting to establish such |